Select Committee on Business and Enterprise Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 500-519)

PROFESSOR JOHN CHESSHIRE AND MR JOHN CLOUGH

5 JUNE 2008

  Q500  Mr Wright: Surely the most cost-effective way, as you have said, is the benefit checks which flag up £28 a week extra income on average which in itself will draw people out of the fuel poverty area. The Warm Front scheme quite clearly reduces the need for energy and conserves the energy and the carbon neutral as well in many respects. Ultimately is the only way out of this problem that we have with high energy prices by increasing the incomes of the individuals, or is this something that we can do extra?

  Professor Chesshire: Incomes is clearly an important way to go. Whether we can increase incomes at the rate prices have increased is another matter and with an economy which OECD projects will grow at 1.7% for the next two years, by and large it will be very difficult to increase incomes more than that across the economy and prices are going up, as we know, between 35-40%. Even incomes have a limit when prices change at that rate. The only sustainable way is to make our dreadful housing stock more energy efficient. If one does take the view that energy prices will rise in real terms, then by definition they will probably also rise faster than incomes. That again caps the extent to which you can rely on increases in incomes. The last thing I would say is that I think looking forward, both for carbon reasons and for fuel poverty reasons, we have to change the nature of competition in the energy market and that competition has been based to date on competition on the price of a kilowatt unit of energy, whereas the problem facing the fuel poor is the size of their energy bill. What we have to do is to aim to minimise the size of the bill and not get quite so exercised about the size of the unit price. Again, it takes us to energy efficiency measures, capital programmes and so on.

  Q501  Mr Weir: Do you think the energy companies are making enough progress in reaching the fuel poor through social tariffs?

  Professor Chesshire: No, I do not, but if I may speak personally because there is a difference of view amongst our members at FPAG, I really question the weight government is placing, and possibly Parliament, on the role of competitive companies to tackle the social problem. Government has a statutory objective set by Parliament to eradicate fuel poverty by 2010 for the vulnerable and by 2016 for everybody else. It is now setting up much vaunted targets to tackle climate change. When the going gets tough, the tough get going I suppose, and one looks for a wider range of players to be blamed and hence this increased focus on the energy companies. I think the energy companies can do more—we have had examples of that this afternoon—but they are never going to be the lead players in tackling UK fuel poverty, let's face it. At best what they do is tokenistic. What worries me is, with the Ofgem summit and other initiatives taken recently, our eye goes off the ball onto the sticking plaster and not onto the gaping wound. That is the perspective I would come to it as someone advising a group such as this. Do not get carried away with the marginal increase in money here on a social programme by an energy company when the resource requirements are just so much bigger than that, probably in order of magnitude bigger than that.

  Q502  Mr Weir: But they are part of the solution to tackling fuel poverty from what you have said yourself. Is part of the problem, and specifically we appreciate there is a wider context regarding social tariffs, in the way that they vary so much from company to company?

  Professor Chesshire: They do vary because different companies have a different definition of corporate social responsibilities (CSR). Some sponsor sport, some sponsor NEA conferences or whatever it is and they have that difference of objectives, so I am not surprised that there would be a difference of approach to the specific issue of fuel poverty as well. As we have heard, some have claimed to have lower tariff levels than others and so on and it would not be surprising if those which have a larger amount of profits to play with might appear more generous with their social tariff initiative, whereas one might properly ask them why is the tariff so much higher in the first place? There is a fog of war out there on the battlefield but my point is this: can it be more than a sticking plaster? Can we really expect profit-making companies to address the social ills such as fuel poverty? Yes, we can, because of corporate social responsibility—some would be very good at doing it—and we can also ask them to experiment. I think if we did get six companies doing more work in this area we might get more knowledge of best practice. What is the best way of reaching the really hard to reach customers, for example? Which marketing campaigns have worked more successfully? Those kinds of issues—engagement of trusted social partners on the ground, for example, the churches, the faith and community groups and so on, all those kinds of groups we could learn a lot from a higher level of social activity by the companies. I am saying do not rely on this to resolve the problems that confront Parliament and the Government.

