 House of Commons |
Session 2007 - 08 Publications on the internet General Committee Debates Counter-Terrorism Bill |
Counter-Terrorism Bill |
The Committee consisted of the following Members:Chris
Shaw, Mick Hillyard, Committee
Clerks
† attended the
Committee
WitnessesSir
Ian Blair QPM MA, Metropolitan Police
Commissioner
Bob Quick, Chair, Terrorism
and Allied Matters Committee, Association of Chief Police
Officers
Dr. Eric Metcalfe, Director of
Human Rights Policy, Justice
Public Bill CommitteeTuesday 22 April 2008(Morning)[Mr. John Bercow in the Chair]Counter-Terrorism Bill10.30
am
The
Chairman:
Before we begin, I have a few announcements.
Members may, if they wish, remove their jackets during Committee
meetings. I emphasise at the outset that in today’s proceedings
and those on Thursday—that is to say during the passage of the
resolutions with which we are about to deal and then in the public
evidence sessions—members of the Committee should remain seated.
When we get to clause by clause, line by line consideration, members
will conduct themselves as they usually operate in the Chamber,
standing when speaking. Please ensure that all mobile phones, pagers,
etc. are turned off or are switched to silent mode during Committee
meetings. In addition, I remind the Committee that there are money and
Ways and Means resolutions in connection with this Bill, of which
copies are available in the room. I would also like to remind members
that adequate notice should be given of amendments. As a general rule,
I and my fellow Chairman Mr. O’Hara do not intend to
call starred
amendments.
The
process of taking oral evidence in Public Bill Committees is of course
new, and it might therefore help if I briefly explained what is
proposed, so that it can be clear to us all. The Committee will first
be asked to consider the programme motion on the amendment paper, for
which debate is limited to half an hour. We will then proceed to a
motion to report written evidence, and then a motion to permit the
Committee to deliberate in private in advance of the oral evidence
sessions, which I hope we can take formally. Assuming that the second
of those motions has been agreed to, the Committee will move into
private session. Once the Committee has deliberated, the witnesses and
members of the public will be invited back into the room and our oral
evidence session will commence. If the Committee agrees to the
programme motion, it will hear oral evidence today and on Thursday and
then revert to the more familiar proceedings of clause by clause
scrutiny next week. Before I call the Minister to move the programme
motion, I inform the Committee that I have selected amendment (a) to
the motion, which stands on the paper in the name of Mr.
Dominic Grieve. I first call Tony McNulty to move the
motion.
Mr.
David Heath (Somerton and Frome) (LD): On a point of
order, Mr. Bercow. I welcome you to the Chair of
the Committee. You will recall that in the programming
sub-committee
yesterday—[
Interruption.
]
The
Chairman:
Order. If we are going to conduct the
proceedings of the Committee, it is basic courtesy that
members should listen to the member who has the floor, and that is
Mr. David
Heath.
Mr.
Heath:
You will recall, Mr. Bercow, that in the
programming sub-committee, when we were discussing the witnesses who
might potentially give oral evidence, we looked at the possibility of
inviting the Information Commissioner to give evidence. Despite the
fact that both sides of the Committee seemed to feel that it would be a
useful exercise to have evidence from the Information Commissioner, we
were told that he was not available, either today or on Thursday. Is
there any means—formally or informally—by which
the Committee could invite the Information Commissioner to give written
evidence? That would be extremely
helpful.
The
Chairman:
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his
point of order. The short answer is that it can be done informally.
There is no formal mechanism by which to invite the Information
Commissioner—or any other potential witness—to submit
written evidence where that evidence is not already extant. In other
words, formally to request new material in written form is not in the
Committee’s power. However, I have heard the hon.
Gentleman’s point of order and will ensure that it is relayed to
the Information Commissioner. I now call Mr. Tony McNulty to
move the
motion.
That—
(1)
the Committee shall (in addition to its first meeting at 10.30 a.m. on
Tuesday 22nd April)
meet—
(a) at
4.00 p.m. on Tuesday 22nd
April;
(b) at 9.00
a.m. and 1.00 p.m. on Thursday 24th
April;
(c) at 10.30
a.m. and 4.00 p.m. on Tuesday 29th
April;
(d) at 10.30
a.m. and 4.00 p.m. on Tuesday 6th
May;
(e) at 9.00 a.m.
and 1.00 p.m. on Thursday 8th
May;
(f) at 10.30 a.m.
and 4.00 p.m. on Tuesday 13th
May;
(g) at 9.00 a.m.
and 1.00 p.m. on Thursday 15th
May;
(2) the Committee
shall hear oral evidence in accordance with the following
Table:
TABLE
(3)
proceedings on consideration of the Bill in Committee shall be taken in
the following order: Clauses 1 to 22; Schedule 1; Clauses 23 to 31;
Schedule 2; Clauses 32 to 37; Schedule 3; Clauses 38 and 39; Clause 45;
Clauses 40 to 44; Clauses 46 to 55; Schedules 4 and 5; Clauses 56 to
89; Schedule 6; Clauses 90 to 92; new Clauses; new Schedules; remaining
proceedings on the
Bill;
(4) the
proceedings shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a
conclusion at 4.00 p.m. on Thursday 15th
May.
I, like
Mr. Heath, look forward to the Committee’s
proceedings under your august chairmanship, Mr. Bercow.
Hopefully, our deliberations will be dealt with in good spirit and
temper, although we will be dealing with some very sensitive and
contentious matters. I am happy that Mr. O’Hara will
be your confrère. Although these rooms are wonderful, I am an
old-fashioned sort and I hope that we will be duly dispatched back to a
rickety old Committee Room in the House of Commons where I can do very
strange things such as stand when I move a motion, especially now that
we are in spring rather than winter. I welcome everyone to the
Committee and hope that our deliberations, although at times serious,
are done in a fair and temperate
fashion.
The programme
motion before us follows two sets of deliberations by the Programming
Sub-Committee. What is before us represents the practicable outcome of
a range of suggestions from both sides during those deliberations. The
set of witnesses to be called is balanced and for the most part it is
an entirely relevant set of individuals, some of whom represent
organisations, who will bring timely experience to the debate. With all
due humility, I include myself and my officials in that as we will be
witnesses in the last
session.
In terms of
what Mr. Heath has just said, I made it very clear at the
Programming Sub-Committee that, if required, I would be happy for all
parties to write to the invitees who, for whatever reason, are unable
to come before us, asking them to submit written evidence. I am
grateful for what you said, Mr. Bercow. As Mr.
Heath quite rightly said, we sought the Information Commissioner and
the intercept commissioner. I think that Lord Stevens is unable to
attend, even though he is erroneously published in today’s
Hansard as attending. If the Chairman’s request does not
elicit such information, I would be quite happy for all parties to
write to the Information Commissioner and others who have been invited,
albeit on an informal basis. We have a measured, balanced and
interesting list of witnesses and I have no doubt that they will
produce four lively sittings. They are all relevant and germane to the
issues. I do not accept the amendment and propose that the Committee
accepts the programming motion so that we can get on with the
fun.
The
Chairman:
I am grateful to the Minister
for those remarks. I call Mr. Crispin Blunt to move
amendment (a) to the programming motion, which stands in his
name.
Mr.
Crispin Blunt (Reigate) (Con): I beg to move, as an
amendment to the motion, in the Table, column 3, after “Lord
Carlile of Berriew QC”, insert “; Dame Stella
Rimington”.
I
echo the Minister’s welcome conservative remarks
about the need to move back to a rickety old
Committee Room next week, which would be preferable to this room for
the legislative stage of our work. I formally welcome you to your
position, Mr. Bercow. The amendment stands in the name of my
hon. and recently learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield. I agree
with the Minister about the need to conduct these proceedings in a calm
manner, given the serious nature of the issues that they will
address.
I
welcome in particular to the Committee the hon. Members for Nottingham,
East, for Stockton, South and for Sedgefield, who made contributions on
Second Reading. I am slightly surprised that the eight hon. Members who
take the Labour Whip and who spoke on Second Reading in a manner that
might be described as hostile to elements of the Bill have somehow or
other avoided selection for the Committee. The Lord Commissioner of Her
Majesty’s Treasury, the hon. Member for Tynemouth may be able to
throw some light on
that.
The
Chairman:
Order. The Committee will proceed in an orderly
fashion. The remarks that the hon. Member for Reigate has just made
have absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with our proceedings. The
selection of hon. Members for Public Bill Committees is not a matter
for him. If he wants to move the amendment, he should continue to do
so.
Mr.
Blunt:
It is important to make it clear at the first
sitting of the Public Bill Committee that the Committee does not
entirely reflect the full views of those who support the Government and
who form the majority of the Committee. That is the
point.
The
Chairman:
Order. I know very well the point that the hon.
Gentleman is making. It is not a matter for debate. I have told him
that it is not proper for him to be making that point. If the hon.
Gentleman wishes to move his amendment, he is absolutely welcome to do
so. This is his opportunity. However, I must repeat to the hon.
Gentleman, and I do not want to have to keep doing this, that I am not
engaged in a debate with him. I am telling him what is orderly and what
is not. What he has just been saying is not orderly and I invite him to
get back into order.
Mr.
Blunt:
I am grateful. On a point of order, Mr.
Bercow. At what point would it be appropriate to raise these matter in
the proceedings of a Bill Committee? I would regard it as being at the
beginning. When the proceedings of the Committee of Selection are not
reportable, and a Bill Committee is produced by a Committee of
Selection that would appear not to reflect the views of the House, at
what point is it in order to raise those
matters?
The
Chairman:
The answer is very simple. The selection of
members for the Committee is not a matter for consideration by members
of this Committee at any stage in its proceedings. I would advise the
hon. Gentleman, if he is concerned about the matter, to take it up
through the usual channels.
Mr.
Blunt:
Thank you, Mr. Bercow. As a member of
the usual channels, you can be sure that we already have taken it up.
However, I have now put the matter on the record, which is all that I
was seeking to do. I was not seeking to challenge the decision of the
Committee of
Selection.
The
amendment goes to an important principle about the conduct of Public
Bill Committees. I know that the House is at an early historical stage
in dealing with Public Bill Committees. This is the second Committee on
which I have sat that takes evidence at the beginning of its
proceedings.
There is
an important issue, first, about the opportunity to hear witnesses
whose points of view might be uncongenial to those held by the
Committee and particularly to the majority on the Committee. There is
also an important point of principle about Back
Benchers.
The
suggestion that Dame Stella Rimington be a witness came to me from my
hon. Friend the Member for Lancaster and Wyre as soon as he was
notified that he had been selected to serve on the Committee. By that
point, the usual channels had, in the normal way, had more than one
discussion about which witnesses might be appropriate to assist our
proceedings. I thought that the suggestion from my hon. Friend was
excellent. However, I proposed that he make the suggestion, as a
Back-Bench member of the Committee, through the usual
channels—the Clerk of the Committee—so that the witness
could be regarded as not having been produced in collusion by the usual
channels and the Front
Benches.
It is
important that Back Benchers should have witnesses whom they wish to
see. However, although the suggestion had my strong support and that of
my hon. and learned Friend, we received a response from the Cabinet
Office to the effect that the matter had to be dealt with through the
usual channels. I thought that that was inappropriate and that the
system ought to allow for the suggestion of witnesses from Back-Bench
members of the Committee, and should not rely on the fact that my hon.
Friend has a particularly good relationship with his usual channels.
That should not be a requirement for the endorsement of that
suggestion. However, that was the first response. It was then taken up
through the usual channels, and, to my surprise, no inquiry has been
made of Dame Stella’s availability to attend. The motion put
forward by the Government yesterday at the Programming Sub-Committee
did not include Dame Stella Rimington.
Martin
Salter (Reading, West) (Lab): I thank
the hon. Gentleman for giving way. I am intrigued by his argument.
Will he explain how long ago Dame Stella Rimington
was involved in working for the security services and her relationship
with the Conservative
party?
Mr.
Blunt:
I am afraid that I am ignorant of any relationship
between Dame Stella Rimington and the Conservative party. Other hon.
Members might be able to assist on that, but I am not aware of any
relationship. Dame Stella finished being the head of MI5 in 1996, which
was 12 years ago, but she could have given—or can give, if the
Committee agrees to the
amendment—important evidence on the climate in which
anti-terrorist operations are conducted. She had long experience in
that post and to a degree is freed from the immediate considerations.
Obviously, it would be inappropriate to take public evidence from the
serving head of MI5.
