| Previous Section | Index | Home Page |
The second question relates to retrospective legislation. We do not legislate retrospectively in this
House, but the Bill provides for retrospective legislation by order. In other words, it is another misuse of the conventions of this House to provide for retrospective legislation. If that were to be justified in any circumstances, it should be done only by primary legislation, not by order.
Thirdly, as regards the tax consequences—this will not be debated in the House of Lords, because it is subject to privilege—examination of clause 10 shows that it would be possible, although in fact I believe that it is intended, to rearrange the tax arrangements, some of which may affect Granite, in such a way as to avoid tax altogether. The clause provides that no tax whatsoever should be paid in respect of the matters contained in the Bill. We do not know how far that will go, because the words used in terms of the order-making power are so wide; they appear in phrases such as “in connection with” and “in relation to”. Connected with that is the fact that the tax consequences are specifically stated as including—[Hon. Members: “Ah!”] I am deeply honoured that the Chief Secretary has come back. I dare say that it is possible that she has discovered answers to some of the points that were raised about 15 minutes ago by a series of hon. Members. I hope that she may take this opportunity to try to reply in the terms that were just suggested.
Not only does the Bill contain very serious and dangerous provisions that could exclude the payment of tax in a whole range of permutations—[Hon. Members: “Ah!”] Here is another one—members of the Cabinet are streaming in. The Bill also includes provision for the disapplication of statutory provisions of any kind and of the rule of law. It may seem astonishing to you, Mr. Deputy Speaker, as it does to me, that any statute should specifically provide that, by order—not by primary legislation—any statute or rule of law can be disapplied in order to achieve the scurrilous activities that lie at the heart of these arrangements. That is an astonishing state of affairs. Under the draft order, a copy of which I have, there is provision for directors of Northern Rock to be exempted from all liabilities under company law. It says explicitly that no director of Northern Rock shall be liable for any proceedings that may be taken against them in relation to their conduct of the affairs of Northern Rock. That includes not only the chairman, who is paid £1.2 million, but other directors.
That is about as shocking and extraordinary a situation as one could possibly imagine. If the Government had gone down the route of selling off Northern Rock as a commercial concern to another commercial concern, would the same provisions have applied? Would the directors of Virgin, having acquired it, have been exempted in the conduct of its running from all liability of proceedings under the Companies Acts through a disapplication of law and statute? That is inconceivable, yet it is what is being done under these arrangements.
Furthermore, under clause 2, it appears that there is a severe probability that the courts would be excluded from challenge. In other words, it would not be possible for any challenge to the arrangements to be made by order in the administrative court, enabling a person such as a shareholder to take action in the courts to rectify problems that they face.
The final question is that of the carte blanche provisions in the Bill. In every conceivable respect this Bill, described as the Banking (Special Provisions) Bill, is a carte blanche one. Never, in my 23 years in the House, have I seen a Bill that was so incredibly invasive of the procedures, conventions and principles upon which legislation should be devised. I have given a number of examples that are all in this Bill; the Chief Whip, who is looking over here, knows perfectly well what I mean. The Bill is a total disgrace to the House. It gives by order—not even in primary legislation—a carte blanche to the Government to give indemnities, and to guarantee that those indemnities will be paid for by the Treasury.
This Bill is a total and unutterable disgrace, and the Government stand condemned for the manner in which they have brought it in, in terms of time, content and the total, flagrant breach of the conventions by which legislation in this House is passed.
11.47 pm
Mr. Greg Hands (Hammersmith and Fulham) (Con): I shall be very brief; I have only a few points to make.
First, I would like to reinforce what many of my colleagues have been saying about the strategic overview that this new institution should be given. It is absolutely vital, if we as taxpayers are taking on this £110 billion portfolio, that some kind of strategic overview should be given to the business on behalf of the taxpayer. The basic questions of whether the business should expand or be able to contract, whether it should continue to be a mortgage bank or something else, and whether securitisation should continue or not are vital ones that should be debated and decided here tonight. Taxpayers cannot really comfortably say that they know what they are getting into. We know virtually nothing about the assets of this bank that we are taking on. We know virtually nothing about its personnel or its procedures, especially those relating to risk management, which is a vital part of any financial institution these days.
