Dawn
Primarolo: I agree about the importance of that. I should
also have made something clear to the hon. Gentleman about attempts at
a cross-subsidy—something that he touched on—by showing
that costs were very high for the introduction, on a so-called
not-for-profit basis. If there was seen to have been a cross-subsidy in
the arrangements, in any way, that would be an offence under the
Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985, and would be dealt with accordingly. I
hope that I have reassured the hon. Gentleman about
that.
Mark
Simmonds: I am grateful for that point, which clarifies
the only outstanding point I had to raise about the amendment. I beg to
ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment,
by leave,
withdrawn.
Mark
Simmonds: I beg to move amendment No. 179, in
clause 59, page 49, line 38, leave
out subsection
(7). The
amendment relates to advertising. At present, there is an outright ban
on advertising for surrogacy services. The purpose of the amendment is
to extract from the Minister what positive changes she believes will
come about as a result of the changes to the 1985 Act. I understand
that the clause would not allow profits to be used for advertising
services, except with regard to initiating or negotiating an agreement,
or compiling information. My understanding is that those concerned
would be able to advertise that they had a list of people who were
willing to be involved in surrogacy, for example.
My amendment
would return the rules on advertising to the existing ones under the
1985 Act and prevent not-for-profits from advertising any particular
services. I cannot see—and I have not heard anywhere, prior to
our discussion now—any defence of, or justification for, the
change. Presumably people who were thinking of using a surrogate would
be able to find the information anyway, without advertisements, because
they would have been interested in it and thinking about it for several
years. It would also be wrong to influence people by
advertisements.
Would the
offences in relation to contravening the ban on advertising under the
clause be the same as for contravening other provisions of the 1985
Act, or would that be something additional to be included in a
subsequent Bill?
Dawn
Primarolo: The hon. Gentleman’s probing amendment
deals with the extent of what can be advertised and whether there is
variation from the provisions of the 1985 Act. I shall deal with those
specific questions.
As I said,
clause 59 amends the Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985 to clarify the
position of non-profit making surrogacy organisations. It allows them
to charge for their services on a non-profit basis, and it also enables
them to advertise the services for which they may charge. The
activities that those bodies carry out involve the following:
initiating negotiations with a view to making surrogacy arrangements,
thus enabling interested parties to meet each other; and compiling
information about surrogates, with a view to using it in making or
negotiating surrogate arrangements—to establish and keep lists
of willing surrogates and intended parents. Those two activities have
to be considered together. The question is how to put the intended
surrogate, the woman who is prepared to be a surrogate, and interested
parents in touch.
The amendment
would remove the provision on advertising. At present, it is unlawful
for anyone to advertise that they are or may be willing to enter into a
surrogacy arrangement. It is also against the law for people to
advertise that they are looking for a surrogate or for intended
parents. Those provisions are contained in 1985 Act, and the Bill does
not change them. Clause 59(7) amends the 1985 Act to allow
non-profit-making bodies to advertise the services for which they may
charge—for initiating or taking part in negotiations, or
compiling information with a view to making surrogacy
arrangements.
I assure the
hon. Gentleman that the Bill clarifies what a not-for-profit
organisation can do without undertaking commercial surrogacy
activities. It can advertise its own services, but it would need to be
very clear about the fact that it has to stop at that point. What is
still prohibited is individuals advertising the fact that they are
looking for a surrogate and the publishing of names. Such specific
services are still covered—the Bill has not changed
that.
I hope that
the Committee recognises that the provisions are not intended to make
surrogacy into a commercial business. We recognise that, for some,
surrogacy is an option of last resort and that the organisations that
provide them with advice and information need to be able at least to
publicise the fact that their services may be of assistance. It seems
unnecessary to make things more difficult than they already are, but it
is necessary to clarify matters and to ensure that the 1985 Act
prohibitions stand. I hope that the hon. Gentleman accepts my
explanation.
Mark
Simmonds: I am grateful to the Minister for her response.
