Clause
54
Protection
for spent cautions under the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act
1974
Question
proposed, That the clause stand part of the
Bill.
Mr.
Burrowes:
The broad rationale of the clause is clear and
one cannot object to the concern to avoid prejudice against people who
have received cautions, reprimands or warnings when they seek jobs and
have to disclose their spent cautions. The position regarding the
disclosure of spent convictions is set out in the Rehabilitation of
Offenders Act 1974. We accept that broad rationale, but I want to
highlight our concerns.
Cautions,
reprimands and warnings are not convictions, which is why they were
outside the ambit of the 1974 Act, and it is important that we do not
creep into considering those disposals to be on a par with convictions.
That chimes with the earlier debate on pre-court disposals and the
importance of distinguishing such disposals from a conviction. Plainly,
a caution, reprimand or warning is an admission of an offence in which
there is sufficient evidence to prosecute, but they are wholly
different from convictions and should be treated as such. We are
concerned that the good intention of trying to prevent prejudice
against people with spent
cautions does not develop into their being seen as equal to convictions.
It is important that we recognise the differences. The rationale is based on the
disclosability of previous cautions. What evidence is there that there
is a problem regarding the disclosure of spent cautions? In their
consultation paper of 19 August 1999, the Government said
that
“it is anomalous for
cautions, reprimands and final warnings to be disclosable in
circumstances where convictions are
not.”
The evidence was
supposedly there then. Why, despite the number of
criminal justice Bills that have gone through Parliament, are we now in
a position that this clause has been added to the Bill? What additional
evidence that there is a need to legislate is there now that was not
there in 1999, when the supposed anomaly was highlighted?
Has there been a problem in the intervening time without legislation
that justifies the provision?
2.30
pm
Mr.
Heath:
Further to the comments made by the hon.
Member for Enfield, Southgate, may I ask the Minister
why this measure does not distinguish between the rehabilitation
provision for a youth conditional caution and the adult equivalent?
Throughout the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974, that distinction
is made. That Act distinguishes between what applies to children or
young people and what applies to adults. There is a different
rehabilitation period for fines, community rehabilitation orders,
community punishment orders, community punishment and rehabilitation
orders, curfew orders, drug treatment and testing orders and for most
custodial sentences. Indeed, even in part 1 of the Bill, there is a
shorter rehabilitation period for the youth rehabilitation order than
there is for the adult equivalent, so why is no distinction made in the
case of these cautions? I am sure that the Minister has a reason, but
it will have to be quite a good one to suggest that these measures must
be an exception from all the other provisions that are covered by the
1974 Act.
Mr.
Hanson:
Clause 54 introduces schedule 12, which is
essentially the nub of the discussion that both hon. Gentlemen have
provoked. The schedule provides for the extension of the Rehabilitation
of Offenders Act 1974 to cover reprimands, warnings, cautions and
conditional cautions as well as convictions. The out of court disposals
that the Bill introduces are not currently within the scope of the 1974
Act and therefore they never become spent. What that means, in effect,
is that, in the event of clause 54 and schedule 12 not forming part of
the Bill, the youth conditional cautions in particular—simple
cautions that may have been given, for example, several years ago for
relatively minor offences—will have to be disclosed when the
Bill comes into effect. The purpose of the clause and the schedule is
to ensure that those disposals become
spent.
The 1999
consultation paper “The Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 and
Cautions, Reprimands and Final Warnings” proposed that those
three out of court disposals should be brought within the ambit of the
1974 Act and that they should be immediately spent, because, as we have
discussed, cautions are used primarily for less serious offences.
Therefore, the Bill provides that simple cautions, reprimands and final
warnings should become immediately spent.
Since that consultation exercise
was undertaken, the Criminal Justice Act 2003 has introduced
conditional cautions for adults, as has been mentioned, and the Bill
proposes the introduction of youth conditional cautions for offenders
aged 16 or 17. I believe that both of those cautions need to be brought
into the scope of the 1974 Act.
