Examination of Witnesses (Questions 1
- 19)
TUESDAY 26 JUNE 2007
DR ALI
ANSARI, DR
TOBY DODGE,
DR ERIC
HERRING, DR
GLEN RANGWALA
AND PROFESSOR
SAMI ZUBAIDA
Q1 Chairman: Good morning. Welcome.
This is our first evidence session in a new inquiry into UK operations
in Iraq. What we are going to be considering is the political
and security situation in Iraq, what are the prospects for national
reconciliation and what the progress is on security sector reform
and reconstruction and what the future is of the UK Forces in
Iraq. We have got a couple of hours this morning. We had to start
a bit late—I am sorry about that—because of the queues
outside; but welcome to our witnesses. We have got a lot of ground
to cover. I wonder if you would begin, please, by introducing
yourselves and saying what your background is, very briefly?
Dr Rangwala: I am Dr Glen Rangwala,
a Lecturer in politics at Cambridge University and a Fellow at
Trinity College, Cambridge. I teach Middle Eastern politics and
have been doing research in Iraq over the past four years. I am
co-author of a book, Iraq in Fragments, with Eric Herring,
my neighbour.
Dr Herring: I am Dr Eric Herring.
I am Senior Lecturer in International Politics at the University
of Bristol, co-author of the book Iraq in Fragments, with
Glen here, obviously, and, some years previous to that, I have
been conducting research into UN sanctions policy on Iraq and
so it has been a continuing interest, US, UN, UK policy towards
Iraq.
Dr Dodge: I am Dr Toby Dodge.
I am a Reader in International Politics at Queen Mary College,
University of London, and a Senior Fellow at the International
Institute for Strategic Studies. I have worked on Iraq all my
academic life, as a political scientist. I was in Baghdad recently,
for the month of April, both in the Green Zone and then travelling
through Baghdad and down to Mahmudiyah, Latifiyah, Yusufiyah and
then finally to Basra.
Professor Zubaida: I am Sami Zubaida.
I am Emeritus Professor of Politics and Sociology at Birkbeck
College. I work on religion, culture and politics in the Middle
East. I was born in Iraq so I have a special interest in Iraq,
a comparative perspective, so to speak.
Dr Ansari: I am Dr Ali Ansari.
I am a Reader in Modern History at the University of St Andrews
and my specialism is actually Iran, so I am here looking at Iran;
it is near abroad, I guess.
Q2 Chairman: Thank you very much.
Gentlemen, can we start by asking, what are the underlying causes
of the violence in Iraq; which are the principal insurgent groups,
if insurgent groups are part of the causes of that violence, and
what are they trying to achieve? Dr Dodge, you were there last
month?
Dr Dodge: I was there during April,
trying to assess the success of the surge. I think the cause is
the collapse of the Iraqi state; the state was put under 13 years
of the worst sanctions ever imposed, I think, in international
history. It did what it was meant to do, but at the wrong time,
so as too few American troops reached Baghdad they could not control
the looting, the civil servants that were running the state had
gone through three roles in 20 years and the state was taken to
pieces. I was in Baghdad in May 2003 seeing the almost complete
destruction of the state. If you add on to that the now infamous
decisions to disband the Iraqi Army and to de-Ba'athise, what
de-Ba'athification did was take away what was left of the state,
the senior levels of the Civil Service, its institutional memory.
Into that vacuum firstly stepped criminals and then insurgents
fighting to drive out American occupiers, and then, finally, militias,
legitimising themselves by sectarian ideology, and that big stew
of violence is the Iraqi civil war as it stands. The one thing
I would add to that is the complexity of this situation; the final
legacy that Saddam Hussein left to the country was, by using vast
amounts of violence and money, he combed through society, breaking
any organisational capacity he did not control, so the organisations
I have just described to you, the militias, the criminals, the
insurgents, are deeply fractured and very fluid. The danger would
be to simplify the groups on an ethnic or organisational basis,
and I do not think any one group has the coherence to be called
institutionalised.
