Memorandum by the Institute for Public
Policy Research (ippr) Migration, Equalities and Citizenship Team
The Institute for Public Policy Research (ippr)
is the UK's largest independent policy think tank. In recent years,
the ippr has published several reports that cover community cohesion
and migration and make, inter alia, the following observations
that may be of interest to the Committee:
1. DEFINITION
OF SOCIAL
COHESION
1.1 Community cohesion is a contested term.
Based on our research, ippr defines cohesive communities as communities
where there is:
— progress towards equality;
— the integration of community members
in economic activity;
— a sense of belonging to a locality
and nation;
— trust and reciprocity between members
of the community;
— social integration of community members,
facilitated by social networks, and thus the development of social
capital; and
2. MIGRANTS'
PERCEPTIONS OF
SOCIAL COHESION
2.1 ippr's research indicates that the vast
majority of migrants feel integrated. They tell of making friends
with people from a range of social backgrounds: from their own
community, other migrants and members of established communities.
These friendships are forged in the workplace, at school, college,
places of worship, through sport, the arts, and other leisure
activities such as volunteering and political activities, or by
visiting bars and restaurantsi.
2.2 Many migrants, however, feel their neighbourhoods
are rather unwelcoming. Many migrants do not know or have never
spoken to their neighbours. Our interviewees felt the biggest
barrier to community cohesion was the unfriendliness of their
neighbours, which in some instances amounted to overt hostilityii.
2.3 Many migrants have experienced racial
harassment in their neighbourhoods, such as name-calling, verbal
abuse, damage to their property and to a lesser extent physical
attackiii.
2.4 The role of race, ethnicity and religion
influences how migrants are perceived and received, with white
eastern European migrants reporting a more positive reception
than non-white migrants.
2.5 ippr research showed that some migrants
feel that the responsibility for integration is placed solely
on migrant communities but the problem lay with the majority community
who were unfriendly and did not integrate. Debate about integration
and community cohesion has the potential to alienate migrant and
minority communities and therefore must be approached sensitively
by Government.
2.6 Migrants who were interviewed in a number
of ippr research projects felt that the UK had become a more hostile
place for migrant and visible minority communities since the terrorist
attacks of 2001 and 2005. Those who had come to these conclusions
included observant Muslims, Muslims who were less observant and
interviewees who were not Muslim or were secular.
3. PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS
AND PUBLIC
CONCERNS ABOUT
IMMIGRATION
3.1 ippr research shows concerns about migration
are intimately bound together with issues around "race",
belonging, identity and security, as well as fears about Europe
and globalisation. In the UK, migration, as opposed to "race"
issues, has increased as a public concern since 1990iv.
3.2 Public concerns about migration are
rather fluid, nevertheless, since 1990 a number of recurring themes
have emerged as concerns:
— Threat of uncontrolled immigration.
— Concerns bout the accuracy of immigration
statistics.
— Abuse of the asylum system.
— Abuse by migrants of welfare benefit
system.
— Strains placed on public services
such as healthcare and education and cost to public purse of services
to migrants.
— Competition for social housing and
other concerns about the allocation of social housing.
— Terrorism and threats to national
security posed by asylum-seekers post 9/11 and 7/7.
— Threat to "British" culture
and values.
— Concerns over job displacement and
wages levelsv.
3.3 There is often a wide discrepancy between
the actual impacts of migration on community cohesion and perceived
impacts, as reported by local communities and the media. This
discrepancy is overshadowing a more productive discussion that
could be taking place among policymakers on how better to support
and improve social cohesion.
3.4 There has also been little discussion
about the positive benefits of migration at a national and local
level. For example, while much recent media coverage has focussed
on the strains placed on public services by migration, there has
been little discussion of the positive impacts on public services,
notably the staffing of key public services by immigrants. Some
60% of the Philippines-born population resident in the UK work
in public servicesvi. Many migrant populations make greater tax
and National Insurance contributions than does the UK-born populationvii.
3.5 Communicating the benefits of migration
to a sceptical public requires considerable skill, as does facilitating
debate about migration. Teaching about diversity in the UK—a
component of the citizenship programme of study in schools also
requires considerable skills. A range of staff such as local authority
communication teams, teachers and youth need to develop greater
skills in communicating and debating migration.
3.6 Arts, cultural and sports funding might
be better directed towards initiatives that bring communities
together, particularly in areas experiencing conflict.
3.7 Public hostility and about negative
media coverage may circumscribe Government's ability to stand
up for the principle of asylum, as well as to fund interventions
for new migrants.