Clause 54 and schedule 12 set
the rehabilitation period for conditional cautions and youth
conditional cautions at three months—the midpoint between simple
cautions and the least serious court disposals. They also ensure that
such cautions remain on record while the conditions are outstanding. I
hope that hon. Members will welcome those facts, because I am sure that
they would not wish to see the maintenance of those youth conditional
cautions on offenders’ records in the
future.
Our
intention has been to legislate when parliamentary time allows, and the
introduction of youth conditional cautions now makes it all the more
important that we provide for those cautions to become spent. Clause 54
and schedule 12 will do so. I commend the clause to the
Committee.
Question
put and agreed to.
Clause 54
ordered to
stand part of the
Bill.
Schedule
12 agreed
to.
Clause 55
ordered to stand part of the
Bill.
Clause
56
Allocation
of offences triable either way
etc.
Question
proposed, That the clause stand part of the
Bill.
Mr.
Burrowes:
The clause provides a good
opportunity to highlight previously expressed concern about the
amendment of unimplemented legislation. It is consistent of us to
welcome the extension of discretion, given that we have argued in
debating other clauses against its removal from magistrates courts, and
the clause is welcome. The Government have decided to remove an
unimplemented measure in the Criminal Justice Act 2003 that would have
limited magistrates’ discretion to send to the Crown Court cases
in which the defendant pleads guilty before a venue. The discretion
will now be extended back to the original position before the 2003
Act—magistrates will have wider discretion to commit offenders
tried summarily to the Crown Court for
sentence.
The concern
is best summed up by the Magistrates Association, which welcomes the
reversal but
considers
“the
legislative situation to be confusing. The Bill amends an unimplemented
part of an earlier Act, which in turn altered another Act which is
still in force—the effect appears to be to retain the status
quo. Less legislation and better thought out provisions would avoid
such confusion.”
I would
welcome the Minister’s
comments.
Maria
Eagle:
I understand and accept the hon.
Gentleman’s point about the undesirability of the confusion that
can be caused by amending unimplemented legislation, but I do not think
that one should put it at the top of one’s list of things to
chase after, as a Minister. However, I take on the chin the points made
by the Magistrates Association and others.
Clause 56 introduces schedule
13, which changes schedule 3 to the 2003 Act, as the hon. Gentleman
explained. In mitigation, the original purpose in the 2003
Act—it was before my time in the Department—was that
custody plus, the 12-month sentencing power and the procedural reforms
in schedule 3 should be implemented at the same time. As the Committee
knows, custody plus is not being implemented at present, but there is
certainly a lot of support for it. A review last year found a consensus
on sentencing among criminal justice agents that replacing the
committal procedure with a sending procedure offers benefits. It makes
sense to consider bringing schedule 3 into force by itself, hence the
clause and schedule
13.
I accept the hon.
Gentleman’s point that it is not entirely desirable to amend
unimplemented legislation. We should certainly try to avoid it, and I
undertake to do so in future. I hope that he will accept that I have
listened to what he said. It was an issue worth raising. The
Magistrates Association itself said that although clause 56 might
create a certain amount of confusion, it does not oppose the clause as
part of the whole picture, and that it is probably a good thing. On
that basis, I commend clause 56 to the
Committee.
Question
put and agreed
to.
Clause 56
ordered to stand part of the
Bill.
Section
13 agreed
to.
Clause
57
Trial
or sentencing in absence of accused in magistrates’
courts
Maria
Eagle:
I beg to move amendment No. 202, in
clause 57, page 37, line 18, at
end insert—
‘( ) In each of
subsections (3) and (4), for “A magistrate’s
court” substitute “In proceedings to which this
subsection applies, the
court.”’.
The
Chairman:
With this it will be convenient to discuss
Government amendment No. 203.
Maria
Eagle:
As I— [Interruption.] There is some
coughing in the Committee, and I hope hon. Members with coughs feel
better as we go on into this afternoon and evening, or whenever. We are
in the hands of others in that regard.
