New Clause
59
Protection
from eviction
‘(1) In the
Protection from Eviction Act 1977 (c. 43), after section 3(3), insert
the
following—
“(4)
In this section premises shall be treated as let as a dwelling, or
occupied as a dwelling, if the occupier is for the time being residing
there, except that B & B accommodation and hostel accommodation
shall not be regarded as a
dwelling.
(5) In subsection
(4), “B & B accommodation” has the same meaning as in
the Homelessness (Suitability of Accommodation) (England) Order 2003
and “hostel” has the same meaning as in section 622 of
the Housing Act
1985”.
(2) In the
Protection from Eviction Act 1977, after section 3A(9), insert the
following—
“(10)
Where a person lawfully occupies any residential premises under an
excluded tenancy or excluded licence, he shall not be evicted from such
premises except following the expiry of a reasonable period of
notice.
(11) For the avoidance of doubt, an excluded tenant
or excluded licensee shall not be compelled to leave accommodation by
the landlord or the landlord’s agents following the expiry of a
reasonable period of notice while he is physically present within those
premises.
(12) For the purposes
of subsections (10) and (11) above, a licence of accommodation in a B
& B or hostel shall be treated as an excluded
licence.”.’.—[Mr.
Love.]
Brought
up, and read the First
time.
Mr.
Andrew Love (Edmonton) (Lab/Co-op): I beg to move, That
the clause be read a Second
time.
New
clause 59 would amend the Protection from Eviction Act 1977 to give the
most basic protection from eviction for some of the most vulnerable
occupiers of certain types of property. To expand on that, the 1977 Act
provides various types of protection to some occupiers by giving them
the right to remain in that accommodation until they receive a 28-day
notice to quit. It also provides some protection in that the landlord
has to obtain a court order for eviction. Of course, not all occupiers
have those rights. There is a group of excluded occupiers who do not
have the benefits of minimal rights who are not entitled to a formal
notice or a court order. The excluded groups include not only occupiers
but people living in hotels and hostels, homeless people living in
temporary accommodation provided by the local authority, and homeless
people living in self-contained
accommodation.
1.15
pm
The
options for those excluded occupiers are rather bleak. Although they
are meant to have some protection in common law, in reality they have
virtually nowhere to turn when evicted. Most of those who want access
to the private rented sector will have to raise a deposit, and they may
have to provide rent in advance. If they have to apply to the social
fund, we all know that there can be real difficulties with its
administration, and even then they may not get a loan once a decision
has been made.
Many
will have to turn to the local authority for a rent deposit, and
although we are seeing a significant improvement in the coverage of
rent deposit schemes, it is still the case, in practical terms, that
many people are refused rent deposits. People who have children may
then have to apply to the local social services, under the Children Act
1948, but threats are sometimes made to people in those circumstances
that the children will be taken into care, often scaring the parents
off from approaching the local authority.
The new clause would first
extend the groups covered, and those groups will therefore be spared
some of the hardship that ensues from being evicted in very short
order. As I say, they often find it difficult to obtain suitable
alternative accommodation. We want to bring self-contained temporary
accommodation within the ambit of the Protection from Eviction Act
1977.
Secondly, I
think everyone understands that, for people in bed-and-breakfast, hotel
or hostel accommodation, it is not practical to give them entitlement
to a court order before eviction. Currently, the common law suggests
that they should be given a reasonable period of notice. We know that
that is not happening for many people up and down the country. We want
to bring that within the
ambit of the Bill, so that people in such circumstances will at least
have a strengthened possibility of receiving a reasonable period of
notice before they are evicted. Of course,
“reasonable” has different definitions in various
circumstances. For example, there may be occasions when someone living
in a hostel is being very difficult, and the reasonable test would be
rather shorter than for someone in real difficulty. I hope the Minister
will respond sympathetically, but the essence is to reach out to some
of the most vulnerable people. They often do not understand the
situation that they are in and find that they may have made wrong
decisions along the way, and as a consequence will eventually be
evicted. The hope is that by extending some legal rights to them, we
will give them the opportunity to find alternative accommodation and to
have a little more balance in their lives.
Lembit
Öpik (Montgomeryshire) (LD): I am a little confused
by one element. The proposed new subsection (11)
states:
“For
the avoidance of doubt, an excluded tenant or excluded licensee shall
not be compelled to leave
accommodation”—
and
so on. It seems to me that that means that an excluded tenant or an
excluded licensee can simply squat in the premises and never be
compelled to leave. Perhaps I misunderstand the
provision.
