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Session 2007 - 08 Publications on the internet General Committee Debates Political Parties and Elections Bill |
Political Parties and Elections Bill |
The Committee consisted of the following Members:Chris Shaw, Chris Stanton,
Committee Clerks attended
the Committee Public Bill CommitteeTuesday 11 November 2008(Afternoon)[Frank Cook in the Chair]Political Parties and Elections BillClause 7Political
restrictions on Electoral Commissioners and
staff Question
proposed [this day], That the clause stand part of the
Bill.
4.30
pm Question
again
proposed.
The
Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Mr. Michael
Wills): I welcome you to the Chair, Mr. Cook. I
am sure that we will benefit from your guidance as we make further
progress on this important
Bill. I
was responding to the hon. Member for Cambridge, who had referred to
the briefing note put out by the Electoral Commission on the relaxation
of the political restrictions on commissioners. He was asking, in the
spirit of inquiry more than anything else, why we had not followed the
commissions
advice. The
Government are aware of what the commission feels about the matter, but
I am afraid that our view is different. We take the view of the
Committee on Standards in Public Life that continuing with the current
10-year rule for staff is not proportionate or necessary to ensure the
impartiality and independence of staff employed by the commission or,
more broadly, the commission itself. Obviously, there must be some
restrictions. We think that 10 years is too long but five years is
about right. It is a matter judgment, and that is our
judgment. Mrs.
Eleanor Laing (Epping Forest) (Con): I do not wish to take
up much of the Committees time on this matter, as we dealt with
most of the principles of political involvement of commissioners when
we considered amendments to the preceding clauses this morning. I
simply want to put on the record that I agree with what the Minister
just said. It is right that there should be restrictions, and we must
make a distinction between those on the commission who are
representatives of the political world and those who are not. I think
that that distinction is clearly made in the clause, which we
support. Mr.
Andrew Tyrie (Chichester) (Con): I have had a chance to
remind myself of the content of clause 7I did not get enough
time to do that during the four minutes of debate on it before
lunchand I have realised that there is some substance to the
clause that needs an airing and deserves attention before we move on to
further clauses. I am grateful to the hon. Member
for Cambridge for flagging this up rather than taking the clause on the
nod.
The clause is
important because it creates two classes of commissioner for the first
time, and we need to pause a moment to ensure that we have them right.
We need to bear it in mind that the purpose of the clause is to bring
some political experience into the commission, which many have argued
has not shown enough political experience of the system that it is
trying to regulate. This is why, after much careful thought, the
Committee on Standards in Public Life decided to argue in favour of a
relaxation of the 10-year bar on political involvement. Its
recommendation is set out in paragraph 3.29 on page 59 of its report.
My question is whether what is in clause 7 is consonant with what is in
that
recommendation. I
am a little concerned that we may find that nearly one half of the
appointed commissioners have recent political experience, as set out in
the clause; and that under this clause the other groupin the
past, it would have had no ties with a political party for 10
yearsmight also have been MPs only five years ago, hammering
things out in a Committee such as this, for example, or across the
Floor of the House. In other words, we may find ourselves with a group
of commissioners all of whom have a good deal of very recent political
experience.
I am not
entirely sure that I am happy with that, so I am not entirely sure that
I am happy with the move from 10 to five years for the remaining
classthat is, the original classof commissioners. I
would like the Minister to give an explanation for that reduction from
10 to five years. I have a couple more points that I would like to make
while he is thinking about that one, unless he wants to intervene on me
now; if not, we can wait until I have dealt with the other
points. Another
point concerns the staff, whom we have not mentioned at all. Clause
7(2) proposes that the 10-year bar that applies at present be reduced
to five years for the chief executive and to one year for all other
staff. That is also a substantial change when taken together with the
change for commissioners. I wonder whether we ought to
considerI throw this thought to the Ministerextending
the five-year minimum to several other important jobs, rather than just
limiting it to the chief executive of the Electoral
Commission.
