Clause
127
Extent
Amendments
made: No. 217, in clause 127, page 84,
line 15, after ‘follows’ insert
‘and to any other provision of
this Act’.
No.
310, in
clause 127, page 84, line 15, at
end insert—
‘(1A) Subsection
(1) does not apply to Part 4, the following provisions of which extend
to England and Wales
only—
(a) paragraphs 1
to 5, 8 and 9 of Schedule 7 and sections 30 to 34, so far as relating
to complaints about matters falling within any of paragraphs 1 to 5 of
that Schedule;
(b) paragraphs 1
to 4 of Schedule 8 and sections 35 and 36, so far as relating to deaths
falling within any of those
paragraphs;
(c) section
37(3)(a) to (f);
(d) sections
37(apart from subsection (3)(a) to (h)) and 38, so far as relating to
requests by the Secretary of State which specify matters
which—
(i) relate to
events which have (or may have) occurred as mentioned in any of
paragraphs (a) to (f) of section 37(3);
or
(ii) the Secretary of State
considers are (or may be) linked to such
events;
(e) sections 39 to 41,
so far as relating to investigations of complaints, deaths or requests
mentioned in paragraph (a), (b) or (d)
above;
(f) sections 43 and 47,
so far as relating to complaints mentioned in paragraph (a) above or
investigations of deaths or requests mentioned in paragraph (b) or (d)
above.’.
No.
311, in
clause 127, page 84, line 18, leave
out paragraph (a) and
insert—
‘(a) sections 29,
37(3)(g) and (h), 42, 44 to 46, 48 (subject to subsection (5)), 49 to
52 and Schedule 10;
(aa)
paragraphs 6 and 7 of Schedule 7 and sections 30 to 34, so far as
relating to complaints about matters falling within either of those
paragraphs;
(ab) paragraphs 4
to 6 of Schedule 8 and sections 35 and 36, so far as relating to deaths
falling within any of those
paragraphs;
(ac) sections 37
(apart from subsection (3)(a) to (h)) and 38, so far as relating to
requests by the Secretary of State which specify matters
which—
(i) relate to
events which have (or may have) occurred as mentioned in paragraph (g)
or (h) of section 37(3);
or
(ii) the Secretary of State
considers are (or may be) linked to such
events;
(ad) sections 39 to 41,
so far as relating to investigations of complaints, deaths or requests
mentioned in paragraph (aa), (ab) or (ac)
above;
(ae) sections 43 and 47,
so far as relating to complaints mentioned in paragraph (aa) above or
investigations of deaths or requests mentioned in paragraph (ab) or
(ac)
above.’.
No.
312, in
clause 127, page 84, line 35, leave
out paragraph (c).
No.
367, in
clause 127, page 84, line 36, at
end insert—
‘( ) section
(Northern Ireland Commissioner for Prison Complaints: disclosure of
information
etc);’.
No.
218, in
clause 127, page 84, line 37, leave
out paragraph (d) and insert—
‘(d) sections 64 to (Special rules relating
to providers of information society services) and Schedule (Special
rules relating to providers of information society
services);’.
No.
275, in
clause 127, page 84, line 37, at
end insert—
‘( ) section
79(6) and (7) (so far as relating to any provision of Part 3 of the
Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 which extends to Northern
Ireland);
( ) sections
(Transfer of certificates to central authority for Scotland), 80 and 81
and Schedules (Penalties suitable for enforcement in England and Wales
or Northern Ireland) and
16;’.
No.
219, in
clause 127, page 84, line 38, leave
out paragraph (e).
No.
368, in
clause 127, page 84, line 40, leave
out paragraph (a) and
insert—
‘(a) sections
(Appointment etc. of Northern Ireland Commissioner for Prison
Complaints) to (Northern Ireland Commissioner for Prison Complaints:
power to confer new functions) (except section (Northern Ireland
Commissioner for Prison Complaints: disclosure of information etc.))
and Schedules (The Northern Ireland Commissioner for Prison
Complaints), (The Northern Ireland Commissioner for Prison Complaints:
complaints remit), (The Northern Ireland Commissioner for Prison
Complaints: deaths remit) and (The Northern Ireland Commissioner for
Prison Complaints: controlling authorities);’.—[Maria
Eagle.]