Mr.
Love:
I do not think that that is the legal implication.
Yes, for excluded tenants or licensees we clearly want to extend the
right to remain until they have received a period of notice. However, I
do not think that we would extend to them the right to squat in the
property for good, as has been
suggested.
The reality
is that the law is very firmly in favour of the landlord’s right
to take their property back into ownership. I do not think that this
proposal would upset that in any way other than in the two marginal
ways that I have suggested: to provide that people who are in local
authority self-contained accommodation have greater rights and, perhaps
just as importantly, that people who do not have the right to hostel
accommodation should at least be given a period of notice. I commend
the new clause to the Minister and ask that he looks on it
sympathetically. It would go a long way towards helping people in very
difficult
circumstances.
Dr.
Roberta Blackman-Woods (City of Durham) (Lab):
I
know that the Committee needs to make progress so I will be extremely
brief. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Edmonton for tabling the
new clause. It enables us to focus on this very vulnerable group of
people who can find themselves in a situation where they experience a
lot of panic and hardship in being evicted from temporary accommodation
without being able to find suitable alternative accommodation and
without being given time to do so.
The new clause would bring
self-contained temporary accommodation within the ambit of the
Protection from Eviction Act 1977. It would give the evicted person
more breathing space to explore possibilities of finding alternative
accommodation. It seems like a very reasonable and necessary protection
for this vulnerable group. I look forward to hearing what the Minister
has to say.
Mr.
Wright:
I have a lot of sympathy with what my hon. Friend
the Member for Edmonton has said on this issue. As he has mentioned,
the principal purpose of the new clause is to extend the protection
afforded to people who have been considered under the homelessness
legislation, part 7 of the Housing Act 1996, and have been provided
with temporary accommodation, but in respect of whom the local
authority has no further statutory obligation. That could be because
they do not have a priority need for accommodation or because they have
brought homelessness upon
themselves.
Under
the current homelessness legislation, if a local housing authority has
reason to believe that an applicant is homeless or is likely to become
homeless within 28 days, it must make inquiries to satisfy itself
whether any duty is owed under part 7 of the 1996 Act. Key factors
would be whether the person is actually homeless, whether their
homelessness is through no fault of their own, and whether they have a
priority need for accommodation. Those inquiries can take time, but in
cases where the authority has reason to believe that the applicant may
be homeless and may have a priority need, it has an immediate duty
under section 188(1) of the 1996 Act to secure accommodation until
their inquiries are completed. At that point, in some cases the
authority might find that it has no further duty to secure
accommodation, for example, because the applicant does not have
priority need. Subject to reasonable notice being given, the authority
can end the provision of
accommodation.
In
other cases, the authority might find that it owes the duty under
section 190(2)(a) of the 1996 Act, which is owed to applicants who have
a priority need, but have made themselves homeless intentionally. The
authority must secure accommodation, but for only a limited period, to
provide the applicant with a reasonable opportunity to secure
accommodation for him or herself. At that point, no further obligation
will be owed and the authority needs to be in a position to end the
provision of accommodation, subject to reasonable notice being
given.
Although I have
a lot of sympathy with what my hon. Friends have said, the Court of
Appeal has ruled that temporary accommodation made available in these
circumstances does not benefit from the protection provided by section
3(1) of the 1977 Act. In my view, that position is correct in policy
terms, and to reverse it could jeopardise local authorities’
practical operation of their homelessness provisions. Because of that,
I do not consider it necessary or appropriate to extend section 3 of
the 1977 Act to people who have been provided with temporary
accommodation under homelessness legislation, in circumstances in which
the local authority’s obligation—this is the crucial
point—is specifically limited to a short-term
period.
Mr.
Love:
I am listening to carefully to my hon. Friend. There
is clearly a balance to be struck: a local authority needs to gain the
accommodation that is being made available and does not want to delay
the process any more than necessary, but the families involved are
often the most vulnerable, moving from pillar to post and perhaps not
receiving the best possible advice. Is there no way in which we can
negotiate at least some additional time to give them the opportunity to
make arrangements for the future, rather than leave them in
limbo?
Mr.
