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Norman Lamb: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to the answer of 23 October 2007, Official Report, column 173W, on armed forces: personnel management, how many underpayments there were to Royal Air Force personnel between 1 January 2007 and 30 September 2007 classified by category of error; how many of these underpayments have now been corrected; and what changes have been made to the (a) payment system and (b) departmental processes following these errors. 
Derek Twigg: From 1 January 2007 to 30 September 2007, other than a Change of Rank (see serial number 6 in the following table), there were no Joint Personnel Administrative system errors which affected RAF basic pay. During this period 1.83 million payments were made. Details of the Royal Air Force underpayments are given in the following table:
|Serial||Type of Error||Service||Number||Action taken|
|(1) The numbers of Royal Air Force personnel affected by these issues could be provided only at disproportionate cost. Service personnel who have been underpaid can request cash advances from their units.|
Dr. Fox: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence which less-than-lethal weapons and non-lethal weapons are available for use by armed forces personnel; how many personnel are qualified for those weapons in each branch of the forces; and how much training is required annually to maintain that qualification. 
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: The only non-lethal weapons used by our armed forces are the L104 and L67 baton guns. Information on the number of personnel trained in the use of these weapons is not held centrally and could be provided only at disproportionate cost. Neither of these weapons is permanently held by units; they are issued to meet the requirements of specific theatres of operation.
When these weapons are required, nominated personnel will receive appropriate training in their use prior to deployment. Those personnel trained in handling such weapons, who are required to maintain their proficiency, will need to pass a weapons handling test every six months and take part in an annual weapons assessment shoot as is the case for any weapon.
In addition to baton rounds, these weapons can also be used to fire a CS gas grenade, the L96A1, for law enforcement operations at the discretion of unit commanders in theatre. The necessary instruction is delivered during unit pre-deployment training.
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: We have a number of Supacat-based vehicles, used for specialist roles. The most numerous are the All Terrain Mobility Platform (ATMP), and the Mobility-Weapon Mount Installation Kit (M-WMIK) which will enter service shortly.
The M-WMIK, like all WMIK vehicles, is designed as a carrier for medium support weapons, providing high levels of terrain accessibility, situational awareness and firepower. It complements the use of Protected Patrol Vehicles.
Ann Winterton: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to the answer of 6 December 2007, Official Report, column 1402W, on armoured fighting vehicles: Afghanistan, whether the 170 Vector vehicles are in addition to the 160 previously ordered. 
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: The Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) now requires AWE plc to seek prior authorisation for assembly/disassembly work. Such activities have always been allowed to proceed, with no impact on operations at AWE Burghfield, which remains fully operational and safe.
It is emphasised that, if NII believed a particular operation were unsafe, it would not allow it to take place, and has appropriate regulatory powers at its disposal to cease operations. AWE Burghfield remains operational as the NII is satisfied that all appropriate licence conditions are being met by AWE plc.
Mr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence why AWE Burghfield did not meet the deadline of 27 September to address the shortfalls identified as a result of its periodic review of safety. 
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: Some of the issues identified by AWE plc as a result of its periodic review of safety required the procurement of specialist equipment where the acquisition time was such that the equipment could not be brought into service by the deadline of 27 September. Consequently, the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) has agreed a new programme of work with AWE plc. It is important to note that NII is satisfied that appropriate progress is being made at AWE Burghfield to address the findings of the periodic review of safety.
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: The safety case issues in question were identified not by the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII), but by AWE plc in its own periodic review of safety. These were associated primarily with risk assessment techniques and the clarity of audit trails. A revised safety case addressing these issues was adopted in September 2007 and NII is satisfied that appropriate progress is being made at AWE Burghfield to address the findings of the periodic review of safety.
Mr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what responses he has made to the letter from the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate dated 9th May, Annex 1, with particular reference to its conclusions on the safety of continuing to operate at AWE Burghfield; and if he will make a statement. 
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: The letter from the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) was to AWE plc and not MOD. MOD officials work very closely with both the AWE nuclear site licensee, AWE plc, and the external regulator, the NII The latter is satisfied that operations at AWE Burghfield are safe and the Department's internal nuclear safety regulator supports this position. No useful purpose could therefore be served by the intervention of the Secretary of State for Defence in matters which are essentially for AWE plc to address with the NII.
Nick Harvey: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the (a) name, (b) function, (c) estimated cost and (d) projected in-service date is of each of the 23 new build projects in the Atomic Weapons Establishment Site Development Context Plan 2005-15. 
Des Browne: The 23 projects included in each of the functions in the Atomic Weapons Establishment Site Development Context Plan 2005-15 are listed in the following table. Where applicable, the names of projects are indicated where they have been finalised. The function of each project correlates with the headings in the plan. Costs not shown are being withheld as their disclosure would, or would be likely to, prejudice commercial interests. Projected in-service dates are shown in five-year bandings in order to avoid prejudice to national security and/or defence interests.
These facilities are required to support the UK's current warhead in-service. Decisions on whether and how we may need to refurbish or replace this warhead are likely to be necessary in the next Parliament.
|Name of project||Cost (£m)( 1)||Function|
|(1)( )2007-08 prices.|
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