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22 July 2008 : Column 1062W—continued
In November 2006, after the loss of Nimrod XV230, DE&S introduced new mandatory fuel leak reporting procedures (known as ‘Leaflet 70 reports’) on all leaks associated with fuel tanks within the fuselage, the fuel system and any residual fuel found in specific areas of the aircraft (such as the bomb bay). So far our analysis indicates that since the introduction of these procedures, 111 fuel leaks (of varying degrees of severity) have been recorded under Leaflet 70. Of course, once the outcome of the ongoing detailed analysis of fuel leak data by DE&S is known, I will write to you again.
I should point out that following a recent request by the Oxfordshire Coroner relating to fuel leaks reported under Leaflet 70 we have provided the same information to him. In light of this, I was keen to ensure that you received this information as quickly as possible.
I am copying this letter to Ian Liddell-Grainger and Sir Nicholas Winterton, who have expressed an interest in this subject.
Substantive answer from Bob Ainsworth to Liam Fox, dated 13 July:
I wrote to you on 21 May 2008 in answer to two Parliamentary Questions that you tabled about fuel leaks from Nimrod aircraft. I explained that the Nimrod Integrated Project Team within Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S) was carrying out a detailed manual analysis of fuel leak data in order to answer your questions.
This work has now been completed and I can now provide you with a full response. In your first question on 21 November 2007, (Official Report, Column 990W) you asked how many instances of fuel leaks from Nimrod aircraft had been recorded in the last 12 months. This was taken to be the period from 1 November 2006 to 31 October 2007. A fuel leak is defined as any leakage of fuel from aircraft couplings, pipes or fuel tanks. In that period, there were a total of 252 fuel leaks reported on the Nimrod MR2 and R1 aircraft. In your second question on 20 May 2008 (Official Report, Column 181W) you asked how many fuel leaks had been reported since January 2007. Between 1 January 2007 and 31 December 2007 there were 277 fuel leaks reported on the Nimrod MR2 and R1 aircraft. Based on current data, between 1 January 2008 and 31 March 2008 (the last full month for which validated data is available), there have been a total of 33 fuel leaks reported on the Nimrod MR2 and R1 aircraft. That figure is however provisional, as some records have yet to be received from aircraft deployed on operations, and it is therefore likely to increase as the records are completed.
The figures quoted above do not include fuel leaks which are caused by our scheduled maintenance activity, as we disturb the fuel system. In these cases the leak is both caused and rectified while on the ground.
Although all aircraft are designed to be leak tolerant, all fuel leaks are thoroughly investigated. Furthermore, the measures implemented following the loss of Nimrod XV230 mean that the chance of any fuel leak Igniting is extremely low. In particular we have, as you know, removed potential sources of ignition by switching off the aircraft’s very hot air system while airborne; it is used for short periods on the ground but does not reach temperatures sufficient to ignite fuel. Despite this, no leakage, however small, from pipes, couplings or fuselage tanks is accepted and the aircraft will not fly until such leaks have been rectified. The only occasion on which an aircraft will fly with a fuel leak is with certain categories of leaks from the integral fuel tanks in the wings. In such instances leaking fuel from the wing tanks disperses safely into the aircraft’s slipstream, and, as there is no potential source of ignition, there is no hazard to the aircraft.
Of the 310 fuel leaks reported between 1 January 2007 and 31 March 2008 over 50 per cent were leaks from integral fuel tanks in the wings, in which fuel would simply pass into the aircraft’s slipstream during flight. In each of these reported incidents, whether from the integral fuel tanks in the wings or elsewhere, the fuel leaks did not compromise the safety of the aircraft and were rectified by normal maintenance procedures.
In my letter of 21 May, I stated that in November 2006, after the loss of Nimrod XV230, DE&S introduced new mandatory fuel leak reporting procedures (known as ‘Leaflet 70 reports’) on all leaks associated with fuel tanks within the fuselage, the fuel system and on any residual fuel found in specific areas of the aircraft (such as the bomb bay). I also explained that since the introduction of these procedures, 111 fuel leaks (of varying degrees of severity) had been recorded under Leaflet 70. This procedure will continue to bring fuel leaks in the fuselage to the immediate attention of the DE&S Nimrod Integrated Project Team. The current maintenance policy for the Nimrod fuel system remains appropriate.