Wright:
Again, I sympathise with my hon. Friend, but I
suggest that if families are being moved from pillar to post and there
are concerns about their cases, they will already be captured in the
priority need for accommodation. I hope that the local authority would
see it in that way.
On
the basis that I have set out—the local authority’s
obligations, and the short-term periods—I hope that my hon.
Friend will withdraw the
motion.
Mr.
Love:
I am somewhat disappointed by the Minister’s
comments. Often people find themselves subject to an intentionality
decision, or they have refused the first offer of
accommodation—I have seen many cases of that nature—and
the local authority therefore decides that it has no further
responsibility to them. They may well have taken their decision for
good reasons, but not fully understanding the implications. People
often find themselves being evicted quickly, which comes as a complete
shock and, because of their limited choice, creates great difficulties
for them.
I hope that,
after reflecting on that, the Minister will consider ways to ease the
real housing difficulties of many vulnerable families without allowing
people to effectively squat in a property, as the hon. Member for
Montgomeryshire mentioned. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the
motion.
Motion and
clause, by leave,
withdrawn.
New
Clause
61
Domestic
violence
‘(1) The Housing Act
1996 (c. 52) is amended as
follows.
(2) After paragraph
(d) of section 189(i) (Priority need for accommodation)
insert—
“(e) A
person without dependant children who has been subject to domestic
violence or is at risk of such violence, or if he or she returns home
is at risk of domestic
violence.”.’.—[Mr.
Love.]
Brought
up, and read the First
time.
Mr.
Love:
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second
time.
This is a
probing new clause, and would amend the Housing Act 1996 to include a
new section allowing a person without dependent children who has been
subject to or is at risk of domestic violence, including if he or she
were to return home, to have priority
need.
Domestic
violence currently accounts for 16 per cent. of all violent crime in
this country and is estimated to cost in the region of £23
billion a year. In the latest year for which figures have been taken,
more than 100 women and 30 men lost their lives as a result of domestic
violence, and it is estimated that it affects one in four women and one
in six men at some time in their lives. It is an enormous
problem.
We do not
want someone to be forced to choose between staying at home in a
violent relationship and facing the prospect of street homelessness. If
accepted, the new clause would bring England into the same
situation as already exists under the Welsh homelessness legislation,
and I would commend it on that point
alone.
1.30
pm
The current law
suggests that people who seek assistance from a local authority have to
be homeless, in priority need and not intentionally homeless. It is the
difficulty of demonstrating that people are in priority need that we
wish to address through the new clause. According to the Homelessness
(Priority Need for Accommodation) (England) Order 2002, a victim of
domestic violence is
a
“person who is
vulnerable as a result of ceasing to occupy accommodation by reason of
violence from another person or threats of violence from another person
which are likely to be carried
out.”
That sounds as if
it provides protection, but the problem is the accepted definition of
vulnerability, which states that someone who has become homeless in
such circumstances
is
“less able to fend for
themselves than an ordinary homeless person”.
That definition of vulnerability gives
rise to four problems with the current law. First, the nature of the
vulnerability test leads to a number of problems to do with consistency
and decision making. One authority may take a decision that is quite at
odds with other authorities’ measures, so the leeway in the
definition of vulnerability means that consistency is sometimes the
first casualty of such decisions.
Secondly, in many cases
decisions are resource-driven, and that assertion is not just based on
anecdotal evidence from my own local authority area. Indeed, it was
echoed by a Lord Justice, who said in Osmani v. Camden
that
“decisions are often
likely to be highly
judgemental”.
That has
often been the outcome when such cases come to court, and the new
clause would go some way towards address the problem.
Thirdly, victims of domestic
violence often find it extremely difficult to provide sufficient
evidence of their vulnerability. It is not easy for someone to come
forward—victims of domestic violence often do not go to the
police or any other authority for help—and when they have to go
to a housing authority it is difficult for them to prove that they are
victims, which makes it problematic to deal with them under the
existing definition. As a consequence, people are often forced, if the
local authority is not helpful and if they cannot show the necessary
evidence, into a stark choice: do they stay where they are, subject to
further violence, which may have serious implications, or do they turn
to the streets, simply go to central London and end up in a hostel? One
benefit of the new clause is that it would enable us to tackle that
great difficulty.
