Mr.
Wills: It would help me to understand the hon.
Gentleman’s concerns if he said exactly what he meant by
“a veto”. The clause states that the Speaker
agrees “that
the motion may be
made”, and
the motion is the subject of consultation, and so on. If the hon.
Gentleman means that the agreement of the Speaker is necessary for the
motion to proceed, yes, it does mean that he has a veto—that is
my understanding of the clause—but not
otherwise.
Mr.
Tyrie: I am somewhat concerned because, in the past, there
have been stories about differences of view on the Speaker’s
Committee, members of which—indeed, a majority—have not
been in agreement with the Speaker about action that should be taken on
supervision of the Electoral Commission. I am concerned lest we find
ourselves building into law the potential for further difficulties of
that
type. The
issues are obviously sensitive, and not ones that I intend to develop
further, unless absolutely forced to do so. The Minister will already
be aware of some of the instances that I have referred to, or to which
I am alluding indirectly, not least those that concerned the
reappointment of Sam Younger. It is important that we clarify the issue.
Will the Minister look at the drafting and consider whether, on Report,
he might frame the clause in terms of the Speaker’s Committee,
rather than the
Speaker? Mr.
Wills: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for those
remarks and, as always with anything he suggests, I shall consider them
extremely carefully—I bow to his great experience in such
matters. He has given a great deal of thought to the whole area, so
anything he suggests we take seriously. However, I am slightly
concerned about some of the implications of what he
said. It
is inevitable, and in the nature of any Committee, that there will be
disagreements. I am not sure what the hon. Gentleman is referring to
exactly, but I am not surprised to hear that different members of the
Committee, including the Speaker himself, have different views about
how to proceed. However, the hon. Gentleman will be well aware that we
in the House elect a Speaker to act as Chair of proceedings, and we
have to have faith and trust in his judgment. That is why we elect
him. Every
day, the Speaker has to make judgments with which not every Member will
agree. It seems right and proper that, broadly, he should continue to
fulfil that role here. As the hon. Gentleman spoke, I could not, on the
face of it, see a better way to proceed. We are always in search of
perfection, so if he has a better way I am happy to consider
it. I
hope that I have given the hon. Gentleman some reassurance. As he said,
these are sensitive and delicate matters, but we must have faith in the
office of Speaker and in him doing his job, to which we all elect
him. Question
put and agreed
to. Clause
4 ordered to stand part of the
Bill.
Clause
5Four
Electoral Commissioners to be persons put forward by
parties
Mrs.
Laing: I beg to move amendment No. 15, in
clause 5, page 3, line 35, after
‘(d)’, insert ‘(i) and
(ii)’. The
clause also concerns the appointment of electoral commissioners put
forward by political parties. I think that I am correct not to address
clause 5 generally, but to limit myself to amendment No.
15.
Mrs.
Laing: I shall do so, and spare my remarks on the
principle of the clause until later. Although it is not obvious on
reading, the amendment would amend the clause, which would in turn
amend a small part of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums
Act 2000. The effect of the amendment would be to prevent someone who
had been named as a donor to a political party within the preceding
five years from becoming a commissioner proposed by any party. Set out
in section 3 of the 2000 Act—the section to be
amended by clause 5, which we are considering—are clearly stated
rules about who can and cannot become a politically
appointed
commissioner. It seems logical that, if somebody has been a donor to a
political party within the past five years, they should not hold the
office of
commissioner. While
supporting amendment No. 15, the Electoral Commission suggested that,
if donors to political parties were to be prevented in such a way from
being nominated for appointment as a commissioner, such practice should
include people who have appeared as lenders on the register of loans to
parties. That is an omission. I am sorry that I did not include such a
provision in the amendment because, if we are considering the principle
of donors, lenders also come within that principle. However, that does
not alter the principle of my
proposal. Mr.
Andrew Turner (Isle of Wight) (Con): My hon. Friend makes
a point, but has she considered this one? When donations are given by
trade unions to political parties, that might not be known by the
individuals concerned. For example, the other day, the hon. Member for
Birmingham, Yardley (John Hemming) said that he had been recognised as
a donor, although he had never knowingly been a donor. What would
happen if he were made a commissioner under such
circumstances?