Dr Herring: I would agree with
all of that and would add a number of things to it. The first
is that in different parts of Iraq you have different conflicts
and they are certainly not all inter-sectarian. In the west of
Iraq there is now a developing conflict between Sunni Arab elements
which are connected with the Coalition versus those opposed to
it versus those supporting al-Qaeda in Iraq. In the north of Iraq
you have the potential struggle over Kirkuk, which obviously is
Kurdish Turkoman and Arab. In the south of Iraq, although it is
relatively quiet, much of the territory, nevertheless it is an
intra-Shi`a political and effectively mafia struggle; so a number
of complex struggles there. However, the US Department of Defense's
own figures show that, and further consistently so, about 70%
of the violence, the attacks are directed at Coalition Forces.
There is a lot of uncertainty over that figure, the Iraq Study
Group says that there is much, much more violence than that, many
more attacks, and so the figures are uncertain. In the Coalition's
own assessment, it is very much the primary attacks are directed
against the Coalition, and what it raises, of course, is the major
policy issue, which I am sure we will come to.
Q3 Chairman: We will. Any other comments
on which are the principal groups?
Dr Rangwala: I would add that
I think a picture of complete disorder within Iraq today would
be inaccurate. A number of the insurgent groups have increasingly
formed command structures within them that have shown themselves
willing to engage in compromises with groups that are not their
ideological bedfellows, and so we have seen over the past year,
in particular, a number of different groups that were essentially
autonomous insurgent groups engaged in deal-making structures
with other insurgent groups. We have seen the formation of the
so-called Islamic State of Iraq, in Anbar and in Mosul, and in
that respect, at least, there is some sense of there being structures
within the insurgency which show themselves willing to engage
in negotiations.
Q4 Mr Jenkin: This may seem a strange
question, but obviously the targets are very varied, sometimes
they are other insurgent groups, sometimes they are Government
or Police or Iraqi Army targets, sometimes obviously they are
the British and American and Coalition Forces. Against whom is
the insurgency campaign directed, what is the agenda behind the
various insurgencies; because it is not a so-called Shi'a/Sunni
civil war, which is often what it is mischaracterised as, is it?
Professor Zubaida: I think you
are quite right, it is not just simply sectarian, or ethnic, I
think it is also a battle over resources. In fact, if you look
at, for instance, the battles in Basra and in the south of Iraq,
it is over control of oil resources, of smuggling gangs; most
of the people there, well, all the sides there are Shi'ite but
they are divided along different loyalties to different parties,
to different tribes, straightforward gangs and mafias, and so
on, so I think part of the objectives of the insurgency are actually
control of material resources: profit.
Q5 Chairman: Dr Dodge, you looked
as though you wanted to answer that question?
Dr Dodge: I just think `insurgency'
is probably the wrong word now, that we have a series of different
groups fighting different wars. Glen is right, that there has
been some solidification of the insurgency, but that solidification
is our next state of Iraq, for example, resulting again in a second
splitting, so we have, I think, a series of different groups,
some coming together, some splitting. If you were to look at the
extrajudicial killings in Baghdad—1,400 in January, 800
in February, 550 in March, 550 in April, 700 in May—that
would give you another example of a civil war that is being driven
by ethnic cleansing, so what we have is a multi-level conflict.
As Eric has said, there are different geographical struggles going
on, but I think if you were looking for the overarching explanation
for that it is this security vacuum which these different groups
have stepped into, with different objectives.
Q6 Chairman: We have got a lot of
questions to cover, so although there is much that could be said
on this can I ask what is the position now and has it got better
or worse in recent months?
Dr Rangwala: The number of multiple-fatality
bombings, the number of extrajudicial killings, has gone down
in recent months since the injection of new US troops into Baghdad.