Dame Stella would be an expert
witness on the wider consequences of some of the legislative framework,
particularly the increase from 28 days to 42 days for detention without
charge. She has particular experience relating to Northern Ireland as
well as in dealing with the emerging threat from Islamic terrorism in
the 1990s. She has an impeccable professional reputation and would make
a fine witness if the Committee were inclined to agree to the
amendment. I am as much concerned about the process as I am about her
qualities as a witness, which are exemplary, so I regret that the
Government and the Cabinet Office have not seen fit to establish her
availability. I think that we should request her to attend by putting
her name on the Order Paper.
The
Chairman:
With regard to how I intend to deal with these
matters, I am happy to facilitate a general debate now on the merits or
demerits of the amendment and on the Government’s main motion,
but it is important to stress that we have to dispose of all of the
motions—there are a number of motions to dispose of—no
later than two minutes past 11. That is procedurally required, and I am
sure that members of the Committee will agree that it is important not
to lose time for questioning our various witnesses. Five members are
seeking to catch my eye, which is absolutely fine, but it would be much
appreciated if colleagues could bear that in
mind.
Martin
Salter:
Welcome to the Chair, Mr. Bercow. I
will take your strictures for brevity extremely seriously and just want
to make three points. While it would be inappropriate to get into a
debate about the credentials of Dame Stella Rimington and the evidence
that she might give us, the hon. Member for Reigate should be aware
that the Home Affairs Committee has just concluded a lengthy inquiry in
which we took an immense amount of evidence from expert witnesses. At
no point did any Conservative member of that Committee seek to have
Dame Stella Rimington called to give up-to-date evidence. The hon.
Gentleman should bear that in mind, because he is out of line with the
views of his own colleagues on the Home Affairs Committee.
My final point—it is
probably worth putting on the record—is that I understand that
Dame Stella Rimington is involved in Conservative party policy groups,
and that does not in any way exclude her from giving useful evidence.
[
Interruption.
] It is useful to put that on the
public record since the hon. Gentleman seems to be completely ignorant
of the fact. May I also ask the Minister to make it clear to the
Committee when he sums up how much time the House will get to discuss
the Bill on Report, because that stage is extremely important for the
Bill and it would be useful to clarify that
point?
Mr.
Heath:
I shall amplify that point. Although it is not
under discussion at the moment, it will be critical to have sufficient
time to discuss the Bill on Report. My
hon. Friend the Member for Carshalton and Wallington
cannot be here this morning due to a long-standing constituency
engagement, but he sends his apologies and will of course join us
later. The Minister of State suggested that the Bill was going to be
fun. I know that he had his tongue firmly in his cheek at the time, but
these are serious matters—even the areas on which members of the
Committee agree, let alone those that are contentious, are extremely
serious. The characterisation of the Bill as fun may not hold true, but
I hope that we can conduct our affairs in an appropriate way and with
respect for each other’s points of
view.
I
am grateful to the Minister and to the Treasury Bench for having
listened to some of our suggestions during the early stages of this
process about who should give evidence, particularly the inclusion of
Scottish Law Officers to deal with the important issues that relate to
the Scottish law system and the way in which that is affected by the
legislation. This is an evolving procedure. This is the second Public
Bill Committee on which I have sat that has taken evidence and I am not
sure that we have all the procedures right at this stage.
There are two matters that I
should like to raise today, Mr. Bercow. The first is the
matter that I raised on a point of order and I am most grateful for
both your response and that of the Minister. Where we have agreed to
seek oral evidence and it is not possible simply because the person
involved cannot attend our Committee meetings, we should invite that
person to provide written evidence as a matter of course. That is
common sense and perhaps that could be fed back to the relevant
authorities.
My second
point is that the evidence sessions for this Committee finish on
Thursday evening. The deliberative sessions start on Tuesday morning.
Under the rules of the House with the three-day requirement for
amendments, any matter that arises out of the evidence that we receive
on Thursday afternoon cannot be incorporated in an amendment for the
first sitting on Tuesday morning. I do not suggest that anything will
necessarily emerge, but it seems to be a flaw in the procedures and the
Chair would perhaps need to apply some discretion in allowing a starred
amendment were that to
happen.
It is obvious
why we are not receiving evidence from the secret intelligence
community this morning or on Thursday, but having someone from that
community to give evidence would be a sensible move, even if it is
someone whose experience is not as up to date as perhaps we would wish.
Therefore I will support the amendment today. Again this demonstrates
the need for perhaps more clarity in our procedures to ensure that
where a significant part of a Committee wants to receive evidence from
a particular witness they have the opportunity to do
so.
The
Chairman:
I will sympathetically consider the hon.
Gentleman’s request for the exercise of discretion. Beyond that
I will report back his remarks to what he called the relevant
authorities, in this case the Chairmen’s
Panel.
Patrick
Mercer (Newark) (Con): I welcome you to the Chair,
Mr. Bercow. I rise briefly to support the amendment and to
pick up some of the comments of
my fellow member of the Home Affairs Committee, the hon. Member
for Reading, West. In view of the evidence that we have taken on that
Committee, our not asking for Dame Stella Rimington to come forward was
probably a mistake. The hon. Gentleman makes a very good point. I think
he is mistaken about her involvement in Conservative party policy, but
I stand to be corrected on that.
The great value that Dame
Stella Rimington will add is this. It became clear in our deliberations
in the Home Affairs Committee that, particularly on the issue of
detention without charge and the evolution from a state of internment
during the Northern Ireland troubles through to how that was
manipulated and manoeuvred towards the so-called end of the Northern
Ireland troubles and then into the emerging threat from Islamist
fundamentalism, she has a unique view on these two varied, but similar,
campaigns. I believe that she could give an unparalleled and very
useful insight into these
matters.
Mr.
Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield) (Con): I welcome you to the
Chair, Mr. Bercow. I want to add only a couple of points
about procedure because a serious issue is raised here. Clearly there
may be differences of opinion as to whether Dame Stella Rimington is a
sensible person for this Committee to listen to. But the point has been
well made that, for obvious reasons, we do not have access to the heads
of the security services. Therefore, individuals who have served in the
Security Service and the Secret Intelligence Service in the past are
likely to be extremely helpful to the Committee and to be able to give
evidence in a way that those who are currently serving are
not.
The second point,
which I raised last night and which troubles me far more, is that it
appears that the Committee and, indeed, the Commons generally are
toothless in this process. We rely on the usual channels to communicate
a wish, and it is then actioned by the Government to see whether the
person concerned can be brought before the Committee. It appeared that
the request had simply not been processed because the Minister had
taken the view that Dame Stella Rimington was not worth listening to.
Therefore, we were not even in a position to know whether she was
available. I find that situation deplorable. It highlights areas where
the House of Commons is deficient in its processes. I hope that that
will be communicated back. I may have misunderstood the position, but I
was left with the distinct impression that a veto had been applied at
an earlier stage by the Minister, on the basis that it was his
prerogative to do so, so that we did not even know whether she could
come or not.
I do
believe that it may be helpful for us to hear from Dame Stella. She may
have less to say that would be helpful to us than we would hope, but
her name was put forward in good faith as someone whom we think could
probably help the Committee. I commend the motion and amendment to the
Committee.
The
Chairman:
Before I call Ben Wallace, in case people are
not watching the clock, I emphasise that we now have a maximum of only
six minutes. We have to dispose of the motions, and I also want to say,
for the benefit of the Committee, a few sentences about how I intend to
conduct the public evidence sessions.
Mr.
Ben Wallace (Lancaster and Wyre) (Con): I welcome you to
the Chair, Mr. Bercow. At the outset, in response to the
point made by the hon. Member for Reading, West, I would like to
clarify the fact that I think that he is confusing two dames. Former
Dame Pauline Neville-Jones has been involved with the Conservative
party. She is now Baroness Neville-Jones of Hutton Roof and is a member
of the shadow Cabinet. I am sure that it is not the first time that he
has mixed up the
dames.
The reason that
I made the suggestion to my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate was
because the balance of the witnesses was focused on the protection of
human rights and the judicial body, as opposed to the operational
aspect. I concede that the first witness today relates to the
operational implication of the law. However, it is clear to some of us
on the Opposition Benches who have operational experience in
counter-terrorism that bad law affects not only rights, but the
business of intelligence
gathering.
Dame Stella
Rimington has expert knowledge of intelligence gathering and, to my
knowledge, no link to any political party. She was a first rate
director general of the Security Services who, as my hon. Friend the
Member for Newark pointed out, knows the bridge from one type of
terrorism to the other, and could properly contribute to the process of
the Committee. If we get part of the Bill wrong, it may have an impact
on the ability to recruit sources and run informers, which is at the
heart of the operational side of counter-terrorism. I think that she
would have contributed greatly, and I hope that the Committee will take
advantage of experience that is out there, rather than shut down any
debate.
Mr.
McNulty:
I do not have time to do anything other than to
move the main motion and to say that I have not learnt anything to
suggest other than that the Committee should resist the
amendment.
Question
put, That the amendment be made:—
The
Committee divided: Ayes 8, Noes
11.
Division
No.
1
]
AYESNOES
Question
accordingly negatived.
Main Question put and agreed
to.
Ordered,
That,
subject to the discretion of the Chairman, any written evidence
received by the Committee shall be reported to the House for
publication.—[Mr.
McNulty.]
The
Chairman:
Copies of any memorandums that the Committee
receives will be made available in the Committee
Room.
Ordered,
That,
at this and any subsequent meeting at which oral evidence is to be
heard, the Committee shall sit in private until the witnesses are
admitted.—[Mr.
McNulty.]
11.1
am
The
Committee deliberated in
private.
11.6
am
On
resuming—
The
Chairman: Good morning. My name is John Bercow. I am Member of
Parliament for Buckingham and am co-chairing this Public Bill Committee
with Eddie O’Hara. I warmly welcome our witnesses. May I ask you
to introduce yourselves formally, for the
record?
Sir
Ian Blair:
Ian Blair, Commissioner of Police of the
Metropolis.
Bob
Quick:
Bob Quick, assistant commissioner of the
Metropolitan police, with responsibility for
counter-terrorism.
The
Chairman:
Thank you. Before calling the first member to
ask a question, I would like to remind all members of the Committee
that questions should be limited to the scope of the Bill. I call first
Mr. Dominic
Grieve.
Q
1
Mr.
Grieve:
Good morning, and thank you for coming in. Can I
deal first with pre-charge detention? It has been suggested to us that
the Association of Chief Police Officers has a collective view about
pre-charge detention. One of the problems is that if one looks at the
ACPO website it is impossible to see who serves on the ACPO terrorism
and allied matters committee. No such information is provided. It is
difficult to know how ACPO comes to its collective decisions. Could you
help the Committee by indicating how that has happened, who is on the
ACPO-TAM committee, and whether an expressed viewpoint is a collective
viewpoint, a majority viewpoint, a unanimous viewpoint or the viewpoint
of certain individuals?
Sir Ian
Blair:
In that case, I think that I have exactly the
right witness for you, because Bob Quick, in addition to being
assistant commissioner in the Metropolitan police, is chairman of the
ACPO-TAM committee, although it is bit hard on him to ask him to rattle
through the names, because he has only been in that position for six
weeks.
Bob
Quick:
The TAM committee is very large. I think that
it has a membership of over 70 people from various organisations, but
including of course many chief police officers. To answer your
question, those issues are indeed discussed in detail at the TAM
committee, but in terms of forming a collective position among the
chief constables of England and Wales, TAM merely makes recommendations
to what we call ACPO cabinet and then to council—council being
the most authoritative body within ACPO. This
argument and debate has been reflected in a number of documents, which
were refined into a position agreed by ACPO council in 2007, which
reflects in detail the terms of a letter that has been sent, I believe,
to the Committee by Ken Jones, the president of ACPO. You will see that
the names of the chief constables of the forces that are foremost in
the fight against terrorism—Greater Manchester, West Yorkshire
and West Midlands—are on that letter, and of course the
Metropolitan police is also a
signatory.
Q
2
Mr.
Grieve:
I am grateful for that. So would it be perfectly
possible for there to be divergences of views within the TAM committee
as
well?
Bob
Quick:
Indeed, there is discussion and views are put
forward. It would be foolish to suggest that every single view met and
overlapped entirely. A position paper has been agreed by the Chief
Constables’ Council—the collective body of chief
constables who lead the forces in England and
Wales.
Q
3
Mr.
Grieve:
May I then to turn to the main issue around
extending pre-charge detention from 28 to 42 days? The Home Affairs
Committee has received evidence from the Director of Public
Prosecutions that it has been managing comfortably with an outer limit
of 28 days’ detention. How does that affect your perception of
the need for an
extension?