The
Chairman:
At this stage, I indicate to the Committee that
I am minded to have a break. I have been sitting in this Chair for nigh
on three hours without any movement, except up and down. I feel the
need for a break of 20 minutes. It can come now or a little later. I am
happy to take advice from the hon. and learned Member for
Harborough.
Mr.
Garnier:
There is only a certain amount of advice that I
can give you, Sir Nicholas. I have a suspicion from looking at the
annunciator screen that we are moving towards a vote on the Floor of
the House. There is an hour and a half’s business downstairs and
they are likely to have a Division at 4.26 pm. I am all for double
breaks if—I was going to say your lordship, but I am in the
wrong forum. I am either in the wrong room or I am anticipating myself.
If you want the break and the vote to coincide, that is fine by us, Sir
Nicholas, but if you want to break now, that is equally
fine.
The
Chairman:
I am very happy with that. That is why I allowed
input. If that is the case and a Division takes place, I will extend
the suspension to half an hour. I will suffer in the Chair for a
further 26
minutes.
Mr.
Walker:
We will suffer with you, Sir
Nicholas.
The
Chairman:
I am grateful for that. I am sure that we will
continue to make excellent progress until 26 minutes past the
hour.
Mr.
Garnier:
I beg to move amendment No. 18, in
clause 127, page 84, line 40, at
end insert—
‘(aa) section
[Amendment of the Criminal Law Act (Northern Ireland)
1967];’.
The
Chairman:
With this it will be convenient to discuss the
following: New clause 2— Amendment of the Criminal Law Act
1967—
‘(1) The Criminal
Law Act 1967 (c. 58) is amended as
follows.
(2) In section 3 (use
of force in making arrest, etc.), after subsection (1),
insert—
“(1A)
Where a person uses force in the prevention of crime or in the defence
of persons or property on another who is in any building or part of a
building having entered as a trespasser or is attempting so to enter,
that person shall not be guilty of any offence in respect of the use of
that force unless—
(a)
the degree of force used was grossly disproportionate,
and
(b) this was or ought to
have been apparent to the person using such
force.
(1B) No prosecution
shall be brought against a person subject to subsection (1A) without
the leave of the Attorney
General.
(1C) In this section
“building or part of a building” shall have the same
meaning as in section 9 of the Theft Act 1968 (c. 60)
(burglary).”.’.
New
clause 3—Amendment of the Criminal Law Act (Northern Ireland)
1967—
‘(1) The Criminal
Law Act (Northern Ireland) 1967 (c. 18 NI)) is amended as
follows.
(2) In section 3 (use
of force in making arrest, etc.), after subsection (1),
insert—
“(1A)
Where a person uses force in the prevention of crime or in the defence
of persons or property on another who is in any building or part of a
building having entered as a trespasser or is attempting so to enter,
that person shall not be guilty of any offence in respect of the use of
that force unless—
(a)
the degree of force used was grossly disproportionate,
and
(b) this was or ought to
have been apparent to the person using such
force.
(1B) No prosecution
shall be brought against a person subject to subsection (1A) without
the leave of the Attorney
General.
(1C) In this section
“building or part of a building” shall have the same
meaning as in section 9 of the Theft Act (Northern Ireland) 1969 (c. 16
NI))
(burglary).”.’.
Mr.
Garnier:
As before, amendment No. 18 is not the central
proposal in the group. New clauses 2 and 3 contain the guts of our
debate. I can describe the issue via new clause 2 because new clause 3
is in exactly the same terms, only extending the law to Northern
Ireland as well as England and Wales, which are covered by new clause
2.
As you will know,
Sir Nicholas, self-defence by householders has been an issue of some
controversy for the past half dozen years or so. At least three
Conservative Back Benchers have introduced private Member’s
Bills in this regard. I make no secret of the fact that new clauses 2
and 3 are stolen from the private Member’s Bill introduced by my
hon. Friend the Member for Vale of York (Miss McIntosh). There would be
no point in doing otherwise, because everybody knows about it. It is
part of the history of this
legislation.