3.8 Negative public perceptions about migrants
and unbalanced media reporting have the potential to increase
racist attacks on migrants and visible minority populations, as
well as prevent the integration of new migrantsviii. However,
there are a number of factors that determine how media messages
on migration will be received by individuals. These include the
individuals' prior awareness of migration, their personal experiences
and the prominence and repetition of messages.
3.8 There are no reported widespread conflicts
or patterns of violence between established and new migrant communities.
Conflicts that do occur appear to be isolated and often triggered
by local critical incidents. Other factors that may contribute
towards the racial harassment of migrants comprise:
— high unemployment and bad housing
in socially deprived areas: hostilities may stem from perceived
economic injustice and are most prevalent among economically vulnerable
groups, white and ethnic minority alike;
— the language used by national and
local political leaders (see 3.9 below);
— the ill-planned dispersal of asylum-seekers
and no local consultation over plans to house asylum-seekers or
other migrant groups;
— little previous settlement by ethnic
minority communities; and
— failure by the police and other key
actors to pick up on growing tensions and to protect victims effectively.
3.9 The language used by Government ministers
and others associated with the Government can also increase public
hostility to migrants. Research shows that "talking tough"
statements used by Government Ministers (For example, "We
turn back two jumbo jet loads of immigrants every day".)
have the potential to construct a social problem in the eyes of
the public. We would recommend that Government and the Border
and Immigration Agency adopt a communications strategy that aims
to defuse public hostility to migrants.
4. IMPACTS OF
MIGRATION ON
PUBLIC SERVICES
4.1 Migrant communities tend to have a different
demographic profile to that of the overall UK population. Recent
migrants tend to be younger than the overall UK population. Higher
proportions of migrants are male than the overall UK population.
For example, Government data on migrants from the eight new EU
accession states (A8) suggests that 82% of A8 migrants were aged
between 18 and 35 years. Only 7% of A8 migrants registered with
the Workers Registration Scheme stated that they had children
living with them in the UKix.
4.2 The age profile of migrants is likely
to be the prime determining factors impacting on their overall
use of public services. Their younger age profile of means places
less of a burden on healthcare and adult social care. One the
other hand these younger groups of migrants tend to be relatively
greatr users of services used by similar age cohorts among the
general population, for example policing, sexual health services
and maternity services.
4.3 Migrants manifest greater residential
mobility than do many UK-born populations—usually moving
to work. Migrant populations in rural areas are usually more mobile
than are migrants in urban areas, because of the seasonal nature
of much agriculture work, as well as food processing and tourismx.
This residential mobility has a cost for public services—there
is an additional administrative cost in enrolling children in
new schools, for example. Residential mobility can also make the
delivery of English language courses for adults challenging.
4.4 Migrants may disproportionally use particular
public services related to their ethnicity or region of origin
(for example services for those with haemoglobinopathies), as
well as services associated with lack of English language fluency
(ESOL provision for adults, English language support in schools
and translation and interpreting services).
4.5 The geographical dispersal of recent
immigrant groups, especially into areas that have not seen much
immigration in the past, may place particular strains in particular
parts of the UK. The absolute scale of immigration in particular
localities may present challenges to service delivery. Where resource
allocation and delivery capacity cannot respond quickly, local
services may be placed under pressure.
4.6 The complexity of migration flows (many
different countries of origin and many different immigration statuses
including groups such as asylum seekers, highly skilled workers
from outside the EU and low-skilled workers from inside the EU)
will have differential impacts on public services and will often
require differential policy responses.
4.7 Counting and predicting migration flows
is extremely difficult, making resource allocation and planning
difficult. Most public services depend on annual population estimates
to allocate funds.
4.8 There have been a number of criticisms
of the ways in which ONS produces population estimates. ippr is
of the opinion that present methods of population enumeration
and proposals to improve population enumeration over a seven year
period will not capture significant groups of migrants such as
very short-term migrants, transient populations, most irregular
migrants and those outside the taxation system. The solution to
problems relating to population enumeration and public services
funding might be to have a component within public service funding
formulae that is a proxy for international migration, such as
population mobility or proportions of population in Homes of Multiple
Occupancy. Additionally, ippr suggests that central government
initiate a contingency fund for local authorities, NHS and policing,
to which public services might apply if they experience population
change.
4.9 Schools funding in England does include
a contingency fund. The Dedicated Schools Grant, which meets mainstream
school funding, now includes an Exceptional Circumstances Grant.
However this grant is only triggered when there is a mid-census
increase in EAL pupil numbers in the whole local authority
of more than 2.5%. What this means in practice is that West Sussex,
a local authority educating 91,000 children would have to enrol
more than 2,275 new children with English language needs to trigger
the grant. However, migration into West Sussex has been focussed
in a small number of schools in particular areas. Most local authorities
in England are unlikely to be able to secure access to this grant.
