The Iraqi Army
54. The MoD has presented a generally positive assessment
of the development of the Iraqi Army in MND(SE). In evidence to
us on 23 October 2007, Lieutenant General Wall described the UK's
training and mentoring of the Iraqi Army as "a very good
story". According to Lieutenant General Wall, there had been
"considerable progress" over the past year in building
the capacity of the Iraqi 10th Division, the result
of "quite a protracted effort" by UK and Coalition Forces,
"through considerable materiel investment by, of course,
the United States and some by ourselves".[78]
Similarly, the Secretary of State told us that "we are making
good progress across Iraq in building the capability and capacity
of the security forces". The 10th Division, he
argued, continued to show "its growing capability".
It was now "taking the lead in many operations in the south
with minimum support from the coalition" [79]:
Overall, in the south of Iraq the Iraqi Security
Forces have shown themselves as capable of dealing with isolated
incidents of violence in the three provinces that have been handed
over to Iraqi control and that is what they have had to face.
In Basra city, they have assumed the primary role for security
and they have proved able to deal efficiently with incidents of
violence.[80]
55. According to Brigadier Chris Hughes, in evidence
to us on 24 July 2007, the 10th Division had "had
some genuine success". Overall, UK Forces had been "pleased"
with its progress.[81]
But he acknowledged that the Division still faced a number of
challenges. Loyalty had been a particular problem but this was
now being addressed through the creation of a new Division, the
14th Division, which had grown out of the 5th Brigade
of the 10th Division, to operate in Basra. When we
were in Iraq in July 2007 we were told that because the 10th
Division was raised in Basra, the soldiers and their families
were subject to intimidation and violence, and were, therefore,
susceptible to intimidation and sometimes corruption. As the new
14th Division was raised in other provinces within
South Eastern Iraq, the difficulties with loyalty and reliability
were less likely to occur.
56. A further problem the 10th Division
had encountered had been the lack of "rear end" capability,
such as logistics support and intelligence assets. Although "in
terms of equipment levels they are well-equipped at the moment
with their frontline kit", and "have got 100% of the
up-armoured Humvees that they were due to get and their other
vehicles and equipment" they nevertheless lacked this important
supporting capacity.[82]
However, when we were in Iraq in July 2007, the UK Military Transition
Team told us that the Iraqis themselves wanted additional heavy
equipment. While it was recognised that Humvees were suitable
for their needs they nevertheless wanted to have tanks and artillery.
We also heard that it had often proved hard to unlock resources
from the Iraqi Ministry of Defence. The 14th Division,
in particular, was under-equipped to such an extent that militia
groups and tribes had more powerful weaponry.
57. Brigadier Hughes told us that the UK Government
had put £54 million through Operation OSIRIS, a project for
provision of equipment and infrastructure for the Iraqi Security
Forces in MND(SE). Around £13 million of this had been used
to support the Iraqi Army 10th Division which was in
addition to the equipment that had "flowed down from Baghdad,
originally from the Coalition and now from the Iraqi Ministry
of Defence".[83]
But, overall, Brigadier Hughes suggested that the 10th
Division had enjoyed significant progress:
Are they a reasonable force, given where they
have come from in the timeframe that they have come from, yes
they are. Do they have problems? Yes, they do […] They continue
to be taken forward and […] we continue with the SSR [Security
Sector Reform] process.[84]
58. One significant development over the past year
was the appointment of General Mohan as Commander of Iraqi Security
Forces in Basra Province. According to the Secretary of State,
General Mohan had "brought strong Iraqi leadership to the
security situation in Basra" which was "extremely welcome
from our perspective" as he "takes a very robust approach
to the development of the Iraqi Security Forces as a whole".[85]
The Minister for the Armed Forces told us in July 2007 that he
believed that the appointment of General Mohan was "very
important" and "a good sign of potential" for improving
the leadership of the Iraqi Army.[86]
According to Mr Ainsworth, the appointment, together with that
of General Jalil to command the Iraqi Police in South Eastern
Iraq, amounted to a "recognition" by the Iraqis "that
their getting a grip of their security arrangements in Basra is
increasingly important and that we are not prepared to hold on
forever". There had, he suggested, been "a concentration
of the mind" among Iraqis in the South of the country.[87]
59. There has been significant progress over the
course of the past year in building the capacity of the Iraqi
Army in South Eastern Iraq. Major improvements have been made
to the capacity and readiness of the 10th Division, to its ability
to operate independently of the Multi-National Forces, and to
the equipment made available to it. We welcome the creation of
the new 14th Division for Basra as a way of addressing the problem
of loyalty which had confronted the largely Basrawi-recruited
10th Division. We also welcome the MoD's assurance that General
Mohan has adopted a robust approach to the development of the
Iraqi Security Forces in Basra. But the job is not yet complete.
Despite its increasing capability, the Iraqi Army in South Eastern
Iraq still requires the support of UK Forces, particularly in
logistics and intelligence. The MoD should explain in its response
to this report how it is addressing this lack of "rear end"
capability in the Iraqi Army, when it expects this capability
gap to be filled, and for how long it expects UK Forces to be
required to lend support to the Iraqi Army. We also call upon
the MoD to provide in its response an analysis of UK expenditure
on, and the results of, projects for the provision of equipment
and infrastructure to the Iraqi Security Forces, including Operation
OSIRIS.