I have no
doubt that the Minister will be well prepared to deal with the
arguments that I shall make. I hope that I am not breaching any
confidence, but I want also to place it on the record that the
Secretary of State for Justice and his Ministers very kindly hosted a
meeting attended by my hon. Friends the Members for Enfield, Southgate
and for Arundel and South Downs
(Nick Herbert) and the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome and perhaps
others—I do not remember. At any event, we had a meeting at the
Department to discuss this question. I know that, following their
consideration, the Government intend to table some form of provision on
Report or later, but that should not inhibit us from having a brief
discussion about the issue now, because we do not often have the chance
to do
so. 4
pm
The current law
of self-defence is governed by section 3 of the Criminal Law Act 1967,
which says:
“A
person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the
prevention of crime, or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest
of offenders or suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at
large.”
In 2005 the Home
Office, the Crown Prosecution Service and the Association of Chief
Police Officers came to the conclusion that the public perhaps did not
fully understand the law of self-defence. ACPO and the CPS then
produced a leaflet called “Householders and the use of force
against intruders”, which endeavoured to explain the law of
self-defence, particularly in relation to householders. It asked and
attempted to answer the following
questions:
“What
is the purpose of this statement? Does the law protect me? What is
reasonable force? Do I have to wait to be attacked? What if the
intruder dies? What if I chase them as they run off? Will you believe
the intruder rather than me? How would the police and CPS handle the
investigation and treat
me?”
The first
time that I ever saw that leaflet was in the Department when I went to
the meeting with the Secretary of State and his Ministers and
officials. Perhaps I just do not go to the right places to find these
leaflets. It seemed to be a sensible leaflet in that it tried to
provide some form of reassurance to those who were fearful that they
would get into trouble if they hurt someone who invaded their property
with a view to committing a
crime.
Since then the
Secretary of State has said that he wanted to review the issue and that
review is ongoing. It will result perhaps in some provision coming
forward on Report or in the other place. I hope that I am not breaching
a confidence but I think that the Government are considering three
options. The first is to do nothing, the second is to clarify the
existing law, and the third is to legislate to do something more. I
want to try to persuade the Government that the do nothing option is
not an option. The clarification option is a possibility so long as the
clarification goes beyond what the ACPO-CPS leaflet does and is done in
a more public fashion. The third option may be the only way forward in
that it creates a degree of publicity about what the Government are
doing beyond the simple issuing of guidance and leaflets. Perhaps I am
looking for a combination of options two and
three.
We are at odds
with the Government, as are Back Benchers, over the question of what is
the appropriate level of force that a householder can use. There is
also a less serious dispute about whether any advance in the law should
only cover householders or should also cover people who are defending
themselves, others or their property outside a building. I do not think
that that dispute between the Government and the Opposition will last;
there is clearly a way through that.
When a person is defending himself inside his building, other factors
will impinge on his mind. Equally, why should not a person defending
himself from an attack on the street have the same protection, or at
least as adequate protection, as I seek for a
householder? New clause
2(2)(1A) refers to a person
who
“uses force in the
prevention of crime or in the defence of persons or property on another
who is in any building or part of a building having entered as a
trespasser or is attempting so to enter”.
I am not going to go to the cross
demanding that the law should be as that proposes and nothing else. If
we can devise a form of words or a new level of clarity that covers
people in public places as well as in buildings, I would applaud
that.
Ms
Keeble:
Will the hon. Gentleman say a bit more about
public places? One of the differences is that a person who defend
themselves in a public place might put another person at risk, perhaps
by hurling a brick at someone. Does he think that the same protection
should apply in all circumstances? Should not the person in the public
place also have regard for the safety of others in that
place?
Mr.
Garnier:
Essentially, we are looking at a subjective
appreciation of what is going on. Whether a person defends themselves
when attacked in their own house late at night when it is dark or out
in the street, the court would look at what was going through their
mind at the time. I hope that this will not be thought too
self-regarding, but I would like to read out a
summing-up.
