Mr.
Tyrie: I do not mean any disrespect, but I have
Hansard, column 61, of 20 October 2008, in front of me,
and so far the hon. Gentleman has read out his speech as it appears
there. He made those points on Second Reading. If he carries on like
this, we will end up having to make all the obvious replies—that
he
tabled a probing amendment, that he made that clear, and that the
decision was taken without even a Division, which hardly suggests that
there was opposition on our part. There is no merit in his
persisting.
The
Chairman: Order. I know that was an intervention from the
hon. Gentleman and I am sure that what he said has been noted, but the
hon. Member for Battersea is entirely in order in what he is
saying.
Martin
Linton: Thank you, Sir Nicholas. I understand the point
that the hon. Member for Chichester is making, but without the context
we would not get to a meaningful discussion. I shall not dwell on what
has happened since that loophole was opened up. I do not blame Lord
Ashcroft for making use of it in the 2005 election and I cannot blame
him for seeking to make use of it now in his new position in the
Conservative party. After all, I would not deny that my party tries to
match spending by the other party, so both parties are using the
loophole.
Parenthetically,
I do not accept the argument that parliamentary newsletters invalidate
the issue. Hon. Members are welcome to look at my parliamentary
newsletters. I do not think that they bear on the point of candidate
spending at all. It is perfectly right that Members should be allowed
to communicate with their electors and tell them what they have done in
Parliament. If they have done things that are good for the
constituency, it is right that they should get whatever credit the
electors feel that they deserve, but that does not invalidate the need
for a return to candidate spending
limits. Mr.
Alan Reid (Argyll and Bute) (LD): I agree absolutely that
there is a problem that must be tackled, but I am concerned that the
clause is not the right way to tackle it. The hon. Gentleman referred
to newsletters, but what if an Opposition candidate put out a
newsletter saying what a wonderful job he was doing, how he had got the
roads fixed and so on? It is totally unclear whether that would be
counted as election expenses. That is our concern about the
clause.
Martin
Linton: The hon. Gentleman is right that there are
difficulties with triggering. That is the reason for the amendment. I
do not deny that the difficulty with triggering is that there is a
certain element of uncertainty about it. It is like a sword of Damocles
hanging over a candidate. They never know when they might accidentally
overstep a mark and trigger election
expenses. I
am trying to act in a spirit of cross-party consensus. I am not
insisting that there should be a consensus, but I believe we can find a
degree of it. The Bill reinstates the legislation of 1983, which was
Conservative legislation, so the Bill cannot be accused of being
partisan. I would prefer us to stick with what the Bill says because
that is the system that worked for 117 years, and that is the system
that we know has some effect. If a better system can be found, we
should all try to move towards it.
In the
amendment, my hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Test and I
suggest a different version of triggering that is meant to achieve the
objective in a better way. The idea first came up in evidence from my
hon. Friend to the Constitutional Affairs Committee. Instead of
candidate limits that apply from the point
when somebody becomes or declares themselves a candidate or appeals for
votes, they should apply from a specific point in the parliamentary
cycle. The first suggestion was 42 months. Three and a half years into
a Parliament, candidate limits should automatically come into
effect. The wording
of the amendment takes into account the fact that we are already well
past the 42nd month of this Parliament. As 42 months is not relevant to
the present situation, the amendment refers to the 50th month, which
means that the candidate limits would come into force in July next
year—that is, 11 months before the last possible date on which
an election can be held. There would essentially be one period from the
beginning of July until dissolution during which candidates could spend
up to their candidate limit—those limits vary from constituency
to constituency, but they fall roughly within the range of
£10,000 to £12,000—and another regulated period
during the campaign itself.
So there
would be two regulated periods, which would double the amount that
candidates could spend to £20,000 to £25,000. That is a
reasonable proposition. I do not make it out of self-interest—my
self-interest would best be served by what is in the Bill—but
because I recognise that there are many legal difficulties associated
with triggering and that, in the past eight years, parties have got
used to having no restrictions on candidates. It might be a bit
difficult for us to turn the clock back to a situation where triggering
operates all the time.
Mr.
Turner: Will the hon. Gentleman clarify one point, for my
benefit? If the period is instituted as he described, are the
candidates allowed to spend before
that?
