Clause
91
Notification
requirements: initial
notification
Mr.
Coaker:
I beg to move amendment No. 214, in
clause 92, page 63, line 18, leave
out ‘or’ and
insert—
‘(ca) any prescribed
change of circumstances,
or’.
The
Chairman:
With this it will be convenient to discuss the
following:
Government
amendments Nos. 213 to 216, 242, 249 and
250.
Government
new clause 40—Notification requirements: prescribed
information.
Mr.
Coaker:
Amendments Nos. 213 to 216 provide the Secretary
of State with the power to add to the notification requirements of
violent offender orders by secondary legislation. The clause will
require that all individuals subject to a violent offender order or an
interim violent offender order are also subject to notification
requirements. Additions to the existing notification requirements are
currently made only by primary legislation, but the Government feel
that the police and public would benefit from the greater flexibility
offered by the measures.
The
notification requirements imposed on sex offenders as introduced by the
Sex Offenders Act 1997 have proved an effective method by which to
manage the risks posed by sex offenders in the community. We have
previously strengthened the requirements through the Sexual Offences
Act 2003 by requiring sex offenders to register more information with
the police and by shortening the time scales by which information must
be provided. However, the protection of children from sex offenders
review identified the benefits of requiring offenders to register more
information, which could mean offenders providing more personal details
and so on. To enable the requirements to be changed more easily, the
review recommended that we should take a power to amend them by
secondary legislation. That will enable us to respond more quickly to
technological developments and new patterns of behaviour. Government
new clause 40 will provide that power. The Association of Chief Police
Officers expressed its support for the review’s commitment to
the additional requirements.
Amendment No.
242 will allow the Secretary of State to make transitional arrangements
when prescribing additional information that must be notified by sex
offenders and to create different requirements for different types of
offender. A power to allow the Secretary of State to amend the
notification requirements of the 2003 Act by secondary legislation is
provided by new clause 40 and Government amendment No. 242. It makes it
clear that the amendment to the Sexual Offences Act 2003, which states
explicitly that transitional provisions can be made through
regulations, does not affect the validity of transitional provisions in
regulations that have already been passed under the Act—for
example, the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (Travel Notification Regulations)
2004.
Amendment
No. 250 would repeal sections 86(4) and 87(6) of the Sexual Offences
Act 2003, which allow regulations made under those
sections—foreign travel notifications—to make different
provisions for different categories of
persons.
Mr.
Heath:
I note that this part of the Bill covers the
English and Welsh jurisdictions, but not Scotland and Northern Ireland.
What is the procedure for notifying Scottish or Northern Irish
authorities when the home address notified under the initial
requirement, or indeed under a notification of change, is in Scotland
or Northern
Ireland?
Mr.
Coaker:
I will have to get back to the hon. Gentleman on
that. I cannot give him a proper answer now, but I shall try to do so
at some point, or write to
him.
Amendment
agreed
to
.
Clause
91, as amended, ordered to stand part of the
Bill.
Clause
92
Notification
requirements:
changes
Amendments
made: No. 214, in
clause 92, page 63, line 18, leave
out ‘or’ and
insert—
‘(ca) any prescribed
change of circumstances,
or’.
No.
215, in
clause 92, page 63, line 24, leave
out ‘or’ and
insert—
‘(ca) the prescribed
details,
or’.
No.
216, in
clause 92, page 63, line 45, at
end insert—
‘(7A) In this
section—
(a)
“prescribed change of circumstances” means any
change—
(i) occurring in
relation to any matter in respect of which information is required to
be notified by virtue of section 91(2)(h),
and
(ii) of a description
prescribed by regulations made by the Secretary of
State;
(b) “the
prescribed details”, in relation to a prescribed change of
circumstances, means such details of the change as may be so
prescribed.’.—[Mr.
Coaker.]
Clause
92, as amended, ordered to stand part of the
Bill.
Clauses
93 to 97 ordered to stand part of the
Bill.
Clause
98
Offences
Question
proposed, That the clause stand part of the
Bill.
Mr.
