Our inquiry
7. In this report, we consider recent developments in the political
and security situation in Iraq, the prospects for political reconciliation
at both the national and the local level, the progress in implementing
security sector reform, including the development of the Iraqi
Army and Iraqi Police, as well as the impending transition of
Basra to Provincial Iraqi Control. The report also examines the
changing role of UK Forces in South Eastern Iraq as they prepare
to handover responsibility for security in the area and assume
a position of overwatch. The report examines what overwatch means
and whether the force levels proposed by the Government are sufficient
to be sustainable.
8. This is our second report into UK operations in
Iraq in this Parliament.[8]
Our first report, published on 10 August 2006 following our visit
to Iraq in June 2006, examined the security situation in South
Eastern Iraq and the threat that the escalation of violence had
posed to UK Forces.[9]
It considered the prospects for transition to Iraqi control in
Dhi Qar, Maysan and Basra provinces, none of which had then undergone
transition to Provincial Iraqi Control, and the progress in the
implementation of security sector reform. We also examined equipment
and personnel issues raised with us by UK Forces during our visit
to Iraq.
9. As part of our current inquiry, we visited Iraq
in July 2007 to see for ourselves the changing operational environment
in which UK Forces were working and to meet senior members of
the Iraqi Government. In Basra, we met UK Forces at the Contingency
Operating Base (COB) at Basra Air Station. We also held meetings
with local politicians to discuss the political and security situation
in Basra, the influence of Iran, and progress in reconstruction
and development. In Baghdad, we met the Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri
Al-Maliki and other senior Iraqi politicians and US and UK commanders,
including the US Commander of Multi-National Forces in Iraq, General
David Petraeus, and the US Ambassador to Iraq, Ryan Crocker. We
also visited Kuwait where we held discussions with the Kuwaiti
Armed Forces and officials at the Foreign Affairs Ministry and
the National Security Bureau.[10]
10. We also held discussions on the situation in
Iraq during our visit to the United States in June 2007. We met
senior officials at the Pentagon and the State Department, the
House and Senate Armed Services Committees and the House Foreign
Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations Committees to discuss the
security situation, the progress of the US surge of an additional
29,500 US Forces deployed to Iraq between January and June 2007,
the prospects for political reconciliation, and the nature and
extent of Iranian influence in Iraq.
11. We held three evidence sessions during the course
of this inquiry. On 26 June 2007, we took evidence from Dr Ali
Ansari, University of St Andrews, Dr Toby Dodge, Queen Mary College,
University of London, Dr Eric Herring, University of Bristol,
Dr Glen Rangwala, University of Cambridge, Professor Sami Zubaida,
Birkbeck College, University of London, and Mr Nadhim Zahawi,
YouGov. On 24 July 2007, we took evidence from Rt Hon Bob Ainsworth
MP, Minister of State for the Armed Forces, Desmond Bowen, Policy
Director, and Brigadier Chris Hughes, Director of Joint Commitments
(Military) at the Ministry of Defence (MoD). On 23 October 2007,
we took evidence from the Secretary of State for Defence, Rt Hon
Des Browne MP, Lieutenant General Peter Wall, Deputy Chief of
the Defence Staff (Commitments) and Jon Day, Director General
Operational Policy at the MoD. Earlier in the year, on 11 January
2007, we had held a joint evidence session with the Foreign Affairs
Committee with the then Foreign Secretary, Rt Hon Margaret Beckett
MP, and the Defence Secretary, Des Browne, to consider the implications
of the US Iraq Study Group Report.[11]
We also received written evidence from the Ministry of Defence,
Redress, and Dr Eric Herring.[12]
We are grateful to all those who have participated in the inquiry.
12. Our report focuses on joint land-based operations
in Iraq. It does not deal with maritime operations in Iraqi waters
of the Gulf. During our visit to Iraq, we were briefed by Royal
Navy personnel at Um Qasr on their role in supporting and training
the Iraqi Navy in protecting the oil platforms, vital to the recovery
of the Iraqi economy. We also met personnel of all three Services
serving in joint land operations. The fact that this report
does not comment on the progress of maritime operations in Iraqi
waters is not a reflection of the relative importance we attach
to those operations. We acknowledge the important contribution
which all three Services are making to the security of the region.
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