Sir
Ian Blair:
Our position is unchanged since Peter
Clarke and I gave evidence to the Home Affairs Committee. We have never
put forward a case that there is evidence of a need for an extension of
the length of pre-charge detention. What we have said repeatedly is
that, given the circumstances that the UK has faced over the last few
years, the growth in the number of plots, the number of conspirators in
each plot and the magnitude of their ambition, a pragmatic inference
can be drawn that sooner or later we are going to need more than 28
days. That is particularly affected by the different criminal
investigation and criminal justice processes of the United Kingdom. We
are not the same as the United States. We are not the same as France,
Germany, Spain and Italy. We are in a place in which a great deal of
responsibility is placed on police investigators rather than
prosecutors. Although I respect the views of the DPP and the
Attorney-General, it is appropriate for the professionals, who are
charged with the actual investigation before the lawyers make their
decision, to put forward a viewpoint. That is what ACPO has
done.
Q
4
Mr.
Grieve:
Is not the position that, as matters stand, the
Crown Prosecution Service is closely involved in any prosecution
decisions as to when charges are brought and, indeed, is involved at
quite an early stage? If, historically, it has not seen that as a
problem in terms of prosecuting the most difficult and serious
terrorist offences, why is there this divergence of views with
yourselves?
Sir
Ian Blair:
It comes to the same point. We are the
people who have to investigate. We know the difficulties of
investigation. We do not produce the material for the Crown prosecutors
until we have actually got it. Both Bob and I could refer to a number
of circumstances where it takes time to produce that material. Once the
material is there, then of course the prosecutors are in a position to
deal with it.
Q
5
Mr.
Grieve:
May I turn briefly to time periods? One of the
issues which has been raised during the course of discussion is that
there have been occasions when the 28-day limit has come close to being
reached. I do not know whether you can help us on this—I am
deliberately trying to be a bit careful and am speaking in generalities
because I am conscious that there are matters which may well be sub
judice at the moment. One of the problems that I have had is that on
the two examples that appeared to be given of going to 28 days, I was
able to obtain information quite readily from others involved that,
although it might have gone to 28 days, the evidence on which the
decision to charge was made had in fact been available quite
substantially earlier. Could you make any comment on
that?
Sir
Ian Blair:
I am not sure that I have any comment to
make and I am not sure that I am aware of that
information.
Bob
Quick:
I am aware of some of the detail of those
cases. The decision to charge is a decision for the CPS, and it must be
satisfied that a point in time has been reached and that the evidence
to justify a prosecution is sufficient. It must be reasonably certain
that a prosecution will succeed. It is largely a decision for the CPS
about when that sufficiency of evidence has been reached. I know that
in the cases to which you refer it was not satisfied until the very
last moment, and the difference between charging and not charging was
quite
marginal.
The
Chairman:
With the agreement of the Committee, I would
like to take further questions on the subject that Dominic Grieve has
opened up, namely pre-charge detention without trial, so that we can
deal with the subject in one block, rather than continually coming back
to it with other subjects in the interim. Therefore, other Members who
wish to raise questions on that point are welcome to do
so.
Q
6
Mr.
Heath:
I am grateful to the witnesses for what they have
to say. Sir Ian, you said that there was a pragmatic inference. Would
you expand on that a little and explain the circumstances in which you
believe that the present 28-day limit would need to be
breached?
Sir
Ian Blair:
Yes. I have to be careful here, because I
do not want to give a road map of what we would find particularly
difficult to those who might want to attack the United Kingdom. If one
looks at the series of factors that affect the difficulty of
investigation, one will see that there could be multiple sites or
multiple plots. You could have a sequence of plots, with things
happening at different times and different attack methodologies. You
could have some of the attacks taking place in the United Kingdom and
some elsewhere. If all those things are combined together, our view is
that that is when we might reach the stage that 28 days was not
enough.
Our concern
over that has been prompted particularly by what is very properly
happening now, which is a discussion in the calm—we have always
sought to avoid that discussion happening after an atrocity. That
remains our concern because, unlike the United States, we do not have
facilities for using intercept as evidence or plea bargaining. We do
not have investigative detention authorised by prosecutors,
as is the case in the jurisdictions of France, Spain and Italy, so the
police service is the key element in determining whether evidence is
gathered.
Q
7
Mr.
Heath:
Under the Bill, the trigger for a parliamentary
decision on extension would take place not in the circumstances of
calm, but effectively in the circumstances of emergency. We have spent
a lot of time over the last few years quite properly looking at those
matters and trying to provide appropriate legislative weapons to the
police and prosecuting services, and we have made a number of changes.
What is your assessment of what we have done so far? For instance, how
effective have the lower order offences that were introduced been in
enabling you to prosecute someone at an earlier
stage?
Sir
Ian Blair:
The lower order offences have been
extremely useful and have populated the legislative landscape with
things that can be done at an earlier stage. Part of the problem is
that the way in which individuals and groups move from what appears to
be facilitation or terrorist financing into active attack is very fast.
It is not right to say that those people can just be picked off at a
lower level of offence. There are people who suddenly emerge from left
field, about whom we know very little but about whom we become
immensely
concerned.
Bob
Quick:
I would reiterate those remarks about the
usefulness of some of the more recent legislation. I feel that the new
provisions have been welcomed universally by the investigative
community. For example, section 5 and the ability to charge with
preparatory attacks, which has overcome some of the limitations of the
old conspiracy legislation, have been used to great effect and have
enabled us to intercept people earlier. The volatility and the
international nature of the threat leave us to conclude that on
stepping back and looking at the events of the last five, seven or 10
years, one can identify trends in terms of complexity, the number of
jurisdictions involved, and the breadth and depth of networks and their
very diffuse nature. Each jurisdiction constrains investigative
activity in different
ways.
As has been
said, in some of our investigations the pre-charge detention period has
come under some pressure. After the 14-day limit was set, it came under
pressure in 2004 when we used the full provisions of the 14 days. In
2006, we detained people for 27 days before
charge.
Q
8
Mr.
Heath:
The point that I am attempting to elucidate is that
we have the acts preparatory, which I hoped would be a useful addition
to your armoury. I think that you have confirmed that it is. We have
the lowering of the threshold for an evidential basis for prosecution,
which again ought to be extremely helpful. Given that those weapons are
available to prosecute somebody who is held on a lower order offence
before the court, under what circumstances would there not be
sufficient evidence to proceed to prosecution of such people—on
acts preparatory, or one of the other offences available—so that
they would have to be held for longer than 28
days?
One of the
arguments has always been about encryption, but there is a prosecutable
offence of refusing to provide a key to encryption. I do not
understand the argument for the measure, and I ask for your advice on
why those things are not sufficient to enable somebody to be held in
custody, facing a charge which might not be the most serious charge
that they will face after continued investigations, but which is
sufficient to hold them in
custody.
Sir
Ian Blair:
Let me start with a general view and I
will ask Bob to fill it in. I cannot be specific, but a number of cases
already have or will eventually come to trial where, because of the
level of the threat that we perceive, we make arrests when almost no
evidential material is available. We have lots of intelligence, but
nothing that can be put into evidence. We start from a position where
we are very concerned about what such people appear to be attempting to
do, but we are not quite sure what that is. Those arrests have led to
some of the most serious charges that we have had. We sometimes face a
position where we do not have the acts preparatory. We just have to go
in and find what is on those computers and in those houses and what the
contacts are.
On lower
order offences, while under serious charges of terrorism the courts
would remand people in custody, there is no prospect that defendants
facing a maximum penalty of two years—as with the encryption key
offence—will be remanded in
custody.
Bob
Quick:
I can think of examples where preparatory acts
may not come into play. To answer the first point, yes, in some cases,
we will have sufficient intelligence coverage and the run-in to the
inquiry will reveal evidence of preparatory acts or other lower order
offences against which we can act. We will always act where we can to
take out the threat at the earliest
opportunity.
In recent
years, we have witnessed a much more volatile picture where suspects
who are of interest or concern to us are not engaging in much activity.
They will then go abroad where the intelligence coverage might not be
as reliable or satisfactory as in the United Kingdom, receive their
taskings, come back to the UK and immediately engage in attack-planning
activity. In some investigations, we have seen that materialise so
quickly that on public safety grounds we have had to act pre-emptively
before we have had the opportunity to exploit pre-arrest evidential
opportunities. That places a huge burden on the senior investigating
officer.
To follow up
a question that was put earlier about the CPS and the DPP’s
remarks, some of the stresses and pressures on the senior investigating
officer and the investigative team operating in those circumstances are
not necessarily entirely visible to the CPS and the prosecution team.
There are practicalities whereby officers are having to travel around
the world against extremely tight deadlines, working with high-tech
teams to try to elicit evidence and break encryption codes, and many
other human pressures on people to deliver the evidence within
constraints.
The
Chairman:
Thank you, Mr. Quick. I have a list
of nine members of the Committee seeking to come in
specifically on the subject of pre-charge detention
without trial. For the avoidance of doubt, let me say that I am happy
to take all those questions. It would be a pity if other matters in the
Bill were not raised at all, unless that was the specific will of the
Committee. However, I would not want hon. Members subsequently to
complain
that they did not have the opportunity to raise other germane matters.
Therefore, I will take everyone’s questions, but I appeal to
colleagues to exercise a certain self-denying ordinance—I want
pithy questions, and, of course, both pithy and comprehensive replies
from our august
witnesses.
Q
9
Martin
Salter:
Once again, Mr. Bercow, I will obey
your strictures, but it is probably helpful if you ask us to be pithy
in a pithy manner—that is me done,
now.
I have three
quick questions for Sir Ian Blair and Mr. Quick. I know that
you put some of this evidence in front of the Select Committee on Home
Affairs a few months ago, but, for the benefit of the Committee, could
you indicate how many serious terrorist plots the police and the
security services have disrupted since the London bombings of
7/7?
Sir
Ian Blair:
I will stretch to something like 12, but
where would you get to,
Bob?
Bob
Quick:
I am still being briefed on the very complex
history to fighting terrorism, but my understanding is in the order of
about 15 occasions. On some very recent occasions we have been able to
disrupt terrorism by some sophisticated and unusual methods. That is
what we do. We are constantly seeking opportunities to disrupt. That is
part of a multi-pronged attack on terrorist
activity.
Q
10
Martin
Salter:
Without compromising, allowing me to pry or giving
aid to people who would wish to do us harm, could you indicate to the
Committee how many of those 12 to 15 serious plots would, had they been
successful, have resulted in a loss of life in excess of
100?
Sir
Ian Blair:
If you had asked about loss of life, I
would be reasonably comfortable, but to put a figure of
100—
Sir
Ian Blair:
I would have thought that most of those
incidents would have resulted in
that.
Bob
Quick:
I would say that all loss of life is
significant, and it is impossible to put numbers on
it.
Sir
Ian Blair:
If you think of one particular case that
has come to trial and been dealt with, which was the
attempted—
Sir
Ian Blair:
No, that is on trial at the moment. I am
referring to the conspiracy to abduct an individual member of service
personnel, execute him and post that on the internet. That involved a
single life, but the impact on community relations would have been very
significant.
Q
11
Martin
Salter:
Could you follow up from that and give the
Committee some indication of the complexity of terrorist plots compared
with 10 or 12 years ago, and the sheer volume of evidence that you now
have to shift before you can move to charging a terrorist
suspect?
Sir
Ian Blair:
I will divide that in half and let Bob
deal with the level of evidence, because we have quite a lot of
that.
There is an interesting and
pertinent comparison to make with our struggles against Irish
republican terrorism. Without in any way diminishing the murderous
intent of the IRA and some of the loyalists, there were three
categories of difference. First, they almost invariably gave warnings.
Secondly, they did not want to die. Thirdly, they did not want to cause
mass casualties, with one or two exceptions. I suppose that you could
add a fourth category, which was that they were heavily penetrated by
British intelligence. There are obviously exceptions to all those
events, but that is the general pattern. That is not the case with the
threat that we currently
face.
Bob
Quick:
To add to that from a practical viewpoint, if
you go back perhaps 15 years to the latter part of the Provisional IRA
campaign, you might have been dealing essentially with relatively few
suspects and perhaps relatively few mobile phones—in fact mobile
phones were only just coming on to the market in the mid-90s.
Occasional you would encounter computers, but not
often.
Now we are
dealing with very loose networks of people, but with mass communication
on the internet and mobile telephony around the globe. I am aware of
cases where up to a dozen different jurisdictions have been involved
around the world, all with different demands in terms of being able to
elicit evidence. There are massive amounts of data on devices such as
laptops and flash drives, on very small devices that could be secreted
in a house and which might take an enormous amount of effort to find.
Indeed, through very painstaking methods we have found evidence of a
critical nature on a tiny device, which has in effect broken the whole
case open. So we have legions of people having to service that demand
during an
inquiry.