As I began with mea culpas, may
I admit that when the Bill was introduced, two short subsections were
accidentally omitted from clause 57? Their purpose was to qualify
section 11 (3) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, which
prohibits magistrates courts from imposing a custodial sentence in an
offender’s absence, and subsection (4), which restricts the
circumstances in which a court could impose disqualification. The
missing provisions would have limited those prohibitions to cases
initiated by
“an
information, where a summons...and...by a written
charge”
and
requisition.
In other
cases, the most important category of the measures relates to a
situation in which a defendant has been bailed to
appear in court. In such a case, the prohibition would be lifted on the
basis that he would know that he was due to appear in court, but that
is not
always so when cases are initiated by information and summons. It does
not necessarily follow that a court would consider it appropriate to
impose a custody in absence, but that would not justify statutory
prohibition. The amendments will put the missing subsections in the
Bill, and I hope that the Committee will make
them.
Mr.
Burrowes:
I welcome the Minister’s mea
culpa—long may that continue. These belated provisions to amend
the Bill are welcome, but they raise a question similar to one asked
earlier about the magistrates courts’ citation and concern about
legislation. The Committee will remember that during an evidence
session, magistrates said that they were not properly consulted, and
that practitioners such as themselves and others who deal with absent
clients and defendants day in, day out, could have given clear advice
to deal with the problems that the amendments will address. Any
magistrates court could say clearly that there is a need to ensure that
proceedings
“instituted
by an information, where a summons has been issued;
and...proceedings instituted by written
charge”
were necessary
prerequisites when they deal with cases involving absent clients. That
illustrates what we heard in evidence sessions and outside the
political process—that practitioners such as magistrates and
others would want to be fully informed, engaged and consulted when
proposals are put forward, so that they can ensure that mistakes do not
occur.
Maria
Eagle:
I hear what the hon. Gentleman says. It is not that
the provisions were not written and ready to be included in the Bill;
that they were not included owes more to an administrative issue than
to a lack of consultation. I heard what he said, but I would be
grateful if the Committee allowed the amendments to be made.
Amendment agreed
to.
Amendment
made: No. 203, in clause 57, page 37,
line 25, at end
insert—
‘“(4A)
Subsections (3) and (4) apply
to—
(a) proceedings
instituted by an information, where a summons has been issued;
and
(b) proceedings instituted
by a written charge.’.—[Maria
Eagle.]
2.45
pm
Question
proposed, That the clause stand part of the
Bill.
The
Chairman:
With this it will be convenient to discuss the
following: New clause 23— Protection of vulnerable persons
following conviction
‘(1) The
Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 (c. 43) is amended as
follows.
(2) After section 11
insert—
“11A
Protection of vulnerable persons following
conviction
(1) Where a court
has proceeded in the absence of an accused under section 11 and
following conviction the court or its officers are informed or discover
that the convicted person falls into a vulnerable category as laid down
by page 9 of the National Standards for Enforcement Agents, no further
steps under a fines collection order or enforcement measure shall be
taken until the court has held an inquiry into the means and
circumstances of the convicted person in his/her
presence.
(2) When conducting an inquiry into means and
circumstances of the convicted persons under subsection (1) the court
shall also consider whether any other occupant of the property in which
the convicted person resides falls into a vulnerable
category.
(3) Where on having
conducted the inquiries required by subsection (1) in the presence of
the convicted person who is subject to the fine, and having considered
the situation of any other occupant required by subsection (2), the
court may vary the level of fine imposed on the convicted person or
substitute it with another penalty it considers
appropriate.
(4) Where, on
having conducted the inquiries required by subsection (1) in the
presence of the convicted person and having considered the situation of
any other occupant as required by subsection (2), the court may place
such restrictions on enforcement as it sees fit and amend any fines
collection order as it sees fit, including withdrawing or cancelling
the order.
(5) Where the court
or its officers are informed or discover that a convicted person falls
or is likely to fall into a vulnerable category any warrant of distress
issued will be suspended and returned to the court for further
consideration.”’.
Harry
Cohen:
I tabled the new clause on behalf of the Zacchaeus
2000 Trust. Representations were made to me by Rev. Paul Nicolson, the
chairman of the trust. He makes a good case that relates to the
treatment by the courts of vulnerable people and, beyond that, by
bailiffs. There is a great hole in the current procedures that mean
that vulnerable people are treated extremely
badly.