Therefore, the question arises, to what extent is that a permanent
reduction in the violence in Baghdad, in particular, and in the
rest of Iraq more generally; is this a situation in which those
groups which did engage in those multiple-fatality bombings and
extrajudicial killings have been disbanded. I think the answer
there has to be pessimistic, that, in some sense, these groups
have either left Baghdad and are operating outside the capital
city, or have just stored their weapons away temporarily, waiting
for the US Forces which are there, going to be there really for
only another few months, at current levels, to depart from the
country. In that sense, I believe there is a temporary lull in
the violence, but not a reduction.
Dr Herring: The US Department
of Defense's own figures say that the overall number of deaths
globally in Iraq has continued to increase very slightly in this
period, and so there is a displacement of violence to other parts
of Iraq and a destabilisation of places which were relatively
quiet; it is definitely a decline. There are other measures of
decline, which would be including increasing support across Iraqi
communities, in Shi`a and in some Kurdish elements as well, for
attacks on Coalition Forces. Iraqis are now, broadly, evenly divided
on this. More Iraqis than ever want Coalition Forces to leave,
and support for the idea of an Iraqi national state, while still
in a majority, is declining really noticeably, from about 80%
into the 50s. There is a fundamental decline; the strategy cannot
work, in terms of these kinds of trends. The standing up of Iraqi
Forces is not linked to a decline in the killings; they are both
on the same upward trajectory.
Q7 Robert Key: Gentlemen, do you
think Coalition Forces are still an essential stabilising element,
or do they just fuel the violence?
Dr Dodge: I think they are a stabilising
force. I think where we have seen them withdraw, especially in
the provinces in the south, the violence has increased and there
has been a sharp drop-off. Both Eric and Glen are right to suggest
they are the target for violence, but there is an awful lot of
violence going on outside their remit. On one level they are not
reducing the violence across Iraq but I think they are putting
a break, albeit a rather malfunctioning one, on the swift movement
to civil war.
Professor Zubaida: I agree with
that up to a point, but the point is, by staying there, is the
stabilisation of the situation permanent or is it the fact that
whenever they leave there is going to be a civil war. If they
leave now or if they leave in two years' time it could be the
same outcome, unless in the meantime, while we are staying, they
have effective measures for controlling, reconciling the different
sides in the conflict. I am not sure that they are capable of
doing that, so it seems to me that they are there stabilising
the situation, to some extent, now; whenever they leave the terrors
will be unleashed, in any case.
Q8 Robert Key: Do you see that chaos
as inevitable, whatever happens?
Professor Zubaida: No; not inevitable.
If, in the meantime, there are actually measures to stabilise
the situation, successful measures, although I cannot see what
they are, then obviously that will be useful. I am sure that Toby
will have some answers to this, but, as far as I can see, as soon
as the Americans leave there will be a fight between the different
sides to consolidate their territory and to consolidate the resources
they control.
Dr Rangwala: I would take Professor
Zubaida's point a little bit further. It is my sense that deal-making,
national reconciliation between different Iraqi groups is actually
hindered by the uncertainty about the future of the US presence
in Iraq at present. If some sides believe that the US will continue
to stay in the country and support, say, for example, those parties
currently in government, they see no good reason to make a deal
with, say, the insurgent groups which are aiming for that ousting;
they see no reason to engage in compromises because they have
got the US to fight on their behalf during those struggles. If
there becomes increased certainty about what will happen to the
US presence in Iraq, whether they will retain a long-term, small
presence, whether they will retain an ability to intervene in
the country to support the Government, that would enable different
Iraqi groups to engage in compromises in a way which they do not
at the moment. Therefore, at least, the uncertainty about the
future of the US presence is a major factor which is preventing
national reconciliation in that way.
Q9 Robert Key: Dr Rangwala, you gave
evidence to the Iraq Commission and you said, with Dr Herring,
the immediate withdrawal of British Forces from Iraq would be
the right decision, as they are doing little of value, attracting
increased hostility and suffering losses in support of an approach
that has failed?