Q
12
David
T.C. Davies (Monmouth) (Con): You just said that one of
the problems is opening up evidence that might be on computers, mobile
phones and so on. While I understand that, surely it would also apply
to other forms of organised crime, such as people trafficking, child
pornography and large-scale drug dealing? Those all involve
international organisations using mobile phones and IT equipment. What
is the difference? If the 42-day legislation is passed, surely in
principle there would be no reason why you would not support an
extension for other forms of crime, which can have just as awful an
impact on the
victims?
Sir
Ian Blair:
I will go back, if I can, to the fact that
with these particular individuals, the perceived threat is so awful
that we arrive at their premises right at the beginning of an
investigation. With a lot of organised criminality you will have a
great deal of evidence before you make the arrests—enough to
charge in a number of cases—and the breaking of the encryption
comes later. There is also something about the groups that we have met
so far that makes them interested in IT. That is something quite
remarkable. I had a bit of an interchange of correspondence with the
other David Davis about some evidence that I gave before the Home
Affairs Committee about a case—Tsouli and others, which has just
finished—in which a million separate files had to be opened. The
individuals do things such as breaking up an ordinary commercial film
and inserting something into it. So the whole film has to be watched.
That is the situation that we face.
Q
13
Mr.
McNulty:
I have just a few points. First, there is the
inference—and it has been hinted at already today—that
the more time the police get, the lazier they get and the more they
mess around and go to full term. It has been said clearly by the other
David Davis—the shadow Home Secretary—and implied again
today, that the evidence in the alleged plot that is before the courts
was secured at 14 to 18 days and that the police faffed around for a
further 10 days to get to 27 or 28, because they had the time. Would
you comment on
that?
Sir
Ian Blair:
I do not recognise in any way that
portrait of what goes on. These are expert investigators. They know the
pressures under which they are operating because they know where the
next job may come from. I cannot imagine that as being an approach that
the Metropolitan police or any other police service would take in these
serious
circumstances.
Bob
Quick:
Likewise, I think that the evidence directly
contradicts that. If you were to examine terrorism arrests over the
last 10 years you would see that the vast majority are dealt with very
expeditiously. Charges are either brought early, or people are
released, often within 24 hours. I just do not think that that stands
up to
scrutiny.
Q
14
Mr.
McNulty:
Let me ask you an entirely unfair
question. Why on earth do you think that people would say that then, if
it is so palpably not the case?
Sir Ian
Blair:
You are asking me a question that I am not
sure we should get
into.
Q
15
Mr.
McNulty:
I did say that it was a touch unfair. Others have
suggested that in the end it is simply a matter of resources and that
were there further resources you would not need an extension of any
sort, even in the extraordinary circumstances proposed in the
Bill.
Sir
Ian Blair:
I thought that Peter Clarke put this very
well to the Home Affairs Committee. This is not a cavalry charge. You
can get a very large number of people to do the basic breaking down of
the material that you have. That is obvious. You want as many people to
do that as possible. But in the end, you will need to have a very small
number of inquiring and controlling minds who actually can sift and
analyse the information. I am talking of the Crown prosecutors.
Resourcing is not the issue. Of course, Minister, if you wish to give
me more resources for this purpose I shall be delighted, but that is
not the issue in terms of the length of detention. I should also add,
just for the completeness of the record, that I am not entirely certain
that I recognise the characterisation of the Opposition’s
position as being quite as you put it in your last
question.
Q
16
Mr.
McNulty:
I would probably accept that, given the
Opposition’s comments today. Certainly it was as I characterised
it in the past and it has been put as cavalierly as that by the shadow
Home Secretary. To go back to your earlier point, you said
that, notwithstanding what we have already done with acts preparatory
and other lower order charges, as they are rather dismissively called;
notwithstanding what we
have done, as we will hear later this afternoon, about the threshold
test; and notwithstanding post-charge questioning—if, heaven
forfend, I go to some other part of the Bill—and the Chilcot
implementation group’s consideration of intercept as evidence,
you are still of the view that there may be exceptional circumstances
and that we should legislate on a precautionary basis in the
circumstances outlined in the
Bill.
Sir
Ian Blair:
That has been the position of ACPO and the
Metropolitan police for some time. If I can, without spreading across
to the rest of the Bill, I should mention that we see post-charge
questioning as a useful approach. As Peter Clarke said to the Home
Affairs Committee, 90 per cent. of the main perpetrators in these cases
never reply to questions. The value of post-charge questioning is
therefore only that people can have something put to them so that a
court can know that they have had the chance to refute it. In terms of
the Chilcot review, as you know, we have supported the concept of the
evidential intercept, but there remain significant practical barriers
between now and when that happens. In the meantime, our position
remains that precautionary legislation is the right
approach.
Q
17
Patrick
Mercer:
We started after the 7/7 bombings with a strident
demand for 90 days’ detention. That has now changed. We ended up
with 28 days: 56 days has been talked about and we are now
on 42 days. Surely, 90 days was what was required by you and other
agencies. It is not going to happen. How uncomfortable are you with
this constant chopping and changing and these figures that seem to be
pulled from
nowhere?
Sir
Ian Blair:
We are uncomfortable with the fact that
the debate is around a specific figure, whether it be 90 or 42. We have
always asked for the maximum time under the strictest judicial
supervision that Parliament is prepared to grant. You know as well as I
do the history of this figure and I am not going to go back into it. We
have reached a point where we were pushing at 28 days. The Government
have suggested 42 days. That is a matter for Parliament. We will abide
by its
decision.
Q
18
Patrick
Mercer:
Briefly carrying on from there, what effect do you
think it would have on the Muslim community if we went beyond 28
days?
Sir
Ian Blair:
As long as it is provided in a transparent
way and with the proper level of debate, I think that we can involve
the Muslim community in the protective measures that we are putting
forward. Each member of the Muslim community is as much at risk of
being killed as everyone else in the UK, and we are determined to do
everything that we can to encourage community cohesion. The advantage
that the UK has is that counter-terrorism activity is not separated
from mainstream policing, so chief police officers are responsible for
explaining when things go wrong and for working with the community,
with regard to not only the “pursue” part of the Contest
strategy, but the “prevent” part. While I am conscious of
the fact that many individuals inside the Muslim community and
elsewhere do not want the extension, I think that we can get a mature
debate so that we can at least explain the reasons for
it.
Q
19
Mr.
Russell Brown (Dumfries and Galloway) (Lab): Gentlemen,
you have both indicated that there have been occasions when you have
been pushed tight up against the 28-day limit. On those occasions, has
there been a shift in the emphasis of your inquiries or investigations?
Had those few extra days been available, might you have taken a
different position in your investigation? Did you have to shift
emphasis to come within the 28-day
period?
Bob
Quick:
I can only speak in general
terms because I was not part of the recent investigations, but a very
experienced investigator would constantly refine and review the
investigative strategies as the clock ticks, whether that related to a
burglar with a 24-hour detention limit that was extendable to 36 hours,
or a terrorist arrested for a suspected conspiracy to commit mass
murder with a 28-day limit. The important thing to recognise is the
limitation on how far you can change your investigative strategy,
because the processes of investigation are often linear, as has been
alluded to in some of the questions. No matter how many resources are
thrown at an investigation, there is not a direct relationship between
the resources and the time that it takes to secure and retrieve the
evidence in a form in which it could be made available to a court. Of
course, that is a very forensic and linear process, and the way in
which our laws are constructed and the evidence is presented in
prosecution makes it so. Therefore, there are limits to what can be
done to change an investigative strategy. That is why, so soon after
the introduction of the 28-day limit, we are seeing cases that reveal
significant pressures on the
investigation.
Q
20
Mr.
Elfyn Llwyd (Meirionnydd Nant Conwy) (PC): In response to
Mr. Heath’s earlier question, you distinguished
between the system here and that in the United States and said that
intercept evidence, for example, is available over there. In response
to the Minister, you also referred to the potential usefulness of
intercept evidence. I realise the implications for available resources
and that many hours of surveillance would be necessary to produce
anything useful, but given that such operations would last weeks,
months and perhaps even longer, would it be useful to proceed fairly
quickly with the use of intercept
evidence?
Sir
Ian Blair:
The earlier that we can do it, the better.
I have to make it clear, however, that some of the barriers that sit in
front of it are other parts of legislation. After talking to the head
of the FBI the other day, it became clear to me that their system
depends on the Classified Information Procedures Act, which effectively
prevents disclosure of how the warrant for interception was granted.
That is very different from our public interest immunity position. To
get to where we want with intercept as evidence, in a framework of the
right to fair trial under the ECHR, which is a different place from
other jurisdictions, there is a lot of work to
do.
Q
21
Mr.
Llwyd:
May I briefly add a rider. If that were provided
for in the Bill, would your view on 42 days be
different?
Sir
Ian Blair:
I will put it bluntly. I just do not think
that it can be done at the moment. If there was a way of saying that
intercept could be provided as evidence, I would not particularly
change the fact that we would
want to maximise our investigative possibilities. But we are not talking
in the same place—it is not going to happen in the time scale
that we are in. We face the threat
today.
Q
22
Phil
Wilson (Sedgefield) (Lab): What, in your view, would be
the consequences of not extending pre-charge
detention?
Sir
Ian Blair:
That is a very good question, which Bob
and I have addressed. The consequences might be that, in certain
circumstances, we would be returning to the House in an emergency. I am
convinced that that is not the position to be
in.
Q
23
Phil
Wilson:
Basically, you think that the time to work out
this legislation is before an atrocity happens, so that you do not end
up with knee-jerk legislation? At the moment, therefore, you are
thinking through what needs to be
done.
Sir
Ian Blair:
That is
correct.
Q
24
Mr.
Adam Holloway (Gravesham) (Con): If there had been an
election earlier this year, would you be lobbying a new Government now
for this sort of legislation? Indeed, might you be going
further?
Sir
Ian Blair:
That is a very political question, which I
am not sure that I can answer. We have a professional position that we
have been putting forward for the last two or three years, which has
the backing of the ACPO council and cabinet. Whichever Government were
in power, we would be saying that that is our
view.
Sir
Ian Blair:
I think that this is the same question as
Mr. Mercer’s. We have asked for consideration to be
given to further periods of judicially supervised
detention.
Mr.
Holloway:
But you are realistic. You can make a judgment
of how far you can go. Do you think that, with a new Government, if you
thought that they would go further, you would be asking for more
things?
Sir
Ian Blair:
Having been in this place now for about
the last three years, from 90 days through to the other lists of days,
I think that we should concentrate on what the provisions of the Bill
actually are. That is the particular place that we are
in.
Q
25
Mr.
Adrian Bailey (West Bromwich, West) (Lab/Co-op): I would
like to pursue further the issue of relations with the Muslim
community. I have a substantial number of Muslims in my constituency.
One of the comments that has been bandied around in the debate is that
the proposals are the recruiting sergeant for Muslim extremists. Can
you tell me whether you have managed to identify any increase in
recruits since the change from 14 to 28
days?
Secondly,
have you managed to identify any increasing reluctance of the broader
Muslim community to communicate with you as a result of the
proposals?
Sir
Ian Blair:
I will ask Bob for his reflections on that
question. I do not think that you can isolate the 14 to 28 to 42 days
debate as a single strand in the number of things that concern Muslim
and other minority communities. Part of it is the intemperate nature of
some of the press coverage of the issues.
In terms of the overall Muslim
community, certainly for the Metropolitan police, but I think for all
police services, the best way to get engaged with the Muslim community
is to offer them a decent, transparent service in which they have a
considerable stake. That is what our whole neighbourhood policing
approach is about. To my knowledge, and I will await Bob’s view,
while the level of information coming from the community was originally
not very strong, we have had some interesting developments over recent
times.
Bob
Quick:
It is impossible to draw any firm conclusions.
You will have heard from the director general of the Security Service
that we have seen numbers rise from an estimate of 1,600 at the end of
2006 to about 2,000 at the end of 2007. Disentangling the real growth
in recruits, if we call them that, from the growth in intelligence
capacity is very difficult. It may be that we are just finding what was
already there, or it may be growth. We are still working through to try
to get a better understanding of that. That is the first
point.
On the
reluctance to engage, there is clearly distrust and concern and I have
heard friends in the Muslim community describe their feelings as being
a watched community. It is not difficult to empathise and understand
why they feel that way. What is really important is to keep the
perspective in the debate. The vast majority of terrorism arrests in
the United Kingdom in recent years have been solved very quickly with
minimal detention. Those that have resulted in extended detention
correlate strongly with charge and prosecution. Last year alone, 37
people were convicted of serious terrorist offences, of which 21
pleaded guilty. That is absolutely unprecedented in the history of
fighting terrorism. They were sentenced to more than 500 years’
imprisonment. This year, 28 people have been convicted, of which 11
pleaded guilty. They have been sentenced to well over 100 years. We
have regrettably seen an upward trend, but we have seen success in
pursuing people involved in such
activity.