The Chief Secretary mentioned the importance of protecting taxpayers’ interests, and we are talking about an enormous amount of money. The amount of money we are talking about is 12 times the Olympic budget, and three or four times the budget for the Ministry of Defence. The Chief Secretary said something extraordinary when she said that it would be a mistake to have a fire sale. I happen to agree with her about that, but she said that it would be a mistake because we are currently at the bottom of the market. That could be a huge gamble to take on the position of the housing market in this country. Effectively, we are going to take on a huge mortgage bank, and pretend that it is the bottom of the market and that things can only improve. I am not an expert on the housing market, but I very much doubt if we are at the bottom of the market, and she may well come to regret having made that call on the market’s direction, especially given the amount of risk to the taxpayer she is willing to take on board.
I mentioned risk management, which is absolutely vital. In the 10 years since I left the banking industry,
risk management has become enormous. It has become the largest part of most banks’ activities. We know virtually nothing about the risk management of Northern Rock, the current procedures or the procedures that will be in place following nationalisation.
The Chief Secretary talked about a flawed business model in relation to Northern Rock. There is nothing terribly unusual about the Northern Rock business model. The problem has been its operation and the huge amount of risk and leverage that was taken on. However, the basic concept of borrowing money at indexed or variable rates and lending it in the form of a mortgage at a variable or fixed rate, possibly with securitisation, which has been with us for around 25 or 30 years, is a tried and tested business model.
Two things went wrong at Northern Rock. The first is known nowadays as event risk—that is how risk managers perceive it. There was no assessment of the likely event risk of the market simply seizing up for a time. The second was the mismanagement of the interest rate risk and the credit spreads involved. The Bill gives no idea of the way in which the risk management of the current institution is carried out and how it could change under new management—public sector management in the case that we are considering.
In my time in banking, I have witnessed some major financial scandals, including those concerning the bankruptcy of Orange county in California; the Ministry of Finance of the Kingdom of Belgium; Credit Lyonnais; the London borough of Hammersmith and Fulham with its swaps scandal; and the US army facilities management fund. They all have one thing in common: they are in the public sector. It is not only the private sector that has rogue traders, unauthorised transactions and breaking of credit limits and so on. Oversight and financial management of the new institution are therefore crucial.
The Bill has been drafted far too widely. Although it is not the stated intention, the measure allows almost the arbitrary nationalisation of banks or building societies. [Interruption.] I hear cheers from the Labour Back Benches at the prospect. That gives the game away. We must fundamentally oppose arbitrary nationalisation, and I hope that the Bill does not get a Third Reading.
11.51 pm
Mr. Philip Dunne (Ludlow) (Con): I am pleased that the Chief Secretary is back in her place to hear the final observations. I should like to repeat the point about the impact on Granite that she missed when she stepped out of the Chamber. Earlier, she said that Granite would be excluded from the Bill and thereby from the nationalisation. As the hon. Member for Twickenham (Dr. Cable) and other hon. Members remarked, that leaves a gaping hole in the nationalisation programme.
Yvette Cooper indicated dissent.
Mr. Dunne: The Chief Secretary shakes her head, so I hope that she will take the opportunity to clarify the matter.
Northern Rock owns a seller’s share of the mortgages that are supplied to Granite to underlie the securitisation package to provide funding back to Northern Rock. If the security package is not continually replenished with fresh mortgages for Granite, Granite’s structure will implode. That is the contractual basis of the securitisation documentation. If default occurs, the seller’s share in Northern Rock will also have to be sold at a fire sale price to fulfil obligations. If there is insufficient confidence that new mortgages will be put into Granite through the mechanism under national ownership, which requires continuing business flows, the Government and the taxpayer are at significant risk of sustaining a much larger loss than the Government have let the House believe. It is important that the Chief Secretary tackles that point.
Mr. Beith: Would the hon. Gentleman be prepared to take an intervention from the Chief Secretary or to allow a couple of minutes at the end of the debate for her to respond? Many of us are genuinely anxious to hear her comments about that point.
Mr. Dunne: The Chief Secretary is more than welcome to correct the impression if it is wrong.
Yvette Cooper: We have made the position on Granite clear. We said throughout Second Reading that it is a separate legal entity, which will not be covered by the order, and was equally not covered by Government guarantees. We made that clear from the beginning. The assessment of what was in the interests of the public sector and the taxpayer took all that into account. The private sector proposals and temporary public sector ownership were fully assessed. On that basis, we are clear that it is right to take Northern Rock into temporary public sector ownership to protect the financial stability of the system and the taxpayer’s interests.
Mr. Dunne: That is about as clear as mud. Granite has the contractual ability to suck assets out of Northern Rock, which will be in national ownership.
Mr. Stephen Dorrell (Charnwood) (Con): The only assets worth having.