I have been a
participant in the informal group whose job it was to try to fill the
gap that the Electoral Commission realised existed when it wanted more
political experience to be made available to it. That group has been
functioning for many years. As a member of it, I was initially
sceptical about the need for this clause at all, and wondered whether
the issue could be better addressed, for example, by putting that group
on a formal basis, with the authority to publish views of dissent if it
disagreed with actions of the Electoral Commission, which itself would
be a constraint. If a group of politicians, all from different parties,
said all at once that they disagreed with something and that the
commission was going down the wrong route, that might act as a
restraint on the commission.
This issue was
the subject of the Hayden Phillips process. I participated in that
process, as the Minister knows, and I participated in all the talks
about this issue. It was largely decided in the margins of the Hayden
Phillips discussion to go down this route as it was probably the least
bad option, recognising that there are pros and cons for whichever
route one takes. I am now a convert to the idea of
a reduction, and I will not divide the Committee on this point.
However, I
would be grateful for the Ministers response to a number of
concerns. First, when we consider the changes that we are making to
staff as well as to the commissioners themselves, we are making a
substantial change all in one go. Secondly, is the reduction from 10
years to five for commissioners necessarily right for the reduction for
the non-political group? Thirdly, is the reduction from five years to
one for all staff except for the chief executive the best way
forward?
Mr.
Wills: As always, the hon. Gentleman makes some
valuable points and broadly speaking, they reflect the views of the
Electoral Commission. Of course we are aware of those views and we have
taken them into account. The hon. Gentleman said, using carefully
chosen words, that he was not altogether sure that this way was the
right way. Let me try to give him greater certainty, so that he can go
forward into the afternoon in comfort and relaxation.
There is no
difference in principle between us on the fact that there needs to be
some form of sanitising period; I think that that is consensual. That
is why we have maintained the existence of that sanitising period. The
only question is how long that period should be. We have taken the view
that to maintain the current restrictions is disproportionate and
restrictive on individuals right to participate and perhaps to
bring their interests to bear in this form of public life. There needs
to be a sanitising period. Some of the recommendations have come from
the Committee on Standards in Public Life. The hon. Gentleman is right
to say that the decision to reduce the restrictions on other
commissioners from 10 years to five was taken by the Ministry
of Justice. Therefore, by and large, we have imported the view of the
Committee on Standards in Public Life, except in that one
respect.
I want to
offer to the hon. Gentleman an anecdotal reassurance and then a
reassurance in principle about the approach that we have taken. The
anecdotal experience is that, by and large, being politically active is
an addiction and an obsession. We all know how all-consuming political
activity can be. By and large, when people decide, for whatever reason,
to detoxify and leave the pursuit of politics, they tend to stay clean.
After a break of five years or one, they do not tend to decide to seek
election and parliamentary office. They have either had their fill of
it and they move on, or they have never had their fill of it and never
move on. Therefore, if people take a break, they move on from that
partisan participation. That is the anecdotal reassurance.
Much more
importantly, we must not lose sight of the factwe come back to
this point over and over againthat everyone we are talking
about will be selected on merit. Those selecting them, whoever they may
be, will clearly be conscious of the need to avoid any perceived or
actual conflicts of interest. That is fundamental. All the concerns
that the hon. Gentleman expressed are fundamentally important, but all
the commissioners will be selected on grounds of merit, and with that
will come the fundamental objective of avoiding any conflicts of
interest, real or perceived. I hope that that gives the hon. Gentleman
some reassurance about the approach that we have taken. It is a matter
of judgment. This is the judgment that we have made and we think it
adequate. Question
put and agreed
to. Clause
7 ordered to stand part of the
Bill.
Clause 1Compliance
with controls imposed by the 2000 Acts
etc Mr.
Jonathan Djanogly (Huntingdon) (Con): I beg to move
amendment No. 79, in
clause 1, page 1, line 7, after
the, insert
sole.