Garnier:
Subsection (6) sets out the penalties for
offences in relation to notification. Will the Minister explain whether
he seriously believes that it is appropriate that someone should be
given up to five years’ imprisonment for failing to notify their
national insurance number or home address on the date on which the
notification should have been
given?
Mr.
Coaker:
The only point that I want to
make is that if the offence were as trivial as that, the court would
not be expected to impose a five-year sentence. The hon. and learned
Gentleman knows the courts better than I do, and that the relevant
words are “up to”.
Mr.
Garnier:
I do not mind being rebuked by the Minister or
anyone else, but he has put in the Bill a potential five-year term of
imprisonment for failing to comply with a notification requirement.
Presumably the assumption is that there will be circumstances in which
it is appropriate for the courts to give a five-year term to someone
who has failed to notify the material under clause 91, or the provision
would not be in the Bill. Will he explain in what circumstances he
would hope to find the courts dishing out a five-year
sentence?
Mr.
Coaker:
I did not mean to rebuke the hon. and learned
Gentleman—far be it from me to attempt to do that. I cannot
possible imagine every circumstance that might come before the court. I
repeat the point that I made earlier. If the offence was as trivial as
that which the hon. and learned Gentleman has just described, we would
not expect the court to impose a five-year sentence. I am sure that he
would not do that in the courts in which he acts as a recorder, even if
the power were available to him. I cannot envisage all the
circumstances, but I repeat that the period is of up to five
years.
Mr.
Garnier:
I think that I have made my point. The measure
looks rather heavy-handed. Will the Minister consider what will allow a
sentence of imprisonment, let alone a five-year sentence, for the
offences described in clause 98? We are told, although I find it
difficult to believe, that this is essentially a civil process.
However, it is a civil process whereby people get banged up for five
years if they do not notify the authorities of some relevant
information. We need to keep some balance. It is either a civil process
or it is not. It is either a serious crime or it is not. A five-year
maximum is a heavy maximum. People can commit serious muggings,
burglaries and drug offences and still not get five years.
If
five years is to be the maximum sentence for simply not notifying
people, that brings me back to the data protection issue that I did not
talk about under clause 75. If we are to see fiascos such as
the HMRC disaster, we need to be clear about the circumstances in which
people will potentially be given quite heavy jail sentences.
Mr.
Coaker:
The hon. and learned Gentleman makes a point, but
I say again that if he reads the whole of clause 98 and other parts of
the Bill, as I know that he has, he will see that the penalty will
match the severity of the offence. As clause 98 makes it
clear:
“If
a person fails, without reasonable excuse, to comply with any
prohibition restriction or condition contained in...a violent
offender order, or...an interim violent offender order...the
person commits an
offence”,
one would
expect some of the provisions, prohibitions, restrictions or conditions
that are breached to be more serious than the examples given by the
hon. and learned Gentleman. I remind the Committee that other civil
orders have that level of punishment if they are breached. As we know,
the breach of the order is the criminal offence.
In reply to
the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome, VOOs are applicable only in
England and Wales. People would have to come to England and Wales to
comply with the notification requirements.
Question
put and agreed to.
Clause
98
ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause
s 99 to
103
ordered to stand part of the
Bill.
7.4
pm
Sitting
suspended
.
7.35
pm
On
resuming—
Schedule
17
Closure
orders: premises associated with persistent disorder or
nuisance
Harry
Cohen:
I beg to move amendment No. 328, in
schedule 17, page 193, line 11, at
end insert—
‘(d) the making
of the order is not a disproportionate response to the disorder or
nuisance caused;
(e) the making
of the order will not cause unnecessary hardship or suffering to the
families of those against whom the order is
made;
(f) appropriate steps
have previously been taken to address the disorder or nuisance without
success.’.
The
Chairman:
With this it will be convenient to discuss the
following amendments: No. 329, in
schedule 17, page 193, line 30, at
end insert—
‘(10) No closure
order shall be made unless the magistrates’ court is satisfied
that appropriate arrangements have been made by the local authority for
alternative accommodation and support for those affected by
it.’.