5. THE ROLE
OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE
IN PROMOTING
COMMUNITY COHESION
5.1 English language fluency is essential
for the successful integration of migrants in the UK. It enables
confident and unmediated access to public services. Research has
shown that English language fluency is an important factor in
determining labour market participationxi. English language fluency
also facilitates social interactions between newcomers and the
receiving community, thus contributing to the development of cohesive
communities.
5.2 ippr welcomes the increased central
funding of adult ESOLxii classes through the Skills for Life programme
in England. We welcome the new DIUS consultation on ESOL and community
cohesion and the intention to reprioritise subsidised ESOL provision.
However, recent ippr research found evidence of substantial unmet
demand for ESOL courses. This problem is most acute in London
and in some rural shire countiesxiii. We are concerned that the
policy changes aired in the DIUS consultation will not address
this problem.
5.3 In addition to the unavailability of
college places, work and child care commitments also prevented
students in urban areas from enrolling on courses. The distance
from teaching bases prevented many migrants in rural areas from
enrolling on ESOL courses.
5.4 Migrants who were least likely to be
have enrolled on an ESOL course comprise:
— less-qualified EU migrant workers,
less qualified refugees and other migrant groups including those
with limited prior education;
— migrants living in rural areas;
— seasonal migrants and those who came
to the UK for repeated short-term work; and
— males, although males are more likely
to speak English on arrival in the UK.
5.5 There are significant numbers of migrants
who do not speak fluent English. Many in this group have attended
English language classes, but have failed to gain qualifications,
or to gain Entry Level One or Two qualifications. This group appears
to be unable to break out of a "good enough to get by"
level of English that is sufficient for the basics of everyday
life and some low-skilled work, but insufficient for more complex
conversation or many types of employment.
5.6 The impact of fee changes introduced
in 2007 appears difficult to judge. Some colleges appear still
to have the long waiting lists for ESOL courses that have been
typical of the last 15 years. Other colleges reported to us that
waiting lists had shrunk; a few colleges also stated that they
were having difficulty in filling some ESOL courses. Our research
showed that a key factor affecting demand for ESOL and waiting
lists was the cost of the course. Colleges that charge higher
fees appear to have the smallest waiting lists.
5.7 There is little evidence of employers
paying for ESOL courses. One employer stated that he was unwilling
to invest in basic training for a work force that was "unlikely
to stay around".
5.8 There is little evidence of colleges
and adult education services developing alternative models of
provision to meet the needs of a rural working population. Difficulties
in securing capital funding for projects working with rural migrant
workers were cited as one reason for this lack of provision. Learning
and Skills Council (LSC) requirements for a minimum class size
of 10 persons were also cited as deterrents for developing initiatives
such as mobile classrooms. We recommend that the LSC revise its
guidance on minimum class size.
5.9 Funding for English language teaching
in English schools has not kept pace with numbers of children
needing English language support entering English schools. In
England, most English language support is funded through the Ethnic
Minority Achievement Grant (EMAG). The new EMAG settlement for
2008-11 is at a level slightly above the rate of inflation. Many
local authorities who have received substantial numbers of migrant
children arrivals have seen their monies frozen. There is no contingency
funding within the new EMAG settlement—yet the movement
of international migrants to particular local authorities can
be sudden. This is most challenging in local authorities with
the smallest numbers of staff, thus the least potential to redeploy
teaching resources.
5.10 Despite extensive lobbying from local
authorities, most local authorities are still obliged to devolve
85% of EMAG monies to schools. This obligation means that there
is little flexibility in deploying English language teachers to
schools that see the sudden arrival of migrant children. It should
be noted that refugee and labour migrant populations experience
greater levels of pupil mobility than the majority population.
A school with no EAL staff may suddenly find it has enrolled significant
numbers of children with EAL needs.
5.11 Government has argued that schools
themselves should meet some EAL needs. Its latest guidance on
EMAG (2007) just issued to local authorities, states that "EMAG
is only one source of support for bilingual pupils". The
same guidance argues that the formula used in calculating mainstream
funding is weighed in favour of EAL and ethnicity. However, the
amount of the weighting is very small. Of course, EAL support
is also the responsibility of classroom teachers. But the concentration
of migrant children across local authorities means that in some
schools, classroom teachers have many demands placed on them during
lessons.
5.12 Lack of English language support, and
thus a lack of academic literacy, appears to be a major cause
of underachievement among some migrant groups such as Somali children
many of whom have experienced severe interruptions to their prior
education. Somalis are among the migrant and minority communities
who experience low levels of labour market participation, another
component of poor community cohesion.