We are also
seeing more sophistication. Terrorists are learning from their
experience. We are seeing people come back into the UK with taskings,
so intercept may not have been any use because we would not have been
in a position to secure it. Lots of things are changing very rapidly in
the
threat.
Q
26
Mr.
Grieve:
Trying to pull the strands together, I noted, Sir
Ian, that you said that your interest was not so much in 42 days as in
the extended period of detention, which appeared to be rather
indeterminate, under judicial supervision. I hope that I have not
paraphrased that wrongly. That chimes with what Lord Carlile suggested
with the radical overhaul of our common law principles involving the
period between detention and charge ceasing to be a very short one and
potentially becoming a very long one on the continental model, which
differs entirely from our legal
principles.
Would it
be right to say that as far as you are concerned, 42 days is a bit of
an irrelevancy, except in that it is an extension of 28 days? There is
no magic figure in 42
days.
Sir
Ian Blair:
There is no magic figure; that is
absolutely fair. But if you are suggesting that our view is that we
should just extend detention to the infinite,
the answer is no, we would not. Your job is to balance civil liberties
against the threat. That is what Parliament is engaged in. Our job is
to suggest that sooner rather than later something will happen that
will make 28 days insufficient. The Government have suggested 42 days
and that is a matter for Parliament to
consider.
The
Chairman:
Order. Three Back-Bench Members want to come in
and I want to fit them all in, so you may ask a very brief
supplementary,
Dominic.
Q
27
Mr.
Grieve:
There are other common law jurisdictions, with
which we have a concomity of legal principles and ideas of freedom that
have much shorter periods of pre-charge detention, and which are
managing that by taking other robust measures, such as bringing in
intercept evidence. Do I infer correctly that if we could go down that
road, there is no reason why we should be taking the road that you are
advocating of long periods of pre-charge
detention?
Sir
Ian Blair:
What I have said is that we appear to be
facing the most rapidly escalating threat of those countries in terms
of the number of people involved and the plots that are going on. That
is happening now. I answered a question earlier about intercept. If
intercept was available now or could conceivably be introduced in the
next two or three years, it would be a relevant consideration. However,
it is not available at the moment and there is nothing to suggest that
it will
be.
Q
28
Mrs.
Sharon Hodgson (Gateshead, East and Washington, West)
(Lab): I want to slightly change the direction for a moment
and ask about your view on the current notification requirements for
sex offenders. Have those been successful in keeping track of
offenders? The reason that I ask is that the Bill proposes a similar
notification regime for terrorist offenders. What are your views on
that?
Sir
Ian Blair:
I will pass that to you,
Bob.
Bob
Quick:
Yes. I am familiar with the provisions of
the Sex Offenders Act 2003. They are generally
effective in helping to monitor and regulate sex offenders, but are by
no means perfect. Many sex offenders slip off the radar and sadly can
reoffend. The correlation of sex offending and the patterns and types
of people involved with terrorist offenders is not good. The risks to
the public, while serious with sex offenders, are of a different
magnitude with terrorist offenders who may be seeking to sacrifice
their own life while committing mass
murder.
Q
29
Mr.
Wallace:
May I ask you to clarify? You used two figures:
37 convictions, with 21 pleading guilty. Out of how many arrests were
those
convictions?
Bob
Quick:
Off the top of my head, I think that the
figure is about 145, but I would need to check
that.
The commissioner listed a number
of issues about republican terrorism. Point four was a pretty much full
penetration of British intelligence in sources and informers.
Injustices and detention without trial, be it the extreme of internment
or things like dawn raids, help to cause community friction and make
that harder. Do you think that any amount of detention without trial in
these circumstances will make the job of recruiting sources, as opposed
to investigation,
harder?
Sir
Ian Blair:
That is very difficult to tell. The two
circumstances are fundamentally different. I do not want to go back
into too much history, but there was a nationalist community that had a
very strong view about what was going on as opposed to a Muslim
community of whom the vast majority are appalled by what is going on.
Those places are
different.
Q
31
Mr.
John Heppell (Nottingham, East) (Lab): People have asked
about intercept evidence and post-charge questioning. Am I right that
you do not see this as an either/or? Even if they were available, you
would require the extension of the 28
days.
Sir
Ian Blair:
I certainly support the introduction of
questioning after charge, but I do not think that that will make much
difference because almost everybody will remain silent. In terms of
intercept as evidence, it is just not available and will not be for a
number of
years.
Q
32
Mr.
Heppell:
To follow the question of my hon. Friend the
Member for Sedgefield about consequences, you said earlier that you did
not want to be in a situation where you were having to discuss this
after an atrocity. The implication seemed to be that you think that
these changes could prevent an atrocity. Is that really your
view?
Sir
Ian Blair:
I would not want to say that these changes
alone will prevent an atrocity, but they are part of an armoury that
may help to prevent them. Without going into the matters that are
currently on trial, the scale of the ambition is
remarkable.
The
Chairman:
Thank you, Sir Ian and Mr. Quick, for
your time and expertise. Thank you also, Sir Ian, for finishing with a
matter of seconds to spare—split second timing, you might
say.
Thank you very
much indeed to our witnesses and to all members of the Committee for
their co-operation. We shall now move to the next witness representing
Justice, from whom we will hear in a moment. Let us have a speedy
turnaround.
12
noon
The
Chairman:
I welcome our witness. For the record, would you
be good enough formally to identify yourself,
please?
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
My name is Eric Metcalfe. I am the
director of human rights policy at
Justice.
The
Chairman:
Thank you. My name is John
Bercow; I am MP for Buckingham and I am co-chairing this Public Bill
Committee. With the leave of the Committee, I would like to ask whether
any members of the Committee wish to ask questions on matters other
than pre-charge
detention without trial. If they do, I will take those questions first,
and then move on to the important matter of pre-charge detention
without trial. Thank you, colleagues, for your co-operation. I call
Dominic Grieve, then David
Heath.
Q
33
Mr.
Grieve:
First, may I turn to the issue of the DNA database
and data-sharing powers in the Bill? I wondered what your views are on
that and whether you consider that the powers being envisaged are
proportionate, in view of the fact that they appear to
allow—certainly in the case of the security services and
others—a wide dissemination of information other than only for
the purposes of preventing crime, given that it is specifically
provided that it is also for the purposes of national security, which
is a rather more nebulous
concept.
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
I agree that it is a much more
nebulous concept. In previous years, we have seen a number of
situations in which powers used for national security tend to bleed
down into the ordinary criminal law. One only has to consider the
recent examples of authorisations under the Regulation of Investigatory
Powers Act 2000, in which surveillance powers are used in relation to
parents being in the right zone for schools, and so forth. In relation
to the collection of DNA, we are extremely concerned about the lack of
regulation in relation to the police database and the very broad
powers, particularly in relation to suspects on control orders. As some
of you may know, the measure is being heard before the European Court
of Human Rights and we expect a judgment very shortly. We are concerned
that it is liable to create further interference with the right to
privacy.
Q
34
Mr.
Heath:
Dr. Metcalfe, I would like to ask you about
post-charge questioning. In your evidence, you make it clear that you
feel that the Joint Committee on Human Rights is right to suggest that
there needed to be very clear provisions, either through a code of
conduct or, preferably, in primary legislation, to secure the rights of
the individual under post-charge questioning. I notice that you also
suggest that there should be direct supervision by the court. Can you
elaborate on exactly how you feel that that should take
place?
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
We see no barrier to the questioning
taking place in front of a judge. That emphasises the importance of the
court being in control of the process. There is a very important
distinction once the charges have been brought against an
individual.
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
It is not necessarily the trial judge,
although if it is possible to arrange that, it would
obviously be desirable. Generally speaking, you certainly want to
emphasise the role of the judge in charge of the pre-trial process.
Bear in mind that case management for terrorism trials can go over a
number of months, so there may be some leeway for different judges to
be involved at different stages. The fundamental distinction, which was
identified by the Joint Committee, is that once charges have been
brought, the police are no
longer in charge of the investigation; it is the court that controls the
investigation. That is a fundamental part of our criminal justice
process. It is important that the police remain under the close
supervision of the court, in a way that they are not in relation to
pre-charge
investigation.
The
Chairman:
Thank you. As we are dealing with post-charge
questioning, I shall come back to Dominic Grieve, who wants to come in
on that
matter.
Q
36
Mr.
Grieve:
I think that it may already largely have been
covered. There seems to be widespread agreement about desirability, but
is it not very much in the interests of the police themselves that
there should be judicial supervision of the
process?
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
Absolutely, because at the end of the
day, this is an evidence-gathering process and one wants the evidence
to be admissible; one doesn’t want it to be thrown out due to
the judge’s discretion to bar evidence obtained by oppression.
So it is in everyone’s interests that there are as many
safeguards as possible in the Bill in relation to post-charge
questioning.
Q
37
Mr.
Llwyd:
Dr. Metcalfe, in your document entitled,
“Intercept evidence: lifting the ban”, dated October
2006, you said that there was an overwhelming case for the ban on
intercept evidence to be lifted forthwith. I think that you were in the
room when Sir Ian Blair said, somewhat dismissively, that there are
administrative and legislative barriers that make that quite impossible
and that it is virtually pie in the sky that it could ever come in over
the next two or three years. What is your view on
that?
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
I was very surprised that Sir Ian took
that view. I think it is taking a cue from the report of the Chilcot
committee, which says that more time is needed to think about it. We
take the opposite view, which is that a great deal of thinking has
already been done on this issue; in particular, we know that the
Government have been working on the public interest immunity plus model
of intercept evidence for some time. Indeed, we were told by the Bill
team in the Home Office, prior to the Chilcot report being handed down,
that in the event that the Chilcot committee gave the green light to
using intercept evidence, it would be prepared to insert clauses into
the Bill. So it seems unusual, given that at one point, just at the
beginning of this year, we were told that clauses could be imminent,
but that now the most senior police officer seems to think that
resolution of the issue is years
away.
On the
experience in the United States, which Sir Ian mentioned, I think, with
respect, that he is completely wrong about the US model of intercept
evidence. There was a report published in 2006 on a detailed
comparative study of the use of intercept evidence in Canada, Australia
and New Zealand, South Africa and the United States. We noted that the
US law to which Sir Ian refers is, in its overall design and framework,
similar to the public interest immunity process that we have here.
Certainly, the Home Office will have been aware of that when working on
public interest immunity plus. We think that it should be possible to
introduce clauses much more quickly than is being done. The Chilcot
report identified points that need to
be addressed, but we do not think that it is a matter of years; we think
that, at best, it is a matter of months. With the best will in the
world, I am sure that clauses could be introduced into this
Bill.
Q
38
Patrick
Mercer:
What is Justice’s view of the provisions
relating to coroners’ inquests and, indeed, their inclusion in
the
Bill?
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
We strongly oppose
the provisions. Obviously, coronial proceedings are under reform at the
moment. There was talk of a coroners Bill, and we understand that
certain provisions in relation to intercept evidence and closed
proceedings were transplanted into this Bill. In our view, those are
extremely ill thought
out.
At the moment, a
coroner’s inquest sitting under the special appointment
procedure would have the power to hear intercept evidence. If the
coroner reaches a finding of unlawful killing, the case would be passed
to the Crown Prosecution Service, which would, under the current
situation, be unable to use any intercept evidence to prosecute an
individual. You would therefore have an obvious mismatch between a
clear finding of the coroner that there was unlawful conduct and the
inability of the CPS to prosecute. That is just one of the anomalies
that are brought about by the failure to address the issue of intercept
evidence
wholesale.
The second
issue, and our major concern, is the provision to allow coroners to sit
without juries and hold closed proceedings. Article 2 of the European
convention on human rights, which relates to the right to life,
contains clear requirements on duties towards the relatives of those
who are unlawfully killed. It is extremely important for them that
justice not only be done, but be seen to be done. The provisions in
part 6 seem to us to cut off that possibility completely. Therefore, we
think that they are extremely ill thought out and we look forward to
them being
withdrawn.
Q
39
Mr.
Holloway:
With reference to the proposals for
Government-appointed coroners, how would you suggest that operational
details about the manner of the deaths or ways that the state was
trying to counteract them could not go into the public domain if you
did not have Government-appointed
coroners?
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
A number of different methods can be
used and there is a variety of different stages. For example, only
yesterday we learned that the jury in the royal blackmail case heard
the tapes being played in camera—in private—and the media
were excluded. That is one means by which a jury can sit and hear
sensitive information without the broader information being passed to
the public at
large.
