Nick
Ainger: I am still a little puzzled. The Minister and the
Electoral Commission tell us that they are producing the guidance, so
why is the requirement so onerous? If it is producing the guidance, it
does not seem to be too onerous for it to do so. We being told that
putting “shall” instead of “may” and
creating a duty would somehow be asking far too much, and would take up
far too much time. Will my right hon. Friend explain
that?
5.15
pm
Mr.
Wills: As I was saying, the requirements of the Act to
which the measure would apply are complex and various. The guidance
being produced is a matter for the commission, and it is doing what it
feels is appropriate. Placing a duty on it to provide guidance on every
aspect of the Act would be a different matter and would be more
onerous. I hope that that answer reassures my hon.
Friend. The
hon. Member for Huntingdon asked whether we have consulted the
Electoral Commission. The answer is yes; we consult it frequently and
will continue to do
so.
Mr.
Djanogly: On
resources?
Mr.
Wills: There has not been any formal communication with
the commission about resource requirements, but we discuss all those
issues with it, and will continue to do so. I hope that I have given
enough reassurance for the amendments to be
withdrawn.
Nick
Ainger: As I have indicated to my right hon. Friend, I am
still a little puzzled. The good news is that the commission is
producing guidance; that is absolutely essential. We might have to
return to this issue, but I shall not press the
amendment.
Mr.
Djanogly: Parliament is putting in place some pretty
material changes here, not least in relation to the commission’s
functions. The Minister has just called them complex and various, but I
do not see the sense of urgency from him that this matter deserves.
Electoral law has consistently fallen into abeyance in the past because
of a lack of focus. That is not fair on our party workers, who will
need the guidance urgently, and that is why I shall ask the Committee
to divide on the amendment.
The
Committee divided: Ayes 8, Noes
9.
Division
No.
4] Question
accordingly negatived.
Question
proposed, That the clause stand part of the
Bill.
Mr.
Djanogly: Political party funding and the organising of
elections have been controversial in this country for centuries. One
has only to look at a series of reports going back over the years to
see that those perennial problems have presented challenges to the
electoral
system and political parties alike throughout history. To the extent
that society changes over time, so do its expectations for electoral
and funding probity, and changes then follow. However, the problem has
become far more acute under the present Government.
As I said on
Second Reading, this is a half-hearted Bill, which is characterised
more by what is missing than by our wholesale objections to its
content. We are missing an opportunity to rectify the damage and add
legitimacy back into the system. We are not the only ones to think that
way. A key finding of the Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust
was: “Public
confidence in the electoral process in the UK was the lowest in Western
Europe in
1997.” An
effective electoral system and its administration must be the
foundation of our democracy. For a democracy, we need elections. Those
elections cannot be free and fair unless the rules governing them are
fair and coherent, and those rules must be administered properly and,
if necessary, enforced actively. Party funding regulations are just as
important. Given
recent experience, we agree that the regulatory framework needs
strengthening. The principle, set out in clause 1, that the commission
is now required to both monitor and regulate compliance has long been
promoted by the Conservative party, although we will need to tie down
exactly what that means. We hope that it will result in the commission
doing less of what it should not be doing, such as spending millions of
pounds on increasing voter turnout. That is our job as politicians, not
the job of the commission. As such, we in the Conservative party
cautiously accept in principle some of the proposed additions to the
investigatory and sanctioning powers of the Electoral Commission,
although we will want to examine more closely how they will work in
practice, as we will be concerned to ensure that they do not destroy
donors’ willingness to
participate. Part
I of PPERA contains 21 sections and two schedules that created the
commission and set out its general functions. The commission was
established as a corporate body independent of any Department. Sections
5 to 13 provided it with a broad range of functions primarily in
relation to the oversight of electoral matters in the UK. Its aim, in
essence, is to ensure the integrity of and public confidence in the
democratic
process. However,
the mandate set by the Government in the legislation was
unintentionally broad and ultimately far wider than originally
envisaged. The commission sees its function as ranging from the
regulation of political donations and expenditure by political parties
through to the promotion of greater participation in the democratic
process and responsibility for electoral policy review. That is a very
extensive remit for a body that, according to the figures on its
website, has only six commissioners, one chief executive, an executive
team and an employee force of fewer than 200
people. After
the enactment of PPERA, several years passed before the problems
associated with the breadth of the remit became apparent. The
commission itself, in a report that it published on PPERA in 2003,
queried the extent of its role and whether it had sufficient powers to
ensure that there was compliance with the Act. By the start of 2007,
the problem had become so acute that it was hampering the commission in
its work.
The 11th report
by the Committee on Standards in Public Life, entitled “Review
of the Electoral Commission”, was published in January 2007 and
attracted considerable press coverage. While commending the work of the
commission to date, it noted rather
alarmingly: “Evidence
received by the Committee strongly suggested that it has been less
successful in acting as an effective and strategic regulator in a
manner which ensures public trust and confidence. The root of this,
from the evidence we have received, appears to lie in the
Commission’s interpretation of its regulatory mandate in PPERA
and, in consequence, its overly passive
role.” That
criticism of a too-passive approach to its role as regulator has dogged
the commission in recent years. Peter Wardle said in evidence to the
CSPL: “The
legislation very much puts the onus on the parties to comply and some
of the information that we need, which can trigger our investigations,
does not come into our possession until such time as the parties do
that under the
legislation.” For
a regulatory body whose total net operating costs have exceeded
£22 million for both 2006-07 and 2007-08, that is a rather
depressing perspective on its role as a
regulator. Of
more concern, perhaps, was that the Government seemed to support that
passive role when only 18 months ago Lord Falconer stated in evidence
for the same CSPL
report: “The
Electoral Commission’s role, as set out by PPERA, was not to
investigate. It was simply to be a recipient of information. They were
in a sense exactly the same as the Register of Companies (Companies
House).” The
CSPL expressed considerable surprise at the time at those comments.
