Clause
43
Power
to Amend Specified Terms or Periods of Imprisonment or
Detention
Mr.
Grieve:
I beg to move amendment No. 175, in
clause 43, page 32, line 4, leave
out paragraph
(a).
The
Chairman:
With this it will be convenient to discuss
amendment No. 176, in clause 43, page 32, line 5, leave out
from ‘force’ to end of line
9.
Mr.
Grieve:
This is a simple
matter—just to have it on the record. As I understand the
purpose of clause 43, it is to ensure that there will be no
retrospectivity applying to any decision to reduce a specified term or
period requiring notification but, at the same time, will give
individuals the benefit of any retrospectivity in cases of extending
the period and thereby taking people out of the regime altogether. In
those circumstances somebody who has been made subject to a
notification process but finds subsequently that the Government change
the rules so that they would not have been subject to that process at
the outset of notification would thereby no longer have to
register.
Mr.
McNulty:
I am grateful that the hon. and learned Gentleman
suggests that these are probing
amendments.
Clause 42 specifies that
sentences or orders of 12 months or more for relevant
offences would lead to the notification requirements applying, as we
have discussed. We believe that this threshold will lead to
notification requirements for convicted terrorists who pose a
significant risk to the community on their release from
custody.
It may be
found in future that the threshold captures serious offences not deemed
to present sufficient risk to justify the application of the
requirements because the threshold is too low. Alternatively, the
threshold may be found to be too high. The clause provides the
Secretary of State with an order-making power to vary the sentence or
order thresholds to ensure that they remain effective, proportionate
and justified. This will be subject to parliamentary scrutiny as the
order is subject to the affirmative resolution procedure. If the order
reduces the thresholds for notification requirements, they will only
apply to those dealt with after the order comes into force. However, if
the order increases the thresholds, for example, from 12 months to two
years, individuals who were subject to notification requirements
because of a sentence of up to two years, would no longer be required
to notify as from the date the order comes into force.
It is as the hon. and learned
Gentleman suggests. With that explanation, I hope that the amendment
will be
withdrawn.
Mr.
Grieve:
I have no difficulty with that explanation and
will ask to withdraw the amendment.
That somebody has clearly seen
the necessity of making the provision highlights the fact that although
notification in itself may not be viewed as a punishment it is
nevertheless an onerous requirement that has to be dealt with fairly.
If it were not for that, there would have been no requirement
to put in clause 42 at all. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the
amendment.
Amendment,
by leave,
withdrawn.
Clause
43 ordered to stand part of the
Bill.
Clause
44
Initial
Notification
Amendments
made: No. 145, in clause 44, page 32, line 17, leave out from
‘question’ to the end of line
22.
No. 146, in clause
44, page 33, line 4, at end insert—
‘( ) In the application of this
section to a person dealt with for an offence before the commencement
of this Part who, immediately before
commencement—
(a) would
be imprisoned or detained in respect of the offence but for being
unlawfully at large, absent without leave, on temporary leave or leave
of absence, or on bail pending an appeal,
or
(b) has been released on
licence, having served the whole or part of a sentence of imprisonment
in respect of the offence,
the
reference in subsection (1) to the day on which the person is dealt
with in respect of the offence shall be read as a reference to the
commencement of this Part.’. —[Mr.
McNulty
.
]
Question
proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the
Bill.
Mr.
Heath:
My brief question also relates to
clause 52, which sets out offences relating to notification.
The offence, of course, is failure without reasonable excuse to comply
with initial notification as outlined in clause 44. Presumably, that
offence is triggered by any failure to comply with any part of clause
44, and what worries me—it is a perfectly simple
concern—is subsection (2)(b), the national insurance number. I
can see that it is entirely possible for a person to comply in every
respect with clause 44—to appear at the police station within
the three-day period, give their date of birth and home address, which
they know, and all the other details which they know, but they may not
know their national insurance number. They may thus not be able to
comply with clause 44.
There is no requirement to know
one’s national insurance number; it is helpful if one does, but
there are circumstances in which people do not know or perhaps have
never been allocated one, or have been allocated two, which is
sometimes the case. As the offence is non-compliance, it worries me
that the compliance is absolute in terms of the whole provision, yet
one element is not necessarily in the control of the individual to whom
the notification order
applies.
Mr.
Blunt:
I have a brief point on which I
seek clarification. In what circumstances is it anticipated that
someone who is unlawfully at large would notify their address and all
the other required information to the police? I just draw attention to
subsection (1)(b)(ii), which puts a duty on someone who is unlawfully
at large to provide their details. I would be grateful if the
Minister—[ I
nterruption
.
] I
understand that, but the punishment under the provision is five years
on conviction. I would have thought that someone unlawfully at large on
a conviction for being unlawfully at large would already be subject to
a punishment of that order. I would be grateful for the
Minister’s clarification.
Mr.
McNulty:
On the point made by the hon.
Member for Somerton and Frome, if he had committed the Bill to
memory—as no doubt he has, but has forgotten it, rather as I
have—he would have rushed to clause 52, where it says very
clearly under “Offences relating to notification” that a
person commits an offence
who
“fails without
reasonable excuse to comply with...section 44”.
It would be a reasonable excuse that a
person had tried and been unable to get his national insurance number
from the Department for Work and Pensions or whomever, but told the
police that he would try to get it as quickly as possible. That would
be a reasonable excuse, so I think the interplay between the two is
perfectly fair. As the hon. Gentleman says, giving a false name would
be a different matter.