With respect to the airworthiness of the aircraft today, we have ceased air-to-air refuelling and ceased the use of very hot air systems in flight. These measures, together with the enhanced aircraft maintenance and inspection procedures introduced since the Nimrod XV230 crash ensure the aircraft, as it is today, is safe to fly. Indeed, my Department having carefully considered all the issues has declared that all reasonably practicable measures have been taken to reduce the risk of fire and explosion to As Low as Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). The work to reach this position has been contributed to by key stakeholders represented on the Nimrod Platform Equipment Safety Committee (comprising representatives of the DE&S Nimrod Integrated Project Team, Air Command, the Release to Service Authority, BAE Systems, Rolls Royce and QinetiQ) which supports this declaration.
In addition, to ensure we can continue to operate the aircraft efficiently until its planned retirement from service, we have in place a programme of more permanent measures which includes replacing, where judged necessary, fuel seals and engine bay hot air ducts on the aircraft, this work is being progressed as quickly as practicable.
I am copying this letter to Ian Liddell-Grainger and Sir Nicholas Winterton, who have previously expressed an interest in this subject.
Nuclear Weapons: Safety Measures
Mrs. Cryer: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what procedures are in place with regard to the (a) design and (b) handling of nuclear weapons to ensure that there is no popcorning or accidental explosion; what procedures are in place to ensure public safety in the event of popcorning; and if he will make a statement. [218746]
Des Browne: The theoretical phenomenon known as "popcorning" is a process whereby a series of accidental detonations of a number of warheads' conventional explosives could lead to some nuclear yield. This is extremely unlikely and could occur only if the warheads were located in close proximity to each other without mitigation. Warheads are designed such that there cannot be a nuclear detonation without authorisation.
Warhead handling, transit and storage facilities, and processes are designed to reduce the risk of popcorning to ‘As Low As Reasonably Practicable’ levels by, for example, separating stored warheads and having physical shielding between them. Similarly, moves of warheads are planned and executed to minimise the proximity of warheads to each other.
Safety in the nuclear weapons programme is of paramount importance. There are well-rehearsed generic response plans in place to protect workers and the general public in the unlikely event of an accident; all measures are taken to ensure acceptable levels of safety throughout the life cycle of the Trident warhead.
RAF St. Athan
Mrs. Gillan: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what assessment he has made of the effect on the proposed Defence Training Academy at St. Athan of the cancellation of major house building projects in the area by Persimmon and other construction and house building companies. [219617]
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: The Defence Training Review Package 1 Project has a requirement for service families accommodation in the St. Athan region from 2013. An Assessment Study has been commissioned by MOD to identify the best value for money options to procure housing for servicemen based at the Defence Technical Academy. This is likely to increase demand for housing in the area in the future. The MOD is therefore working alongside the Vale of Glamorgan, as the planning authority responsible for ensuring demand capacity can be accommodated, to examine how our housing requirements might be met.
Mrs. Gillan: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make an assessment of the likely effect of the construction of Olympic facilities for 2012 on availability of construction workers to work on the construction of St. Athan Defence Training Academy. [219618]
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: Officials have already assessed the impacts of construction industry demand capacity on the proposed construction of the Defence Technical Academy at St. Athan. Populating an Office of Government Commerce simulation model, the data and advice received have indicated that construction of the Olympic facilities for 2012 is not expected to cause any significant implications for the local construction environment in the Vale of Glamorgan.
Mrs. Gillan: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the purpose is of his Department’s consultation on the proposed Defence and Training Academy at St. Athan; and how long the consultation will last. [219619]
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: I refer the hon. Member to the answer I gave on 15 July 2008, Official Report, column 314W.
The consultation process will end when planning consent is granted for the development. This will complete the planning process, and is expected to be in October 2009.
Harry Cohen: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence which troops will be trained at the Defence Training Academy at St. Athan; and how they will be selected. [219736]
Mr. Bob Ainsworth:
The scope of training within package 1 of the Defence Training Review to be delivered at the proposed Defence Technical Academy at St. Athan are specialist phase 2 and phase 3 engineering courses of the Royal Navy, Army and Royal Air Force. They include those courses delivered today within the Defence Colleges of Aeronautical Engineering, Electro-mechanical Engineering and Communications and
Information Systems. Phase 2 training involves initial trade training for the armed forces; phase 3 training involves continuous professional development. In addition, some training of overseas troops in the same disciplines may take place under current Defence relations arrangements.