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
As some people have pointed out, large
numbers of the general public, particularly ex-service personnel, have
low-level security clearance. One possibility is, when empanelling a
jury, to investigate to determine whether individuals already have
clearance, as is often the case. Another method is to have a sifting
process involving a disclosure stage using special advocates; the
special advocates and the coroner could then determine what material
could be made public and what would remain
closed.
Q
41
Mr.
Holloway:
You are almost suggesting that you appoint the
juries. That is the logical conclusion of what you
suggest.
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
That was only one suggestion, and I am
not suggesting that you should appoint the juries. I am saying that
that is one way in which you could meet the concerns. I think that we
need to have more faith in the role of juries and in the particular
importance of their oaths not to disclose information. I also think
that there is a certain amount of overstatement in the
Government’s case that the most sensitive secrets need to be
disclosed during a coroner’s proceedings. We have seen a number
of inquests taking place at the moment that relate, for example, to
military operations in Iraq and they do not require that kind of
sensitive intrusion.
Q
42
Mr.
Holloway:
Are you leaving it to your faith in juries to
determine whether sensitive information that should protect everyone
does not go into the public
domain?
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
No, I am simply stating
that that is one of a number of different mechanisms
available.
Q
43
Mr.
Holloway:
But that is not available, and it will not
protect operational security. It is not available and simply would not
work, so what would
work?
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
That particular measure of getting
security-cleared
juries.
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
Why would not security-cleared juries
work?
Q
45
Mr.
Holloway:
You are suggesting that you should pull people
off the street. The logical consequence of that is to have appointed
juries, so what is your objection to having appointed
coroners?
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
That is a very different process,
because we are talking about members of the public with security
clearance.
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
There are two different methods. You
can either seek out members of the jury who have already received
security clearance, or you can empanel members of the public and go
through the process of giving them security
clearance.
Q
46
Mr.
Holloway:
There is a very big difference between low-level
security clearance and much higher-level clearance, and the effect of
having people with much higher-level security clearance would be that
the state, in effect, was appointing the jury
anyway.
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
It really depends on the kind of
material that the Government would wish to put before
the coroner’s inquest in the first place. For example, if you do
a sifting process involving special advocates prior to the jury being
empanelled, you could determine what material requires protection and
what does not. In
current closed proceedings, we quite often find that a great deal of the
material that the Government claim is so sensitive that it cannot be
disclosed is in fact found by the court not to be so. Therefore, I am
saying that there is a combination of different measures, and these are
just examples: there are more. By a combination of different methods,
it is possible to have coroners sitting with juries drawn from the
general public.
The
Chairman:
Thank you, Dr. Metcalfe. If there are no further
questions on other matters we will move on now to the subject of
pre-charge detention without
trial.
Q
47
Mr.
Grieve:
Dr. Metcalfe, I should be grateful if you could
give an overview of Justice’s position on pre-charge detention.
I do not know whether you were here to hear Sir Ian Blair’
evidence. The view he put forward was that it was a necessity because
of the lack of the availability of intercept evidence, for example,
which seems to be a voluntary decision of the Government rather than
anything else. Could you shed any light on the apparent lack of clarity
about how long it is taking in current cases to bring charges against
individuals accused of
terrorism?
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
In general terms I identify five major
arguments against the Government’s proposal to extend the
maximum limit for pre-charge detention to 42 days. The first is that,
in our view, it clearly violates the right to liberty laid down not
only in our own Human Rights Act, but under relevant international
human rights standards, including the international covenant on civil
and political rights to which the United Kingdom is party.
Our second major argument is
that 42 days is unsupported by evidence. The Government have not
identified any case in which a person has been held for 28 days and
then released and has then been shown to be involved in terrorism.
Thirdly, we think that 42 days is unnecessary in practical terms,
primarily because of the ability of the Crown Prosecution Service to
apply the threshold test at a certain point in the investigation, to
allow people to be charged with terrorist offences even where the full
evidential material is not available.
Fourthly, we note that 42 days
is far longer than any other western democracy allows, and that
includes the European civil systems. Fifthly, we think that there are
no credible safeguards in relation to 42 days. There are no additional
judicial safeguards offered in the Bill, and the parliamentary
safeguards are inappropriate and, in any event, very much after the
fact.
It
is important to note that there is a large gap
between suspicion and proof and what the police are dealing with in
their investigations at the point of arrest is suspicion, and in
particular the idea of reasonable suspicion. In order to charge an
individual and to convict them you need proof. The argument seems to be
that the police need ever longer periods of time in order to gain
sufficient admissible evidence. We argue that the threshold test
essentially allows for reasonable suspicion to be applied at the point
of charge, so really there has been no problem, as the chief prosecutor
indicated, in bringing charges against those who are suspected of
involvement in the most serious of crimes.
Q
48
Mr.
Bailey:
May I pursue an issue that I raised with Sir Ian
Blair—relations with the Muslim community? What is your
assessment of the likely impact of the previous extension from 14 days
to 28 days, and of any potential extension from 28 days to
42
days?
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
Let me stress first of all that we are
a policy organisation. We do not represent individuals. We are not what
one might describe as a grass-roots organisation. However, in general
terms it does seem that one argument is that effective
counter-terrorism investigation relies on the community to bring
forward intelligence and on the use of informers and such like in order
to detect people who are involved in terrorism in the first place. As a
matter of common sense, it inhibits people’s willingness to come
forward if they see their community as a whole being targeted. There is
no doubt that the nature of the current threat tied to radical
Islamicists means that the Muslim population of the United Kingdom as a
whole—as a general category—is liable to be
targeted.
I fully
accept that, as Sir Ian Blair says, the great majority of those people
themselves do not want to be blown up by terrorists and strongly oppose
the terrorists. None the less, I think he underestimates the
possibility that people may strongly dislike terrorism while also
strongly distrusting the police. If you see that members of your
community are liable to be arrested and held without charge for more
than a month, that might well diminish the likelihood that you will be
willing to co-operate with the
police.
Q
49
Mr.
Bailey:
Have you had representations from any Muslim
organisations or prominent Muslims that would substantiate the argument
you have just
deployed?
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
I can speak only in anecdotal terms,
because we are not in a position to invite such representations, formal
or otherwise, but we go to a number of meetings and speak on platforms
about pre-charge detention. I have been to any number of meetings at
which a great deal of concern has been expressed by members of the
Muslim and broader communities about the likely impact of the
provisions—so, yes, anecdotally, I
have.
Q
50
Mr.
Wallace:
I want to link pre-charge detention with the
measures on post-charge questioning. One of the arguments presented by
the police is that they need time to examine evidence. Given the
provisions in the Bill on post-charge questioning, does it seem to you
that if someone were charged with a fairly serious or middling
terrorist offence, they would be much more likely to be remanded than
released on bail? Would not the police then have all the time in the
world to examine evidence and put it to that individual in a
post-charge situation? Would not that solve some of their concerns
about having time to examine the evidence? Does not the facility for
post-charge questioning do half the job of pre-charge
detention?
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
It is interesting to compare the
support for post-charge questioning indicated by police with the
comments that they have made to the Select Committee on Home Affairs in
previous inquiries,
particularly about the 90-day issue. It is apparent that the police do
not readily rely on questioning suspects in terrorism cases. If you
look at the testimony of solicitors representing detainees in terrorism
cases, questioning is not a major part of the investigation. For the
same reasons, I do not see that there would be much need to rely on
post-charge questioning. Our support for post-charge questioning partly
goes to the principle that if there are pressures, they can be
alleviated by post-charge questioning. Given that there is a principled
case for allowing it, why not make it available? We support it on that
basis, but I do not think that there is a strong demand for post-charge
questioning. I think that the experience of suspects in terrorism
investigations is not to answer questions, so, as the police themselves
have said—I invite you to look at their previous testimony to
the Home Affairs Committee when the 90-day limit was being
considered—it is probably only a limited measure. None the less,
we support it to the extent that it could be seen to reduce
pressure.
Q
51
Lord
Commissioner of Her Majesty
’
s Treasury
(Mr. Alan Campbell):
Dr. Metcalfe, you have set
out very clearly in your evidence today and in your memorandum to the
Committee the criteria on which you judge that any extension up to 42
days would be unacceptable. You have also just given Mr.
Bailey another reason—the effect that any change in the law
would have on the willingness of people to come forward with evidence.
Using the same criteria and, presumably, maintaining a consistent
position for Justice, will you remind me what Justice’s position
was on allowing 90 days?
Dr. Eric
Metcalfe:
We strongly opposed a 90-day
limit.
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
We oppose 28
days.
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
We oppose 14
days.
Q
54
Mr.
Campbell:
What would Justice’s position be on 58
days, which, I remind you, is the period that could be introduced if
the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 were
amended?
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
Whether you could use the Civil
Contingencies
Act—
Mr.
Campbell:
If it could be amended—let us say, for
the sake of argument, that it could—to 58 days, would you oppose
or support it?
Dr. Eric
Metcalfe:
It would depend on the threats involved
that justified the use of the Act in the first
place.
Q
55
Mr.
Campbell:
On the basis of where we are now, do you think
that you would support or oppose
it?
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
I cannot answer a hypothetical
question based on threats that have not been made clear. Whether or not
the Act could be used in relation
to a future terrorist investigation would, to my mind, very much depend
on the facts of the case. I think it is highly unlikely. That is the
general
answer.
Q
56
Mr.
Heath:
May I take you back to something that you mentioned
earlier, Dr. Metcalfe—the threshold test? I agree with you that
it is of some significance, but that was not the position that the
police had taken until recently, was it? I think that Deputy Assistant
Commissioner Peter Clarke said that it had no relevance to terrorism
cases. Do you agree with me that what we heard from Mr.
Quick today was a recognition that the threshold test had a part to
play in assisting, as part of the armoury, terrorist
inquiries?
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
I did understand Mr. Quick
as saying that as well. I think that the important point to stress is
that it is not the police who are responsible for charging suspects in
terrorism cases. I also think that Sir Ian somewhat understated the
involvement of the Crown Prosecution Service in the preparation and the
investigation of terrorism cases of this kind. As the CPS paper that
was released by the Government last July makes clear, it is the CPS
that is responsible for going to courts to seek authorisation of
continued pre-charge detention. In order to do that, the CPS itself
must be apprised of the nature of the investigation and how it is
proceeding. How else is the CPS supposed to defend the detention and
argue for an extension in court, unless it is very intimately involved
with the ongoing investigations?
Q
57
Mr.
Heath:
Taking the threshold test together with what I
shall persist in calling lower order offences even if it offends the
Minister, because that is exactly what they are and it is the correct
term, is that not a mechanism for what used to be called a holding
offence, to enable a charge to be brought quite properly against a
suspect against whom there is prima facie evidence? Furthermore, does
your organisation have any objection in principle to the use of holding
charges in order to ensure that somebody is kept in custody while
further offences can be
investigated?
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
I do not think that we need to mix
those two situations together. It is perfectly possible to use the
threshold test in relation to the most serious kinds of charges, for
example conspiracy to cause explosions, which is the standard charge
that is brought against suspected terrorists, or incitement to commit
murder. The threshold test applies equally to the most serious charges
as to what we might call minor holding charges.
I think that everyone has a
problem with the idea of applying a charge against a suspect for which
there is not sufficient evidence; that is problematic. In a less
problematic way, what a holding charge generally refers to is simply
using another charge for which there is evidence to support the
individual being charged against that individual while you prepare more
serious charges, and nothing prevents more serious charges from being
brought. If there is evidence to show that the person is also involved
in encouraging terrorism, or I should say inciting terrorism, but you
are also looking for evidence that they are actively involved in
conspiracy to commit explosions, there is nothing that prohibits that
person from being charged with the so-called lesser
offence.
Q
58
Mr.
Heppell:
My hon. Friend the Member for Tynemouth has
reminded us of the fact that Justice opposed the extension to 28 days.
Which of your five, or possibly six, reasons would you not have used in
your arguments against 28 days that you use for 42 days? Is anything
different in what you are saying now about the extension beyond 28 days
from what you said about the extension to 28
days?
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
I think that the arguments apply
equally to the extension to 28 days as to the extension beyond 28 days.
The biggest difference about this debate is that, whereas the CPS was
content to remain silent in relation to the extension from 14 to 28
days, the CPS has now broken its silence to say that it believes that
28 days is more than sufficient.
Q
59
Mr.
Heppell:
That is the view of the CPS. Is what you are
saying that your position has not changed?
Dr. Eric
Metcalfe:
The arguments that we identified have been
consistent,
yes.
Q
60
Mr.