  Q503  Mr Weir: I do not think anybody is relying on it as solving the problem. What we are trying to get at is, first of all, the Government argue that by not mandating specific social tariffs it allows the companies to innovate. That seems to me to be what you are saying as well. Do you accept that or do you think the Government should have a mandatory clear social tariff that applies equally to all the companies operating in the market?

  Professor Chesshire: I think FPAG's judgment will be we want a mandatory minimum floor if we are to go that way, but not a cap.

  Q504  Mr Weir: The other side of the argument is if we put a mandatory tariff in, the minimum becomes a maximum because companies will only do what they have to do. Do you accept that?

  Professor Chesshire: In the dynamics of competition that is the case. In our earlier debate we did not touch on the dynamics of competition. The issue is that those customers who are most mobile, most socially adept, most technologically fluent in the internet and telephoning call centres are the most mobile and you are left with a rump who are less able to move, less socially confident, less in possession of the information and that will be exploited.

  Q505  Mr Weir: There is no competition for these customers.

  Professor Chesshire: When I was advising your predecessor, Chairman, one anticipated this very point that the mobile part of the customer base would become mobile and the margins for them would be competed away. When I first switched I saved £142 as a direct debit customer to direct debit. We are now talking about £30. There is no competition in the pre-payment end of the market.

  Q506  Mr Weir: To get a meaningful social tariff, accepting all that you say about it, it does not tackle the whole problem. There is going to have to be action by the Government to set a mandatory minimum. Would you accept that?

  Professor Chesshire: I think it needs to be examined. We have not formally at FPAG taken the view that that is the way to go because we want to see what the offer is. We want to see some evidence, but it may well be that if capital programmes cannot increase and for the reasons I have given incomes cannot increase at the rate that price increases in this area, then we might need to consider this. The problem is some groups—this is my own personal view—will want the net spread as wide as possible. If you have say eight million households receiving a social tariff being supported in total by 25 million customers, there is an awful lot of cross-subsidy. The nearly fuel poor suddenly find themselves subsidising the fuel poor and become fuel poor as a result. This is why FPAG as yet has not taken a decision yes, that is what we want. We want to see what the offers are. Clearly the wider the number of social groups entitled to this tariff, the bigger the challenge is in its sustainability over time, but it is an option which we need to bring onto the table.

  Q507  Mr Weir: Taking it slightly wider, I did raise earlier with the other witnesses those who are off grid and not on the gas supply, for example, have you thought of any way in which they could be helped with the rising prices of fuel oil or bottled gas and suchlike which are not covered apparently by Ofgem's recent fuel summit or any other regulation?

  Professor Chesshire: I think all of us have paid insufficient attention to the non-reticulated customers—not the wires, not the pipes in other words. The amount of research time focused on households using coal, oil or LPG has really been quite small. There was a Competition Commission inquiry some two years ago about LPG and so on and who pays for the tanks and whether customers are locked in, but by and large outside Northern Ireland, I think, the amount of policy attention focused on customers using coal or oil has been quite small. Those numbers are quite small and, as Mick Clapham will tell you, Chairman, a number of those are still in receipt of concessionary coal and so on.

  Q508  Mr Weir: It is estimated at one and a half million households.

  Professor Chesshire: There is a problem there because as you are moving solid or liquid fuels into rural areas the transportation costs are very high as well because the amount you are dropping off at each point is comparatively small compared with a dense urban area. Even if one moves to renewable sources of supply like biomass, unless one can get clusters, rural areas are always going to be disadvantaged because you are moving a low density fuel around quite large distances using oil as the fuel to transport it by and large, so that is a problem. I think programmes such as Warm Front over time, and certainly CERT over time, need to look at a range of renewable micro-generation technologies, for example, both at individual household level and, where applicable, because of scale at an integrated level, maybe a local dairy and a farm with a school and houses and so on. Not much field trial data exists on those—it is being accumulated—but we have not spent enough money in my view on soundly-based field trial data to inform public policy and scheme design, but that will be a feature I have no doubt of policy programmes in the next five years or so.