No. 38, in
clause 1, page 1, line 16, at
end add (4) In the 2000
Act section 13 (which makes provision about the promotion of the
electoral and democratic system by the Electoral Commission) is
repealed..
Mr.
Djanogly: We move to clause 1, which deals with the
functions of the Electoral Commission. In fact, we are moving back to
clause 1. There is always something about moving backwards in Bills. I
should like to put it on record that we have found it difficult to
prepare comprehensively for these clauses. They are the most technical
clauses in the Bill, and it would have been helpful to have had more
time. As a result, amendments have been rushed with little or no time
for consultation. That includes the Government amendments that we
received on Friday. Although it is good to have seen the
amendmentsand I thank the Minister for having put some of them
throughwe have not been able to consult on them for obvious
reasons. Frankly, that is not the best way to make law. I hope that
lessons will be learned from the experience that we have had in this
Committee, although that is unlikely to be the
case.
Mr.
Tyrie: I am particularly perturbed that we have not had
time to prepare for this Bill. The language has always been consensual.
We will do this by working together. I cannot understand the mad rush.
We are talking about not just legislation, but constitutional
legislation at that. I wonder whether my hon. Friend wants to comment
on
that.
Mr.
Djanogly: Given that, one way or another, whether here or
in the other place, the Bill is invariably going to stretch into the
next Session, I agree with my hon. Friend about the rush. However, that
is the situation that we
face. 4.45
pm Let
me move on to amendments Nos. 79 and 38. We generally support the aim
of clause 1 and believe that it should be a tool for change. There is a
need to refocus the commission on its core duties as a regulator. That
is generally recognised by pretty much everyone, not least by the
commission itself. The question is, how are we going to do that? Given
the known weakness of the commission in its various functions, does the
Bill go far enough in redefining those functions? The Bill gives the
commission lots of new investigatory powers, for instance, but will it
actually use them in the exercise of its functions, given the limited
redefinition in the Bill? Do the functions need further focus than has
been provided?
Let us examine
the redefinition. Clause 1 will delete the original wording of section
145(1) of PPERA, which
states: The
Commission shall have the general function of monitoring
compliance
and replace it with the
slightly more proactive
wording: shall
have the function of monitoring, and taking such steps as they consider
appropriate with a view to securing,
compliance. That
emphasis on the proactive role of the commission is to be encouraged,
as the bulk of the reports to date have recommended a need for it to
act more courageously and to shrug off what some have seen as a passive
attitude. In essence, clause 1 provides that in addition to its
existing function of monitoring compliance with the various
requirements, the commission shall also have the function of taking
such steps as it considers appropriate to secure compliance with those
requirements.
The aim of
amendment No. 79 is to tighten the wording of the clause, to insert the
word sole before describing the function of the
Electoral Commission. The aim is that first, we will not be back here
again in six years, with all the associated costs, to review the scope
of the commissions duties because it has been able to take the
path of least difficulty and resume a passive role and, secondly, to
aid the commission and give it a clearer indication of what Parliament
thinks its role should be. It may take time for the commission to
readjust to its new role, so I propose a clear statutory signposting so
that it can have the courage of its convictions to fulfil its mentoring
and enforcement role, without the need to consider the wider issues for
the electoral system. I hope that the commission and the Government see
this is an enabling remit for the commission, rather than a restricting
one.
Amendment No.
38 seeks to clarify the position. Given that the Bill seeks to refocus
the commissions core duties on to its role as a regulatory
body, we need to do away with a particular section in PPERA as it will,
in effect, become all but redundant. To leave it on the statute books
will serve no function other than to confuse the commission and those
studying the
legislation. Section
13 of PPERA places a duty on the commission to promote awareness of the
electoral and democratic systems. As my hon. Friend for Chichester so
rightly pointed out in his submission to the Committee on Standards in
Public Life review, this is not a matter for the commission; rather it
is a matter for political parties. The amendment is designed to tie up
the loose ends so that there is no room for future confusion.