Reserve Forces: Deployment
Dr. Fox: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many reservists are serving on operations overseas, broken down by location. [216176]
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: As at 31 May 2008, reservists are serving on operations overseas as follows:
| Location | Op Name | Number of reservists serving |
In addition there were a further 572 reservists in full-time service within the UK and in other permanent joint operational bases; this includes those undergoing pre-deployment training, and those on post-deployment leave. There were also on average 50 Sponsored Reserves mobilised at any one time during this month (May 2008), most of whom will have served at one time or another in an operational area. A further 1,844 personnel were serving on Full Time Reserve Service contracts, and some of these will be in an operational area, but further details of their individual locations are not held centrally.
Selly Oak Hospital
Dr. Murrison: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many bed-days were accounted for by service in-patients in each ward at Selly Oak Hospital in each month since the opening of the military-managed ward. [206318]
Derek Twigg: We do not collect statistics in the format requested.
USA: Nuclear Weapons
Mrs. Cryer: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many US nuclear warheads are based in the United Kingdom; when he last discussed with the US authorities their withdrawal of warheads from the UK; and if he will make a statement. [218747]
Des Browne: I refer my hon. Friend to the answer I gave on 7 July 2008, Official Report, column 1154W, to the hon. Member for Portsmouth, South (Mr. Hancock). It is not the practice of the Government to make public details of all discussions with foreign Governments as this would, or would be likely to, prejudice international relations.
Vanguard Class Submarines
Mr. Gerald Howarth: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the (a) unit cost and (b) date of commissioning of each Vanguard class submarine was. [218233]
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: The commissioning dates for the four Vanguard class submarines are listed in the following table.
| Submarine | Date commissioned |
The total procurement cost for the four submarines was £3,587 million, which equates to approximately £897 million per submarine.
Wind Power
Dr. Whitehead: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what pre-application enquiries to his Department or Defence Estates for onshore wind turbines received an objection from his Department between 1 January and 30 June 2008; and what percentage this represented of the overall number of pre-application enquiries received. [217944]
Derek Twigg: All wind farm applications that we assess are subject to individual consideration. We consider a range of factors such as safety or the impact on Air Defence or Air Traffic radars. Concerns will only be lodged with pre-applications if the operational impact is assessed as being unmanageable. Even where concerns are raised, mitigation options will be suggested to the developer where possible.
Between 1 January and 30 June 2008, the Department expressed concerns about 82 onshore wind turbine pre-planning application enquiries. This represented 14 per cent. of the overall number received in that period.
Dr. Whitehead: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what planning applications for onshore wind turbines his Department did not initially object to but objected to during a public enquiry in the period 1 January to 30 June 2008. [217945]
Derek Twigg: Between 1 January and 30 June 2008, after initially confirming it had no objections during the pre-planning consultation stage, the Ministry of Defence did not object to any planning applications for onshore wind turbines during a public inquiry.
Health
Drugs: Equality of Access
11. Kerry McCarthy: To ask the Secretary of State for Health what plans he has to achieve equality between areas in access to drugs approved by the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence; and if he will make a statement. [220343]
Dawn Primarolo: The NHS Constitution gives patients an explicit right to drugs and treatments that have been recommended by the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) for use in the NHS. This will help to ensure equality of access to NICE recommended treatments throughout the NHS in England.
17. Ms Dari Taylor: To ask the Secretary of State for Health what steps he is taking to achieve equality between areas in access to drugs approved by the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence; and if he will make a statement. [220350]
Dawn Primarolo: The NHS Constitution gives patients an explicit right to drugs and treatments that have been recommended by the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) for use in the NHS. This will help to ensure equality of access to NICE recommended treatments throughout the NHS in England.
Primary Care Trust Allocations
13. Tony Lloyd: To ask the Secretary of State for Health when he plans to announce the revenue allocations to primary care trusts for 2009-10 and 2010-11. [220345]
Mr. Bradshaw: We will issue PCT allocations for 2009-10 and 2010-11 alongside the NHS operating framework for the NHS in October.
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