It might be that the confusion—if that is the right
word—rests on what “advertisement” means. Is it
the same as making information available, or does it mean promulgating
a service and attracting an audience to a service provision? There is
no problem if it means information, but the word
“advertisement” has a commercial connotation. The
Minister gave a clear explanation of the meaning of proposed new
subsection (1A) to section 3 of the 1985 Act means and the difference
that applies, but she did not explain why the measure has been drafted
or what positive difference it will make. I have not had any experience
of, or been contacted by, anybody, either from my constituency or
elsewhere, who has not been able to find out about matching and
commissioning people who are prepared to be surrogates, so there is no
failure in the structure of the 1985 system. I am therefore not sure
that the word “advertisement” adds anything.
The Minister
was right to reconfirm that the measure does not amount to a
commercialisation of surrogacy, and I agree with her. However, what
difference would the measure make to those who were trying to access
surrogacy services by allowing those who provide the service to
advertise over and above the current provision of services? The measure
does not seem to make any difference, so I do not see the point of
it.
Dawn
Primarolo: My answer will take longer than a normal
intervention. The Government are aware that a number of
agreements—the number is small rather than vast—are
reached each year, as I mentioned in my contributions to debates on
other surrogacy measures, which is linked to the point that the hon.
Gentleman made on what can be
advertised. However,
the point is that bodies can make a charge, on a non-profit making
basis, for initiating negotiations with a view to making a surrogacy
agreement and, as I said, enabling interested parties to meet each
other. Some organisations would find it difficult to present such
services—they are not commercial, which is to say that they are
not for profit—under the 1985 Act. The Government are clarifying
the difference between what we consider to be commercial and not for
profit. We are not going to see adverts on television because we are
talking about a specialised area and small group of people. The
advertising can draw the public’s attention, but charging people
who want to initiate negotiations is not for
profit. I
accept what the hon. Gentleman said. He said that those parents who
have taken the big step, for whom surrogacy is the last resort, are
more than likely to be aware of everything. It could be considered
churlish to make things more difficult just because we can when we are
limiting what is provided by the 1985 Act. This is about the difference
between what organisations are allowed to provide on a non-profit
making basis and thus charge for, which is basically the introduction,
and the commercial aspect. Individuals are not allowed to advertise and
we do not allow the publication of a list of individuals, or for people
to say, “I’m an individual looking for a
surrogate”. That type of advertising is not permitted. That is
the fine line that we seek to draw. That is a slightly elongated
attempt to pick up the points, but I hope that I have clarified the
situation. 1.30
pm
Mark
Simmonds: I am grateful to the Minister for that further
clarification. She is absolutely right to highlight the difference
between non-profit-making and charging elements. However, I ask that
she and the relevant civil servants monitor the situation carefully,
because there is concern that it might be possible to stretch the
envelope in ways that were never intended for the advertising and
marketing of services. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the
amendment. Amendment,
by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 59
ordered to stand part of the
Bill.
Clause
60Exclusion
of embryos from definition of “organism” in Part 6 of the
EPA
1990
Dr.
