Select Committee on Business and Enterprise Written Evidence


Supplementary memorandum from the Construction Confederation

OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING (OFT) INVESTIGATIONS IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY

  We spoke about your current inquiry into the OFT and I mentioned the concerns we have identified in relation to its recent investigations into suspected bid rigging in the construction industry. I realise that you cannot become involved in the detail of, or influence in any way, the investigation but it is throwing up some issues of principle about the way in which the OFT is undertaking the investigations which might interest your committee.

  The issue of concern to OFT is bid rigging between contractors. However, to a large extent, the majority of instances of alleged bid rigging currently under investigation concern the so-called practice of "cover pricing" which, for many years, was prevalent in the industry. Cover pricing is essentially when a bid is entered for the sake of bidding. They were often put in to avoid upsetting a client and/or falling off an approved tenderer's list but the contractor would try to price the job too high to avoid getting the work. This often meant talking to other bidders to find out what their offers were. Clients (including public sector procurers) often encouraged or requested covers too because it meant they could demonstrate there had been a competition. With the advent of "best value", as opposed to lowest price, as the key criterion for awarding contracts and the move towards longer term relationships between contractors and their clients, the practice was dying out. It is also clear that, at the time it was most prevalent, the Competition Act 1998 had not yet, or had just entered into force and that there was a good deal of ignorance and confusion at that time as to whether it was illegal.

  There are four issues that I would like to bring to your attention:

    —    we understand that this has now become one of the biggest suspected cartel investigations that the OFT has undertaken. Even so, it is not proven that there was any real consumer detriment arising from the practice of cover pricing, ie that customers and ultimately consumers paid a higher price than they otherwise would have done if the cover pricing information had not been exchanged. Moreover it is largely an historic practice and hence the OFT is essentially shutting a stable door after the horse has bolted. We do not challenge the principle that cover pricing technically breaches competition law but we do question the approach of the OFT which appears to be to considering the practice in the same category as much more serious "hardcore" pricefixing cartel agreements;

    —    this is the first time that the OFT has undertaken a "plea bargaining" approach to the expediting of an investigation, ie where companies plead guilty and avoid a protracted legal process in return for a reduction in the level of any penalty eventually imposed. However, the way in which the OFT has approached this has resulted in companies being unduly pressurised into making admissions of "guilt", without, it would appear, being aware of the evidence available to the OFT and unable to verify whether it is correct, accurate or reliable. Moreover, those not prepared to do so are being unfairly denied the opportunity to benefit from the reduction of penalty offer mainly due to the fact that the tenders in question date from up to six or seven years ago and most companies have no documentary evidence that would enable them to verify their involvement one way or the other. The OFT's offer also appears to be designed to discourage an individual company's appeal of any final decision. In particular, the OFT reserves the right to apply to the Competition Appeal Tribunal for an uplift in fines and the fixing of costs if a company appeals any final infringement decision. Such rights of appeal are an inherent part of due process and it is wholly inappropriate for the OFT to misuse its position in this way in order to minimise its own exposure to potential cost and inconvenience should it, for example, subsequently transpire that the evidence presented is incorrect and that there is an entirely legitimate basis for an appeal;

    —    OFT does not appear to understand the financial characteristics of the construction industry and has made a number of public statements threatening to levy fines that are based on relatively high percentages of the total annual turnover of the companies under investigation and certainly exceeding the average 1-2% of total turnovers that they imposed in the past on roofing contractors. This will almost certainly put a significant number of companies out of business, threaten their supply chains and reduce the industry's capacity to respond to current demand for construction work. Construction contractors tend to have relatively high turnover but low profit margins and thin balance sheets. If maximum fines were imposed, these could represent at least between five and 10 years' operating profit; and

    —    we have so far found the OFT to be unresponsive to these concerns and reluctant to discuss alternative ways of achieving their objective of eliminating and deterring anti-competitive practices in the industry. The Dutch competition authorities have recently been involved in a similar exercise which we believe to have been more transparent and co-operative with the industry. With specific reference to cover pricing as opposed to other possible evidence of more serious forms of bid rigging,

  We consider the OFT's approach to this investigation to be unduly harsh and disproportionate having regard to the lack of competitive harm arising from the alleged infringements. There must surely be an issue of principle about whether this is the best use of the OFT's resources. We also consider that the consequences of imposing penalties at the levels indicated by the OFT as being likely to give rise to consequences that will cause significant harm to the competitiveness of, and capacity within, the UK construction industry.

  As you will appreciate we are in contact with OFT on these issues of principle and a number of other detailed points about the current investigation. Nonetheless, I thought you would find these observations on our experience to be helpful. Please let me know if you would like any further information.

15 June 2007





 
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