Martin
Linton: Before the first regulated period starts,
candidates, as now, can spend as much as they like. Once a regulated
period has started they can spend only up to the constituency limit in
that regulated period. The reason for two regulated periods is because
if we merely increase the candidate limit over a longer period, some
candidates who were adopted only towards the election would have twice
as much to spend during the election campaign as a candidate who had
been adopted earlier. That would introduce an element of unfairness.
The concept is that there should be two regulated periods. It could be
three regulated periods, so that candidates are not completely
precluded from spending any money before the election, but they are not
allowed to save all that money up and have a spending spree during the
election itself.
Mr.
Turner: I am grateful for that answer. Could the hon.
Gentleman help me with a second point? What are the conditions as far
as Members of Parliament are
concerned?
Martin
Linton: Members of Parliament who have been adopted as
candidates would be caught by the same provisions. To the extent that
they wanted to promote themselves as candidates, they would have to
work within the limits, as they do during the election period. It would
not stop them putting out parliamentary newsletters, provided that
those conformed not only with Parliament’s definition of a
parliamentary newsletter,
but with the electoral returning officer’s definition. Those
should, in principle, be the same, but there is no guarantee of
that.
The simple
principle that I am putting before the Committee as a possible way
forward, if one is needed, is that we can proceed on the basis of a
fixed triggering point, where every candidate is triggered and that
that should be at a fixed point in the parliamentary cycle. In the
normal course of events I would propose 42 months—three and a
half years—which means that in a four-year Parliament, the last
half year would be covered by limits. In the occasional five-year
Parliament—they are still a minority—it would be the last
18 months. That would remove the doubt as to when triggering started.
It would remove the need for all the long titles like parliamentary
spokesperson and prospective parliamentary candidate, which the public
find rather laughable. It would mean that the starting gun was fired at
the same point for everybody and that the rules were the same for
everybody. I
agree with the hon. Member for Cambridge that the test is not whether
there is consensus between the parties, because the history going back
to the 1970s is that one party can see that it has an advantage in
consensus and uses the consensus as a veto. That is why we had the 20
or 30 years of scraping the bottom of the barrel for party funds in
this country, whereas other countries all found consensus around party
spending limits, party donation limits and state spending. We were the
only country that left it until 2000 before we even began to consider
comprehensive party funding legislation. Where there is consensus, that
is desirable, but it is important that we do something that is seen by
the public to be fair. A fixed triggering time for everybody would be
the right
principle.
Mr.
Tyrie: Will the hon. Gentleman indicate, on a scale of one
to 10, to what extent the Electoral Commission’s proposal would
be second best? The commission has come forward with a four-month
proposal. 3.30
pm
Martin
Linton: The Electoral Commission agrees in its note that
this proposal could provide greater certainty for parties and
candidates—Members can read it themselves. The commission
basically supports the proposal. It sees one or two possible
disadvantages, but it prefers it to triggering. I have no personal
interest here; as a Member with a majority of 163, anything that
reduces the spending of my potential opponents is welcome. Triggering
might be more effective, but this is probably a fairer system—it
is certainly a clearer one. It is more likely to be the basis of
cross-party agreement, and above all, it is more likely to appear fair
to the
public.
Mrs.
Laing: The proposals made by the hon. Gentleman in
amendments Nos. 201 and 202 are interesting. I am glad that he has now
explained just what they mean and why he has proposed them, and I
sympathise with his attempt to produce a clearer and more certain Bill.
I hope that we will have time to debate the whole of clause 10, because
it is one of the most important in the Bill. To ensure that we have as
much time as possible for that debate, I will be brief in my remarks on
the amendment.
The hon.
Gentleman and others have used the phrase “going back
to”—going back to triggering, going back to what happened
before 2000. We should not look to go back to the confusion that we had
then; we should look to go forward.
[Interruption.] Of course I will give way. I am
sorry; I thought that the hon. Gentleman wanted to
intervene.
Dr.
Whitehead: I was simply gesturing that that is what the
amendment attempts to do: to go forward to a more satisfactory version
of what might misleadingly be called triggering but which ought to have
a new name—a pre-election period that is clear to everybody and
does not relate to whether somebody has called themselves a
candidate.
Mrs.