Mr. Dunne: Indeed. The quality of the assets in Granite is higher than the quality of the assets remaining in Northern Rock, and it will have the ability to take what other good assets remain in Northern Rock.
As the Chief Secretary is here, I would like to ask her another question—again, she may not be prepared to answer it: why is there such urgency over the suspension of shares? One of the main planks in her argument for the haste with which we are having to consider this nationalisation Bill—we are doing so in one day: today—is that it is vital for shareholders to have some clarity about their future. The shareholders know that Northern Rock is going to be nationalised; the shares are suspended. It is perfectly normal corporate practice when shares are suspended these days for resumption to take weeks, and in some cases months. It is not a legitimate argument to pin the speed of nationalisation on the issue of suspension.
Finally, I would like to point out another commercial practice, in relation to administration. This point was missed by the hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Rob Marris), which is surprising given his legal background and his understanding of corporate law. The administration arrangements were set up to mirror in the UK legal context what happens in the US under chapter 11, under which businesses can be taken into administration to protect them from their creditors, not to wind them up or declare them insolvent. The purpose of an administration is to provide a protective umbrella, under which the administrator takes steps to restore the company to health. That is precisely what my hon. Friends on the Front Bench have proposed, but Government Members have consistently obfuscated the issue or misunderstood it.
11.56 pm
Mr. Kenneth Clarke (Rushcliffe) (Con): Time will not permit me to repeat the points that I made earlier, but they remain valid.
The more this debate has gone on, the more it has seemed extraordinary that this legislation has been passed so quickly—at least in this stage, through the House of Commons—only two days after the Prime Minister finally made his mind up on Sunday that, after all, he could be persuaded to nationalise the business. I strongly believe that for most of the past six months he has been the person resisting nationalisation in any circumstances, for a variety of political motives. We shall never know which Treasury Ministers were allowed even to be involved in the tortuous process of decision making, but at last common sense has prevailed and the Government have taken control of events in that way.
We have discussed the best use that the Government could make of taking the bank into public ownership. I repeat, briefly, what I said before. The financial stability of the banking system was the main objective of intervention from the word go. The financial stability of the banking system now depends in part on having some understanding of what the Government’s strategic policy is and what strategic direction they have given the bank’s new management. The question throughout this debate has been: do they intend the bank to be grown, in order to maximise the proceeds when it is sold, or do they intend to wind it down and have an orderly sale of the assets?
The frank truth is that we have had no answer. Depending on whether north-east Labour MPs or people looking at the issue from the point of the view of the City are being addressed, slightly different answers come forward, but the matter will apparently be determined by the Commissioner for Competition in Brussels. I assume that that means that the negotiations will be conducted on the basis that the bank will be expanded as rapidly as possible, up to the limits that Miss Kroes will permit and which are still compatible with state aid rules.
The most extraordinary thing that has emerged—it did so clearly only really on Third Reading, although it was referred to yesterday—is that the Prime Minister is perhaps now as bemused as we all are about precisely what assets we are nationalising. It has become clear that we are not acquiring the assets in Granite. I think
that my hon. Friend the Member for Ludlow (Mr. Dunne) is the only Member in the Chamber with a comprehensive knowledge of the arrangements, but the Minister could neither add nor subtract anything from what he said.
The best assets are in Granite—it looks as though there is a contract enabling more assets to be drawn in—and it is the rubbish in the assets that we are now nationalising. Where is all the constant assurance that we have had on the authority of the Financial Services Authority that this is a quality loan book? We have been reassured that it is an asset that is to be taken into public ownership and well managed, under the Government’s wise direction, by the new managers that they have put in place. I would advise the Minister—
It being Midnight, Mr. Deputy Speaker put forthwith the Question already proposed from the Chair, pursuant to order [this day].
The House divided: Ayes 293, Noes 167.
AYES
Abbott, Ms Diane
Ainger, Nick
Ainsworth, rh Mr. Bob
Alexander, rh Mr. Douglas
Anderson, Mr. David
Anderson, Janet
Armstrong, rh Hilary
Atkins, Charlotte
Austin, Mr. Ian
Austin, John
Balls, rh Ed
Banks, Gordon
Barlow, Ms Celia
Barron, rh Mr. Kevin
Battle, rh John
Beckett, rh Margaret
Begg, Miss Anne
Beith, rh Mr. Alan
Benn, rh Hilary
Benton, Mr. Joe
Betts, Mr. Clive
Blackman, Liz
Blackman-Woods, Dr. Roberta
Blears, rh Hazel
Borrow, Mr. David S.
