Select Committee on Regulatory Reform Sixth Report


Submission to the Regulatory Reform Committee from Julian West (Lloyd's Name)

1). The Lloyd's Act was presented to parliament as a private bill, to which there is a general right of objection by way of petition to parliament, and after enactment became a local Act. Such Acts are required to be strictly construed and, by the same token , the LLRA must also be strictly construed when used to amend such Acts..

2). The reforms to the Council and the abolition of the Committee listed in proposals 1, 2 & 4 (Articles 3, 4 & 5 of the LRO), comprise significant changes to the constitution of Lloyd's. These particular reforms are both clearly and self evidently of constitutional significance for the Society, and therefore may not be the subject of a Legislative Reform Order (see LRRA Subsection 3(2)(f)* below). The changes to the voting arrangements, entitlement to election, and the abolition of the Committee and of its responsibilities listed in proposals 1, 2 & 4 (Articles 3, 4 & 5 of the LRO) are all significant changes to the constitution of Lloyd's. In spite of this, in sections 2.5 and 3.53 of the LRO consultation response it is stated that:- "However, though these proposals do affect the constitution of Lloyd's, the government does not consider that they have any significance for the constitution of this country and hence satisfy Subsection 3(2)(f) of the 2006 Act.", and "Nor does the government consider that these proposals make fundamental changes to the constitution of Lloyd's". However, the Act only requires that "the provision is not of constitutional significance". This requirement, expressis verbis, is not limited either to "the constitution of this country" or to "fundamental changes", but includes within its ambit any changes of "constitutional significance" for Lloyd's. The government's conclusion that proposals 1, 2 & 4 (Articles 3, 4 & 5 of the LRO) satisfy Section 3(2)(f) of the 2006 Act, is therefore incorrect in law.

3). The reforms to the Council and the abolition of the Committee in proposals 1, 2 & 4 (Articles 3, 4 & 5 of the LRO) do not meet the requirements of either Section 1(1) or 2(1) of the Legislative Reform Act, in that they do not discernibly reduce any burden as defined in Section 1(3) of the LRRA, or relate to regulatory functions as defined by Section 2(2) of the LRRA, and are therefore not allowable.

4). Given the constitutional nature of the reforms listed in Articles 3, 4 & 5 of the LRO (consultation proposals 1, 2 & 4), the Super-Affirmative Resolution Procedure would appear to be necessary in this case. Presumably the appropriate procedure is to be decided by the Committees themselves, rather than by the Treasury.

*The LRRA Subsections 3(1) and (2)(f) state:-

3 Preconditions

(1) A minister may not make provision under section 1(1) or 2(1), other than a provision which merely restates an enactment, unless he considers that the conditions in subsection (2), where relevant, are satisfied in relation to that provision.

(2) These conditions are that - (f) the provision is not of constitutional significance.

19 September 2008




 
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Prepared 20 October 2008