Fourthly, many of those single
people—mostly women, but also some men—end up on the
street or in a hostel. However, because they cannot prove that they are
vulnerable, they are not picked up under homelessness legislation, so
they spend considerable periods of time in hostel accommodation before
they can move on. That, as we all know, silts up the hostel
accommodation and makes it more difficult for other single, homeless
people to access it. As I mentioned, the new clause would bring us into
line with the situation in Wales, but most importantly it would provide
a way out for one of the most vulnerable groups in our society. I
mentioned earlier the level of domestic
violence in this country and the shocking statistics; we know how
violent some of those relationships can be. The new clause would
provide an option—a way out—for someone who in those
circumstances has difficulty showing that that is the situation. It
would allow them to access alternative local authority accommodation,
move on and restart their life without the problems caused by their
violent partner, so I commend it to the
Minister.
Grant
Shapps (Welwyn Hatfield) (Con): I rise to give general
support to the intention behind the new clause, which I think is a very
good one. There is definitely a problem concerning the difference
between being intentionally and unintentionally homeless, particularly
with regard to domestic violence. I suspect that all hon. Members have
experience of dealing with constituency cases in which someone is
clearly frightened to death by what is going on in their home but is
scared to leave, because they have been told, perhaps by someone in the
housing department, that if they do so and do not have clear evidence
of violence, they will make themselves intentionally homeless, which
means that they will not gain access to the services that they
require.
Many
of us are fortunate enough to have excellent women’s refuges and
other facilities in our communities, but inevitably they never have
sufficient capacity to deal with the large number of cases. Domestic
abuse is very much a hidden problem; it takes place behind closed
doors. It is right to consider amending the law to ensure that the
balance of proof is pushed just a little further towards people who are
suffering domestic
abuse.
Margaret
Moran:
I support my hon. Friend the Member for Edmonton,
and I congratulate him on tabling the new clause. Speaking about this
issue, I have a feeling of dÃ(c)jà vu, because I was
involved, as I believe he was, in considering a previous Housing Bill,
in which we introduced the wider definition of vulnerability. We had a
very good debate on domestic violence, and we believed that it would be
incorporated by widening that definition. We thought that that would
encourage more local authorities to take domestic violence into account
when making decisions about homelessness. It was the
Government’s intention at that time to incorporate the
seriousness of domestic violence into consideration of whether someone
was homeless and therefore entitled to be considered for accommodation.
It was their intent to recognise domestic violence as a particular
category.
I hope that
the Minister will reflect on that and reinforce the Government’s
intention. Despite our best intentions, as my hon. Friend the Member
for Edmonton said, it is still a postcode lottery as to whether someone
who is a victim or survivor of domestic violence receives assistance
from the local authority. It is very much down to the discretion and
the definition of each local authority in deciding what vulnerability
means. It is extremely difficult to categorise, so
survivors—women predominantly—who flee domestic violence
are in a predicament based entirely on where they live and whether the
local authority is sufficiently sympathetic to their situation. That is
what determines whether they can flee from repeat
violence.
Let us be
under no illusions: these are not individual assaults. Most victims and
survivors of domestic
violence have been repeatedly assaulted before they even report the
fact. Consequently, we are forcing survivors to remain in a violent
relationship, because they have no guarantees that they will not find
themselves homeless if they try to secure their safety. We cannot
possibly allow ourselves to remain in a situation in which we
jeopardise the safety of vulnerable women simply because different
local authorities have different definitions of
vulnerability. In my
previous life, I ran a housing association. We were the only housing
association in London specifically for women, and we were the only
place where single women without children, or women without children
generally, could find accommodation. That provision was tiny and wholly
inadequate to meet the need. I refer the Minister to a recent report by
Crisis. We know that in those circumstances either women become street
homeless or, more likely, they spend years and years in a series of
temporary arrangements, such as sleeping on people’s floors,
that eventually fall to pieces. Very often, their lives fall to pieces,
because without a permanent, settled home, they are unable to sustain
working and other arrangements. At the end of the day, that also costs
us.
Some women are
successful in fleeing their home and go to a Women’s Aid refuge,
but that organisation has repeatedly told me that those refuges are
silting up. There simply is not sufficient accommodation for those
women. Again, we know that the availability of such refuges is a
postcode lottery. We wish that it were not—we should have decent
refuges everywhere in the country, but that is not the case. My hon.
Friend the Minister and his Department need to get a grip on the
problem, because those limited places are being silted up. Places must
be held for those women, because they have nowhere else to go. They do
not have the prospect of a local authority or housing association home
to go to.