Will the Minister address that issue and tell us why there has been a
change of approach from the Government, as welcome as it is? It is
important that that is placed on the
record. The
explanatory notes to the Bill indicate that the commission has
estimated that the additional costs arising as a result of the changes
to its powers and sanctions will amount to about £650,000 per
annum. Could we please hear from the Minister how likely it is that it
will be able to meet those costs from its existing budget? Details on
the budget would be
helpful. Of
more concern is that, once again, the Government are swinging wildly
between opposing sides of the argument: from a placid commission to a
full-throttled regulator with all the powers needed to enter
people’s homes. I do not say that as an indication of a likely
approach that I have received notice of from the commission. Rather, it
is an observation of the potential held in the wording of the Bill. A
lack of balance runs throughout the Bill, and I will return to it in
coming debates as I attempt to highlight some of the Bill’s
inconsistencies. Our
concerns focus on the tendency of the commission to travel the path of
least resistance and sometimes spread itself so widely on less vital
issues that it has been left wanting when faced with larger problems. I
would like to take this opportunity to quote from the submission of my
hon. Friend the Member for North-East Hertfordshire (Mr.
Heald) to the CSPL in June 2006. It adds considerable weight to what I
am saying. He
stated: “We
have concerns that the Commission may have attempted to do too much,
such that it has spread itself too thinly and failed to deliver on
inflated expectations of what an ‘independent electoral
watchdog’ should achieve. This problem of ‘mission
creep’ is not unique to the Commission and has affected other
public sector
agencies...Although the Commission has a statutory function to
review and issue reports on matters relating to elections, it has
produced an excessive flurry of investigations into every single aspect
of the electoral system. We are concerned that the Commission may have
adopted the institutional mindset of ‘change for change’s
sake’.” I
will give one more short excerpt. My hon. Friend
continues: “We
would suggest that the Commission has interpreted its remit to believe
that elections must be ‘modernised’ as an end in itself.
RPA2000, PPERA, and successive legislation, have created an
institutional instability in the electoral
system.” My
hon. Friend’s comments are just as relevant
today. “In
a classic example of public choice theory in action, these reviews have
resulted in the conclusion that the Commission should have a bigger
budget and more power. ‘The need for the Commission to take on
new functions has been pressed on us...We recognise that now a central
electoral body exists, there is an inevitable logic in locating certain
central functions with the Commission.’ Mirroring this trend of
constantly seeking to expand its role, the Commission’s
expenditure has spiralled from £7 million in 2001-02 to
£26 million in
2006-07.” That
has been a common feature of the commission’s performance to
date. It bemoans its lack of powers, yet only 29 people have been
prosecuted for crimes under PPERA. Compare that with the 400-plus cases
of alleged electoral fraud that have apparently occurred in the same
period, and one begins to get the impression that better utilisation of
what the commission has is needed as much as more
powers. Furthermore,
the commission’s predisposition—albeit somewhat reduced
in recent months, it has to be said—to include itself in
non-regulatory or enforcement activities such as the promotion of the
electoral system and encouraging people to vote has, in the view of
many, detracted significantly from its role as a guardian of the
electoral system’s integrity. As my hon. Friend the Member for
Chichester so accurately stated in his submission to the report of the
CSPL: “The
first area where I think a mistake has probably been made was in asking
the Electoral Commission to take responsibility for voter
participation. I am confident, in retrospect, the majority of people
think that it should not have...I think that is the responsibility
of political parties. If people are not interested in politics it is
our fault,
primarily.” I
presume that “our” refers to
politicians. Yet
that element of the commission’s work is supported by a
ring-fenced £7.5 million, or some 34 per cent. of last
year’s costs—more than one third of its expenditure. I
believe that those figures are right, but I would appreciate it if the
Minister could confirm that that is the case. The Government’s
original rationale for placing this function within the remit of the
commission was alarm at the continuing drop in turnout at various
elections. While the reasons individuals do not vote are highly
subjective, it is surely a political party issue rather than a
commission one. As my hon. Friend the Member for North-East
Hertfordshire the then shadow Secretary of State for Constitutional
Affairs, noted in the Committee on Standards in Public Life’s
report, “I
think it is an important issue, but I think someone else should be
doing
it”. Even
more damning is the suggestion from the CSPL that the evidence of any
impact, in terms of increased turnout in elections on the back of the
Commission’s work, is at best mixed and some would argue
negligible.
5.30
pm So
this is the commission we find ourselves confronted with today. We
accept the need for an effective commission and recognise it as a
necessary and vital part of the modern electoral fabric. It is its duty
to act as a watchdog of party financing and electoral administration.
If we get it correct, people will have faith in the system and its
integrity and we shall not undervalue the role of promoting the
integrity of the system when assessing people’s propensity to
vote. In other words, if I do not trust the system, why should I bother
voting? That is the fundamental issue that the Government consistently
shirk in the Bill, in which they continue, wrongly, to put turnout on
the same level as countering fraud. The priority needs to be to refocus
the commission, and that is what the amendment and new clause 1 sought
to do, which is why we will be coming back to it at later
stages. What
we have got, through a combination of deficiencies in the PPERA, is a
mandate for the commission that is too weak in some cases and too broad
in others. This has left us with an enforcement body that has fallen
short of fulfilling both its potential and its important statutory
duties. We will want to ponder where we have got to before the Bill is
considered on Report, but I am not satisfied that we are yet where we
want to be. It would be helpful if the Minister spent a little time
analysing how we got to this position. Was it poor management, a poor
legal structure, or a bit of both? Is he confident that the Bill,
following the implementation of clause 1, is going to deal with the
problem?
| 