Dr Rangwala: Yes, because I believe
that it is impossible for the US or the UK to have a credible
commitment to stay in Iraq indefinitely. I think that would not
be seen as a credible promise by the British or American Governments,
in that sense. Therefore, if one wants to stabilise Iraq, the
best way of showing the Iraqis that the future, essentially, is
in their hands and that they have to make a deal between themselves
is to withdraw Forces. That is why I have been a proponent, since
over the past year, of the need to scale down and eventually eliminate
the US military presence.
Q10 Robert Key: This is seen primarily
as an Army operation, a land operation. Can I ask you what you
think would be the consequences of the United States, Australian
and the British Royal Navy withdrawing their Navies from this
area, and it might be interesting to have an Iranian perspective
on that?
Dr Ansari: An Iranian perspective:
I think that Iran's position vis-a"-vis the Coalition as
a whole can be viewed as dichotomous, there are two different
strategies going on in Tehran, at the moment. One if reflected
by, really, I suppose, what you would normally call the Civil
Service, the Foreign Ministry and the old hands in Government,
and the others being perpetrated, or promoted, by the current
Government and Mr Ahmadinejad and his allies in the Revolutionary
Guard core. I think the latter would very much like to see a withdrawal
of Coalition Forces from a whole range of their activities, both
in Iraq and in the Persian Gulf, which of course they will emphasise
to you is the Persian Gulf and therefore is something that they
have a certain right to monitor. I have to say, I think that views
in Tehran are divided, I would not say that it is quite so clear,
and there are those that actually see the Coalition presence as
doing some good, at the very least in directing certainly insurgency
activities away from them. I think there is an acknowledgment
in Iran that if the Coalition withdrew then a lot of these groups
probably would turn their attention on to the Iranians that are
around, so there is a lightning-rod activity, facility, going
on there as well, at the very least.
Dr Herring: I would like to say,
briefly, that the fundamental role of the Coalition Forces is
a destabilising one, because it is permitting the intransigence
of forces in Baghdad that are not interested in delivering the
things that are necessary for national reconciliation, so it is
fundamentally destabilising. Then there are particular operations,
like the current one in Diyala Province, which are deeply destabilising
because they are highly polarising military exercises, which come
across to Sunni Arabs in Iraq as essentially anti-Sunni. Then
there are other roles, for which actually there is quite widespread
support, the idea of peace-keeping and policing, and so on, which
Iraqis can support, and that leads to issues of Naval patrolling,
and anti-smuggling activities are in a different category. You
are dealing with a fundamental, strategic role, then specific
military operations which the US is conducting, which are deeply
unhelpful and just a repeat of what we have been doing over and
over. Then there are these other, more peace-keeping, policing-orientated
activities, which would receive widespread support.
Q11 Robert Key: Is the Iraqi Navy
capable of protecting Iraq's bialex(?) ports?
Dr Herring: No.
Professor Zubaida: No.
Dr Dodge: The port in Basra is
thoroughly penetrated by militias who cream off, in effect, a
tax for everything. The Iraqi Navy has little or no role in stopping
that. Just to disagree with my two august colleagues, I think
what we are involved in doing is second-guessing the rationality
of Iraqi actors, and the vast majority of those Iraqi actors,
Eric and Glen claim will come to compromise when the Coalition
Forces leave, are at the moment the key national figures involved
in perpetrating killings and murders. If you want to look at their
motivation and their actions, let us look at what they are doing
now. The militias, a vast array of them, and forces within the
Iraqi Government are perpetrating violence against other Iraqis.
My assessment is the same with Eric and Glen, it is speculation
from present events that they will increase their deployment of
violence, and not decrease it, when troops go home.
Dr Herring: There is actually
not a difference between our positions. If you refuse to support
these intransigent troops, they might still prefer chaos to compromise;
that is certainly the case. The question is are we stabilising
by supporting intransigent groups, and the answer has to be, no.
