Memorandum submitted by Professor Peter
Stone
1. EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. The identification and protection of
the cultural heritage was not a formal structured component of
the planning for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. It should have been
and UK forces must take protection of cultural heritage into consideration
in all future deployments.
2. A trade in illicit antiquities has developed
in Iraq that not only makes the transition to a stable society
more difficult but also, according to parts of the US military,
directly helps fund the so-called "insurgency".
3. Implementation of this draft Bill will
be impossible unless the UK military accepts the responsibilities
suggested in the Bill including [a] the embedding of archaeological
cultural heritage training at all levels and (b) the formal identification
and protection of the cultural heritage in times of conflict.
4. It is essential that sufficient funds
are made available to ensure that when UK forces are deployed
they have the training and resources to deal competently with
the protection of the cultural heritage.
2. BACKGROUND
TO SUBMISSION
2.1 In the two months in the lead-up to
the 2003 invasion of Iraq I was the only archaeologist to whom
the Ministry of Defence was willing to speak. This was unusual
in that I have no expertise in the archaeology of the country
or region. My involvement was purely on the basis that I happened
to be known by a serving officer in the Royal Navy who was at
the time seconded to the MoD and who was involved in the detailed
planning for the invasion. If it had not been for this personal
contact it seems clear that UK forces would have been deployed
in Iraq with no consideration for the archaeological cultural
heritage of one of the most important areas in the world for understanding
the development of human society.
2.2 In the two months before the invasion,
and with the support of two colleagues, one with expertise in
the archaeology of the region the other with expertise of the
trade in illicit antiquities, I was able to do three things: (a)
deliver a list of key sites to be avoided and protected at all
costs; (b) stress especially the vulnerability of sites and museums
immediately after any conflict and before either any stable external
Interim or a new Iraqi authority was in place; and (c) remind
my contacts of their responsibilities under International treaties—especially,
as the UK had not signed the 1954 Hague Convention, with respect
to their obligations under the Geneva Conventions. I understand
that three further things happened: (a) these sites went onto
military maps/into field orders to avoid if possible; (b) these
sites went onto the Attorney General's no-strike List; and (c)
this information was shared with American and other coalition
partners.
2.3 After the conflict began and during
the initial stages of fighting these measures to protect the archaeological
cultural heritage appeared to be working. Much of this was ascribed
to the speed of the Coalition's advance, the failure of the Iraqi
military to affect any major defence, and the remoteness of many
sites. Then it became clear that a number of museums had been
ransacked and looted closely followed by the depressing news that
many archaeological sites had been clandestinely excavated and
looted. The archaeological world was in uproar and after concerns
were raised at a meeting at the British Museum in April 2003 I
was able to go back to the MoD and I believe, as a result of this
additional intervention, three additional things happened. First,
plans were developed to ensure all UK military personnel leaving
Iraq were searched for antiquities; second, that UK troops with
border responsibilities were briefed to be on the look-out for
the smuggling of illicit antiquities; and third that all troops
and other UK personnel going out to Iraq were provided with a
short briefing note about the extent and importance of the archaeology
of the area. I have no knowledge if these activities continue.
Unfortunately, as we all know, little of this work had any long
term impact given the extent of looting and destruction of the
archaeological record that continues in Iraq.
2.4 By mid/late 2003 some sites had in excess
of 100 men digging in broad daylight—essentially the whole
male population of the local village. A colleague tried to take
photographs from the same places she had taken shots in 1999 but
could not find these places as the landscape had changed so much.
In places four metre square holes two to three metres deep littered
the landscape. This is a catastrophic loss to the common human
heritage. We know (or will know once final cataloguing has been
completed) what we have lost from the museums. We have photographs
of most of the objects; we have inventories; much of the material
has been studied already. We have no idea what we have lost, and
are losing on a daily basis, from the sites: we have no photographs;
we have no inventories; none of the material has been seen let
alone studied. When my colleague asked the men why they were looting
the sites their response was simple: since the collapse of the
Saddam regime there had been no payment for their crops: they
were looting to get the money to provide food for their families.
I pleaded, to no avail, in 2003, in a presentation to civil servants
from a number of UK Government Departments and military personnel,
for DFiD to purchase the crops. I emphasised that there was a
real danger of a systematic trade in illicit antiquities developing.
That trade has now developed and appears to be blossoming. This
is destruction on an unprecedented scale. It continues today and
is not only the result of looting and the trade in illicit antiquities
but also of the insensitive use of major archaeological sites
by Coalition Forces.
2.5 The failure of coalition forces to protect
the cultural heritage has had a huge impact on our ability to
further understand the development of human society in this region.
More immediately however, is that there is increasing evidence
that the failure to protect the cultural heritage is causing significant
problems for Coalition forces and the new Iraqi security forces
and Government as the general population become increasingly agitated
by the lack of respect shown to this heritage. Even more pressing
is that colleagues in the American military are now stating openly
and in print that profits from the sale of illicit antiquities
looted from the archaeological sites in Iraq are being used to
fund the so-called "insurgency".
2.6 In recent discussion with the American
military it is clear that not enough troops were deployed to allow
for the protection of the cultural heritage. This was also my
understanding from conversations with members of the UK military
in 2003. We cannot expect our armed forces to deliver with the
necessary means at their disposal.
2.7 Further details of the events of 2003
and since can be found in P G Stone & J Farchakh Bajjaly (eds)
The Destruction of Cultural Heritage in Iraq, Boydell &
Brewer, 2008)
3. COMMENTS ON
THE DRAFT
BILL
3.1 I am extremely pleased and grateful
that this Bill is now being considered. I fully support its passage
and hope that it can be passed into law as quickly as possible
in order that the UK will be able to accede to the 1954 (Hague)
UNESCO Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in the
Event of Armed Conflict and its two Protocols of 1954 and 1999.
I have five concerns/comments regarding the
Bill.
3.2 Implementation of any Act will be impossible
unless the UK military accepts the responsibilities suggested
in the Bill including (a) the embedding of archaeological cultural
heritage training at all levels and (b) the formal identification
and protection of the cultural heritage in times of conflict.
There is much to learn from the military in other countries and
tentative steps are being taken (meetings between military representatives
from a number of countries and archaeologists have been arranged
at the next World Archaeological Congress to be held in Dublin
in July 2008 and plans are underway for a larger gathering next
year). These, essentially informal, developments need to be formalised
and a strategy for enhanced training needs to be developed as
does a methodology for formalising identification and protection
in times of conflict. I am aware that the UK military is actively
considering these developments and that the UK National Commission
for UNESCO is willing to help facilitate them.
3.3 Similar developments need to take place
with respect to other affected agencies, for example the Crown
Prosecution service, police, and customs staff.
3.4 UNESCO is currently preparing guidelines
for how the Convention and in particular the second protocol might
be implemented. The UK should be making every effort to be a part
of and influence this process.
3.5 My evidence has focussed on the deployment
of UK forces overseas. While critical, and while there is good
justification for this aspect of the Bill to be prioritised, such
emphasis should not be to the detriment of planning for natural
and human created emergencies in the UK.
3.6 As ever, much of this will come down
to funding. It is essential that sufficient funds are made available
to ensure that when UK forces are deployed they have the training
and resources to deal competently with the protection of the cultural
heritage.
June 2008
| 