Clause 57 will
amend section 11 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 with
respect to criminal trials that start in the absence of the person who
was summonsed. It reduces the discretion of justices to decide whether
to proceed in the absence of the accused. Vulnerable people are fined
in their absence and, for many reasons, fail to pay the fine. They
might be illiterate, ill, confused or a busy lone parent on benefit
with several children to look after all at once with no one else to
look after them if they go the court. There are myriad reasons why poor
people do not attend court. They rarely receive advice or legal support
in a fines court unless the magistrates are minded to imprison them.
They are in a vulnerable position in the courts, and that is not taken
properly into
account.
If the
magistrate has no defendant, he invariably imposes the largest fine
available to him, which is disproportionate to the means of the people
who I am describing, especially those on the lowest incomes. It is
incredibly difficult when that happens to get the case back to court.
The Zacchaeus 2000 Trust said that a case in which it was involved was
fraught with difficulty. Since March 2006, when the relevant part of
the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 came into force, the
magistrates have no responsibility for enforcing a fine after the case
is heard and the level of the fine is set. The collection order is
given to the fines support officer who administers its enforcement. If
the defendants are in court, they invariably make an agreement to pay,
but if they are not, the matter ends up in the hands of the bailiff who
still has draconian powers and can break into houses without reference
to the court.
The
trust said that the 2004 Act gave bailiffs even more power. It
overturned the previous common law controls. It has found that the
bailiffs completely ignored the national standards for enforcement
agents, especially the relevant standards on page 9 of its
document, which outlines a procedure for returning such cases to
magistrates for reconsideration in the light of a means statement. It
is not in the bailiffs’ interest to get the case returned to the
court. They are not interested in that. They just want to push ahead
with enforcement. The
Zacchaeus 2000 Trust was effectively told that once a case has been
handed to the bailiffs, it could not be withdrawn. Whatever the letter
of the law says—even some of that is not very
adequate—that is the real position that many vulnerable people
find themselves in. Despite the advice of the Ministry of Justice,
which says that such cases can be returned to the magistrates, that
does not seem to be the case in reality.
Lord Justice Simon Brown
interpreted the law in the case of R v. Hereford and Worcester
magistrates court, ex parte MacRae 1999, which held that a distress
warrant cannot be withdrawn once it has been issued. That approach has
been further enshrined in other legal documents.
The amendment does two things.
First, it puts a common-sense procedure into statute, so that when a
vulnerable situation is encountered, the magistrate can provide a just
level of penalty for the case. Secondly, it tries to give some teeth to
the national standards for enforcement agents—the point is made
on page 9—which calls bailiffs to account when they are dealing
with vulnerable households and individuals.
One final point is that the
Home Office added a last minute amendment to the Domestic Crime, Crime
and Victims Act 2004, which allowed bailiffs to break into domestic
premises to enforce a fine. That comes into force in March 2006. When
it did that, it said that the measure would be used as a last resort,
but it is not difficult to imagine how, and under what circumstances,
it has been operating in practice.
When the Zacchaeus 2000 Trust
sought information, the Ministry of Justice refused to provide it. The
trust was sent 30 pages of guidance from magistrates, with 15 of those
blacked out. That is not right. I know from own constituency that a lot
of people suffer from heavy-handed action, and in those circumstances
it is reasonable for a pressure group such as the Zacchaeus 2000 Trust,
and those who wish to control the activities of bailiffs and hold them
to account, to be able to look at the papers and see how the law is
operating. It was good of the Rev. Paul Nicolson and the Zacchaeus 2000
Trust to bring the matter to our attention, and I am pleased to move
the amendment and to get a response from the Minister on the
matter.
Mr.
Heath:
I am grateful to the hon. Member for Leyton and
Wanstead for introducing the new clause to which I have added my name
and that of my hon. Friend. It raises an important issue. I would also
like to deal briefly with the clause stand part and the general
circumstances in which the clause moves towards a presumption of a
trial in absentia, rather than the occasional disposal that the courts
already have available. The matter raises some
issues.