Maria
Eagle:
Whose is that,
then?
Mr.
Garnier:
It is mine. What it says is not original to me,
but is borrowed from the Judicial Studies Board’s guidelines. It
might help the hon. Member for Northampton, North. It sets out what a
jury should consider when dealing with a case of self-defence. This
very learned judge said to the
jury:
“The law
in relation to self defence is that a person who is attacked or
believes that he is about to be attacked may use such force as is
reasonably necessary to defend himself. If that is the case he is
acting in lawful self defence and is entitled to be found not guilty.
It is for the prosecution to make you sure that the defendant was not
acting in lawful self defence, not for him to prove that he was. A
person only acts in lawful self defence if in all the circumstances he
believes that it is necessary for him to defend himself and if the
amount of force which he uses in doing so is reasonable. So there are
two main questions you have to consider: Did the defendant honestly
believe or may he honestly have believed that it was necessary to
defend himself? You may think it self evident that a person who is the
aggressor does not act in self defence and if you are sure that he did
not honestly believe it was necessary to defend himself then self
defence does not arise in this case and, so long as you find that he
assaulted”
the
victim
“and caused the
injuries he sustained, he will be guilty of unlawful wounding. But if
you decide that he was or may have been acting in that belief you must
consider the second question: Taking the circumstances and the danger
as the defendant honestly believed them to be, was the amount of force
he used reasonable?
Force used in self defence is
unreasonable and unlawful if it is out of all proportion to the nature
of the attack, or is in excess of what is really required of the
defendant to defend himself. When deciding whether or not the force
used by”
the
defendant
“was reasonable
you may want to think about the following: what was the nature of the
attack that you find was being made on him by”
the victim.
“It is not in dispute
that”
the
victim
“was on his own so
there can be no question of”
the defendant
“having to repel a larger attack
but remember that a person who is defending himself cannot be expected
in the heat of the moment to weigh precisely the exact amount of
defensive action which is necessary. If you conclude that the defendant
did no more that he honestly and instinctively thought was necessary to
defend himself you may think that would be strong evidence that the
amount of force used by him was reasonable. If you are sure that the
force used by the defendant was unreasonable, he cannot have been
acting in lawful self defence and he is guilty of unlawful wounding,
but if the force used was or may have been reasonable then he is not
guilty.”
That related to
the stabbing of the victim at a bus stop—a public
place—in Clapham
Common.
Ms
Keeble:
The difference between someone in their own home
and someone in a public place is that the person in a public place can
put other people at risk. This is an intervention, not a
speech.
Ms
Keeble:
Exactly. Does the hon. and learned Gentleman not
see the difference between someone at home and someone in a public
place whose defensive action and split-second response might involve a
risk to other members of the public? I shall think carefully before I
delay our proceedings with another
intervention.
Mr.
Garnier:
I may be entirely wrong, but I like to think that
I have set out the principles that a jury must examine when considering
whether someone has a defence of self-defence in a given set of
circumstances. The assault case in which I was involved happened in a
public place, but matters would have applied equally had it happened in
a private place. We need not get into the detail about what sort of
action the householder or the person attacked in the street takes.
Clearly, if someone comes at us with a feather duster and we shoot him
dead, that would be a disproportionate
response.
Mr.
Garnier:
As the Under-Secretary of State for Justice says,
such a response would be grossly
disproportionate.
We
could have an interesting discussion about the matter for some time,
but I do not want to delay the proceedings any more than the hon.
Member for Northampton, North does. Perhaps she will let me finish my
point and she can then respond if she so wishes. However, she has
succeeded in making me lose the thread of my argument, which is a
considerable
achievement.
Although
the summing-up that I gave as an example was quite clear, it must be
said in complicated language. It is full of double negatives, and
language such as “If this or that, if not this or that”.
The jury
must think carefully about the issues involved. I accept that, in a
sense, that does not matter as it is what juries must do, but the use
of “reasonable” can sometimes lead members of the jury
astray and to wonder, “Is this what I would have done? Is this
what a reasonable person would have done in the circumstances?”
