David
Howarth: May I come back with just one more
question?
The
Chairman: Order. I ask colleagues to ask brief, succinct
questions. Martin Linton caught my eye first, then Eleanor Laing, the
Minister and, when he comes back, Mr. Tyrie. I see that
David Howarth wants to come in again, but we must move
on.
Q
8Martin
Linton (Battersea) (Lab): Thank you, Sir Nicholas. I have
some specific questions, but I shall try to be
brief. No
one pretends that triggering is a 100 per cent. foolproof method, or
even necessarily the long-term solution to the problem, but I cannot
quite agree with Professor Fisher. On the one hand, he says that it is
impossible to police but, on the other, points out that there has been
only one case in living memory. My specific question is, if we do not
have triggering, what solution would Professor Fisher advocate? He
mentioned four months, which I supported in the Electoral
Administration Bill, but which the Lords did not like. What about 365
days, as with national expenditure? What about a solution advocated in
the past by the Neill committee of a Canadian-style system, lumping
local and national spending together and dividing it by the number of
constituencies, so that, effectively, you have a single limit for local
and national
spending? I
have another couple of quick questions, mainly addressed to Professor
Ewing. I agree with him that, just as taxation legislation has to be
renewed every year to deal with the accountants’ loopholes, this
legislation has to be updated on a regular basis. I would be interested
if he could elaborate a little on what he sees as a solution to two
specific points he made. One concerns the unincorporated associations
and private companies that have become a conduit for undeclared
donations. Would it be possible to bring these bodies into the
legislation, so that whatever applies to political party donations also
applies to them? In many cases, they have just become a conduit for
non-disclosed donations.
The
Chairman: Order. May I ask Mr. Linton to come
to a conclusion? We have less than 20 minutes and there are a lot of
people who want to come in. I apologise to our witnesses if they feel
that things are being hurried, but unfortunately these are the
procedures under which we operate. The Committee agreed with timings
proposed by the Programming Sub-Committee, and I am in the Chair as an
adjudicator.
Martin
Linton: I have only four more words—what about
private
companies? Professor
Justin Fisher: It is not just me who has concerns
about triggering. In February 2000 in the House, Mr. Linton
said: “Candidates
can have a real problem in not knowing when their candidacy starts and
perhaps inadvertently forgetting to use the word
‘prospective’.”—[Official Report,
Standing Committee G, 10 February 2000; c.
365.] It is a
common
problem. In
response to your other two points and whether to use four months or 365
days, my concern with 365 days is that it would make legislative sense
in some sense to unify the times, but there is a great problem in
over-regulating local party activity. We do not want to strangle the
communications between parties and electors in advance of the election.
Electors respond to that—where campaigns are more intense, there
is higher
turn-out. In
terms of aggregating the spend, in one sense again that would make for
a convenient solution. The problem is that all that would happen is
that the money would be spent in about 150 seats, and the other
parliamentary seats would simply be ignored, so while it would be
convenient in legislative terms, it would produce adverse consequences.
My proposal of four months is a compromise; it is the most workable
solution in an imperfect
world. Professor
Keith Ewing: The answer to the question is in
paragraph 10 of my submission. What has happened is that a number of
satellite organisations have emerged around political parties. The best
way to deal with that is to say that we need to extend the scope of the
regulations, so that they apply not only to political parties, but to
what I call related entities and what the Australians call associated
entities. That way, bodies such as unincorporated corporations and, in
some cases, private companies, which exist principally to fund, raise
money for, or provide services to parties, would be subject to the same
financial accountability as political parties. That means annual filing
of income and expenditure and better regulation of the transparency of
donations. In
terms of private companies, there is an issue there too. I would deal
with it by going back to the Neill committee recommendation and saying
that private companies can give money to political parties only from
trading income that is generated from activity in this country. I would
go further still, and say that only private companies that are owned
wholly or mainly by a permissible donor should be allowed to give to a
political party. We need to tighten up on that in order to be faithful
to the Neill committee position, and I would do it in the ways that I
have set out.
Q
9Mrs.
Eleanor Laing (Epping Forest) (Con): We have had in recent
times two general elections that have been fought with triggering, and
others still in recent memory that were fought without it, such as the
one in
2000 that Mr. Linton referred to in the quote that Professor
Fisher gave. As distinguished academics, are any of you aware of an
assessment or a comparison having been made of the effects of one type
of election or another?
Professor
Justin Fisher: It is difficult to make that
assessment because it is only since the introduction of the current
rules, under which candidate expenses begin at the point of
dissolution, that we have had an electoral commission taking a broad
overview. To be honest, the system prior to the 2000 Act was slapdash
and subject to minimal oversight, which is almost certainly why there
has been only one case in living memory—the case in Newark. I
would stress that my point is not that the current system is perfect.
The Bill is correct to assert that there is a problem with significant
pre-campaign spend. My point is that triggering is the wrong way to go
about it, because it would create more uncertainty and potentially less
transparency, and therefore a lack of confidence in the
system.
Mrs.
Laing: For clarity, what is the right way to go about
it? Professor
Justin Fisher: In my view there is no perfect option,
but the least bad option is the proposal originally included in the
Electoral Administration Act 2006. That assumes that general elections
tend to be in the first week of May, and that therefore 1 January is
the start date, giving a period of four months. That is the least bad
option, but on balance it is probably the best of the options on the
table.
Q
10Mr.
Wills: I have brief points of clarification for Professor
Ewing and Professor Fisher, but I would like to offer a summary
assurance to Dr. Pinto-Duschinsky, who raised a valuable point about
the legislative process. We should be clear that our discussion today
relates only to amendments that arise out of the evidence that we have
heard, out of this relatively new process. There will be plenty of time
for amendments to be tabled on Report, for example. The Government have
made it clear that as long as other members of the Committee come
forward with proposals that are consonant with the overall objectives
of the Bill, we will be flexible and accommodating as far as we can
be.