No.
354, in
schedule 17, page 193, line 30, at
end insert—
‘(10) If a child
under 18 is resident on the premises, no action shall be taken until a
multi-agency assessment of the child’s needs has taken
place.’.
Harry
Cohen:
My amendments relate to the power of closure
orders. Amendment No. 329, which is the key amendment, refers to
vulnerable people and their families who might be a nuisance and could
therefore be subject to a closure order.
Closure
orders combined with antisocial behaviour orders have been very
successful. They provide the power to close premises for three months
and, in exceptional circumstances, for six months. They have been
appropriate, particularly for premises in which there have been drug
problems, although sometimes premises can be closed for too long, and
they blight the rest of the neighbourhood. However, the orders have
solved problems and they are popular. The Minister was right to say
that orders such as ASBOs and closure orders are popular when a
nuisance has been caused.
However,
there are problems relating to the orders. One is the issue of
vulnerable people; the other is what Liberty calls
“cuckooing”, which means displacement. That is an
unfortunate consequence. Once premises are closed down, people who are
the subject of the order may then target very vulnerable people and
move into their premises. On one level, the Government or the police
authorities need to deal with that problem and be alert to the danger
of cuckooing, which is the unfortunate consequence of a closure
order.
The orders
also provide powers to close premises for activities that are not
unlawful. For example, lots of people coming in and out of premises
might not necessarily be a sign that antisocial behaviour is going on.
It might be that lots of parties are going on. I agree that they are a
nuisance, but in themselves they are not necessarily unlawful. In a
sense, that is a precedent that needs to be
considered.
The
only other point that I want to make is that when the original
consultation came out, it included very strong safeguards. I will not
take up the time of the Committee and read the whole report, but it
mentioned putting in robust guidelines for the consideration and
operation of the closure process, such as considering whether closure
is the most appropriate course of action and addressing the needs of
vulnerable people in the household, including children and young
people. There was quite a detailed statement in relation to the
original consultation, which is not reflected in the Bill. That is the
point that I am most concerned about.
Vulnerable
people are potentially involved—they are not necessarily the
ones causing the nuisance, but may be relatives or others who live in
the house. They could all be thrown out and made homeless. My amendment
says that there should be provision to look after them and, if
necessary, the local authority should provide alternative accommodation
for vulnerable
people.
Mr.
Heath:
I seem to spend a lot of time in this Committee
asking, “What about the children?” In this instance, I am
talking about children who have not been accused of any crime or even
of any potentially offending behaviour, but who merely happen to reside
in the house or premises that are subject to a closure
order.
The
hon. Member for Leyton and Wanstead has already made a number of the
points that I wanted to make. Amendment No. 354 is a probing amendment
to see how the Government intend, first, to assess the needs of
vulnerable people on such premises and, secondly, to cater for them if
a closure order is made. As the hon. Gentleman said, this issue was
recognised in the Government’s own consultation paper,
“Strengthening powers to tackle anti-social behaviour”,
which the Home Office published in 2006. He quoted part of a passage
from it that I had intended to quote when he
said:
“The
needs of any vulnerable people in the household, including children and
young people, will need to be
considered.”
It goes on
to
say:
“Their
safety must not be compromised and a clear plan needs to be put in
place to safeguard them and promote their welfare if the closure goes
ahead.”
Amen to that. It
is exactly what the Government should be considering in this context,
but at the moment there is no mention as far as I can see, in either
the parent clause or the schedule, to that assessment being
made.
In
other legislation of a broadly similar type, that linkage is made. Let
us consider, for instance, housing benefit sanctions under section 31
of the Welfare Reform Act 2007. There is a link between the sanction
and helping the family in question to deal with the consequences, but
in the Bill no link is made between the closure order and
rehabilitative services. In my view, there should be
such a link. The Government appear to have at least considered it at an
earlier stage, but it does not appear in the Bill. How does the
Minister propose to ensure that vulnerable people, such as children,
who reside in the same premises are safeguarded in relation to actions
that may be completely beyond their control—actions that are
committed by another person, perhaps a parent or another relative, who
is resident in the same premises? I ask that because we do not believe
in collective punishment in this country. It is not appropriate that we
should not have regard for the interests of innocent
parties.