Mrs.
Laing: I thank my hon. Friend for raising that important
issue. He has illustrated for the first time, but not, I suspect, for
the last during our consideration of the Bill, what I shall politely
call the grey area around trade union donations to political parties,
who the people are who give the money, why they do so and what it
means. My hon. Friend rightly suggests that we should consider that.
When drafting the amendment, it was too complicated to include
donations through trade unions, but that is an area we shall consider
in greater detail later in our
proceedings. Tony
Lloyd (Manchester, Central) (Lab): The hon. Lady has had
an interesting exchange with the hon. Member for Isle of Wight. From
time to time, trade unions make mistakes, as all organisations do, but
she is on to something interesting. She describes this as a grey area
for trade unions. What about the very dark, black area of the
unincorporated association? How should we decide the remit of the
principle that she is trying to establish in relation to those shadowy
donors who take part in the Midlands Industrial Council and the various
golf clubs, which are major donors to the Conservative party? She is on
to a good point and I congratulate her on spotting
it.
Mrs.
Laing: I thank the hon. Gentleman for that intervention.
We could get into an artistic argument about shades of grey and black.
I do not accept that, on one side of the argument, things are grey and
that, on the other, they are murky black. There are areas that are not
quite clear on all sides of the argument, which is why we have to
clarify the Bill. However, we are considering amendment No. 15 and now
is not the correct time to consider shades of black or grey in the area
to which he
referred. All
I am trying to do with the amendment is tighten up the criteria for
political appointments. Conservative Members consider that people who
have direct political experience will enhance the Electoral
Commission.
The
Chairman: Order. I invite the Committee to stand to
observe two minutes’
silence. 11
am The
Committee observed a two minute
silence.
Mrs.
Laing: I merely conclude by saying once again that we
would like to tighten up and clarify the Bill with the
amendment.
David
Howarth: Again, the principle behind the amendment is well
worth supporting. As the hon. Lady said, there may be some defects in
the drafting, but I would urge the Minister to take on board her
points. The objective of the amendment is to remove from the list of
permitted political commissioners those who have given donations to
political parties, treating them as they would be treated at present.
The principle behind the amendment is a good idea, because one of the
main functions of the commission is to regulate donors. Although there
are times for making sure that those who are regulated are represented
on regulatory bodies, with the particular sensitivities surrounding the
area of large donations it would not be a good idea, or add to public
confidence in the commission, if the electoral commissioners were to
have among their number major donors to political
parties. I
have some reservations about the detail of what is proposed in the
amendment. The hon. Lady referred to lenders not currently being
covered in the amendment. There is also the question about the extent
of donation that should, in effect, disqualify someone. Minor
donations, although registrable, might not be of an extent or scope
that would bring the general principle into play. Nevertheless, the
principle is worth considering. A slight difficulty with the amendment
is that one of its effects would be to make it more likely that a
political commissioner would be an activist or a former employee of a
political party, as opposed to a volunteer. In general, volunteers are
more likely to be donors than party officials or party professionals.
That might be seen to be a move in the wrong direction, because we want
to encourage voluntary effort in politics. Nevertheless, it is not a
knockdown objection to the amendment. In bringing more political
experience to bear in the commission, we are trying precisely to bring
in the experience of people who have been more on the inside of
politics so that the commission gets the benefit of poachers who are
being persuaded to turn gamekeepers. Although that is a disadvantage of
the amendment, it is not a knockdown objection to it.
I do not want
to join in the previous conversation about trade union donations, but I
urge hon. Members who are interested in that topic to consider new
clause 11. I hope that the Committee will have enough time
to discuss that important proposal in
detail.
Mr.
Wills: The debate has illustrated the complexity of the
issue. I want to help the Committee to find a way through it, and the
easiest way to do so is simply to resist the
amendment. James
Duddridge (Rochford and Southend, East) (Con):
Elaborate.
Mr.
