Memorandum submitted by Tim Ambler and
Professor Francis Chittenden
The questions to which we were asked to respond
are:
1. The extent to which the Better Regulation
Executive (BRE) has developed a coherent strategy for implementing
regulatory reform.
2. Whether the BRE works effectively with
other areas of government to implement regulatory reform initiatives.
3. If the approach to measuring and reporting
on performance and outcomes is sufficiently robust.
4. Whether the current approach to regulatory
reform is delivering genuine results.
This paper will provide quick "bottom line"
answers for readers in a hurry. We understand the Committee would
prefer a brief paper from us. We would be happy to justify those
answers if challenged or called upon to do so. See second bullet
point below. Support for our conclusions is provided by our six
annual RIA reports and the "Déja" vu" deregulatory
report, published by the British Chambers of Commerce (BCC).[45]
Before responding we would like to register two points:
— Despite the criticisms we make of
the BRE below, attitudes have improved, some specifics have improved
and they are making real efforts for further improvement. We are
glad to work with them.
— We are concerned that the great balance
of the limited time for oral evidence has been given to organisations
that know very little, if anything, about these topics and that
specialists in the area, apart from the BRE and its siblings,
have been given no time. Cynics might conclude, although we ourselves
would not, that there is a predetermined plan for the outcome
of this inquiry.
Our "bottom line" answers are:
1. The extent to which the Better Regulation
Executive (BRE) has developed a coherent strategy for implementing
regulatory reform
So far as we are aware, there is no overall
strategy. Such a document would need to cover:
a. Synchronisation with EU regulatory systems.
Nothing seems to have been attempted in this area. Impact assessment
concentrates on the UK end of the process by which time it is
too late.
b. Regulation by Regulators. This is outside
the BRE remit.
c. Effective challenge to new regulatory
proposals. The new Impact Assessment system has yet to be audited
but, judging by the RIA system which preceded it, the challenge
is ineffective and departments merely go through the motions.
Some better than others. The trebling of the rate of introduction
of business-related regulations since 1997 is one piece of evidence.
"Better" means "more". The OECD rating for
the UK for regulation does not use relevant data for this purpose.
The evidence of William Sargent to the Committee makes it all
plain. Note that he says without qualification "We start
with some very clear principles in place in that regulation is
a good thing, a positive thing in our society and in particular
in the business community" (response to Q.1 29 January 2008).
In other words, the more regulation the better. He makes no reference
to the cost to British business, ie the UK GDP, in excess of £66
billion. for new regulations since 1997[46],
Northern Rock, a debacle created by regulation, and the ongoing
cost from earlier regulation.
d. Reduction in the burden of existing regulation.
Here there are three positives: Hampton, admin burdens and removal
of outdated or redundant regulations. Hampton made some sensible
comments on implementation which we applaud. The admin burdens
(keeping policy compliance but reducing reporting or paperwork
costs) is sensible in principle but, as the National Audit Office
has said (March 2008), the numbers are frail, ie there is more
hype than substance. The removal of old regulations (apart from
those concerning fire, a bright spot) is proceeding at the rate
of about four a year and is being overtaken by every snail in
town. We pointed out in our "Déja" vu" paper
that this approach had been tried many times before and would
fail for the same reasons.
e. Post implementation reviews, sunset clauses
and the like. Again this is honoured in the breach. Of our sample
of 134 large regulations where post implementation reviews were
due or overdue, 79% had not been conducted.
2. Whether the BRE works effectively with
other areas of government to implement regulatory reform initiatives
This glass can be seen as half full or half
empty. BRE works well enough with most departments (HMRC performance
is relatively good, for example) to achieve the very limited successes.
On the other hand, it is not achieving the fundamental change
in Whitehall regulatory culture (see above) that even Rick Haythornthwaite,
then Chairman of the Better Regulation Commission, has been calling
for.[47]
3. If the approach to measuring and reporting
on performance and outcomes is sufficiently robust
Not only is it not robust, one can question
whether it exists at all. As noted above, post implementation
reviews are rarely completed. There is no central registry or
recording of these reviews or any outcomes. We help the BCC compile
the only existing database bringing together the costs and benefits
of new regulations (since 1998) and have annually offered to turn
this database over to BRE. It is not expensive to maintain and
we cannot explain their reluctance to do so. They are, however,
now creating a library of Impact Assessments but, so far as we
understand it, this will not include an audit trail showing when
the IA process commenced, or how the proposed regulation has been
amended (or withdrawn) as a consequence of consultation and Impact
Assessment. Nor will the library show the outcome of post-implementation
reviews subsequently conducted.
4. Whether the current approach to regulatory
reform is delivering genuine results
The answer to this depends on the meaning of
"genuine results". There are some positive outcomes
but they are microscopic by comparison with the scale of the task.
The overall impression is that more effort is given to justifying
regulations that Ministers /Departments want to introduce rather
than challenging or reforming them. The National Audit Office
seems to have reached similar conclusions.[48]
We hope the Committee will find these answers
helpful, bearing in mind the request that we should be brief.
We would be happy to provide further justification if called upon
to do so.
April 2008
45 T Ambler, F Chittenden and S Iancich, The British
Regulatory System (British Chambers of Commerce, London, March
2008);
T Ambler, F Chittenden and Deming Xiao, The Burden of Regulation:
Who is watching out for us? (British Chambers of Commerce, London,
2007);
T Ambler, F Chittenden and K Ahuja, Regulators: Box Tickers or
Burdens Busters? (British Chambers of Commerce, London, 2006);
T Ambler, F Chittenden and C Hwang, Regulation: Another Form of
Taxation (British Chambers of Commerce, London, 2005);
T Ambler, F Chittenden and M Obodovski, Are Regulators Raising
Their Game? UK regulatory Impact Assessments in 2002/3, (British
Chambers of Commerce, London, 2004);
T Ambler, F Chittenden and M Shamutkova, Do Regulators Play By
the Rules? An Audit of UK Regulatory Impact Assessments, (British
Chambers of Commerce, London, 2003);
T Ambler and F Chittenden. Deregulation or De«ja" Vu?
UK Deregulation Initiatives 1987-2006 (British Chambers of Commerce,
January 2007). Back
46
BCC Barometer 2008. Back
47
Haythornthwaite R, Keynote speech to CBR conference, September
2007 Back
48
Evaluation of Regulatory Impact Assessments 2006-07, Report by
the Comptroller and Auditor General, HC 606 Session 2006-07, 11
July 2007. Back
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