Submission to the Regulatory Reform Committee
from Julian West (Lloyd's Name)|
1). The Lloyd's Act was presented to parliament
as a private bill, to which there is a general right of objection
by way of petition to parliament, and after enactment became a
local Act. Such Acts are required to be strictly construed and,
by the same token , the LLRA must also be strictly construed when
used to amend such Acts..
2). The reforms to the Council and the abolition
of the Committee listed in proposals 1, 2 & 4 (Articles 3,
4 & 5 of the LRO), comprise significant changes to the constitution
of Lloyd's. These particular reforms are both clearly and self
evidently of constitutional significance for the Society, and
therefore may not be the subject of a Legislative Reform Order
(see LRRA Subsection 3(2)(f)* below). The changes to the voting
arrangements, entitlement to election, and the abolition of the
Committee and of its responsibilities listed in proposals 1, 2
& 4 (Articles 3, 4 & 5 of the LRO) are all significant
changes to the constitution of Lloyd's. In spite of this, in sections
2.5 and 3.53 of the LRO consultation response it is stated that:-
"However, though these proposals do affect the constitution
of Lloyd's, the government does not consider that they have any
significance for the constitution of this country and hence satisfy
Subsection 3(2)(f) of the 2006 Act.", and "Nor does
the government consider that these proposals make fundamental
changes to the constitution of Lloyd's". However, the Act
only requires that "the provision is not of constitutional
significance". This requirement, expressis verbis, is not
limited either to "the constitution of this country"
or to "fundamental changes", but includes within its
ambit any changes of "constitutional significance" for
Lloyd's. The government's conclusion that proposals 1, 2 &
4 (Articles 3, 4 & 5 of the LRO) satisfy Section 3(2)(f) of
the 2006 Act, is therefore incorrect in law.
3). The reforms to the Council and the abolition
of the Committee in proposals 1, 2 & 4 (Articles 3, 4 &
5 of the LRO) do not meet the requirements of either Section 1(1)
or 2(1) of the Legislative Reform Act, in that they do not discernibly
reduce any burden as defined in Section 1(3) of the LRRA, or relate
to regulatory functions as defined by Section 2(2) of the LRRA,
and are therefore not allowable.
4). Given the constitutional nature of the reforms
listed in Articles 3, 4 & 5 of the LRO (consultation proposals
1, 2 & 4), the Super-Affirmative Resolution Procedure would
appear to be necessary in this case. Presumably the appropriate
procedure is to be decided by the Committees themselves, rather
than by the Treasury.
*The LRRA Subsections 3(1) and (2)(f) state:-
(1) A minister may not make provision under section
1(1) or 2(1), other than a provision which merely restates an
enactment, unless he considers that the conditions in subsection
(2), where relevant, are satisfied in relation to that provision.
(2) These conditions are that - (f) the provision
is not of constitutional significance.
19 September 2008