Memorandum
from The City of London (BOP 56)memorandum fromm
This
letter responds to the recent invitation to submit written evidence to the
above inquiry. As the Committee may be aware, the atypical nature of the
administration of the City of London necessarily
means that direct comparison with practices in the London boroughs, or local government more
generally, is limited. By way of
example, spending on education and social services usually represents the
largest component of a London Borough's budget but in the City of London this element
represents less than 8% of the City's "local authority" spending. In contrast,
the largest proportion of government grant to the Common Council (which exercises
the functions of a local authority and police authority in the City) is for the
police, a function which is not exercised by the boroughs or, for that matter, local
authorities outside the capital.
The
City of London
serves some 8,000 residents and a daytime working population of around 350,000.
Apart from its responsibilities within the Square Mile, the City Corporation
also undertakes many activities which are not geographically confined and in
that sense, the City Corporation is the 'head office' of a broader operation.
In addition to national and international support for the financial services and
related business services sector, there is a substantial research programme on
issues of that sector (wherever in the UK it is based), a City Brussels Office
dealing specifically with the EU and offices in China and India working to
strengthen trading and investment links in both directions between the
countries and the UK. The City Corporation has close ties with central
Government departments especially the Treasury, the Foreign & Commonwealth
Office and UK Trade & Investment.
The
City is a corporation by prescription. The executive arm of the City which
undertakes local authority functions conferred by Parliament is the Court of
Common Council. The Committees of the Common Council deal with particular
subject or policy areas, whether they derive from local authority or other
powers vested in the City.
The
members of the Common Council's Committees are not elected on a local
government franchise under the Representation of the People Acts, but by a
franchise set down by a combination of private parliamentary acts and the
City's own legislative instruments, enacted by a procedure somewhat like
Parliament's. Most of the members of the Common Council are elected on a
business franchise which in the case of incorporated bodies (the biggest
component of the business element) gives an entitlement to appoint
representatives as business voters based on the number of people employed. Such
an arrangement does not, of course, exist at all in respect of statutory local
authorities. In consequence the
interests which most Committee members represent, and thus their
accountability, is not (as in statutory local authorities) to residents, but to
business.
'Local' services in the City of London include those for
the small residential population but most concern the running of the City as
centre of international business. The form of "localism" in the City is also
distinct with 100 'Commoners' and 25 Aldermen. The latter are unlike members of
local authorities who used to bear the same name as they are directly elected.
They form a separate 'Upper House' and executive of the City Corporation known
as the Court of Aldermen. The City has 25 wards in an area which in a local
authority might comprise a single ward. Individual members are therefore
'local' to a wholly different order of magnitude as against local authority
councillors. Individual complainants are able to approach the members
representing their ward but also have a further mechanism (not available in
local authorities) by which the Common Council can be petitioned directly
through the City's wardmotes. When this occurs (usually to create local
publicity) the Common Council refers the matter to a Committee for a report.
As
an executive of the City, the Common Council comprises the Commoners and the
members of the Court of Aldermen sitting together and this arrangement is
replicated in the Committees. They are all therefore 'members' of the Common
Council. The functions of the Common Councilmen and women include general
representational activities in their wards. Business voters predominate in 21
of the City's 25 wards. The functions of
members of the Court of Aldermen are also representational but are directed
increasingly to international promotion of the financial services sector as
they advance to the Mayoralty.
The
City Corporation has an ability to set a Business Rate at a different level from
the National Non-Domestic Rate (NNDR). In 2003/04 for the first time the City
Corporation exercised its power to vary the NNDR. Following extensive consultation with the
business community, a premium was levied in that year for police and security
purposes. This money already funds an additional 48 uniformed officers, an
expanded Economic Crime Department to investigate money laundering, and the
significant expansion of the City Security Zone. It should be noted that,
unlike the Metropolitan Police, the City of London receives no extra government grant for
its capital city policing responsibilities. The City's existing powers have
worked well in the relatively short period they have been used and retain
business support. The City has a direct form of engagement with the
participating businesses because the members of the Common Council are directly
elected and the franchise established by the City of London (Ward Elections) Act 2002 means that
all businesses have an opportunity to participate in that process. The Common Council's composition provides the
appropriate mechanism to ensure the necessary engagement with business on both
the levying of the rate and the use of the resources generated by the rate. The
consequence is that the Corporation is highly responsive to the needs of the
financial and business communities, its constituents.
During
the Lyons Review, the City Corporation submitted formal written evidence to the
inquiry emphasising the City's unique position in terms of local government
finance. The City of London
Corporation supported the principle outlined in Sir Michael's final report, to
allow local authorities to levy a supplementary business rate rather as the
City already does. Sir Michael suggested the "London-wide supplementary rate
would be set through agreement between the GLA and the boroughs, and in
consultation with the business community, with a joint plan for the use of the
revenues collected from that rate". Last year, alongside the Pre Budget Report
2007, it was instead announced that the City and the London boroughs would not benefit directly from
the potential new income stream. It was instead decided that in London the GLA rather than the City and boroughs would be
given the power to raise such a rate on a pan London basis.
The
Committee's Call for Evidence suggests the Committee is interested in the
extent to which local government services are a product of national or local
decision making. It is widely recognised that the majority of the mechanisms
for the delivery of local services by local authorities are the result of
national decision making. Such mechanisms are not always appropriate for
implementation in the City, especially if, when designing these mechanisms,
there is little or no scope for local flexibility.
The
distinctiveness of the City Corporation's internal management and
representational basis makes apparent the difficulty of attempting successfully
to shoehorn the City into general internal management provisions applying to
statutory local authorities. For this reason, the City has been afforded
provision in a range of statutes which allow for the City to achieve the same
policy objectives as in other authorities but in a way most suitable to the
City's internal structures.
The
relationship between the local and police authority functions in the City is
worth noting. In addition to providing local government services for the Square
Mile, the Court of Common Council, through its Police Committee, also acts as
the Police Authority for the City of London
Police. The relationship between the police authority
and provider of local services could not, therefore, be any closer. The City
community values the existing arrangements for policing in the City which offer
specialist crime operations, and also day to day territorial policing. Views
expressed by business support the view that the City community believes the
current model works best for the City as a whole and offers effective
arrangements for democratic accountability. The high regard in which the City
Police are held by business is illustrated in the numerous letters of support
that accompanied the City of London
Police's business case submitted to the Home Office in
December 2005 as part of the (then ) police reform proposals.
October
2008