I hold no
brief whatsoever for those who delinquently absent themselves from
court. They must be made to realise that when they are summonsed to
appear in court, it is a serious matter and they must appear. There are
far too many court cases that are
delayed or adjourned due to the non-appearance of defendants or other
key players, and it is not in the interests of the administration of
justice for that to be the case. However, I still have concerns about
people such as those to whom the hon. Gentleman
referred—vulnerable people who are wrestling with extremely
difficult problems who may not be intentionally delinquent but are
chaotic. We all know of these people from our surgeries, and we all
know the extent to which small problems can escalate into huge ones
simply by their not doing what is expected of them by the system. They
find themselves getting into deeper and deeper trouble, and eventually
turn up at our advice surgeries, but we find it difficult to
give them adequate advice because of the difficulties in which they
find themselves. That
happens also in court. It happens with people who have chaotic
lifestyles of one sort of another, or who have difficulties in their
personal circumstances, which can occasionally result in them not
appearing in court. It gives me cause for concern that those factors
may not be recognised by the court. It is also gives their
representative lawyers a problem because of the competing
responsibilities of the solicitor to his or her client and to the court
as an officer of the supreme court. They therefore have the
responsibility of ensuring that the trials take place in an appropriate
way. I would prefer, if possible, to avoid such conflicts of
interests.
Having said
that, the problem mentioned by the hon. Gentleman is a real one. Much
concern has been expressed in recent years over the way in which
bailiffs carry out their duties. Despite everyone’s best
intentions, and despite guidance, it often seems that they carry out
their duties aggressively and inconsiderately and in a way that shows
little regard for the circumstances of the person upon whom they are
levying the distress warrant. We should be concerned about that. We
should be concerned about precisely the sort of people referred to by
the hon. Member for Leyton and Wanstead earlier, which is the principle
concern of the Zacchaeus 2000 Trust in its work with such
people.
We want some
sort of process of referral back or repechage, not to enable people to
evade their responsibilities to the court but to ensure that the
procedure takes cognisance of their situation and acts accordingly. We
do not want an escalation of costs or penalties; it is in no
one’s interests if all we do is make a poor person poorer still,
or take away essential items from a household that is already deprived.
It is not a bleeding-heart liberal issue; it is about common humanity,
and not dealing badly, as is sometimes the case, with people who are
not able to look after themselves or who cannot even see what actions
on their part would be in their best interests. That, sadly, is too
often the case.
I
support the new clause, and I look forward with interest to the
Minister’s
response.
3
pm
Mr.
Burrowes:
I commend the hon. Member for Leyton and
Wanstead on the intentions behind the new clause.
I commend the Zacchaeus 2000
Trust on its tenacity and persistence and for Paul Nicolson’s
concern for the vulnerable. In many ways, we are talking about
legislation, but organisations such as the Zacchaeus 2000 Trust are at
the sharp end, dealing with vulnerable people in a noble way. I wish to
commend Mr. Nicolson on bringing to our attention his
concerns about young people, especially those who, for instance, face
bailiffs at the door. It is a worrying situation for many, as they do
not know how to deal with such situations. However, they seek some
justice, to the extent that they want their inability to pay fines to
be brought to bear.
I
would like the Minister to respond to the legislative and practical
concerns at the heart of new clause 23 about the effectiveness and
teeth of the national standards for enforcement agents. Page 9 of the
national standards refers to the need for enforcement agents to
recognise their
“role in
ensuring that the vulnerable and socially excluded are protected and
that the recovery process includes procedures agreed between the
agent/agency and creditor about how such situations should be dealt
with”,
and emphasises the
need for an appropriate use of discretion when dealing with vulnerable
people.
I understand
that the Zacchaeus 2000 Trust and Ministers have debated the definition
of vulnerable people, and that concern was expressed about the
difficulty of defining vulnerable people during the passage of previous
legislation. Further concern was expressed about the need to give teeth
to the national standards during the passage of the Consumer Credit Act
2006 and the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. Section 12(2)
of the Consumers, Estates and Redress Act 2007 provides a definition of
a vulnerable person, to which reference is made in the national
standards.