6. FACTORS WHICH
PROMOTE POSITIVE
SOCIAL INTERACTIONS
IN AREAS
EXPERIENCING MIGRATION
6.1 ippr welcomes the publication of good
practice in relation to community cohesion, by CLG, the Commission
of Integration and Cohesion and other bodies. We do, however,
have concerns which we do not think are being addressed at present,
which are set out below.
6.2 Political leadership, nationally and
locally and the language used by political leaders, emerges as
a key factor in promoting a more positive reception of new migrants.
We would urge Government and local political leaders to stress
more publicly the benefits of immigration.
6.3 Public bodies could make better use
of the race equality duty in promoting social cohesion and integrating
new migrants.
6.4 The built environment—housing
design—and the existence of soft infrastructure such as
parks, sports and community facilities, may facilitate positive
social interactions between different groups of people. However,
the role of public space in promoting social cohesion has received
less consideration, particularly at a local level. Planning departments
are not always included in discussion about social cohesion strategies.
The impact of new urban developments on social cohesion is not
always considered. Today, large housing developments are being
planned in south east England, with very little consideration
given to soft infrastructure and thus to social cohesionxiv. We
suggest that central government might provide guidance so that
local authorities, commercial developers, the Housing Corporation/English
Partnerships and registered social landlords to ensure that building
design promotes community cohesion. Locally, a broader range of
actors should be brought into discussions about social cohesion,
including local authority planning departments and relevant Registered
Social Landlords should always be included in discussion about
social cohesion strategies. Local authorities should ensure that
where their housing is transferred out of the public sector, new
management organisations have clear responsibility for social
cohesion and community development. Central government must provide
a lead and ensure that the new housing development in Growth Areas
make provision for soft infrastructure such as parks and sports
and leisure centres.
6.5 Irregular migration challenges community
cohesion. Home Office calculations, based on the 2001 Census,
suggest that there may be 310,000-530,000 irregular migrants living
in the UK, the majority of whom are visa or asylum overstayers.
They are a group of people with very limited rights and are usually
living in the poorest and most overcrowded housing. Research on
this group suggests that they are disproportionally employed in
the informal sector where they will not have the protection of
the National Minimum Wagexv. Home Office policy focuses on sanctions
for those who employ irregular migrants, coupled with the detection
and removal of irregular migrants. We question how practical large-scale
removal is as a policy objective, given the large population of
irregular migrants and a limited Home Office removal budget. We
recommend that Government should consider regularisation for some
irregular migrants.
REFERENCES
i Rutter, J; Cooley, L, Reynolds, S and Sheldon,
R (2007) From Refugee to Citizen: a research report on integration,
Britishness and citizenship, London; Refugee Support.
Pillai, R, Kyambi, S, Nowacka, K and Sriskandarajah,
D (2007) The Reception and Integration of New Migrant Communities,
London: ippr.
ii ibid.
iii Rutter, J; Cooley, L, Reynolds, S and Sheldon,
R (2007) From Refugee to Citizen: a research report on integration,
Britishness and citizenship, London; Refugee Support.
iv From the mid-1990s until 2005, opinion polls
show that perceptions that asylum migration is uncontrolled have
frequently topped more traditional concerns such as the NHS.
v Finney, N (2003) The Challenge of Reporting
Refugees and Asylum-Seekers, Bristol: Press Wise.
Finney, N with Peach, E (2004) Attitudes Towards
Asylum-Seekers, Refugees and Other Immigrants: a literature review,
London: CRE.
Hewitt, R (2003) Asylum-Seeker Dispersal and Community
Relations, Swindon: Report to Economic and Social Research
Council.
Lewis, M (2005) Asylum: Understanding Public Attitudes,
London: ippr.
vi ippr (2007) The economic characteristics
of Britain's immigrant communities, London: ippr.
vii ibid.
viii Information Centre on Asylum and Refugees
(2004b) Understanding the Stranger, London: ICAR.
ix Home Office (2007) A8 Accession Monitoring
Report May 2004 to June 2007, London: Home Office.
x Commission for Rural Communities (CRC) (2007)
A8 Migrants in Rural Areas, London: CRC.
xi Bloch, A (2004) Making it Work: Refugee
Employment in the UK, London: ippr.
xii English for Speakers of Other Languages.
xiii ippr (2008, forthcoming) Migration and
Post-Compulsory Education and Training, London: ippr.
xiv ippr (2006) Would you live here?,
London: ippr.
xv See research cited in ippr (2006) Irregular
Migration in the UK, London: ippr.
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