Heppell:
Do you accept that there is some justification in
the increase under the Terrorism Act 2006 from 14 to 28 days, because
there have been prosecutions that would not have taken place if there
had not been an extension from 14 days? Do you not accept
that?
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
I do not accept that; I do not accept
the premise that those prosecutions could not have taken place had you
applied the threshold test at 14 days.
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
It does seem, from the evidence that
Sir Ken Macdonald and Sue
Hemming—
Q
62
Mr.
Heppell:
It did happen, though, did it not? There were
prosecutions, were there not, as a result of the
extension?
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
No. It is not clear on the evidence
that that is in fact the case. It is clear that three people were held
to 28 days and then charged, but you cannot demonstrate from that as a
matter of logic that they could not, in fact, have been charged on the
basis of evidence that, as it may seem, was in fact available at the
14-day point.
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
Well, I think to anyone, outside of
the police and the CPS. You will have to ask Sir Ken these questions, I
think, in more detail.
The
Chairman:
Order. Briefly please, Adrian—if it is on
this point. Otherwise, I want to bring in Phil
Wilson.
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
We think that the original limit of
seven days laid down under the Terrorism Act 2000 is the maximum period
that is likely to be compatible with the right to liberty under article
5 of the European convention. I know that the UN human rights
Committee, which is responsible for the international covenant on civil
and political rights, has said clearly in its own general commentary
that detention of more than a few days is unlikely to be compatible
with the right to
liberty.
Q
64
Phil
Wilson:
In paragraph 45 of the brief that you sent us, on
page 15, in relation to the Barot case in 2004, you are on about the
complexity of cases, I think. You say there were 274 computers, whereas
there were 400 in the alleged airline plot in 2006, and 2,000 computer
disks, CD and DVDs; you add
that
“there were 8,224
exhibits seized in the Dhiron Barot case compared with in excess of
25,000 in the alleged airline plot.”
Do you think that that could all have
been sorted out in seven
days?
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
It is a false assumption to suppose
that it needs to be sorted out in seven
days.
Q
65
Phil
Wilson:
I do not think it is, because I notice further on,
in paragraph 46, you are on about the suspicions of the police. I think
I would give them the benefit of the doubt, on the basis that they deal
with this on a day-to-day basis. It is credible that they could not
sort it out in seven days; they needed more time to do
it.
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
That is their claim. That is not in
fact clear, because they were not responsible for charging
anyone.
Q
66
Phil
Wilson:
I suppose they must be given the benefit of the
doubt, because they deal with this on a day-to-day basis. Are you
saying that you would only give them seven days to sort all that
out?
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
They are not responsible for charging
the people. It is the Crown Prosecution Service that is responsible for
that.
Q
67
Phil
Wilson:
What the police say is that they need up to 42
days to help sort out those cases, because they are becoming highly
complex. Why should not we accept their views, considering that they
deal with this on a day-to-day
basis?
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
You have raised the facts and figures
that I cited in paragraph 45. Let me refer you to paragraph 47, which
refers to 250 police officers and an investigation costing £2.2
million, involving MI5 and police, lasting over two months. That was
the Forest Gate investigation. If you tell me that an investigation
involves 250 police officers and costs £2.2 million, it sounds
very complex to me, but that was an example of reasonable suspicion by
the police that bore no fruit. You are asking for the police to have
the power to detain suspects for six weeks on the basis of the same
reasonable suspicion. What if the police had held those people in the
Forest Gate investigation for up to six weeks, on the basis
of—
Q
68
Phil
Wilson:
But with the people who were being charged
ultimately after 28 days, the police needed the time to do it. I think
what we are doing is dancing on a pin
head.
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
The police can cite to you 2,000
computer disks, and I can cite 250 police officers and £2.2
million. The fact that we can both throw figures
up into the air to suggest complexity does not relate logically to the
question of whether there is any basis to the
case.
Q
69
Mr.
Holloway:
Following up on Mr. Wilson’s
point and the question whether the Committee was denied other witnesses
with operations experience, such as Stella Rimington, who might oppose
the legislation, why do you think that people such as Sir Ian and
Mr. Quick—operational people who deal with the issue
every day—seem to be in favour of it? It must be more than
toadying up to their political masters, must it
not?
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
I have never suggested it was that. I
think that they operate in complete good
faith.
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
I think that there is a disagreement
among senior police
officers.
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
It would be natural for anyone; if you
put me in charge of investigating counter-terrorism cases in the United
Kingdom, I would ask for as much time as I possibly could. In that
situation, as hypothetical commissioner, I am not actually required to
balance the public interest in protecting fundamental rights. I would
simply ask for as much time as you could give me. If Parliament is
willing to give me 100 days or 200 days, or an indefinite period, as
Lord Carlile suggested, I would ask for
that.
Q
71
Mr.
Holloway:
Surely, the motivation of such people is to get
a conviction and to keep the public
safe.
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
Absolutely, and that is the only
consideration as far as the police are concerned, and thank God that
that is their primary motivation. My point is that, when Parliament
comes to consider whether pre-charge detention is justified, it cannot
have regard just to the operational considerations of the police. I
would always say that more time is going to be helpful, but the police
are not responsible for charging suspects, and the Crown Prosecution
Service does not require the proposed amount of
time.
Q
72
Mr.
Holloway:
But if the police take the view that more than
seven days—seven days is about what you would think
appropriate—would help to keep the public safe and secure
convictions, why would you not support that?
Dr. Eric
Metcalfe:
The logical end point of that argument is
an indefinite amount of time. If 42, why not 58? If 58, why not 90? If
investigations are so infinitely complex—something of which I am
highly sceptical, I have to point
out—
Q
73
Mr.
Holloway:
So why have you alighted on seven, then? You say
that the logical conclusion of what I am saying is that we should have
an unlimited amount of time. Why are you saying seven?
Dr. Eric
Metcalfe:
Because seven, according to international
human rights jurisprudence, is clearly the maximum amount of time that
you can allow the police, balanced with the rights of the individual
suspect.
Dr. Eric
Metcalfe:
They are not considering the rights of the
suspect.
Dr. Eric
Metcalfe:
Yes, but that is only one consideration
among many.
Dr. Eric
Metcalfe:
Let us look at it this way. The public have
a right to be kept safe—that is true. However, they have a right
to be kept safe not only from terrorist threats, but from
disproportionate Executive measures. Innocent members of the public
travelling on the tube have a right to be kept safe from being blown up
by terrorists. Innocent members of the public travelling on the tube
also have a right not to be shot in the head seven times by
counter-terrorism officers.
Q
77
Mr.
Holloway:
Do you not think that we are in a slightly
different situation now, given what Sir Ian Blair has said about plots
and about the scale of terrorists’ ambitions being
remarkable—that is, unlike anything that we have seen outside
war
time?
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
Here is the difficulty that I have
with that statement. In 2000, at a time when al-Qaeda had already begun
to be engaged in serious threats to US national security interests and
was no doubt on the radar of MI6, we had established seven days. After
9/11, with an incredibly serious, widespread plot involving multiple
international targets and suspects in a number of different
jurisdictions, the police in this country argued for 14 days. It went
up to 14 days in 2003 and then to 90 days after 7/7. The difficulty is
that the Madrid bombings and the 9/11 attacks were plots of equal
complexity, and the suggestion that, in the past five year, the plots
have somehow escalated in complexity, is something that I find
difficult to apprehend. We are dealing with a relatively constant level
of threat, from internationally based plots, which involve multiple
jurisdictions and suspects with different backgrounds and different
languages, although the level of computer technology has not made a
dramatic difference. I accept that the situation is highly complex, but
it does not seem to be dramatically different from the situation that
we faced in 2003, when Parliament decided that the limit should be 14
days.
Q
78
Mr.
Holloway:
Could it not be that the scale of the problem
dawns on people more slowly than you suggest?
Dr. Eric
Metcalfe:
If that is the case, I am very surprised
that it has taken such a long time to dawn.
Dr. Eric
Metcalfe:
It is also important to note that, at the
end of the day, the complexity is solved by the threshold test, which
provides the ultimate answer to all these issues. We should bear it in
mind that the police have to have reasonable suspicion at the point
when they arrest a subject. That means that they have to have
intelligence of some kind to justify the assertion that these people
are sufficiently dangerous to be arrested. So it is not the case that
the police have no evidence at the point when they arrest someone; in
fact, they have to have a reasonable basis for their suspicions. What
we are really talking about is having sufficient time for them to
gather admissible evidence. As we have pointed out time and again, the
most compelling kind of inadmissible evidence currently available is
intercept.
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
I am not aware of their names, I am
afraid.
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
No, I read a report in The
Guardian this morning.
Q
82
Mr.
McNulty:
You made it very clear that senior police
officers object in terms to what the Metropolitan Police Commissioner
and the most senior anti-terrorism officer in the country said, but you
cannot remember their
names.
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
It is striking that Assistant
Commissioner Quick had the opportunity to tell you that senior police
officers were unanimously in support of the proposals, but did not do
so. From that one can reasonably infer that if they were unanimously in
support of the 42-day extension they would have told you that, but they
did
not.
Q
83
Mr.
McNulty:
With respect, he made it very clear that the
cabinet and council of the Association of Chief Police Officers were at
one regarding the proposals made by ACPO-TAM, which he chairs. This is
not a deliberative Parliament. They come to a position and they agree
it.
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
With respect, it was not clear from
their evidence this
morning—
Q
84
Mr.
McNulty:
That aside, you have invoked senior police
officers and you cannot even name
them.
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
I have identified the report in The
Guardian this morning, which identifies the
senior—
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
I gather a great deal of my
information about Government that
way.
Q
85
Mr.
McNulty:
You read in the paper that there were senior
police officers against it, and that is the sum of your evidence. When
were you given an intelligence brief on Forest Gate and what that
entailed?
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
That again was drawn from material
that is available on the—
Mr.
McNulty:
When were you given an intelligence brief by the
authorities on what they went into Forest Gate
anticipating?
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
I am pleased to confirm that I was
not.
Q
86
Mr.
McNulty:
Okay. You have just said that the ultimate answer
to all these issues is a threshold test. Is that
right?
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
Yes, it
is.
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
You either have sufficient evidence to
meet the threshold test or you have sufficient evidence to meet the
full code test, or you release the suspect, once they have reached the
maximum period of pre-charge detention that is available under the
existing
law.
Q
87
Mr.
McNulty:
Do you think you can use threshold tests to
charge someone simply on the basis of
intelligence?
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
It depends very much on the nature of
what we are describing as intelligence in the
situation.
Mr.
McNulty:
Do you think that intelligence, as we commonly
accept it, is sufficient to arrest someone on the threshold
test?
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
Again, I have to point out that I do
not receive intelligence briefings, but intelligence, as I understand
it, is drawn from a number of different sources, some of which may be
admissible and some of which may not. Some of the sources may be
hearsay, some may be speculation and some may be reasonable hypotheses.
So some of the intelligence will be likely to
be—
Q
88
Mr.
McNulty:
So, there might be at least an element of time? I
think that you agreed earlier that turning intelligence into admissible
evidence is part of the police
investigation.
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
Some of it may in fact already be
admissible.
Q
89
Mr.
McNulty:
Surely some, but you will not be able to charge
purely on intelligence. What admissible evidence was there against
Dhiren Barot when he was
arrested?
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
I do not have that information in
front of
me.
Q
90
Mr.
McNulty:
Peter Clarke has made it very clear that there
was none, and that it took the Metropolitan police the full 14 days to
secure sufficient admissible evidence to charge
him.
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
If the Metropolitan police were
willing to make available the full amount of admissible information
that it had in the case files, we could have a proper debate.
Unfortunately you only have the say-so of a senior police officer who
has already made it clear that they are in favour of arguing for an
extension.
Q
91
Mr.
McNulty:
Only the say-so of the most senior police officer
in counter-terrorism in this country, who has just
retired.
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
Who was none the less a proponent of
extending pre-charge detention. I do not have the opportunity to speak
to senior police officers who are on the other side of the fence, or
those who
disagree.
Q
92
Mr.
McNulty:
So you are happy to invoke the Dhiren Barot case
in terms of complexity, in the quote referred to earlier at page 15,
but have no understanding of the fact that with Dhiren Barot—one
of the most serious cases we have had over the past couple of
years—there was no evidence when he was arrested. You rather
conveniently do not take the word of the most senior police officer in
counter-terrorism, probably because you have not read it in The
Guardian
.
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
I have not cited the example at
paragraph 45 to suggest that I do not believe it. I believe that the
facts and figures cited there are accurate. You have not disputed them.