Will the
Minister assure the Committee that there will be proper and robust
enforcement of the national standards? From my experience as a
practitioner, and particularly as a duty solicitor, I know that in such
situations, there are ways to get the warrant withdrawn and to ensure
that true account is taken of the young person’s means. That
often means that the fine is remitted to a level that can be paid. No
one is suggesting that that young person should be let off the fine,
just that it should be appropriate to their circumstances, and
certainly we should be able to deal with those situations when taking
enforcement action against absent defendants. It would be preferable if
we could enforce those national standards properly without additional
legislation. Will the Minister give the necessary assurance?
Clause 57 creates a presumption
that if a defendant fails to attend a trial in a magistrates court
without good cause, the magistrates will use their powers to try them
in their absence and sentence them if convicted. However, magistrates
have that discretionary power already, which they often use
appropriately and subject to existing case law, such as R v.
DPP, in which the High Court emphasised that the discretionary
power to commence a trial in the absence of a defendant should be
exercised with the utmost care and caution.
Furthermore, magistrates have an eye on article 6 of the European
convention on human rights, which ensures a fair trial. Advocates might seek to
persuade magistrates to exercise their discretion with care and not to
proceed in the absence of a defendant, but often they exercise their
discretion and proceed anyway. In fact, it is now common practice,
whenever a trial date is fixed, to remind the defendant that if he does
not attend, the magistrates will proceed in his absence. Why is it
necessary, therefore, for this Bill to seek to enforce what is
happening already? By building in a presumption when there is good
cause, are we not getting close to infringing article 6? Has the
Minister satisfied herself that the clause complies with the article?
When magistrates are using their discretion on a case by case basis,
taking into account the circumstances of the defendant and any case
history, they are often in the best position to decide whether to
proceed in the absence of the defendant, without the need to create a
statutory presumption in that
favour.
Maria
Eagle:
I begin by congratulating my hon. Friend the Member
for Leyton and Wanstead on introducing the new clause, and I will seek
to reassure him. Perhaps I should warn the Committee that 3.30 is my
worst time of the day, but we still have that to come. I join my hon.
Friend in congratulating the Zacchaeus 2000 Trust and the work that it
does. I do not think that there is an hon. Member, and certainly not a
solicitor, who has not come across the kind of vulnerability that we
are discussing out there in the world, in our advice surgeries, in
court or in forums where we seek to assist members of the public. I do
not think that there is disagreement between any members of the
Committee about the need to ensure that there are relevant protections
for vulnerable people in such circumstances. The issue is whether this
new clause is the best way of achieving that.
New clause 23 would force
magistrates, fines officers or clerks to magistrates to suspend,
pending a means inquiry, warrant enforcement procedures, reconsider how
the fine is being enforced and potentially re-sentence an offender
where the offender, or some other person present at the property where
a magistrates court warrant is being executed, may be vulnerable, as
defined by page 9 of the national standards for enforcement agents,
which
states:
“Those
who might be potentially vulnerable include: the elderly; people with a
disability; the seriously ill; the recently bereaved; single parent
families; pregnant women; unemployed people; and, those who have
obvious difficulty in understanding, speaking or reading
English.”
Later I will
say something about the national standards, but I want to set out for
the Committee why I do not think that the new clause is necessary in
order to provide that level of protection, although I do not comment on
individual cases that my hon. Friend may have been referring to and
which have been the subject of some correspondence.
There is a well-developed body
of law—statute law, case law, practice directions and so
on—in the magistrates courts that ensure that every
defendant’s right is upheld, and that is certainly the
intention. Section 11 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 says
that the court may proceed in the absence of the
accused. Guidance on proceeding in the absence of the defendant has been
given in the criminal consolidated practice direction of 2002. It
directs that the decision to proceed in the absence of the accused must
be exercised judicially, with proper regard to the principle that a
defendant is entitled to a fair trial; that must include a fair
opportunity to be present and/or be legally represented. However, the
principle that the defendant should have a fair opportunity to be
present does not amount to an unlimited opportunity. If it were to do
that, the defendant could indefinitely postpone the proceedings by not
turning up at the relevant time. The intention of the clause, on the
basis of an extremely long list of vulnerability, is to require the
court to reconsider, sometimes at length, what it is doing in any
particular case. I do
not accept that that level of prescription is necessary. The court
always retains the right to take a judicial decision on how to proceed.