Laing: I thank the hon. Gentleman for that apparent
clarification. It is difficult to have a pre-election period when it is
not known when the election will take place, but I entirely concede
that the wording of the two amendments is much clearer on that, because
it refers to the previous election. The amendments, therefore, make
sense from that point of view. While I am referring to the initial
remarks of the hon. Member for Battersea, I also pay tribute to the
late Lord Mackay of Ardbrecknish, who noticed this problem, brought it
up and was sadly ignored. He was a great parliamentarian and a very
clever politician, who is much missed in both Houses and in the
political firmament
generally. The
lack of clarity worries me considerably. In considering triggering,
before 2000, I have had reason to look at the literature of each of the
three main political parties that advises candidates when it is that
they become candidates and when election expenses begin. I sympathise
with the hon. Gentleman’s assertion that it is necessary to be
precise about when election expenses begin. That is why triggering, as
set out in clause 10, is so worrying. Due to lack of time, I will not
quote what I might have quoted, but I will reserve, I hope, the duty of
Her Majesty’s Opposition to bring the matter forward again on
Report.
We are in
danger this afternoon of not being able to consider important matters.
However, I draw the Committee’s attention to the guidance
produced by the Labour party in a document called, “The Way to
Win—Labour’s Campaign Handbook for the 1990s”,
which is when triggering was in effect. There is a paragraph in the
document called, “The dangers of election law”. I always
thought that we made laws to protect people, not to endanger them, but
the way in which the then Opposition saw electoral law at that time was
as dangerous. In the advice to candidates, the document says:
“Keeping
on the right side of election law is vital. But it’s not an
excuse to keep out of sight. Use your imagination to avoid the
constraints imposed by election law on the candidate’s
activity.” That
is what the Labour party told its candidates in the run-up to the 1997
general election.
My argument
is that it is essential to have a law that does not leave itself open
to the imagination of Labour candidates or of any other player on the
political field during a general election and that it must be certain.
Sadly, I do not consider that the hon. Gentleman’s amendments
would improve clause 10, and we therefore cannot support
them.
David
Howarth: The Committee has only 24 minutes left, and I
feel not only that will we not have a chance to discuss the matters
later in the list, but that we do not have enough time to discuss this
matter in the depth that it requires. I am sure that the Committee will
agree that this is a matter to which we ought to return, in detail, on
Report.
The hon.
Member for Battersea has moved an amendment that assumes that
triggering is not the right thing to do. I will not to spend the
Committee’s time explaining why I think that he is right to make
that assumption. That leaves only two other solutions to the problem of
when local spending limits should kick in. One is the fixed-month
solution that he suggested; the other is to say that permanent local
spending limits should be there all the time.
I think that
the permanent local spending limit should be the solution. The problem
with the fixed-month solution that the hon. Gentleman has proposed is
that we do not have fixed-term Parliaments. His proposal is certainly
better than the suggestion made by the Electoral Commission, which said
that the limit should apply a certain number of months before the
election. One would have to be a mind reader to work out when that
would
apply. Nevertheless,
there is a different problem with the hon. Gentleman’s solution,
which would apply a certain number of months after the previous one. It
is obviously clearer, but it still gives an advantage to the incumbent
party, because the leaders of the incumbent party—not
necessarily the people who are standing for Parliament for that
party—will have a much better idea about when the election will
happen than the Opposition parties, and they can give signals to their
candidates to spend. [Interruption.] We know what
happened last year. Those were unusual circumstances, where the signals
got confused on all sides.
The
advantages of incumbency are great, and they include, on the whole,
being in a better position to predict or understand the timing of
elections than the Opposition. Therefore, Government candidates will be
in a position to spend more earlier; they will not have to delay their
spending to get it into the first regulated period. That would not be
the case if the regulated period started so soon after the previous
election that no one would plausibly call an election at that point.
The trouble is that even the hon. Gentleman’s permanent
suggestion—not the one that would apply to the five-year
part—will not really achieve that end. As we have seen, it is
still quite possible for Prime Ministers to think that they should call
an election after two and a half years.
The only way
to solve the problem properly is to ignore a fixed starting point and
go to a third solution. Admittedly, it is one that the Electoral
Commission says is difficult to administer and everyone says would
raise problems with enforcement, but it is nevertheless clearer. It is
to have a permanent local cap on spending. There are various ways to do
that—some are proposed on today’s amendment
paper—but the principle is
clear.
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