Mr.
Burrowes:
I welcome the amendments to clarify what happens
when closure orders have unintended consequences that affect the most
vulnerable people. I am referring to family members or other residents
of the premises who are not in any way associated with the behaviour
that is the basis for the closure order. I also wish to take the
opportunity to assert our support for the principle of closure orders
and to acknowledge the success of similar orders in the
past.
The
points made by the hon. Members for Somerton and Frome and for Leyton
and Wanstead on the two amendments were very well made. It is
interesting to consider closure orders in Scotland. There, unlike in
England and Wales, the sheriff must have regard to these two factors
when determining whether to make a closure order: first, the ability of
any person who habitually resides in a premises to find alternative
accommodation and, secondly, any vulnerability of any such person who
has not been engaged in antisocial behaviour that has occurred in the
premises.
7.45
pm
Those
two additional requirements would not water down the purposes of
closure orders, but they would deal with hon. Gentlemen’s
concerns. They would explicitly make clear what would happen to
vulnerable people who are not engaged in antisocial behaviour. Will the
Minister say why a measure that is in place and explicit in Scotland is
not proposed for England and Wales? The Home Office lauds the success
with which the Scottish powers have been used, so perhaps the guidance
that is available there should also be available in England.
Another
practical point relates to homelessness—those who are
unintentionally made homeless by closure orders. It is accepted that
there should be no statutory duty to house those who have brought
homelessness upon themselves through antisocial behaviour, but if local
authorities increasingly implement closure orders, they will have to
deal with the practical matter of housing vulnerable individuals who
are left without a home because of the orders. I want the Minister to
clarify that question and to provide some reassurance on guidance. Will
additional or amended guidance be provided to local authorities for
when they make decisions on housing people who, through no fault of
their own, are as much the victims as the rest of the community are of
behaviour that takes place in houses that become subject to
orders.
Mr.
Coaker:
Welcome back,
everyone.
May
I begin by saying to the hon. Members for Enfield, Southgate, and for
Somerton and Frome, and my hon. Friend the Member for Leyton and
Wanstead,
that I welcome their support for the principle of premises closure
orders? I also welcome the recognition that, alongside crack house
closures, they have made a real difference in many communities and have
dealt with problems. Some premises in all hon. Members’
constituencies cause huge difficulties—we accept that. We are
left with the question of what to do about the problem. I accept that
any action must be proportionate and reasonable, but it must be
effective. Sometimes, not addressing a problem can cause it to
continue. We all face
the question of how many warnings to issue. When does the end point
come? It is quite difficult to decide and, in fact, the question is
rhetorical. I can think of examples from my constituency, as I am sure
others can, in which the various measures that we might wish to take
have been taken, yet the antisocial, disruptive behaviour continues.
Sometimes, people are at a loss, and when they ask me why nobody is
doing anything about the problem, I am forced to reply that lots of
people are doing something, but we are left with the fact that it is
not working. Allowing such problems to continue—I am not
suggesting that hon. Members believe that it should be
allowed—does not do a great deal for the children who live in
such houses or those who live in the area. We are left with a huge
dilemma for public policy and sometimes one wonders what can be
done.
Premises
closure orders are an attempt to plug a difficult gap and they had huge
public support. The question is, how do we make them work
proportionately and in a way that we can all feel comfortable with? The
hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate, if I remember rightly, asked
whether there will be guidance and rules and what the guidance will
include. There will be robust guidance on how the orders operate and
how the process is put into practice. I will ensure that we include
housing considerations as part of the guidance. I make that commitment
to the hon. Gentleman because he specifically asked about that.
However, as part of the guidance we would also expect the police, the
local authority and all of the other statutory agencies to show that
consideration has been given to every other possible intervention prior
to a premises closure order being applied for. In other words, the
guidance will say that this process is only appropriate if it is an
absolute last resort and nothing else seems to be
appropriate.