How that will then play out, I agree, they might simply say no,
and that is why it is important to know a best case, or the idea
that if you try to manipulate them in giving military support
and dangle carrots and sticks that they will go for that, it might
be just simply another agenda that is very localised.
Q12 Mr Borrow: Just in the same area,
what I am not clear about is whether the presence of Coalition
troops is actually, in a way, allowing violence to take place,
because their mere presence perhaps saves the perpetrators from
the consequence of that violence. In other words, if the troops
were not there, there would be a reaction and there would be more
violence towards the perpetrators of violence; but the mere fact
that the troops are there is actually encouraging people to take
part in violence without suffering the real consequences which
would exist were the troops not there. Is there an element of
that?
Dr Herring: That is actually what
is happening, right now, in Baqubah. As far as I can see, the
current offensive, the so-called Iraqi Army offensive, supported
by the Americans, could not have happened without the American
Army, and it is the kind of operation which simply should not
happen, because that population has no intention of submitting
to what they will see as Shi`a rule, they are just not going to
do it. They might have to back off a little when the Americans
are there in large numbers, but the American military have said,
in the last few days, that the Iraqi Army, so-called, Forces cannot
hold Baqubah, and so when the Americans leave the insurgents will
come back and they will be fighting to regain their territory
and the Shi`a forces will simply have to meet that. I would say
that is a major destabilising element.
Q13 Mr Jenkin: How much is this cycle
of violence psychologically inevitable, after the terrible years
of Saddam's oppression and the systematic decapitation of all
the natural leadership of society and the settling of old scores,
like a sick wound opening up, and it has just got to let all this
out, and it is part of the process that Iraq has got to go through?
How much of it is just inevitable; however Saddam departed, whatever
happened after Saddam, there is going to be some dreadful reckoning?
Professor Zubaida: I think Saddam
laid the basis for it but I do not think it was inevitable. In
fact, I think what Saddam had done, as you point out and as has
been pointed out before, was destroy any basis of social autonomy,
social organisation, political organisation in the country, with
the result that the only leadership and coherence that were left
were those of religion and tribe, and even then these were fractured,
reformed. There was no necessity, no inevitability that these
divisions would actually lead to violence. I think one of the
most important factors which led to the violence was the policy
of the Americans when they got there, which was to abolish, as
has been said already, the Government and the Army. What do you
expect, if you abolish the Government and the Army and you do
not put anything in its place? That really is the crucial factor.
Saddam may have laid the grounds for it but what actually activated
these primordial solidarities into violence, and formed them as
well in groups, was the fact that there was no Government and
no Police.
Q14 Linda Gilroy: Does the Maliki
Government have the capacity and the will to tackle the violence,
and, if not, are there ways in which it can be addressed, and
what are they?
Dr Dodge: That is the question
which I suspect we are all struggling to answer. Let me give you
two sides to the answer. One is, through incentivising the Maliki
Government, possibly through saying, as there is a head of steam
in Washington, "If you do not do X, Y and Z we are going
home, or we'll not fund you; we'll withdraw resources," the
argument is you could minimise their room for sectarian behaviour,
you could reduce their undoubted evidence of the deployment of
government services in a sectarian manner; you could do that.
That is one side of the argument. The second side of the argument
is that we know that ingrained in the Maliki Government, especially
in key ministers of state are sectarian actors who are pursuing
a sectarian agenda and/or that the Maliki Government is largely
irrelevant to what tentative institutions of state, especially
the Police and the militias, are actually wreaking havoc in society.
I would argue more towards the first, and the second, incentivising
the Maliki Government, on one basis only, that we have got a series
of governmental changes, from the CPA to the Alawi Government,
to the Jaffri Government, and with each change in government we
have seen a massive drop-off of governmental capacity, of incoherence,
and whatever, to try to social-engineer another change in a Government
which claims at least a democratic mandate will be extremely disrupting.