If we put the adverb “grossly” in front of the adjective
“disproportionate”, we would have a set of circumstances
that the jury would understand more clearly. That is the point of the
new clause. I want to afford clear protection to those who are
attacked, either in their house or in a building, as we have proposed
under the new clause. However, I look forward to that provision being
extended to incidents that happen in public places
too. Repetition
sometimes, but not often, makes a bad point better. It sometimes makes
a good point better. I hope that I have said enough for the Minister to
have understood my argument and, albeit that this is not a day for
voting on the issue, for her to say when she returns to the Bill on
Report, “Yes, we understand what you are about. We think that
the householders of this country need to have greater security by
knowing that they can do quite a lot to defend themselves and, even
though they might cause quite serious harm to the victim who invades
their space, bodies or privacy, they can be reassured that the
Government and Parliament, as a whole, are on their
side.”
4.15
pm
Mr.
Heath:
I find myself in a degree of difficulty with this
subject, which I have now debated several times in the past few years.
I have the greatest of sympathy with those who want to ensure that
householders, or those who intervene to defend themselves or others in
the street in the courageous way that our derring-do Lord Chancellor so
frequently exhibits, are protected under law and do not find themselves
on the wrong side of the law when doing their civic duty and their
personal duty to protect themselves, their loved ones and their
possessions. However, I have also always taken the view that there is
no deficiency in the law—that the law, if properly interpreted,
provides a clear view that there is no problem with protecting oneself
in a reasonable, proportionate way. I therefore find myself arguing for
the principle, but having difficulty seeing why the law needs to be
changed.
Of course,
this all arose from the wretched Tony Martin case—a very
difficult case. I have yet to hear any commentator who actually
believes that under any change that we are likely to make in the law,
Tony Martin would have been anything other than guilty of a serious
offence for the way in which he conducted himself on that day. In a
way, we should rule out from our consideration the circumstances of
Tony Martin and think about a more reasonable householder trying to
protect their property or their family.
I do not see a need for the
change in the law, but nor do I have a problem if the law is changed,
because it would simply be a different way of expressing the same view
in law. This is where I think the deficiency is: whether we have the
law as it is, or the law as it might be, or whether we have a
leaflet—I agree with the hon. and learned Member for Harborough
that it is an excellent leaflet; I wonder how many people have read
it, but it sets out matters clearly—none of
that will make the slightest difference if PC Plod does not understand,
when arriving at an incident, what he is supposed to do. He might take
the erroneous view, which happens far too often, that when a burglar
says, “’E ’it me over the ’ead,
Officer”, it is his job to arrest the householder and not the
burglar. It is still his job to arrest the burglar unless there is very
clear and disproportionate action on the part of the householder. Far
too often, we hear reports, which are more than anecdotal, of people
who have taken steps to protect themselves or their property and find
themselves subject to intensive questioning, rather than congratulated
on having foiled an attempted crime. That is wrong, but the fault lies
with the investigating officers and occasionally, the prosecuting
authorities, rather than in the letter of the law, because it is rare
for the matter to go to a court and a case to be found against the
individual. I am
perfectly happy for the Lord Chancellor to decide that, contrary to the
position that the Government have taken for the past six years, they
now want to change the law. I understand a sense of pique on the part
of Conservative colleagues who, having repeatedly proposed a change in
the law, only to be told that it was unnecessary, are now told by the
Lord Chancellor that perhaps it is necessary after all. At the end of
the day, whether we change the law or not—I take a ruthlessly
agnostic view at the moment—the most important thing is to get
it into the heads of our police officers across the country, not just
chief constables but policemen on the beat, what the appropriate
reaction is when they arrive at an incident and they find that there
has been an attempt to protect the property of the
individual.
Maria
Eagle:
We have had a short, sharp and high-quality debate;
I will seek to emulate that brevity and quality while making the points
that need to be made. I am grateful to the hon. and learned Member for
Harborough for tabling the amendments, and for indicating, when he
spoke to new clauses 2 and 3, that he is not going to die in a ditch on
restricting the provision to buildings and households in the way that
it is currently set out. That enables me to tear up at least half of my
speech, which I am happy to do, because there are problems with that
approach.
