Mr.
Dhanda: The clause is particularly relevant in the event
that entry has been refused to a development site. It provides that a
justice of the peace may issue a warrant authorising a person
authorised by the local planning authority to enter the land. The
conditions are “that
there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that an offence...is
being, or has been, committed”
under clauses 130 or 131; that entry to
the land has been or is likely to be refused; or that it is an urgent
case. Clause 134(4)
provides that entry is to be regarded as having been refused if no
reply to request for admission has been received within a reasonable
period. The hon. Member for North Cornwall suggests 14 days—a
popular time for him—but the amendment is not necessary. I shall
explain why. The
provision is based on similar provisions in the town and country
planning regime, which have historically worked very well. It allows
the JP, when considering an application for a warrant, to reach a view
on whether a reasonable period has been given for a response. The JP
may well decide that that period should be 14 days, or that it is more
urgent than that. I suggest to the Committee that the provision has
worked well in town and country planning, and that we should follow
that model in part 8 of the
Bill. 12.45
pm
Dan
Rogerson: I am grateful to the Minister for that
confirmation. I suspected that there might be
precedent, and I am grateful to him for pointing it out. I beg to ask
leave to withdraw the
amendment. Amendment,
by leave,
withdrawn. Clause
134 ordered to stand part of the
Bill. Clause
135 ordered to stand part of the
Bill.
Clause
136Rights
of entry: the
Crown Question
proposed, That the clause stand part of the
Bill.
Dan
Rogerson: The clause deals with an issue that has
concerned me throughout: Crown land being given an exemption that does
not apply to any other land. I can see that there are particular
facilities or areas to which one would not expect a right of entry.
There is a facility in my constituency operated by GCHQ that I would
not expect the local planning authority to be able to get access to
easily. However, Crown land is a wide definition, and an awful lot of
land could be covered. I am concerned that the Government could perhaps
have defined it a little more closely and that Crown land is too widely
defined.
Mr.
Dhanda: I shall aim to provide clarity for the hon.
Gentleman. The clause specifies that the rights of entry that we have
just discussed under clauses 133 and 134 do not apply to Crown land.
Clause 175 states that offences under the Bill do not apply to the
Crown; hence, powers of entry are not required. That clause is
equivalent to section 296A of the Town and Country
Planning Act 1990. It is a standard provision that the Crown cannot
commit an offence under planning
legislation.
Rights of entry to Crown land
are strictly controlled. Although we have disapplied them under part 8
of the Bill for the reasons that I have set out, other rights of entry
powers can be exercised if the appropriate Crown authority gives
consent, such as under clause 48. Examples of such an exemption include
Ministry of Defence land, in relation to which it is clearly right that
there should be additional safeguards. In short, the intention is to
make the Bill consistent with the 1990
Act.
Dan
Rogerson: I am grateful for that clarification. I still
think that the clause perhaps captures too much land, but I shall not
seek to press the
matter. Question
put and agreed
to. Clause 136
ordered to stand part of the
Bill.
Clause
137Power
to require
information Question
proposed, That the clause stand part of the
Bill.
The
Chairman: With this it will be convenient to discuss
clauses 138 to 142 stand
part.
Robert
Neill: I have one question on clause 138 and offences
relating to information notices, on which I am sure the Minister can
help me. Earlier in the Bill, in clause 130, we set up the offence of
development without development consent, which is punishable on summary
conviction and on indictment. Interestingly, in clause 138,
particularly subsection (4), we are considering—it is a common
enough formulation—an offence that, under certain circumstances,
such as making a statement that one knows to be false or misleading in
material respects, might be argued to import dishonesty, and probably
would, given the facts of certain cases.
I imagine that the reason for
the provision is that the Minister seeks to follow the Town and Country
Planning Act 1990 approach and other precedent. We have talked about
lower-level breaches, and I shall sound like my right hon. Friend the
Member for Skipton and Ripon now, but when there is dishonesty
involving a potentially important breach in relation to a substantial
project with significant sums at stake, would it be appropriate to make
that offence triable on indictment, too?
Mr.
Dhanda: Again, the hon. Gentleman makes a good point. If
he looks closely at clause 138(3), he will see that for failing to
respond to the information notice, one can incur a level 3 fine, which
is £1,000. However, he makes a fair point that if one
deliberately misleads, there should be a bigger fine, and subsection
(5) states that if there is an offence under subsection (4), the fine
will not exceed level 5, which is £5,000. So we have taken the
issue into consideration and I hope that he will be satisfied, because
we have done so for the reasons that he outlined. If someone
deliberately misleads, it is a bigger
offence.