I think we have to work with what we have got and move heaven
and earth through, I suspect, an international compact to work
with the Maliki Government and try to reform it, or encourage
it to reform.
Professor Zubaida: I would largely
agree with what Dr Dodge has said. I think that is the case.
Dr Herring: I would add a number
of things to that. You are faced with the basic choice of trying
to strengthen what is there, and I would actually oppose that.
I would say that it is not a coherent actor, it is an alliance,
fundamentally, of Kurdish political forces which are doing mostly
their own thing, and, broadly speaking, Shi`a fundamentalist forces
who control various aspects of the central Iraqi Government in
another alliance with the United States, and we see it that way.
We will have to look at how you break up that alliance and how
you try to find different politics to come out of that, and I
do not think that you map out here, the stages that we do that,
it will be something we have to respond to in Iraqi political
process. What we need to focus on are the key things of how will
the coherent actor emerge and why will it seem more to be gained
from negotiating than fighting. No-one is really asking those
questions clearly enough, and the surge is simply not going to
do that, it is not a coherent actor and it gets more from fighting
than from compromising, so there is no point in continuing in
that road. There is actually some hope in all of this, which is
that you can compare the preferences of most Iraqis, and it has
been polled very consistently, we could go into some detail but
I will stick to a few specifics. In comparison with what is happening
at the national level, it is very different. Overwhelmingly, Iraqis
reject sectarianism, overwhelmingly, they think it is being forced
upon them, overwhelmingly, actually, they favour some kind of
Iraqi national government and some kind of Iraqi national presence,
and that is true amongst Kurds as well as Shi`ites. It is not
the case that they are all broken down in that way. The question
is how do we connect that remaining Iraqi national feeling to
some kind of political process, rather than balance the Maliki
Government, which has no prospect of delivering it.
Q15 Linda Gilroy: To what extent
is that tied up with the success, or lack of success, of the Government
in tackling the sectarian divide, and what evidence is there that
they have even tried to do that?
Dr Rangwala: The Government itself,
as Dr Herring was saying, is largely dependent upon one of the
Shi'a political parties, the Supreme Council, now for its parliamentary
representation; they are the major bloc. That is left within the
mainstream of the United Iraqi Alliance. They have an extensive
militia, the Badr Brigades, which are involved in sectarian conflict
throughout southern Iraq and in parts of Baghdad; so in that respect
they are an actor within a sectarian conflict rather than a mediating
force between different sectarian groups. At present, the Maliki
Government is facing quite a severe challenge in retaining a parliamentary
majority, in any case, and one of the parties within the Shi'a
alliance has broken away from it. If the Sadr Movement breaks
away from that political alliance, they will be a minority in
the Parliament, in any case, and there is a very real prospect,
over coming months, of Iraq having a minority Government; so,
in that respect at least, it will retain a consistent problem
of legitimising itself to its own heartlands.
Professor Zubaida: I agree with
that. Really, the Maliki Government is a party in the sectarian
conflict in Iraq. In many respects, as a Government it is highly
ineffective because it has very little capacity, and it is only
the fact that insofar as it depends on its own militias or the
various bits of the Government depend on their own militias, which
of course just adds to the sectarian conflict. I think it is quite
right to say that many Iraqis, when asked, would come out against
sectarianism, in favour of national unity and a national government,
but the national unity and the national government, as they see
it, is under their control. Very few people, except some of the
Kurds, would want to divide up Iraq; most of the parties who are
Arabs want to keep Iraq as a unit but with themselves in control.
This applies, of course, especially in relation to the oil resources,
which are so vital for any future Iraqi economy; and these are
issues upon which it is very difficult to see how people, under
present or foreseeable circumstances, could come to agree.
Q16 Linda Gilroy: Do any of you see
any prospect of any of the political actors emerging to rise above
those sectarian divides?