Bradshaw, Mr. Ben
Brennan, Kevin
Brown, Lyn
Brown, rh Mr. Nicholas
Brown, Mr. Russell
Browne, rh Des
Bryant, Chris
Burden, Richard
Burgon, Colin
Burnham, rh Andy
Byrne, Mr. Liam
Caborn, rh Mr. Richard
Cairns, David
Campbell, Mr. Alan
Campbell, Mr. Ronnie
Caton, Mr. Martin
Cawsey, Mr. Ian
Challen, Colin
Chapman, Ben
Chaytor, Mr. David
Clapham, Mr. Michael
Clark, Ms Katy
Clark, Paul
Clarke, rh Mr. Charles
Clarke, rh Mr. Tom
Clelland, Mr. David
Clwyd, rh Ann
Coaker, Mr. Vernon
Coffey, Ann
Cohen, Harry
Connarty, Michael
Cooper, Rosie
Cooper, rh Yvette
Corbyn, Jeremy
Cousins, Jim
Crausby, Mr. David
Cruddas, Jon
Cryer, Mrs. Ann
Cunningham, Mr. Jim
Cunningham, Tony
Curtis-Thomas, Mrs. Claire
Darling, rh Mr. Alistair
David, Mr. Wayne
Davidson, Mr. Ian
Davies, Mr. Dai
Davies, Mr. Quentin
Dean, Mrs. Janet
Denham, rh Mr. John
Devine, Mr. Jim
Dhanda, Mr. Parmjit
Dismore, Mr. Andrew
Dobbin, Jim
Dobson, rh Frank
Donohoe, Mr. Brian H.
Doran, Mr. Frank
Dowd, Jim
Drew, Mr. David
Dunwoody, Mrs. Gwyneth
Durkan, Mark
Eagle, Angela
Eagle, Maria
Ellman, Mrs. Louise
Etherington, Bill
Fisher, Mark
Flello, Mr. Robert
Flint, rh Caroline
Flynn, Paul
Follett, Barbara
Foster, Mr. Michael (Worcester)
Foster, Michael Jabez (Hastings and Rye)
Francis, Dr. Hywel
Gapes, Mike
Gibson, Dr. Ian
Gilroy, Linda
Goodman, Helen
Griffith, Nia
Griffiths, Nigel
Grogan, Mr. John
Gwynne, Andrew
Hain, rh Mr. Peter
Hall, Mr. Mike
Hall, Patrick
Hamilton, Mr. David
Hamilton, Mr. Fabian
Harman, rh Ms Harriet
Harris, Mr. Tom
Havard, Mr. Dai
Healey, John
Henderson, Mr. Doug
Hepburn, Mr. Stephen
Heppell, Mr. John
Hesford, Stephen
Heyes, David
Hill, rh Keith
Hillier, Meg
Hodgson, Mrs. Sharon
Hoon, rh Mr. Geoffrey
Hope, Phil
Hopkins, Kelvin
Howarth, rh Mr. George
Howells, Dr. Kim
Hoyle, Mr. Lindsay
Hughes, rh Beverley
Humble, Mrs. Joan
Hutton, rh Mr. John
Iddon, Dr. Brian
Illsley, Mr. Eric
Irranca-Davies, Huw
James, Mrs. Siân C.
Jenkins, Mr. Brian
Johnson, rh Alan
Johnson, Ms Diana R.