I want to pick
up two points. Professor Fisher, your remarks about minority parties
and what you assume to be their reaction to proposals by party leaders
suggest that you expect such commissioners to operate on a partisan
basis. Do you agree that those with recent political experience could
contribute to the work of the commission in an impartial and
non-partisan way?
Professor
Justin Fisher: In an ideal world, that would be the
case. Unfortunately, the basis on which the parties are selected
suggests that the Government do not believe that that could be the
case. It would be guaranteeing a place for the three principal parties.
If I may say so, Minister, your reference to the parties as minor
parties says everything about what is wrong with the
proposals.
Professor
Justin Fisher: But, within their respective
countries, they are not minority parties. I need hardly remind you that
the Scottish National party is in power in
Scotland.
Q
12Mr.
Wills: Thank you very much. I am sure that we shall return
to that point later in
Committee. Professor
Justin Fisher: I shall clarify matters. If you are to
have political commissioners, you need to recognise that the world
exists beyond
Westminster.
Q
13Mr.
Wills: As I say, we shall return to the matter. I am
grateful for your contribution. I am conscious of the time and the fact
that others still want to come
in. Professor
Ewing, you made a good point about regulators regulating themselves.
Aside from the fact that only four out of the 10 commissioners would be
appointed in the proposed way and the rest of them would not have had
political experience, do you agree that, if a person had recent
political experience and is not currently an elected politician or
seeking election, that would not be a case of the regulators regulating
themselves? Professor
Keith Ewing: No, I do not agree. I do not know who
you have in mind to make the appointments and, in a sense, that is
another problem. The idea was that those who would be appointed would
have experience in running national elections or perhaps raising money
for political parties. If you intend to appoint people with that level
of expertise—people who have committed their whole professional
life to the work of a political party—it is difficult to expect
them to put their experience and that commitment behind them when
taking on such work. From being close to politicians and people who are
active in the political process, I know that political commitment runs
deep in the individuals concerned. It is unrealistic to expect people
in such positions to put such interests behind them, when operating in
those situations.
To come back
to the point that Michael made earlier, the Federal Election Commission
in the United States consists exclusively of members of political
parties. That would not be a good model for us to follow. There are
problems with the American system because the regulator community is
regulated by itself. A group of four people out of 10 is quite a
lot.
Mr.
Wills: We are not following the American model, but thank
you very
much.
Q
14Mrs.
Laing: On that very point, are you suggesting, Professor
Ewing, that people who have stood for election, been elected or taken
part in elections—the only people who, by definition, have gone
through the unique experience of the election process—are, by
nature of their belief in a political ideal, in some way untrustworthy
and incapable of behaving in an impartial manner? It seems that that is
what you are
suggesting. Professor
Keith Ewing: With great respect, I cannot see how you
can possibly construe that from what I said. It is unrealistic to
expect people who have spent their lives in politics in a partisan
capacity to put all that behind them when they move to the post of
commissioner. However, your point is a good one in that it would be
helpful to the commission to have the kind of experience to which you
refer. Provision was made for that in the Act by the creation of the
parliamentary parties panel. That was designed to create a dialogue
between an independent commission and people who have partisan
political experience on behalf of the political parties. The question
that you might want to ask the commission
and the parties is, why has that system failed? It was designed to fill
the knowledge gap that is now said to
exist.
Q
15Mrs.
Laing: I wonder whether the other gentlemen agree with
that point of view.
Michael
Pinto-Duschinsky: I have been less exercised by this
question of political commissioners than others. To me, it is partly a
matter of the political stance of the commission itself. If the
commission were truly independent, it would be ideal not to have
political commissioners, but I have had the feeling that at certain
times—indeed, I have been informed of this by members of the
commission—that its budget has relied to a considerable extent
on Government favour, and that it therefore needs to accommodate itself
to Government
views. That
danger exists in many commissions in relation to ensuring that they are
independent. If we could be quite confident that there were no
pressures on an electoral commission, it would be ideal to have it as
totally an expert commission. If, however, there are political elements
involved, having a cross-party element becomes useful, as is the case
with the Committee on Standards in Public
Life.
Q
16Tony
Lloyd (Manchester, Central) (Lab): Briefly, if I
understood Professor Ewing correctly, he was suggesting that
unincorporated associations, dinner clubs and so on should have a duty
to report just as a political party has a duty to report, so that they
would have to account for their donors in the same way. Obviously, that
is to avoid the loophole that we cannot trace the original donor. What
would be the trigger for a company or a dinner club to be considered
reportable? Have Professor Ewing or other members of the panel given
any thought to
that? Professor
Keith Ewing: The legislation should apply, as I said
earlier, not just to political parties, but to entities that are in
some way related to a political party and that are not currently
regulated.
Tony
Lloyd: May I make it clear what I am asking? It is about
avoiding a loophole within the loophole. Obviously, if I had an
unincorporated association and I said that 27 per cent. of its
activities were commercial trading activities, it would be clear that
it was substantially a donating body, but there must come a point at
which— Professor
Keith Ewing: Well, it would depend on the
circumstances. What we are trying to do here, which people have lost
sight of, is create a workable system, not a perfect system. Too many
people are looking for perfection in an area where, frankly, it is
impossible. What
I would say as a starting point is that any entity whose principal
purposes included raising funds for or providing services to a
political party, whether on commercial terms or not, should be subject
to the same forms of transparency obligation as a political party.
Basically, that would prevent a political party from offshoring some of
those activities, as it can do
currently.
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