Robert
Neill: I understand and am grateful to the Minister. In
certain circumstances, however, given the size of the project and what
is at stake, one might be tempted—if one were being
cynical—to say, “Cheap at the price.” I shall not
press the point, but perhaps the Minister will think about it again,
because I can envisage circumstances in which the misleading behaviour,
if it were shown to be seriously dishonest, could be as grave—in
terms of public perception—as the offence under clause
130.
Mr.
Dhanda: It is important to remember that clause 138 deals
with offences relating to information notices, not specifically to the
development of a nationally significant infrastructure project on land,
so the provision is proportionate for offences relating to information
notices. Question
put and agreed to.
Clause 137 ordered to stand
part of the Bill.
Clauses 138 to 142 ordered
to stand part of the Bill.
Clause
143Planning
obligations
Robert
Neill: I beg to move amendment No. 421, in
clause 143, page 66, line 8, at
end insert— ‘(za) in
subsection (1) delete the words “interested in land in the area
of a local planning
authority”;’. The
amendment would assist the Government in their objectives and improve
the Bill. It may sound technical, but the reason for adding,
“interested in land in the area
of a local planning
authority”, is
that the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 regime
allows a person to enter into a planning obligation only if they hold
an interest in land that is subject to development. There are proposed
amendments to section 106 of the 1990 Act and we are not unsympathetic
to them, but the amendment before us suggests that to make the system
work better, it might be sensible to extend matters, because section
106 does not permit every promoter of an infrastructure project to
enter into a planning obligation.
It might help if I gave an
example. If an application for development consent includes power for
the promoter of the infrastructure project to acquire land by
compulsory purchase—an example would be the site of a power
station—the promoter would enter into the planning obligation
only after the compulsory purchase order process had been completed.
Only at that point will he hold an interest in land for the purposes of
the Act. If the promoter proposes to install overhead power cables or
underground pipelines, we are advised that the current wording would
mean that he would have no interest in the land at the time that the
application for development consent goes in. He will have interest in
the land only after the development
consent has been obtained and after the promoter has exercised the
compulsory acquisition powers that come with it. That means that he
cannot enter into a planning obligation at the time that the
development consent is granted. We should have thought that it was
probably desirable from the Government’s point of view, as much
as anyone else, that he be able to do so. That is really what we are
looking to achieve here. This matter has been raised by a number of
practitioners in the field. We are sympathetic to the objectives, but
we wonder whether there is an opportunity to improve the Bill’s
operation by enabling people to enter into a section 106 agreement at
the stage of consent. That would be consistent with the desire to have
as much pre-application discussion as possible. No doubt the terms of
that agreement would have been worked out and everything could be
wrapped up more efficiently if it were not caught on the legal hook of
whether, at the time when consent is granted, the promoter has an
interest in
land.
The
Minister for Local Government (John Healey): This is an
important clause. I accept the hon. Gentleman’s explanation of
his amendment and I recognise that the matter has been raised by a
number of practitioners. I will try to deal with the clause as drafted
and explain the purpose behind it; I hope that that will help the
Committee. It allows the promoter of a nationally significant
infrastructure project to enter into agreements with local authorities.
Its purpose is to allow them to do so in the same way—I think
the hon. Gentleman recognises this—as a developer seeking
planning permission under the 1990 Act.
The clause is needed to allow
full use of planning obligations to be made under the single consents
regime. By allowing planning obligations to be negotiated on a
bilateral basis between promoters and local planning authorities,
agreement can be reached on many important issues that might otherwise
have to be brought to the IPC’s attention for examination.
Clearly, if they can be dealt with and agreed in advance, that saves
everybody time and hassle. Certainly, it helps to speed up the
IPC’s examination process and allows it to concentrate on the
matters where agreement cannot otherwise be reached.
I recognise that the hon.
Gentleman raises a real concern with his amendment, but it is not
workable. In many ways it would wind the clock back a number of
decades. At present, under section 106 of the 1990 Act, any person
interested in land in the area of a local planning authority may, by
agreement or otherwise, enter into an obligation with the local
planning authority in question. The obligation is registered as a land
charge. It being
One o’clock, The Chairman
adjourned the Committee without Question put, pursuant to the
Standing
Order. Adjourned
till this day at Four
o'clock.
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