Memorandum submitted by John T Morrill
1. What the likely effects would be of
allocating on-course betting pitches on a purely commercial basis,
as has been proposed by the Racecourse Association?
The result would be that:
(a) the racecourse owner will divert the
betting public to bet for his benefit;
(b) if a racecourse were permitted to do
so then bookmaker attendances would fall off because no bookmaker
would be prepared to bet at a course where he had no chance of
competing on a level playing field;
(c) the result would be that, with fewer
bookmakers in the main betting ring, the competition would be
less intense and the public would get worse prices on and off
course than they do at present;
(d) if commercial decisions were permitted
the ring pitches at the bottom of the ring would become worse
than they are now and that would mean fewer bookmakers. In such
circumstances the public would suffer;
(e) since 1928 the charges to bookmakers
have been limited by law. The primary purpose was to benefit the
betting public. If bookmakers benefited, that was not the purpose
of legislation;
(f) the overriding principle was to prevent
a monopoly in betting through financial muscle.
2. What indications on security of tenure,
if any, were given to those buying positions on bookmakers' lists
in recent years?
(a) There are no statutory conditions on
security of tenure for individual bookmakers;
(b) there is a statutory obligation upon
the racecourse owner not merely to provide space where bookmaking
can be conveniently carried on, but to consider, under the head
of convenience, the numbers of public who wish to bet, and the
designated numbers of bookmakers required to accommodate them,
but these are matters of the general management of the course
and the running of the owner's business;
(c) therefore, in order to ensure good administration,
racecourse owners have recognised the bookmakers' lists of seniority
for the past 50 years;
(d) the recent recognition for the transfer
of buying positions on bookmakers' lists, following recommendations
agreed by a Government appointed sub-committee are to be found
in the HBLB Final Report, March 1998.
3. What the role of Government should
be in the process for agreeing on a future framework for allocation
of on-course pitches for bookmakers.
(a) The role of Government, in the public
interest, should be that owners of racecourses should not be permitted
to restrict the numbers of bookmakers unreasonably and in bad
faith for a purely commercial basis, as has been shown in a recent
Office of Fair Trading investigation.
SUMMARY
To protect society and individuals, who on account
of infancy or other cause are deemed incapable of safeguarding
themselves adequately from the effects of their self indulgence,
is the principal basis on which Parliament has interfered from
time to time with the conduct of on-course betting transactions.
By permitting racecourse owners to enter into
commercial decisions with bookmakers for the allocation of a space
will only encourage the criminal element to infiltrate racecourse
owners in order to divert the public to bet for the interest of
themselves, other than the public interest.
It is evident that very great developments had
taken place in the public's betting habits since the advent of
internet betting and betting exchanges and that this has aroused
interest in those within the industry who seek financial gain
from such facilities and those who seek profit other than by honest
means.
It may not have been the intention of Parliament
to increase the profits of one section of the horse racing industry
at the expense of another, but the end result will certainly be
that the conglomerate bookmakers will use their financial muscle,
influences in the show business world, along with the best accountants
and legal advisers to influence racecourse management/owners to
increase profits, thereby dominating and controlling the percentage
for the ascertainment of starting price returns/industry prices.
October 2007
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