Last night the
Electoral Commission commented on this issue, and it is worth putting
its position on the record. It
said: The
Commission does not support amendment 38 which would remove our duty to
promote public awareness of electoral systems and related matters.
There is a strong case for ensuring that people get clear and reliable
information about how to register to vote, and how to take part in
elections, and for this information to be provided by the independent
Electoral
Commission. Although
the Committee on Standards in Public Life (CSPL), in its eleventh
report, recommended that the Commission should no longer retain a wider
statutory duty to encourage participation in the democratic process, it
also recommended that the Commission should retain a clearly
defined statutory duty for the provision of public information on the
mechanics of the electoral process including electoral registration
procedures, how to vote and explaining any changes to the electoral
system. The
Commission no longer encourages participation in the broader sense
discussed by the CSPL. We agree with the Governments response
to the CSPL on the point that informing the public on the
mechanics of the electoral system, including the registration process,
is key to maintaining a strong democracy and we agree that the
Electoral Commission should continue to fulfil this
role.
While
I can understand the Electoral Commissions position, it leads
to a wider issue, namely: where is the line going to be drawn on what
constitutes strict provision of public information, and how much of its
time should be spent on undertaking that? Given the well recorded poor
record of the Electoral Commission on that aspect, the Bill should be
more specific. That is why I head back towards the measures contained
in my
amendments.
David
Howarth (Cambridge) (LD): I have some sympathy with the
overall aim of the amendments, although rather less sympathy with the
precise terms in which they are drafted. The overall aim will be
recognised by anyone who has had much to do with the Electoral
Commission over the past few years, and is that of producing a
commission that is more focused on its core tasksthe monitoring
and regulation of political parties and the administration of
elections. It has not been all that successful at its more general role
of promoting democracy and participation and, on the whole, that has
drawn attention and resources away from its core tasks.
The problem
with the amendments is what they would do, and that is a separate
question which we should consider in detail. As the hon. Member for
Huntingdon explained, amendment No. 79 would insert the word
sole into the legislation. However, he seems to have
forgotten what it would insert that word intosection
145 of PPERA. After the words in clause 1, that section refers
immediately to
the restrictions
and other requirements imposed by or by virtue of Parts III to
VII. In
other words, it misses out the requirements in parts I and II of PPERA,
which unfortunately are rather important. The hon. Gentlemans
amendment would rule out a role for the commission in those two areas.
Part I includes provisions on a supervised role regarding boundaries in
England, and part II is about the registration of political parties.
The hon. Gentlemans amendment would leave us without any body
responsible for the registration of political parties; I cannot support
it.
There is more
to amendment No. 38 than there is to amendment No. 79, but there is a
difficulty. In its response, the commission said that it still wants to
have the power to give information about how the electoral system
works. That is the proper function of the commission and is part of the
administration of elections. When there are different electoral
systemsthe European Parliament system, for examplethe
commission has a role in ensuring that the explanation for the system
offered to voters is not only clear but fair, and that it is not biased
in the direction of a particular party or group of parties. I agree
that that role should remain, but that does not mean that the
commission should also retain its broader position, which has had the
effect of taking away focus from its core role.
As it now
stands, section 13(1)(a) of PPERA details the commissions role
in explaining the electoral system, and is worthy of retention.
However, according to section 13(1)(b), the commission is supposed to
promote awareness of
current systems
of local government and national government in the United Kingdom and
any pending such
systems, while
section 13(1)(c) states that the commission should promote public
awareness
of the
institutions of the European
Union. It
seems to me surprising that the commission should have such a
role.
Although
I am sympathetic to the overall aim of the hon. Gentlemans
amendment and support its effect in those parts, overall it goes
slightly too far. Nevertheless, I would be interested to hear the
Ministers response to the issues I have
raised.
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