THE IRAQI POLICE SERVICE
60. The development of the Iraqi Police Service stands
in marked contrast to the development of the Iraqi Army. There
continue to be serious problems of corruption and militia infiltration,
and the loyalty and affiliation of many police officers remain
in question. In evidence to us Dr Dodge suggested that the training
of the Iraqi Police had been "an abject failure". He
stated that "the Police are responsible for a great deal
of kidnapping in Baghdad and have been thoroughly penetrated by
the militias in the South".[88]
According to Dr Dodge, the reform of the Police compared very
poorly with that of the Army:
although there are undoubtedly problems in the
Army, they are much, much less, and if you look at opinion poll
data […] the Army consistently gets a much higher recognition
of trust than the Police Force, which, again, not detracting from
the problems inside the Army, indicates the Army has more professionalism
[…] although the Army has problems, it is more coherent,
a more nationalist force than the Police themselves.[89]
61. Dr Herring suggested that the emphasis on the
training of the Police, like the Army, missed the point; "training",
he argued, "is not the issue, loyalty is the issue".
The Iraqi Security Forces as a whole were "riddled with […]
embedded insurgents" and "we are not going to train
that out of them".[90]
62. The Ministry of Defence accepts that the development
of the Iraqi Police has not been as successful as the development
of the Iraqi Army. In evidence to us on 23 October 2007, the Secretary
of State acknowledged that there was "no question" that
there was "an endemic level of corruption in the police".[91]
Similarly, the Minister for the Armed Forces told us in July that
"progress with regards to army capability and army capacity
is a lot more reassuring than it is in the area of the police".
He stated that "the police have got a lot more work to do"
and that "the problems are far deeper and more difficult
to deal with".[92]
According to Brigadier Hughes, the Iraqi Police Service was the
"biggest challenge". There was "effectively […]
a small, murderous, criminal element within the Iraqi Police Force
which we have to root out […] because they are truly irreconcilable".[93]
63. The MoD maintains that the appointment of General
Jalil to command the police in Basra Province is a positive step
and one that is beginning to deliver results, albeit slowly. In
a memorandum to us, the MoD stated that General Jalil "has
shown much determination to reform the Iraqi Police Service in
[Basra] province" and was committed to the "aim of building
an independent, loyal police force". According to the MoD,
General Jalil's efforts to root out corruption had already led
to the dismissal of a total of 111 officers for corrupt activity,
including affiliation with militias and a further 40 officers
were under investigation by the Province's Department of Internal
Affairs. The Government of Iraq, which holds responsibility for
the Police in the other three provinces of MND(SE), had dismissed
over 2,000 police officers since August 2006.[94]
According to the Secretary of State, there was "very strong
evidence" that General Jalil was "building […]
an independent and loyal force which is increasingly capable of
serving the people at Basra and patrolling the streets".
General Jalil and his family had become a target for attacks by
those opposed to his attempt to root out corruption and militia
infiltration.[95]
64. The development of the Iraqi Army and the
Iraqi Police Service as credible, capable, and effective Forces,
which enjoy the confidence and support of the Iraqi people, is
fundamental to the long-term security of Iraq and to the drawdown
and eventual withdrawal of UK Forces. If Iraq is to evolve into
a stable, functioning and prosperous country, the Iraqi Army and
Police must be properly equipped and trained. The Iraqi Government
must ensure that corruption and militia infiltration are rooted
out and that the Army and Police are properly supported by the
Defence and Interior Ministries. We call upon the MoD to explain
in its response to this report how the training of the Iraqi Security
Forces—both the Army and the Police—will progress
once the number of UK Forces in Iraq has been reduced to 2,500.
65. While we welcome the efforts reported to have
been made by General Jalil to counter murderous, corrupt, and
militia-infiltrated elements within the police in Basra, we remain
concerned about the present state of the Iraqi Police. Progress
with reforms has been painfully slow and serious questions appear
to remain about the loyalty of a significant number of officers.
Unlike the Army, which shows clear signs of progress in achieving
operational independence, the Police would seem to have a long
way to go in becoming truly effective and in gaining the trust
of the population. Given the scale of the problems which still
need to be tackled, there would seem to be a need for an ongoing
commitment by the UK to training and mentoring the Iraqi Police.
We call upon the MoD to explain in its response to this report
how it proposes to continue its mentoring and training programme
following the proposed reduction of UK Forces.
69 HC Deb, 8 October 2007, col 27 Back
70
HC (2006-07) 1091-i, Q 2 Back
71
Ev 40 Back
72
HC (2005-06) 1241, para 27 Back
73
Initial Benchmark Assessment Report, published by the White
House, 12 July 2007, p 22 Back
74
US National Intelligence Estimate, August 2007, p 2 Back
75
Ibid., p 3 Back
76
US National Intelligence Estimate, August 2007, p 3 Back
77
Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq by General Petraeus,
pp 1, 5, 6 Back
78
HC (2006-07) 1091-i, Q 38 Back
79
Ibid. Back
80
Ibid. Back
81
Q 131 Back
82
Ibid. Back
83
Q 131 Back
84
Ibid. Back
85
HC (2006-07) 1091-i, Q 38 Back
86
Q 83 Back
87
Q 96 Back
88
Q 58 Back
89
Q 59 Back
90
Q 58 Back
91
HC (2006-07) 1091-i, Q 41 Back
92
Q 83 Back
93
Q 131 Back
94
HC (2006-07) 1091-i, Ev 21 Back
95
Ibid., Q 41 Back