My right
hon. Friend the Secretary of State indicated on Second Reading that he
intends to make changes, because he believes that it is necessary to do
so. As part of the Department’s consideration we have, as the
hon. and learned Gentleman indicated, sought to communicate our views
and to invite interested hon. Members from all parties to share their
thinking with us. That will continue between now and when the
Government table their new clauses on the issue, which will be on
Report, I hope. Further meetings are planned between myself, officials
and hon. Members who have expressed an interest in the
matter.
Given
what the hon. and learned Gentleman said about keeping the issue of
householders at the forefront of his mind, I suspect that the matter
will come down to the definitions of grossly disproportionate,
disproportionate and reasonable. It is worth saying something about
that. The hon. Member for Somerton and Frome is quite right to
say—I think that any lawyer, including the hon. and learned
Member for Harborough, would accept
this—that “reasonable” is an incredibly useful
concept. It is well known in law that it is extremely flexible, and it
is well understood by lawyers and by courts, although perhaps not quite
so well by members of the public. It contains the flexibility that
allows it to be applied in any number of circumstances, and that is its
great strength. It is
undoubtedly the case, as the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk
(Mr. Bellingham) said in 2003 when he first introduced his
Bill, that if there is even the slightest confusion as to the law, it
is unreasonable to expect a householder, during a few fearful seconds
at the top of the stairs in the dark, when he is being menaced and
perhaps threatened with a weapon in his own home, to guess what
“reasonable” is. That is of course the mystery that we
seek to put right, and there is widespread agreement on that. Even the
hon. Member for Somerton and Frome, who is determinedly agnostic about
whether the law needs to be changed in any way has acknowledged that
that is the case.
The
problem that we are left with and which we will be working on, is that
of whether the test of “grossly disproportionate” is the
correct one. There are legal and human rights issues about which I can
say a word or two, based on some real concerns. One of the reasons for
the desirability of action on the test for self-defence is that, as the
hon. Member for North-West Norfolk put it, no one expects a person in
such a situation to be able to respond with total legal
knowledge.
Under the
new clause, the person using the force would be deprived of the defence
only if the degree of force used was grossly disproportionate, and if
that was, or ought to have been, apparent to him. Therefore,
he would be entitled to use force that was
disproportionate, but not grossly so. He would still have to make a
distinction between what was disproportionate and what was grossly
disproportionate. It lowers the threshold with regard to the point at
which he must make a judgment, but it does not remove that judgment
altogether.
The
argument is supported on the legal and human rights side, by the
incompatibility of the term “grossly disproportionate”
with the European convention on human rights. The Joint Committee on
Human Rights has previously considered two similar provisions
incompatible—[
Interruption.
]
The
Chairman:
We have a Division, and I am going to give
myself a little more time. We will resume at 5
o’clock.
4.24
pm
Sitting
suspended for a Division in the
House.
5.2
pm
On
resuming—
Maria
Eagle:
When the Committee suspended, I was discussing
the compatibility, or I would say incompatibility,
with the European convention on human rights of the proposal from hon.
and learned Member for Harborough to adopt “grossly
disproportionate” as the test. I was just making the point that
the Joint Committee on
Human Rights has previously considered two very similar provisions to be
incompatible with the convention rights. I was speculating on the
likelihood that the Joint Committee would do the same in respect of the
two new clauses in this group.
The Joint
Committee on Human Rights previously objected to a similar provision on
grounds relating to the state’s duty to protect the right to
life, which encompasses both obligations relating to the circumstances
in which the taking of life by the state can be permitted and the need
to have adequate law in place to protect against the taking of life by
private citizens. The Joint Committee’s reading of a provision
allowing force just short of grossly disproportionate to be used would
undoubtedly be negative. Were the new clauses to be added to the Bill,
it would not be possible for my ministerial colleague, Lord Hunt of
Kings Heath, to sign a section 19 certificate on the introduction of
the Bill in the other place. As I assured the hon. and learned
Gentleman earlier, Ministers consider that declaration seriously before
they put their name to it. So that is the concern that we have about
the wording that he
proposes.