Jones, Helen
Jones, Mr. Kevan
Jones, Lynne
Jones, Mr. Martyn
Jowell, rh Tessa
Keeley, Barbara
Keen, Alan
Keen, Ann
Kelly, rh Ruth
Kemp, Mr. Fraser
Kennedy, rh Jane
Khan, Mr. Sadiq
Kidney, Mr. David
Kilfoyle, Mr. Peter
Knight, Jim
Kumar, Dr. Ashok
Ladyman, Dr. Stephen
Lammy, Mr. David
Laxton, Mr. Bob
Lazarowicz, Mark
Lepper, David
Levitt, Tom
Lewis, Mr. Ivan
Linton, Martin
Lloyd, Tony
Love, Mr. Andrew
Lucas, Ian
Mackinlay, Andrew
MacShane, rh Mr. Denis
Mactaggart, Fiona
Mahmood, Mr. Khalid
Mallaber, Judy
Mann, John
Marris, Rob
Marshall, Mr. David
Martlew, Mr. Eric
McAvoy, rh Mr. Thomas
McCafferty, Chris
McCarthy, Kerry
McCarthy-Fry, Sarah
McDonagh, Siobhain
McDonnell, John
McFadden, Mr. Pat
McFall, rh John
McGovern, Mr. Jim
McGuire, Mrs. Anne
McIsaac, Shona
McKechin, Ann
McKenna, Rosemary
McNulty, rh Mr. Tony
Meacher, rh Mr. Michael
Meale, Mr. Alan
Michael, rh Alun
Miliband, rh David
Miliband, rh Edward
Miller, Andrew
Mitchell, Mr. Austin
Moffat, Anne
Moffatt, Laura
Mole, Chris
Moon, Mrs. Madeleine
Moran, Margaret
Morden, Jessica
Morgan, Julie
Mudie, Mr. George
Mullin, Mr. Chris
Munn, Meg
Murphy, Mr. Denis
Murphy, Mr. Jim
Murphy, rh Mr. Paul
Naysmith, Dr. Doug
Norris, Dan
O'Brien, Mr. Mike
O'Hara, Mr. Edward
Olner, Mr. Bill
Osborne, Sandra
Owen, Albert
Palmer, Dr. Nick
Pearson, Ian
Plaskitt, Mr. James
Prentice, Bridget
Prentice, Mr. Gordon
Primarolo, rh Dawn
Prosser, Gwyn
Purchase, Mr. Ken
Purnell, rh James
Rammell, Bill
Raynsford, rh Mr. Nick
Reed, Mr. Andy
Reed, Mr. Jamie
Reid, rh John
Riordan, Mrs. Linda
Robertson, John
Robinson, Mr. Geoffrey
Rooney, Mr. Terry
Rowen, Paul
Roy, Mr. Frank
Ruane, Chris
Ruddock, Joan
Russell, Bob
Russell, Christine
Ryan, rh Joan
Salter, Martin
Seabeck, Alison
Shaw, Jonathan
Sheridan, Jim
Simon, Mr. Siôn
Singh, Mr. Marsha
Skinner, Mr. Dennis
Slaughter, Mr. Andy
Smith, rh Mr. Andrew
Smith, Ms Angela C. (Sheffield, Hillsborough)
Smith, Angela E. (Basildon)
Smith, Geraldine
Smith, John
Snelgrove, Anne
Soulsby, Sir Peter
Southworth, Helen
Spellar, rh Mr. John
Starkey, Dr. Phyllis
Stewart, Ian
Strang, rh Dr. Gavin
Straw, rh Mr. Jack
Stringer, Graham
Stuart, Ms Gisela
Sutcliffe, Mr. Gerry
Taylor, Ms Dari
Taylor, David
Thomas, Mr. Gareth
Timms, rh Mr. Stephen
Tipping, Paddy
Todd, Mr. Mark
Trickett, Jon
Truswell, Mr. Paul
Turner, Dr. Desmond
Turner, Mr. Neil
Twigg, Derek
Vaz, rh Keith
Vis, Dr. Rudi
Walley, Joan
Waltho, Lynda
Watson, Mr. Tom
Watts, Mr. Dave
Whitehead, Dr. Alan
Wicks, Malcolm
Williams, Mrs. Betty
Wills, Mr. Michael
Wilson, Phil
Winnick, Mr. David
Winterton, rh Ms Rosie
Woodward, rh Mr. Shaun
Woolas, Mr. Phil
Wright, David
Wright, Mr. Iain
Wyatt, Derek
Younger-Ross, Richard
Tellers for the Ayes:
Mr. Bob Blizzard and
Steve McCabe
NOES
Afriyie, Adam
Ainsworth, Mr. Peter
Amess, Mr. David
Ancram, rh Mr. Michael
Arbuthnot, rh Mr. James
Atkinson, Mr. Peter
Bacon, Mr. Richard
Baldry, Tony
Barker, Gregory
Baron, Mr. John
Bellingham, Mr. Henry
Beresford, Sir Paul
Bone, Mr. Peter
Boswell, Mr. Tim
Bottomley, Peter
Brady, Mr. Graham
Brazier, Mr. Julian
