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Memorandum from Mansfield District Council (BOP 11)
Set out on the attached sheet is evidence for the above Inquiry which focuses on three areas of interest to the Inquiry:
· Further devolution - evidence is presented from the experience of a directly elected Mayor in a two-tier local government structure, focusing on the mismatch between the expectations of the public and actual power and influence of a District Elected Mayor.
· Financial Accountability - evidence supports the inappropriateness of finance ceilings for the rate support grant and capping powers that have they effect of providing a mechanism to deflect accountability.
· Existing powers - evidence is presented to demonstrate the inappropriateness of the Secretary of State's powers to determine planning consent and historic building consent for local planning decisions.
1. Further Devolution
1.1 The importance of local autonomy and consequently local accountability in matters relating to local government are important if local elected community leaders are to be seen by their communities as instrumental in local place shaping.
1.2 The development of executive structures
for local authorities since the Local Government Act 2000 has done much to
increase the sense of local accountability. In
1.3 Local peoples expectations of the powers of a directly elected Mayor, however, in many instances, exceed the true position, as a consequence there is a growing sense of the Mayor being held accountable by the electorate for issues beyond his field of influence or autonomous control, such as the provision of health services, policing levels, and in Mansfield, a District Council area, children and adult services which remain the responsibility of the County Council.
1.4 Central Government has expressed the wish for more visible and accountable local leaders and see an increase in directly elected Mayors at a local level as the preferred route to achieve this outcome. The recent White Paper Communities in Control, Real Power, Real People, suggests incentives to encourage the adoption of these arrangements, setting out the expectation that directly elected Mayors would chair Local Strategic Partnership's and sit on Police Authorities.
1.5 These incentives and much of the ambition
to make directly elected Mayor truly accountable locally for the decisions that
shape their locally do not, however, take account of the current two-tier form
of local government which persist across much of
1.6 Local people generally do not recognise
the distinction between the responsibility of different tiers of local
government or who is responsible for the provision of health and police
services. The accountability that the government seeks for local leaders
through the mayoral form of local government executive can only be truly
meaningful alongside unitary local government and coterminous health and policing
provision for which Mayors should have statutory powers; responsibility for
provision of heath services in Unitary Councils with coterminous Primary Care
Trust's and a statutory place on local police authorities, with local police divisions
coterminous with Unitary Authority boundaries. In the absence of unitary local
government where a directly elected Mayor is in place the statutory right to
serve on the Police Authority and coterminous police division is the minimum
requirement for meaningful influence by Mayor at a local level. However, whilst
this evidence supports the creation of Unitary local government as the
preferred model for local government in
2. Financial Accountability
2.1 A local government finance settlement formula that sees local finance settlements restricted by finance grant ceilings for some authorities in order to cushion the impact of the reduced settlements to areas of less need cannot be supported and completely undermines a local authorities place shaping role.
2.2 Likewise, where a local authority has set out its plans for developing its area and local services, centrally imposed Council tax capping undermines local accountability. In both cases local decision makers could use the existence of these central government imposed measures to deflect the responsibility for local decision making to the government, and indeed some will try to do so. However, more often, local people will erroneous blame local decision makers for decisions not to invest locally in matters of local importance despite the fact that local decision makers may not be free to do so due to Government imposed limits to grants and spending.
3. Existing Powers
3.1 Ultimately, the quality and quantity of local public services is limited by resources available from central government to develop and deliver them. As mentioned above, however, the existence of Central Government restrictions can provide a shield behind which local government decision makers can chose to hide if they wish to do so.
3.2 Well being and trading powers are welcomed and probably could be used more by local government. However, there is one area of law which flies very much in the face of local autonomy and decision making and reduces the ability of local leaders to carry out their place shaping responsibilities in an effective and timely matter.
3.3 This relates to the Secretary of States role in relation to various local planning issues.
3.4 Departures from the local plan and historic building consent are both cases in point. The requirement to refer such matters to the Secretary of State can and does build in long periods of delay to decision made locally about the nature of a place and its development which are at the core of the place shaping agenda.
3.5 The delays experienced are often
difficult to explain to the local electorate and appear to be unnecessary tiers
of bureaucracy. The experience in
3.6 Reform of this legislation would restore balance between central and local government firmly placing important planning decisions in the hands of those elected and held accountable locally to do so. A call-in power, rather than the responsibility to refer such applications would be sufficient to ensure the appropriate checks and balances are in place.
September 2008 |