An individual’s being at
large does not obviate the need for them to comply with the
notification order. If they are unlawfully at large and have a duty to
notify and fail to do so, that is an offence with a penalty of up to
five years in prison, so it is proper that the words “unlawfully
at large” are included. I suspect that the meaning of those
words is not covered by “reasonable excuse” in terms of
clause 52.
The wording
of the clause makes sense, but I take the point made by the hon. Member
for Reigate. The legalese
says:
“A person
to whom the notification requirements apply must notify the required
information to the police within three
days...If the person was dealt with...before the commencement
of this Part and... has been released on licence or...is
unlawfully at
large” on
commencement, and so on. As the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome
implied, the notification elements do not disappear simply because a
person is unlawfully at large; they are still germane and relevant,
which is why they are mentioned in the clause. However, clause 52
answers the hon. Gentleman’s broader
point.
11.45
am
Mr.
Heath:
I am most grateful to the Minister. I hope that
every police officer who is administering that record will note
carefully the Minister’s comment that if one happens not to know
one’s national insurance number it is a reasonable excuse for
not providing it within the three-day
period.
Clause 44,
as amended,
ordered
to stand part of the
Bill.
Clause
46
Notification
of
changes
Mr.
McNulty:
I beg to move amendment No. 147, in
clause 46, page 33, line 37, at
end insert—
‘This does not
apply if the person is at the same time required to notify the police
under section 44 (initial
notification).’.
The
Chairman:
With this it will be convenient to discuss
Government amendments Nos. 149 to
152.
Mr.
McNulty:
These are deeply tedious technical points. Let me
explain the tedium.
Amendment No. 147 ensures that
there is no double requirement to notify changes by stating that if the
individual is already required to notify the police upon his release
from custody, prison or detention in a hospital, he is required to
notify only under clause 44 and not under clause 46 as well, which
could be an inference under the current
draft.
Amendment
No. 149 adds notifications that are made to the police under clause
47—“Periodic re-notification”—to those
covered by “previous notifications” in clause 46.
Amendment No. 150 clarifies that the one-year period for
re-notification under clause 47 runs from the last notification made by
the
individual.
Amendment
No. 151 makes it clear that a person is not required to re-notify under
clause 47 if the annual re-notification date falls when he is remanded
in custody, imprisoned or detained in a hospital. Further to that,
amendment No. 152 provides that if the person is remanded in custody,
imprisoned or detained in a hospital when the period of one year since
his last notification ends, he is required to notify the police on his
release in accordance with clause 46(4); it further provides that the
information he has to notify is that specified in clause
44(2).
The
amendments tidy up a range of technical points in respect of the
interlocking nature of all the clauses in the part of the Bill relating
to notification requirements. I commend them to the
Committee.
Mr.
Heath:
I have one small anxiety. I hope that the people to
whom the notification orders apply are made aware, while in custody, of
all the details about what they are required to do. I am thinking
particularly about the fact that they are required to provide
notification that they have been released from custody. Many people
might assume that the criminal justice system would be aware that a
person had been released from custody, although that is an unsafe
assumption in the current circumstances. Nevertheless, a reasonable
person might assume that the criminal justice system was aware that a
court had released somebody from custody or from detention in a
hospital. Unless that is spelled out to the person, I fear that they
might inadvertently be in breach of the notification procedures even
while they were attempting to do everything required of them, having
made the sensible assumption that once a court says “you are now
free to go”, the fact is logged somewhere in the
system.
Mr.
McNulty:
That part of the hon.
Gentleman’s comments is perfectly fair, but it is incumbent on
the individual—having previously been under a notification
requirement—to understand fully where that requirement picks up
again once he is released from custody. It is a bit two-way but I take
the point none the less.
In terms of the hon.
Gentleman’s first point, I say simply that we are getting there.
The one thing I have discovered, having been tangential to—but
never responsible for—prisons and the interface between prisons
and criminal justice, is the enormous churn of numbers on a daily
basis. It is quite phenomenal when explored in any detail—those
on short term and those being moved from security to open prisons as a
prelude to release. The hon. Gentleman is right; any normal person
would expect that everyone in the entire system knows when someone is
released, but sometimes there is more than one link-up to make in that
regard.
There are also
responsibilities on the individual, however, bearing in mind that they
are already under a notification requirement and, for whatever reason,
are now detained in prison or custody. They should know precisely when
they should pick up and notify again in terms of the register regime.
Between the individual and the criminal justice system, it is to be
hoped that sanity will
prevail.
Amendment
agreed to.
Mr.
McNulty:
I beg to move amendment No. 148, in
clause 46, page 33, line 40, leave
out from ‘changes’ to the end of line 41 and insert
‘in that
information’.
This
amendment simply makes the drafting throughout clause 44 rather simpler
and easier to understand in terms of how it relates to clause 46(5). It
does not change the policy in any way, but it links to the hon. Member
for Somerton and Frome’s earlier point about how key elements
relate to each other. I hope the amendment makes that clearer rather
than otherwise, and I commend it to the
Committee.
Amendment
agreed to.
Amendment made: No. 149,
in clause 46, page 34, line 11, leave out ‘or this
section’ and insert
‘, this section or section 47
(periodic re-notification)’.—[Mr.
McNulty.]
Clause
46, as amended, ordered to stand part of the
Bill.
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