In some
circumstances, although this sounds contradictory, actually closing the
premises will force the system to deal with the needs of children and
vulnerable people. I say that as a teacher. I make the analogy that, as
a deputy head teacher, I never wanted to exclude young people from
school, but in one or two instances the only way to force a resolution
to the problem was to take what I regarded as a draconian step. In
respect of premises closure orders, in some circumstances, that point
will be reached. In other words, the order can act as a
catalyst.
I know what
my hon. Friend the Member for Leyton and Wanstead is trying to do, and,
as the hon. Members for Somerton and Frome and for Enfield, Southgate
said, we have to protect children and vulnerable people. I believe that
through guidance we can ensure that we do that, even though the
safeguards are not necessarily on the face of the Bill. However, I
point out to the hon. Gentleman and to my hon. Friend that new
section 11B(7)
of the Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003, inserted by schedule 17, states
that upon application to the court for a closure
order: “The
magistrates’ court may adjourn the hearing on the application
for a period of not more than 14 days to
enable—
(a)
the occupier of the
premises,
(b)
the person who has control of or responsibility for the premises,
or...any other person with an interest in the
premises—
I would expect
that to be a parent, whether a mother or a father, of children
involved—
“to show
why a Part 1A closure order should not be
made.”
I would expect
that in those circumstances people could make representations to the
magistrates court. The magistrate can adjourn and, which may include
children, people can then make representations to say that the premises
closure order should not go ahead because proper consideration has not
been given to the vulnerable people in the household that is to be
shut.
Ms
Keeble:
Does my hon. Friend agree that if serious
consideration is to be given to not giving a premises closure order
because there are young children in a house that is being used in
certain ways, for example in crack houses, would it not be advisable at
that stage for the medical safeguarding children board to be involved,
to make an assessment of whether the premises should be closed, and to
make proper arrangements for the protection of the
children?
Mr.
Coaker:
That is a good point and I will take it on board.
It should certainly state within the guidance that all along the way,
local safeguarding children boards and such like should be available.
As I have said, I hope that my hon. Friend the Member for Leyton and
Wanstead will be able to withdraw his amendment. There are safeguards
in the Bill and there will be guidance, although I take the point that
alongside what is a good power, we must ensure that we protect the
vulnerable.
Harry
Cohen:
I appreciate the assurances and frank answers given
by the Minister, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the
amendment.
Amendment,
by leave,
withdrawn.
Question
proposed, That this schedule be the Seventeenth schedule to the
Bill.
Mr.
Burrowes:
The schedule has a very wide
definition of premises associated with disorder or nuisance. I refer to
new section 11K(13) of the Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003, inserted by
the schedule, which
states:
“Premises
includes—
(a)
any land or other place (whether enclosed or
not);
(b)
any outbuildings which are or are used as part of
premises.”
That
definition of premises has a wide remit, and I would like the Minister
to comment on that and on the intentions behind giving such a wide
ambit in relation to premises. Is it part of the purpose of that wide
ambit to include open land that might be owned privately or publicly
and which may, for example, include a Travellers’ site where
there has been evidence of persistent disorder or nuisance? Would that
type of persistent disorder or nuisance come within the ambit of
premises closure orders?
Mr.
Coaker:
The hon. Gentleman is right to point out that we
have made the definition wide. We have done so because there may be
buildings or land to which these orders may be appropriate. Therefore,
with that in mind, we included that measure within the Bill to give the
opportunity for the police or local authority to apply to the court for
such an order.
Question
put and agreed
to.
Schedule 17
agreed
to.
Mr.
Heath:
On a point of order, and to avoid unnecessary
repetition, I wonder whether it might be for the convenience of the
Committee if, contrary to the grouping on the paper, we might deal with
amendments Nos. 337 to 339 and clause stand part together. I would be
happy to do that if you, Mr. O’Hara, and the
Committee were agreeable.
The
Chairman:
That seems sensible, if it is for the
convenience of the Committee.
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