Wills: I am being invited by the hon. Gentleman to
elaborate, and I shall be delighted to do so. As we have discovered,
the area is complex. It might help the Committee if I set out our
understanding of the effect of the amendment. It seeks to alter the
section that disapplies the political restrictions for nominated
commissioners. The Committee will be aware that the Bill disapplies for
nominated commissioners the restrictions that prevent a person from
being appointed as an electoral commissioner if he or she is a member
of a registered party or has at any time in the past 10 years been an
officer, an employee, held an elected office or been named as a donor
in the register of donations. The practical effect of the amendment, as
the hon. Lady set out, is to prevent any person who has been named as a
donor in the register of donations, reported under chapters III or V of
part IV of the 2000 Act, from being appointed as a nominated
commissioner. That seems illogical. We cannot see a logical reason to
leave such a restriction in place for nominated commissioners, while
waiving it in respect of the other restrictions. Nominated
commissioners, by definition, will be affiliated to a political party,
and we can see no reason, as such, why they should be barred from
appointment because of any previous donations they have made to their
party or, indeed, any other
party. It
is worth pointing out to the Committee that, were the amendment to be
accepted, it would have the effect of excluding politicians who had
made a declarable donation. Given what I think is broad agreement that
it is desirable to have electoral commissioners with political
experience, I hope that the Committee accepts that we might potentially
be knocking out a whole swathe of otherwise highly qualified candidates
for that role. Having reflected on the matter, I hope that it will
resist the amendment if the hon. Lady presses it to a
Division.
In all such
matters, it will of course be for the Speaker’s Committee, a
body for which each member of the Committee has the utmost respect, to
ensure that there are no likely conflicts of interest before a
nominated commissioner is appointed. I have every confidence that they
will be able to do the job well.
David
Howarth: What the Minister says about the effect of the
amendment is correct. It would exclude practising politicians who are
also donors. However, it would not exclude all of them. A big field of
candidates would still be left. Laying aside the particular wording of
the amendment, does he agree that it would not be a good thing for
public confidence in the commission were commissioners even to be
proposed who were very major donors to political parties? That would
look as though the parties were putting forward people who had given
lots of money to the party in circumstances that would not be looked on
very favourably by the
public.
Mr.
Wills: Of course, I understand the concerns expressed by
the hon. Gentleman, but we must be careful how we approach the subject.
It is not axiomatically a bad thing for people to make donations to
political parties, even very large donations. If people are public
spirited and want to give money to a political party of their choice, I
do not see anything wrong in that. We all in the House agree on the
various considerations—no undue favours sought or undue
advancement—and that
a donation should be given purely to a political party that best
espouses the values that the donor wants to see embodied in our public
life. What is crucial is that the donation should be transparent and
that no favour or advancement should be secured as a result. That is
the crucial
principle. I
am slightly anxious about the underlying assumption of what the hon.
Gentleman is saying, because this is an important issue. We should not
proceed on the basis that everyone who gives a donation to a political
party—whichever political party it is—is automatically
doing it out of some malign motive. Many donors do it in advancement of
their beliefs, ideals and values—that goes for donors of all
political
parties.
David
Howarth: I agree with the Minister wholeheartedly about
donors to political parties giving money in support of their values,
rather than to advance their individual positions. Nevertheless, there
is a big difference between a small donation—we all want to
encourage a situation in which political parties are funded by a large
number of small donations, instead of a small number of large
donations—and an extensive, large donation in the context of
someone receiving a public appointment, which is what we are
discussing. The connection is much closer in such circumstances than it
is in
general.
Mr.
Wills: Again, of course I understand the spirit in which
the hon. Gentleman has intervened. None of us wants to see the practice
of democratic politics tarnished as it has, sadly, all too often been
in the past. We can all agree with that, of course. We have to be
extremely careful. Underlying his point—I thought he was going
to make a slightly different point—is that it is not just a
matter of the facts, but the perception of the facts. If he were to
make that point, I would happily agree with him on that
too. We
have to look at what process is in place. The process will be
transparent and subject to the Speaker’s Committee—in
which I hope everyone on our Committee has
confidence—which will be in a position to evaluate case by case
precisely the concerns that the hon. Gentleman has expressed. It would
be rash to try to draw blanket prescriptions; we should leave it to the
Speaker’s Committee. I am sure that, in making the appointments,
the Committee members will read in Hansard what the hon.
Gentleman and I have said and take those concerns into
account.
| 