Pugh: I beg to move amendment No. 152, in
clause 60, page 50, line 1, leave
out from ‘(2)’ to end of line 2 and insert
‘after “or human
embryos”, insert “but includes human admixed
embryos”.’. I
move the amendment on behalf of the right hon. Member for Coatbridge,
Chryston and Bellshill (Mr. Clarke). It would incorporate
human admixed embryos into the definition of genetically modified
organisms in the Environmental Protection Act 1990 as organisms that
need to be regulated in case of any foreseeable danger to the
environment or dissemination of dangerous developments. Clause 60
specifically excludes human admixed embryos from the Act. Part 6 of the
Act, which deals with genetically modified organisms, states that it
exists
“for the purpose
of preventing or minimising any damage to the environment which may
arise from the escape or release from human control of genetically
modified
organisms.” Section
106(2)
says: “In
this Part the term ‘organism’ means any acellular,
unicellular or multicellular entity...other than humans or human
embryos”. As
I understand it, clause 60 adds to that “or human admixed
embryos”. The amendment would change the wording to
read: “In
this Part the term ‘organism’ means any acellular,
unicellular or multicellular entity...other than humans or human
embryos but includes human admixed
embryos”. The
rationale came as much as anything else from that august body the
Select Committee on Science and Technology. When it recognised the
possibility that new diseases could arise from mixing human and animal
material and recommended cytoplasmic hybrid embryos, it
said: “In
the event that research using cytoplasmic hybrid embryos is authorised,
we urge the Government to ensure that appropriate risk management
procedures are established and
implemented”. The
Government
responded: “The
Government agrees with the Committee that researchers will have to
apply appropriate risk management procedures for research that involves
the mixing of human and animal materials. We will keep the current
procedures under
review.” What
we are looking for in this probing amendment is recognition from the
Government that they have considered all possible safety concerns and
whether the Environmental Protection Act 1990 is the appropriate
vehicle for addressing
them. The
Science and Technology Committee received submissions from the Scottish
Council on Human Bioethics, which told us that by undertaking such
work, scientists risk creating new diseases and that it is
“well known that
many animals may harbour in their organs, cells and genome,
microbiological and other entities which may cross the species barrier
and develop in the
host”. Given
their concerns and those expressed by the Select Committee, the
amendment is a probing one designed to find out whether the Government
have taken those concerns on board, particularly as we all recognise,
having read the legislation, that human admixed embryos is a fairly
wide category.
Dr.
Harris: As a member of the Science and Technology
Committee that compiled the report, I can say that the quotes are
correct. However, I would interpret the report slightly differently
from my hon. Friend. We cite, as Select Committees do, evidence that we
receive. The only evidence that we received on this point—I
remember reading it—was from the Scottish Council on Human
Bioethics, which is a mixed body. The council is not exclusively
religious, but it is not recognised as a body that has the status of a
peer review scientific or academic organisation. We noted what it said,
but we did not share its conclusion. Its conclusion was that much
stronger restrictions were needed. We merely pointed out a statement of
the obvious, and the position was shared by the Academy of Medical
Sciences. The academy’s report says that there needs to be
risk-management procedures appropriate to the status of the scientific
knowledge about the risks. There are already those procedures in labs
and we welcomed the Government’s response on that. Again, we
stated the obvious, that there needs to be risk management. I share my
hon. Friend’s view that this should be a probing amendment
because whatever the risk management procedures are, treating this as a
genetically modified crop does not seem to be the appropriate practical
measure and runs the risk of allowing other people to argue that the
issue is being trivialised, which is not the
intention. As
far as I am aware, environmental release of human admixed embryos is
not envisaged in any laboratory. While I am delighted that the Science
and Technology Committee report has been cited—and cited
accurately—the conclusions that my hon. Friend draws are not
necessarily the ones that we would need to
draw.
Mark
Simmonds: Despite the disparity of interpretation
of the Select Committee quotes by the two hon. Gentlemen, can the
Minister clarify whether this amendment, if it were to be included in
the Bill, would undermine the special status of the embryo, which is
the cornerstone of this particular piece of
legislation?
Dawn
Primarolo: Let me answer that question. Yes, it would
undermine the legislation, and I shall explain why. It conflates two
different issues. Genetically modified human embryos are presently
excluded from regulation on genetic modification of organisms in the
Environmental Protection Act 1990. The 1990 Act regulates the use of
genetically modified organisms for the purpose of preventing or
minimising any damage to the environment, which may arise from the
escape or release from human control of genetically modified
organisms.
The hon.
Gentleman asked whether an embryo or human admixed embryo could cause
damage to the environment if it was released. The answer is an
unequivocal no. A pre-14-day embryo would be incapable of entering into
the ecosystem as it would be insufficiently developed to survive.
However, safeguards are provided. Clause 60 ensures that genetically
modified human admixed embryos are excluded but that they are properly
regulated in protocols and research laboratories with regard to their
disposal. The clause prevents dual regulation that is not necessary and
ensures that the HFEA requires centres to have a documented procedure
for disposal of embryos, which is appropriate and takes into account
the special status of human embryos. Therefore, it is a different
set
of requirements. I hope that I have clarified why we do not need the
cross reference. I trust that the hon. Member for Southport is
satisfied by my explanation and will withdraw the probing
amendment. | 