Nor have you disputed the facts and figures that I cite at paragraph 47
in relation to the Forest Gate case. If we are going to use these kinds
of fact and figures to show that the complexity of the police
investigation therefore equals suspicion of a suspect, that is the
wrong question. Bear in mind that the judicial supervision of
pre-charge detention is not about assessing the evidence. It is about
determining whether the investigation is proceeding diligently, and
whether the police have good reason for supposing that a suspect needs
to be detained for the reasons that the police have given, but not in
relation to the evidence, only in relation to the threat that the
suspect may pose in interfering with the evidence-gathering process. So
the complexity issue is something of a side note as well. It comes down
to the assessment by the Crown Prosecution Service. You have not
disputed that Sir Ken Macdonald is mistaken when he says that 28 days
is sufficient for the Crown Prosecution Service to do its
job.
Q
93
Mr.
McNulty:
We will discuss Ken MacDonald this afternoon.
This is my last point, I think. In your world, the threat has not
changed since 2000 in any circumstance at
all.
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
That is not what I
said.
Q
94
Mr.
McNulty:
It is clearly what you said. You made it very
clear that since al-Qaeda’s existence came to light in 2000, in
substance the threat has not changed at
all.
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
I said that it was not apparent that
the degree of complexity of the plots had
changed.
Q
95
Mr.
McNulty:
With respect, you said that, at the time of the
parliamentary debate about going from seven to 14 days, the threat was
no better, no higher or no worse than
currently.
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
I said that the nature of the
complexity of the plots of 9/11 appeared to be every bit
as—
Q
96
Mr.
McNulty:
So, to repeat, in your world, it is seven days
and that is it. Why not 48 hours? Why does Liberty somehow accept that
public safety for the rest of us matters in going from 48 hours to
seven days, but not when going from seven to 14 or to 28?
Dr. Eric
Metcalfe:
I think that Liberty is giving evidence on
Thursday so you could ask the question
then.
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
I am not from Liberty, but from
Justice. We think that seven days is a maximum. We would prefer 48
hours, but it is a matter of policy. I am telling you what in our view
would be compatible with the requirements of article 5 of the European
convention on human rights, not what Justice would set as the maximum
time.
Q
97
Mr.
McNulty:
Are you seriously contending that since 2000,
nothing that you understand or know about the threat in terms of its
complexity internationally and all of the other dimensions would
persuade you to go beyond seven
days?
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
We always reconsider our position in
the light of
developments.
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
If you study the case law of the
European court in relation to article 5, its position is clear. I
should note at this point that we have made a request to see the legal
advice that members of the Home Office have received under the Freedom
of Information Act 2000. If you believe that the proposal to extend
pre-charge detention to 42 days is compatible with article 5, I invite
you to make public the legal advice that you have received on that
point.
Q
99
Mr.
McNulty:
We are very clear that everything that we do is
ECHR compatible. I am very pleased that we have sought to get the
balance right between the rights of the individual and the rights of
the wider community to public safety. You can quite happily live in
your own skin with the smugness and complacency that you have shown
today, but I am afraid that we cannot afford
to.
The
Chairman:
Dr. Metcalfe, you are most welcome to answer
that last question from Tony and we will then proceed to other
questioners.
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
My statement about the compatibility
of the seven-day limit was based on our reading of article 5 of the
European convention on human rights, but you may have legal advice from
your legal advisers that suggests differently and that 42 days is
compatible with article 5. We have made a Freedom of Information Act
request and I am sure that the Home Office will reply in due course. If
the Home Office firmly believes that that is the case, redact any
sensitive material that the legal advice contains by all means, but
please make it
public.
Mr.
McNulty:
The freedom of information request will be
treated in the appropriate fashion, but I assure you and the Committee
that seven, 14, 28 days and these proposals are entirely ECHR
compatible. [
Interruption.
] The giggles from the
lawyers from the Opposition party aside, it
is.
The
Chairman:
I am grateful to Tony and to our witness. Just
before I bring in Kali, Jamie and Adrian, I ask Dominic Grieve to come
in.
Mr.
Grieve:
My concern was that it was being suggested to this
witness that it had been stated that there was unanimity in ACPO in
making this recommendation. As that was plainly not the evidence of
Mr. Quick—utterly to the contrary—it is
slightly sterile to open up this issue with another witness, so I will
refrain from doing so. Forgive me, Mr. Bercow, if I say that
I sometimes find myself sitting in these Committees thinking that if
this were a court of law, some of the questions that are being asked
would not get beyond the starting point.
[
Interruption.
]
The
Chairman:
Order. With the understanding of the Committee,
I will take that as an observation and not as a
question.
Q
100
Kali
Mountford (Colne Valley) (Lab): One of the five objections
that you outlined a while ago was the process for judicial oversight.
Could you outline exactly what your objections
are?
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
The point is that the court is not
being asked to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to
justify the suspect’s continued detention. The court is being
asked whether the police have shown cause to detain the person in
relation to the grounds set out in schedule 8 of the Terrorism Act that
allow the police to continue their investigation. The police have to
show only that they are conducting their investigations with proper
diligence. It is a common misconception that judicial authorisation of
extended pre-charge detention involves a determination of the evidence
against the suspect. It does refer to the evidence, but only in
relation to the specific question that the court is being asked to
determine.
Bear in
mind also that the individual suspect and his lawyers may be prohibited
from knowing any of the information relating to the investigation that
is put before the court. So the suspect and his lawyers can be excluded
from the proceedings. You can have a situation in which the suspect is
entirely shut out. I know that, in relation to the previous Home
Affairs inquiry, there was correspondence between the Metropolitan
police and the Home Affairs Committee disputing what we have said, but
they did not deny that the Terrorism Act allows suspects to be excluded
altogether from the detention proceedings.
Q
101
Kali
Mountford:
Am I to understand, therefore, that, if we were
to ask you, you would give us some proposals on how you would accept
judicial oversight of further
proceedings?
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
The kind of judicial oversight that is
outlined in the Terrorism Act would be justifiable only for a short
period of time. That is why I have said seven days, which seems the
maximum period of time. I must stress that it is the maximum. We think
that two days is normal, but seven days seems to be the maximum
permissible under the European
convention.
Q
102
Kali
Mountford:
Are you saying, therefore, that over the seven
days you would introduce new legislation for oversight of the current
situation?
Dr. Eric
Metcalfe:
No. I would remove the current strictures
on suspects being able to know the evidence against them and being
properly represented in any proceedings. But it seems that the current
system would be compatible for only relatively short periods of time.
Certainly, 28 days is very much the high water mark of any possible
scheme being
compatible.
You
seem to be asking me how I would otherwise reform the system. I have
said that the system, as it is, can work for only a short period of
time. The alternative seems to be something such as introducing
judge-led investigations, as they have in other European countries,
where the judge takes control of the investigation and tells the police
which suspects to bring in, how to question them, and so on. That
system works very well in Europe, where the judges have training in
that kind of investigation, but it would not work under our common law
system.
Q
103
Kali
Mountford:
If you think that the process would be
acceptable for seven days, I find it difficult to understand why it
would not be acceptable for 14 days, 21 days, 40 days, or any other
number of
days.
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
Because of the unfairness of detaining
a person for longer periods of time without knowing the evidence or
even the charges against them—because there are no
charges.
Q
104
Mr.
Jamie Reed (Copeland) (Lab): You said earlier, and I agree
with you 100 per cent., that the public had the right to protection
from terrorist atrocity in the same way that they had the right to
protection from the intrusion of the Executive. Do you believe that
they are equivalent
threats?
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
No, I do not. I would be extremely
unhappy if anyone were to twist my words to suggest otherwise. We do
not suggest that we are equally at threat from the Metropolitan police
as we are from
terrorists.
Q
105
Mr.
Reed:
I am pleased to hear that. In principle, do you
believe that it is right for those bodies charged with the protection
of the public and public safety to change legislation in the face of
rising threats to public safety?
Dr. Eric
Metcalfe:
It is perfectly appropriate for the police
to express operational concerns about how they can best combat
suspects.
Q
106
Mr.
Reed:
That is not the answer to the question that I asked.
The question is: in principle, do you think that it is right for
Parliament to change law to improve measures to cater for public safety
in the face of overwhelming evidence that suggests that the threat to
public safety is
rising?
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
Parliament has to do that, but it must
also have regards to the rights of suspects as well. So it cannot just
say that one group of people can be protected, but the rights of other
people have to be sacrificed for their safety. It has to balance the
rights of everyone, whether those people are members of the general
public travelling on the tube or whether they are likely to be
suspects.
As the Stockwell shooting
tragically shows, it is possible for reasonable suspicion to go awry
and possible for an innocent member of the public to be tragically
caught up in an otherwise perfectly justified counterterrorism
operation. I do not suggest for a moment that the police were not fully
required to use all means. If that person was a suicide
bomber—all the intelligence indicated that he was—in that
kind of situation the police may be required to act in that way.
However, my point is that we need the safeguards. You also need to have
regard to fundamental rights, otherwise you will find yourself trading
off the rights of suspects against the rights of the broader
public.
Q
107
Mr.
Reed:
In response to questions asked by Mr.
Holloway, you candidly showed some insight into and support for the
position of chief police officers in responding to these threats. Does
the logic of that argument and of your position in regard to those
answers not defeat your opposition to this
legislation?
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
I do not think that it does. I
expressed sympathy for their view. Were I a public servant charged
entirely with the safety of the British public, I would ask for as many
measures as I could possibly get that would enable me to do what I
thought was necessary to protect the public. My point was that it is
not a balance: that is not the perspective from which Parliament can
afford to view the matter. Parliament has to view the operational
demands of the majority of chief police officers, but it must also have
regard to the minority view, to disagreements and to the view of the
chief prosecutor at the Crown Prosecution Service. It must also have
regard to the rights of the general public, whether they are people who
are liable to be suspects in operations or whether they are just
innocent
travellers.
Q
109
Mr.
Bailey:
Okay, I shall make this quick. First, in the
discussion on the charging that took place between the 14 and 28-day
period, you implied, if I understood you, that those charges could have
been brought before the 14-day period. I should like to know on what
basis you say
that.
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
It is simply not clear to us, from
statements that have been made concerning those cases, that the
evidence was not available prior to that. We simply do not
know.
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
As the Minister has correctly
challenged me, I am not privy to intelligence briefings. I am going on
what has been publicly reported. As a civil society organisation, I
should point out that we are in the position of the general
public.
Q
111
Mr.
Bailey:
You are taking a public position on a matter of
vital importance in this country just on the basis that you have not
had contrary information to contradict your
position.
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
Is it not my responsibility as a
citizen of this country and as a representative of a cross-party human
rights organisation, founded by all three main political parties in
1957 to protect human
rights and uphold the rule of law in this country, to question
rigorously the police’s suggestion that 28 days was necessary to
charge a suspect, although they are not responsible for charging a
suspect?
Q
112
Mr.
Bailey:
With respect, you are here to put your case for
your position, not our position. We have responsibilities as
well.
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
You have asked me the question and I
should like to have the chance to respond. I am saying that it is my
responsibility—and it is the responsibility of all Members of
Parliament—to deliberate carefully. When the police said that
they needed 28 days to charge a suspect, even though they were not
always responsible for charging a suspect, it is perfectly right to
ask, “Couldn’t that person have been charged
earlier?”
Q
113
Mr.
Bailey:
Earlier, you said that you thought that the Crown
Prosecution Service was more closely involved with these processes than
Sir Ian Blair was prepared to
admit.
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
That is
right.
Q
114
Mr.
Bailey:
Would you not agree that, in respect of these
cases, had your position been substantiated the Crown Prosecution
Service, which has, if you like, the responsibility to make that
judgment, would have intervened at the 14-day period rather than
later?
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
As Sir Ian indicated, there is a point
at which the police pass information to the
Crown Prosecution Service. The police may have delayed passing
information to the CPS, thereby leading to the delay. The truth is that
I do not know and you will have to ask Sir Ian these
questions.
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
I do not think that any of the
assertions that I made about the role of the CPS were inconsistent with
anything
else.
Q
116
Mr.
Bailey:
You said that it was more closely involved. If
they are that closely involved, the police can withhold information
from
it.
Dr.
Eric Metcalfe:
I did not say that the CPS and the
police were necessarily working side by side. I said that they were
much more intimately involved than Sir Ian Blair was
suggesting.
The
Chairman:
Order. Thank you very much indeed. I am required
to bring this session to an end. I thank Dr Eric Metcalfe for his time,
expertise and interest. The Committee Room will be locked until 4
o’clock, so if hon. Members wish to leave their papers here they
can safely do
so.
It being One
o’clock,
The Chairman
adjourned the Committee without Question put,
pursuant to the Standing
Order.
Adjourned
accordingly until this day at Four
o’clock.
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| ©Parliamentary copyright 2008 | Prepared 23 April 2008 |