  Q509  Mr Weir: There is nothing that gives any immediate solution.

  Professor Chesshire: There is no silver bullet I regret to say.

  Q510  Chairman: You have heard what I said in response to the last session to the lack of joined up energy regulation. From the Office of Fair Trading letter it is quite clear that they can only do this by launching a full scale inquiry and they say that they must prioritise their work given its limited resources. There is no-one going oversight here in the way there is with gas and electricity.

  Professor Chesshire: If I could challenge you, Chairman, there is no ongoing oversight in respect of the gas market. The reason you are having your inquiry and the reason why so many of us are getting rather vexatious is that those who believe in the much vaunted market do not want to evaluate its successes or its failures. FPAG has always argued, and it should be evidence-based—I think Sir John Mogg takes the same view—let's do this, but let's do it regularly, annually and report frankly and let's have it peer-reviewed as well, I would suggest, not just done by the agency responsible for the regulation. That is a personal view but peer review is quite important.

  Q511  Chairman: Our next witnesses are Ofgem so I am sure these issues will be put to them. I would like to engage in the philosophical discussion about why—I am intrigued by this debate about social tariffs—it is right for energy companies to offer cheaper prices to some of their customers but not for food supply companies like Tesco's or Sainsbury's. We will not go into that debate now.

  Professor Chesshire: That is my next session tomorrow, Chairman!

  Q512  Chairman: Let's look at the differential between different forms of payment. Why is the average differential between direct debit customers and prepayment and standard credit customers so large? Why do they increase these differentials?

  Professor Chesshire: I do not think we wholly answered the question, Chairman, going back to your colleague. I think lack of competition in some parts of the market—competition for mobile customers on direct debit was intense early on. They were seen to be lucrative customers, they were seen to be trouble-free customers, they paid up on time and did not cause debt or disconnection problems and they were seen as the obvious target market for suppliers operating outside their historic catchment geographical area. No one found competition for the fuel poor or those on prepayment meters, which are not quite the same, as attractive; in fact, obstacles were often put in their place where they had accumulated debt to prevent them switching suppliers and so differentials widened for that reason—market dynamics. Why they have widened in the last year or two defeats us, Chairman. We have drawn attention in the FPAG annual report now for the last three years to the evidence of this widening differential which cannot be explained by novelty of a newly liberalised market. We have had the liberalised market going for a long time now, so opportunistic companies did take, in my judgment, opportunity to raise margins where they could in the least competitive part of their business. We have argued, and Ofgem knows this, that Ofgem is the only body really fully qualified with access to all the information up and down the energy supply chain to take a look at this. We have said that two or three years running.

  Q513  Chairman: You have partially answered all the other questions I wanted to ask you in that helpful answer. If prepayment meter customers who are not identical with fuel poor customers—many fuel poor customers are standard credit—but if they are being ripped off by the energy companies with making more money out of prepayment meter customers, then there should be enhanced competition for them logically. If they are paying they should be attractive customers.

  Professor Chesshire: I am an economist and at some point you must be right. The margins get sufficiently fat, as it were, for some innovator to come in and say we will specialise in that part of the market, what others might have regarded as the awkward corner of the market. If that does not happen then there is yet another solution of course which is technological change and we will I hope before too long see the roll out of smart meters and this will squeeze those price differentials. That will take a somewhat longer time.

  Q514  Chairman: We have had this discussion before in this Committee and smart metering is often raised as a solution to carbon dioxide emissions. My own personal view is that it is much more likely to help competition in the energy market by highlighting prices and encourage switching.

  Professor Chesshire: Yes.

  Q515  Chairman: As a direct debit customer myself who feels his energy supplier always overestimates what I owe the company and therefore I think is taking too much money off of me too regularly, is there any prospect that direct debit customers are being ripped off by excessive upfront charges?