As the
Secretary of State for Justice and Lord Chancellor said on Second
Reading, we aim to introduce proposals on self-defence, hopefully on
Report. The Government’s approach to resolving the issue of
public confusion is to make a change that is designed to clarify and
reinforce the position on self-defence by building on case law. It will
articulate the state’s responsibility to stand by those who were
acting in good faith when using force in self-defence. That protection
will be extended to all such individuals, whether acting in a
professional capacity or not, on public or private land, defending
themselves or others, or acting to prevent crime. We believe that it is
essential that there be one test and one set of considerations used to
assess the appropriateness of all such
acts.
I am perfectly
happy to continue these discussions, but as the hon. and learned Member
for Harborough said, there have been discussions between all parties in
respect of this issue. I am happy to continue discussing it until we
have to table our amendments, to see if we can come to an agreement. On
that basis and in the spirit of trying to come to an agreement
together, I hope that the hon. and learned Gentleman will feel able to
withdraw his
amendment.
Mr.
Garnier:
I am willing to do so because I know that this is
an ongoing process, but I think it important that we do not lose sight
of this issue. I do not know when the Report stage will be, but between
now and then it would be useful if the Government could come up with
some proposals in draft that they would be happy to share with the
Opposition
parties.
Mr.
Hollobone:
I do not know what the correct procedure is for
such things, but would it not be courteous of the Government to invite
those hon. Members who proposed private Member’s Bills on the
matter to be involved in that
process?
Mr.
Garnier:
It would be, and they have been. My
hon. Friends the Members for Vale of York, for
North-West Cambridgeshire (Mr. Vara) and for Newark (Patrick
Mercer) were invited on the last occasion that we discussed
the matter. The events of the Martin case took place in north-west
Norfolk, but it was my hon. Friend the Member for Newark who was, if
not the first, one of the first to initiate a Bill on the matter. If my
hon. Friend the Member for Kettering wants to be part of this happy
gang, I, for one, would be very happy to see him with us. The first
thing that we need to do is get on paper an idea of what the Government
are proposing. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the
amendment.
Amendment,
by leave,
withdrawn.
Amendments
made: No. 276, in clause 127, page 84,
line 40, at end
insert—
‘( ) sections
(Requests to other member States: Northern Ireland) and (Procedure on
receipt of certificate by Lord Chancellor: Northern
Ireland);
( ) sections
(Requests from other member States: Northern Ireland) and (Procedure on
receipt of certificate by clerk of petty
sessions);’.
No.
277, in
clause 127, page 84, line 41, at
end insert—
‘( ) paragraph
21(3) and (4) of Schedule
22.’.
No.
220, in
clause 127, page 85, line 1, leave
out ‘or repeal’ and insert ‘, repeal or
revocation’.
No.
375, in
clause 127, page 85, line 3, at
end insert—
‘(6) The
following amendments and repeals also extend to the Channel Islands and
the Isle of Man—
(a) the
amendments of sections 26 and 70(1) of the Children and Young Persons
Act 1969 (c. 54) (transfers between England or Wales and the
Channel Islands or Isle of Man) made by Schedule 4,
and
(b) the repeals in Part 1
of Schedule 23 relating to those
amendments.
(7) In section 7(2)
of the Nuclear Material (Offences) Act 1983 (c. 18) (application
to Channel Islands, Isle of Man, etc.) the reference to that Act
includes a reference to that Act as amended by Schedule
15.
(8) In section 384 of the
Armed Forces Act 2006 (c. 52) (extent to Channel Islands, Isle
of Man, etc.) any reference to that Act includes a reference
to—
(a) that Act as
amended by any provision of this Act,
and
(b) paragraph 13 of
Schedule (Amendments to armed forces
legislation).’.—[Maria
Eagle.]
Clause
127, as amended,
ordered to stand part of the
Bill.
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