Brokenshire, James
Browning, Angela
Burns, Mr. Simon
Burrowes, Mr. David
Burt, Alistair
Butterfill, Sir John
Campbell, Mr. Gregory
Carswell, Mr. Douglas
Cash, Mr. William
Chope, Mr. Christopher
Clappison, Mr. James
Clark, Greg
Clarke, rh Mr. Kenneth
Clifton-Brown, Mr. Geoffrey
Cox, Mr. Geoffrey
Curry, rh Mr. David
Davies, David T.C. (Monmouth)
Davies, Philip
Davis, rh David (Haltemprice and Howden)
Djanogly, Mr. Jonathan
Dodds, Mr. Nigel
Dorrell, rh Mr. Stephen
Duncan, Alan
Duncan Smith, rh Mr. Iain
Dunne, Mr. Philip
Ellwood, Mr. Tobias
Evennett, Mr. David
Fabricant, Michael
Fallon, Mr. Michael
Field, Mr. Mark
Fox, Dr. Liam
Francois, Mr. Mark
Fraser, Mr. Christopher
Gale, Mr. Roger
Garnier, Mr. Edward
Gauke, Mr. David
Gibb, Mr. Nick
Gillan, Mrs. Cheryl
Goodman, Mr. Paul
Goodwill, Mr. Robert
Gray, Mr. James
Grayling, Chris
Green, Damian
Greening, Justine
Greenway, Mr. John
Grieve, Mr. Dominic
Gummer, rh Mr. John
Hague, rh Mr. William
Hammond, Mr. Philip
Hammond, Stephen
Hands, Mr. Greg
Harper, Mr. Mark
Hayes, Mr. John
Heald, Mr. Oliver
Heathcoat-Amory, rh Mr. David
Hendry, Charles
Herbert, Nick
Hoban, Mr. Mark
Hollobone, Mr. Philip
Holloway, Mr. Adam
Horam, Mr. John
Howarth, Mr. Gerald
Hurd, Mr. Nick
Jack, rh Mr. Michael
Jackson, Mr. Stewart
Jenkin, Mr. Bernard
Jones, Mr. David
Kawczynski, Daniel
Key, Robert
Kirkbride, Miss Julie
Knight, rh Mr. Greg
Laing, Mrs. Eleanor
Lait, Mrs. Jacqui
Lancaster, Mr. Mark
Leigh, Mr. Edward
Letwin, rh Mr. Oliver
Lewis, Dr. Julian
Liddell-Grainger, Mr. Ian
Lidington, Mr. David
Lilley, rh Mr. Peter
Loughton, Tim
Mackay, rh Mr. Andrew
Main, Anne
Malins, Mr. Humfrey
Maples, Mr. John
Maude, rh Mr. Francis
May, rh Mrs. Theresa
McCrea, Dr. William
McIntosh, Miss Anne
McLoughlin, rh Mr. Patrick
Miller, Mrs. Maria
Milton, Anne
Mitchell, Mr. Andrew
Moss, Mr. Malcolm
Mundell, David
Murrison, Dr. Andrew
Neill, Robert
Newmark, Mr. Brooks
O'Brien, Mr. Stephen
Osborne, Mr. George
Ottaway, Richard
Paice, Mr. James
Paterson, Mr. Owen
Penning, Mike
Penrose, John
Pickles, Mr. Eric
Prisk, Mr. Mark
Pritchard, Mark
Randall, Mr. John
Redwood, rh Mr. John
Rifkind, rh Sir Malcolm
Robathan, Mr. Andrew
Robertson, Hugh
Robertson, Mr. Laurence
Robinson, rh Mr. Peter
Ruffley, Mr. David
Russell, Bob
Scott, Mr. Lee
Selous, Andrew
Simmonds, Mark
Simpson, David
Simpson, Mr. Keith
Soames, Mr. Nicholas
Spelman, Mrs. Caroline
Spicer, Sir Michael
Spink, Bob
Spring, Mr. Richard
Stanley, rh Sir John
Steen, Mr. Anthony
Streeter, Mr. Gary
Swayne, Mr. Desmond
Swire, Mr. Hugo
Syms, Mr. Robert
Tredinnick, David
Turner, Mr. Andrew
Vaizey, Mr. Edward
Vara, Mr. Shailesh
Villiers, Mrs. Theresa
Walker, Mr. Charles
Wallace, Mr. Ben
Waterson, Mr. Nigel
Watkinson, Angela
Whittingdale, Mr. John
Widdecombe, rh Miss Ann
Wiggin, Bill
Willetts, Mr. David
Winterton, Ann
Winterton, Sir Nicholas
Yeo, Mr. Tim
Young, rh Sir George
Tellers for the Noes:
James Duddridge and
Jeremy Wright
Question accordingly agreed to.
Bill read the Third time, and passed.
| Next Section | Index | Home Page |