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13 Mar 2008 : Column 660W—continued
A breakdown of fatalities by service and by year is provided in the following table:
| Table 3: Operational fatalities in Iraq: UK armed forces personnel, by service and calendar year, numbers, 2003-07 | ||||||
| All | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | |
| (1) Naval service includes Royal Navy and Royal Marines. | ||||||
As at 31 December 2007, 212 UK Service personnel have been very seriously or seriously injured while on deployment in Iraq. Details which can be released without potential disclosure of individual identities include:
Since the start of operations in 2003, six female UK service personnel have been very seriously or seriously injured while on deployment in Iraq.
A breakdown of very seriously and seriously injured personnel by age and by year is provided in the following table:
| Table 4: Operational very serious and seriously injured( 1) personnel in Iraq: UK armed forces personnel, by age and calendar year, number, 2003-07 | ||||||
| All | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | |
| (1 )Excluding natural causes. | ||||||
Information on the breakdown of very seriously and seriously injured by regiment (or other service equivalent) cannot be released without disclosing individual identities.
A breakdown of very seriously and seriously injured personnel by service and by year is provided in the following table:
| Table 5: Operational very serious and seriously injured( 1) personnel in Iraq: UK armed forces personnel, by service and calendar year, nu mber , 2003-07 | ||||||
| All | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | |
| (1) Excluding natural causes. (2) Naval service includes Royal Navy and Royal Marines. | ||||||
Information on slight injuries is not held centrally and could be provided only at disproportionate cost.
Dr. Fox: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to the answer of 4 March 2008, Official Report, column 2349W, on Iraq peacekeeping operations, what methodology was used to formulate his answer on 7 February 2006, Official Report, column 1084, on Iraq; and why the information requested in the question on Iraq peacekeeping operations is not held centrally and could be provided only at disproportionate cost. [193161]
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: Exact figures on how many non-infantry personnel have served in an infantry role in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2003 are not held centrally as currently this information is not required for management purposes. The methodology used in the answer on 7 February 2006, Official Report, column 1084W, took the average number of non-infantry sub-units serving in an infantry role per deployment and multiplied this by both the number of deployments and the strength of a typical sub unit; this enabled a rough estimate figure to be provided. Adopting the same approach produces figures of approximately 7,260 and 330 for Iraq and Afghanistan respectively since 2003.
It is not unusual for non-infantry personnel to deploy in an infantry role as every soldier in the Army is trained in the infantry role first, and as a specialist second. When such individuals or units do deploy in an infantry role, they will also undertake similar pre-deployment training as their infantry counterparts.
Iraq and Afghanistan: Peacekeeping Operations
Andrew Rosindell: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many soldiers from British (a) Crown dependencies and (b) overseas territories have served in (i) Iraq and (ii) Afghanistan since the campaigns began. [193404]
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: The information requested is not held centrally and could be provided only at disproportionate cost.
Andrew Rosindell: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many British soldiers have served in (a) Iraq and (b) Afghanistan since each campaign began. [193405]
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: The information requested is not held centrally and could be provided only at disproportionate cost.
Andrew Rosindell: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how much UK military operations in (a) Iraq and (b) Afghanistan (i) have cost to date and (ii) are expected to cost in each of the next three years. [193409]
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: Historic net additional costs of Operations Herrick (Afghanistan) and Telic (Iraq) which have been recovered from the Treasury Reserve are set out as follows. The figures include estimated costs for 2007-08.
| £ million | ||
| Herrick (from 2001-02) | Telic (from 2002-03) | |
Our initial indications for additional cost of operations in 2008-09 is at least £2 billion. This figure will be updated in both winter and spring supplementary estimates. The highly changeable nature of operations means that we are not able to provide accurate forecast costs for operations for either 2009-10 or 2010-11.
Military Equipment: Iraq
Mr. Hoban: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to his Answer of 21 January 2008, Official Report, column 1601W, on military equipment: Iraq, on what dates the (a) sets of body armour, (b) AK47 assault rifles, (c) underslung grenade launchers for AK47s and (d) 9mm pistols were gifted to Iraqi forces in 2005. [185659]
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: Information on the specific dates of gifting for individual items of equipment is not held centrally and could be provided only at disproportionate cost.
Nuclear Weapons: Transport
Mr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make it his policy to ensure nuclear warhead convoys do not travel on motorways that do not have a hard shoulder reserved for emergencies. [193488]
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: Routes for nuclear weapon convoys are subject to a rigorous selection process. The safety and security of the convoy is carefully considered at all stages of this process and all routes are regularly re-assessed. It is MOD policy, however, not to comment on the routes used by nuclear convoys, as to do so would, or would be likely to, prejudice national security.
Radar: Wind Power
Mr. Ellwood: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what assessment he has made of the effects of wind farms on the UK's aerial defences. [193971]
Derek Twigg: We continually assess the UK's aerial defences to ensure that operational requirements are met.
Reserve Forces: Labour Turnover
Dr. Fox: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the (a) inflow, (b) outflow and (c) voluntary outflow rates were for the (i) Territorial Army, (ii) Royal Naval Reserve, (iii) Royal Marines Reserve and (iv) Royal Auxiliary Air Force in the latest period for which figures are available. [193092]
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: It is not possible to provide Territorial Army rates or actual figures by outflow reason as the information is not captured in this way. The following table shows total intake and outflow for Territorial personnel during the period 1 January 2006 to 28 February 2007.
| Inflow and outflow of the Territorial Army( 1) by calendar year | ||
| Calendar year | Inflow( 2) | Outflow( 3) |
| (1) The data exclude Full Time Reserve Service (FTRS), Non-Regular Permanent Staff (NRPS) and Mobilised TA but includes the Officer Training Corps (OTC). (2) Inflow figures include all inflow e.g. intake from civil life and intake from other parts of the armed forces, but does not include the inflow of personnel returning from mobilisation. (3) Outflow figures exclude those personnel who became mobilised. (4) Due to ongoing data validation following the introduction of the new joint personnel administration (JPA) System, there is no TA information available since 1 March 2007. Note: Note: The data have been rounded to the nearest 10, numbers ending in 5 have been rounded to the nearest multiple of 20 to avoid systematic bias. | ||
It is not possible to provide Royal Naval Reserve or Royal Marine Reserve rates or actual figures by outflow reason as this information is not captured in
this way. The following table shows total intake and outflow for the Royal Naval Reserve and Royal Marines Reserve.
| Inflow and outflow of the Royal Naval Reserve and Royal Marine Reserve, 1 April 2007 to 29 February 2008 | ||
| Inflow | Outflow | |
| Note: The data have been rounded to the nearest 10, numbers ending in 5 have been rounded to the nearest multiple of 20 to avoid systematic bias. | ||
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