That costs
the Government a lot, as does the problem of dealing the many other
victims who cannot get a place in a refuge. It would be infinitely more
sensible if we did in the Bill what we intended to do in the Housing
Act 1996, and ensured that domestic violence is recognised as a
priority category of homelessness. My hon. Friend gave compelling
evidence. Given that women in Wales in the same situation are a
priority for accommodation, it is deeply inequitable that women in
England should not have the same rights.
Mr.
Wright:
I am disappointed that my hon. Friend the Member
for Edmonton was disappointed with the last discussion, so I shall do
my best to make amends. As he mentioned, the principal purpose of the
clause is to bring those persons who have been subject to domestic
violence or at risk of such violence within the category of persons who
are given priority need under the homelessness legislation.
The Government take the issue
of domestic abuse and violence extremely seriously. It is a nasty,
pernicious and prevalent crime. It has devastating personal
consequences for victims and their families, and it has a major impact
on the local and national economy, the criminal justice system, and
other
statutory services. That is why we continue to work on many fronts to
raise awareness and understanding of domestic violence, and try to
improve delivery in all sectors. For example, recent investment in
specialist domestic violence courts has resulted in successful domestic
violence prosecutions rising from 42 per cent. in December 2003 to 67
per cent. in June 2006, exceeding the target that we set. My Department
takes domestic violence extremely seriously, particularly the need to
ensure that victims of domestic violence get the help and support that
they need. Under the
current legislation, people who do not have dependent children have
priority need if they are vulnerable as a result of leaving their home
because of violence—not only domestic violence; it could be from
another person—or threats of violence that are likely to be
carried out. The hon. Member for Welwyn Hatfield used the phrase,
“intentionally homeless”, but the concept of
intentionality is not the issue. The issue is more about whether the
victim is vulnerable as a result of their circumstances, and therefore
has priority need. I stress that applicants must be in priority need to
be given the main homelessness duty and secure priority. However, there
are other examples, including vulnerability as a result of old age,
mental illness and mental and physical disability. People aged 21 or
over could be vulnerable as a result of having been in care, and people
who have been in custody and former members of the armed forces could
be classed as vulnerable.
Other categories of applicant
have priority need that is not conditional on their vulnerability. For
example, people whose household includes a dependent child or pregnant
woman, and young people aged 16 or 17. It is accepted that people in
those circumstances, or at least a member of their household, could be
vulnerable in such circumstances, if not in all cases. I cannot stress
enough the fact that the Government take extremely seriously the issue
of protection for people at risk of domestic violence. I know that
there is some disquiet that, in practice, not all people who are
classed as vulnerable because they have had to leave their home because
of violence are accepted as being owed the main homelessness duty, and
I fully take on board what my hon. Friend the Member for Edmonton said
about the apparent differences between England, Scotland and
Wales.
I am therefore
prepared to consider whether any changes to the legislation are
necessary. I ask my hon. Friend to withdraw his new clause, and I
pledge to come back on Report and inform the House further about what
we plan to do. With that commitment, I hope that my hon. Friend is
reassured. I hope that I have wiped out his disappointment over the
earlier discussion, and that he will withdraw the new
clause.
1.45
pm
Mr.
Love:
My hon. Friend the Member for Luton, South
and I remember the discussions that we had and the extra categories
that we created when we discussed the Housing Act 2004. We thought that
we had provided the level of protection necessary for the different
categories that were included in that statutory instrument, but, as we
have said, practical experience has shown that the vulnerability test
is subject to wide
variation in its application. It is a bit of a lottery, depending on
which local authority one ends up with, because one local authority may
be much less sympathetic than
another.
Similarly, as
we all know, especially London Members and Members from urban areas
with acute housing difficulties, such decisions often have a component
that relates to the level of housing stress and resource
considerations, if I can put it in the terms used by a judge. I thank
my hon. Friend the Minister for recognising that. I hope that he will
take that into account and recognise what the new clause attempts to
do, which is to provide the additional protection that was intended in
the 2004 Act but has not yet been delivered. The situation should be
the same as in Wales, and I hope that he can achieve that. I look
forward to what he will say on a future date, and on that basis I beg
to ask leave to withdraw the
motion.
Motion and
clause, by leave, withdrawn.
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