  Professor Chesshire: This is a periodic one, Chairman, and that is the amount of idle balances carried forward each quarter by the energy companies. Certainly at a time when energy prices were falling that was a problem and people were accumulating large amounts. I think some quarters I had over £100 sitting there idly during the summer months which the companies explained in their covering letter would be used to pay off my higher consumption in the winter and by and large that is true. In a rising energy price market of course that is much less likely to be true. In fact, I would think, and we do not have an FPAG position, the majority of customers were rather glad to find that they did have a bit of a carry forward to soften the blow when it came. Ofgem needs to take a look at that but I think it is not quite the issue it was because we are on a rising price curve, not on a falling price curve.

  Q516  Mr Weir: The amount taken by direct debit is rising every time prices go up.

  Professor Chesshire: That is true.

  Chairman: Speaking from my personal experience, I did have large carry-overs when prices were falling and I think on the whole I am doing rather well now when prices are rising.

  Q517  Mr Bailey: Energy companies' profits—I gather from your submission that you broadly agree with the figures given by the NRFC in terms of companies' profitability?

  Professor Chesshire: Yes. We do not have a big research budget. We do rely on the resources of officials in BERR and Defra and sometimes from Ofgem. Where we placed our own weight in the last two or three years is looking at the resources required for fuel poverty so we have not tracked this area so our submission relies fairly heavily on the work of others, particularly the National Right to Fuel Campaign.

  Q518  Mr Bailey: Why do you think energy companies have sought to increase their profit margins and, secondly, who do you think has been the biggest beneficiaries of these increased profit margins?

  Professor Chesshire: We argue in our memorandum that the difficulty is arguing what is a reasonable level of profit in this rather complex energy supply chain. Undoubtedly there was a time probably five years ago, maybe a little longer, when margins were being squeezed quite severely and there was concern about a mounting backlog of power station replacement building up over time. If this was likely to be low carbon technology it was possibly at a higher capital cost than combined cycle gas turbines, for example, so there was some public policy concern of the profit margins being made by the industries. I do not want to sound an apologist for them, but clearly they were being squeezed very hard at that time. I think most reasonable analysts would have expected some return to normal profits. The difficulty is defining what that normal profit might be. Clearly the pendulum has gone the other way for various reasons and they are now making very significant profits in view of the National Right to Fuel Campaign and the data we present here, profits which are very high indeed, probably not sustainable again in the long term but they will be nibbled away by pressures. You ask who is benefiting from this and I am scrambling around in the notes I have here to identify who that is and let me try and be as specific as I can in response to your question. Our judgment is that the bulk will be electricity generators; that would include the independents but certainly the `Big 6' integrated generators are likely to be the beneficiaries. The difficulty there is they can pass costs and profits up and down the supply chain and they can gain from some transfer pricing. The other beneficiaries in that process will clearly be the traders, the transporters, the shippers, the movers of electrons and gas, and also the storage and distribution networks. Some will have gone upstream to the gas producers themselves who are also the integrated oil companies in some cases. I think there has been quite a lot of crumbs on the table for quite a lot of players is the answer to your question, Mr Bailey.

  Mr Bailey: Earlier you seemed slightly unenthusiastic about the role of the industry in alleviating fuel poverty, which seemed slightly at odds from the general thrust.

  Chairman: Through social tariffs.

  Q519  Mr Bailey: Yes. Do you think that the independent generator as in the gas companies should be included in any scheme to contribute to alleviating fuel poverty?

  Professor Chesshire: We do not formally have a view at FPAG on that point. If Ofgem is looking at this market and if the Committee is looking at the market it is something worth looking into. Clearly there are huge transactional costs. There are a lot of players involved who are not familiar with the fuel poverty type of issues, a lot of transformation of information to lots of different places. My judgment is that the share of the market you are going to be capturing, the incremental share of the market is really quite small and I am not briefed on that. If it was an awful lot of effort for 5% more of the market is it worth the candle? I would not want to rule it out if we are going to have a root and branch review, let's have a root and branch review, but do not be carried away that there are lots of riches somewhere out there which are not being captured by the `Big 6' integrated energy suppliers in the domestic sector. We are talking about the domestic sector in FPAG.


 
previous page contents next page

House of Commons home page Parliament home page House of Lords home page search page enquiries index

© Parliamentary copyright 2008
Prepared 28 July 2008