This can range, in appropriate cases, from withdrawing a warrant to
re-hearing the entire case. Cases can be returned to the court and
considered by the magistrates again if the situation warrants it, and
there may be individual circumstances in which that is the right way
forward. Enforcement officers can already be prevented from continuing
with the execution of a distress warrant by the withdrawal of the
warrant. The court’s power to do that is discretionary and it
can be found in section 142(1) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act
1980, which
states:
“A
magistrates’ court may vary or rescind a sentence or other order
imposed or made by it when dealing with an offender if it appears to
the court to be in the interests of justice to do so; and it is hereby
declared that this power extends to replacing a sentence or order which
for any reason appears to be invalid by another which the court has
power to impose or
make.”
That provides an
extremely wide discretion for the court to deal with individual
circumstances of the kind described by my hon. Friend and referred to
by Opposition
Members.
New clause 23
may give rise to a situation in which some people are able to benefit
from repeatedly not attending court. An offender could halt all
enforcement procedures by refusing to attend court. I know that that is
not my hon. Friend’s or anyone else’s intention. They
seek to protect those who are vulnerable, but I am arguing that
sufficient protections are in place. If the circumstances are not all
known at the time at which the original order is made, it is possible
for the court to revisit it in view of receiving correct
information.
The hon.
Member for Somerton and Frome in particular referred to the activities
of bailiffs. I remind the Committee that the Ministry of Justice is
consulting on the regulation of bailiffs, in conjunction with the Home
Office, to ensure that there is a regime which prevents the abuses that
sometimes take place, about which many members of the Committee will
have heard from their constituents, and which can be the real cause of
some of difficulties which have been referred to today. Responses to
the consultation are currently being considered, and, in due course, we
will release the outcome of that process and, hopefully, we will be
able to bring in a better regulatory regime for the activities of
bailiffs.
The hon.
Member for Enfield, Southgate raised the question of the ECHR
implications of the clause. I can
reassure the hon. Gentleman that my right hon. Friend the Minister of
State has certified the implications, in respect of the entire Bill. He
certainly would not have done so had he been of the view that those
matters were not
compliant. In relation
to the clause stand part debate, it is quite right that the magistrates
currently have a discretion, which is used widely in some parts of the
country. However, it is not used uniformly and, in other areas, courts
have seemed especially reluctant to proceed in absence. That is why
putting a presumption in the legislation, with the appropriate
safeguards that I have set out, ought to level out that sort of uneven
activity.
My hon.
Friends might be further persuaded if I were to say that this is a
manifesto commitment. That might not help Opposition Members, but they
ought at least to acknowledge the fact that it is perfectly reasonable
for a Government to try to implement its manifesto
commitments.
With that
clinching argument, I support the clause but I ask my hon. Friend not
to press new clause
23.
Harry
Cohen:
I am grateful for that clarification. I was not
sure whether it was I or the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome who
said that it is important that people should attend court, but I want
to make clear that that is my view. The courts should facilitate
attendance if the individuals are vulnerable, and they are still a long
way from doing so.
I
was also grateful for the Minister’s assurance that such cases
can be returned to the court. I hope that that message will go out
clearly to the courts and that that will then happen in actuality. I
also hope that the courts, having that discretion, exercise it to
recall the warrant in cases involving vulnerable people. The
consultation on the regulation of bailiffs is also very welcome and I
hope to see a good outcome from
that.
That is all that
I wanted to say. I thank the Minister for his response. I shall not
press for the new clause to be added to the Bill.
Question put and agreed
to.
Clause 57,
as amended, ordered to stand part of the
Bill.
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