Dr Herring: Not until the current
ones are undermined. It is worth pointing out that the Maliki
Government is under a lot of pressure from within its own Islamic
Alliance for not doing enough to protect the Shi`a Muslims, so
he is actually putting more effort into that one side of things.
I do not see that there is any reason to believe that the current
actors have any interest in doing that, especially as they are
in government, they are being supported, militarily and economically,
and running entire government ministries, and able also, with
rampant corruption, to pocket vast personal fortunes in this process.
They have just no incentive; and what are they going to do, reach
out and undermine their own militia base: I just do not see that,
I do not see how it can happen.
Dr Dodge: I agree with all that;
it is just that when you look at the comparative studies of civil
war, civil society, which is what Eric is looking towards, it
is going to find it very difficult to organise. It is the people
with the guns who rule the streets, so if you are struggling to
get your kids in and out of school, struggling to stop your family
being murdered or kidnapped, you are not going to join a political
party and put yourself on the front line where the men with guns
can shoot you. The Government is undoubtedly corrupt and undoubtedly
incoherent; factions within the Government undoubtedly are a central
player within the civil war. It is just when you look into society,
and Eric is exactly right on all the opinion poll data, where
is the organisational capacity going to come from to mobilise
and overturn what was, and what the politicians in Government
claim is, a democratic electoral mandate given from two elections
on a referendum in 2005. Those are the two problems. They claim
to have a mandate and society is going to find it very difficult
to organise against them.
Professor Zubaida: I think the
main element of this society, the kind of educated, urban middle
classes, they have been targeted particularly and under great
attack, and I think one of the really dire consequences of this
conflict is the disempowering, and indeed the displacement, of
the middle classes. In fact, many of the people who are now refugees,
in Jordan and in Syria, are from this group, not to mention the
many professionals and business people who have gone to the Gulf
or to Europe or America, in the millions. I think, in many respects,
this vital element, which could constitute civil society in Iraq,
which is genuinely anti-sectarian, which has been the mainstay
of Iraq in the 20th century, has been displaced and disempowered,
and that is a very grave question.
Q17 Chairman: Dr Herring, in his
evidence to the Iraq Commission, Dr Dodge said that he was vehemently
against what is quickly becoming the conventional wisdom, which
is to pull troops out, run away and hope for the best. If the
current Government, the Maliki Government, has been elected via
democratic mandate, why do you think that these people, which
Professor Zubaida is talking about, might be tempted back to Iraq
to form some sort of civil society, if the first thing that you
would advise is undermining that democratically-elected Government?
Dr Herring: There are a couple
of elements there. The first is, it was certainly elected through
a form of democratic process but it was hardly a particularly
free process, and it is certainly not representative of what Iraqis
have been saying they want. If you were faced with a situation
of rampant militia control, complete breakdown of the state, if
you were being picked on and potentially murdered, in this country
because you were Scottish or Welsh, you would end up engaging
in self-protection and backing forces which would protect you.
That is not the same as saying that this is representative of
what the people want in Iraq and I am not suggesting that simply
by pulling out forces therefore that will emerge. I cannot see
how actively supporting, and I will give you a specific illustration,
military offences by what is effectively perceived by Sunni Arabs
as a Shi `a occupation force in Diyala Province, that advances,
in any way, anyone's rights, regardless of which way they did
or did not vote. That is just not the way to go. It is not simply,
as I say, a question of leaving or staying, it is a question of
what function you play and what role you play and Iraqis are more
interested in that more supportive role. It is not a question
of simply leaving and washing your hands, I have never said that.
Dr Rangwala: Just to respond to
the very specific point, what will bring the educated professional
classes back from Jordan and Syria, what will bring them back
is not necessarily a democratic government being in place but
a peaceful country, and what will bring a peaceful country is
what we have been discussing. My sense is that a number of these
groups, which are engaged in quite explicit violence on a very
high scale within Iraq, already through back channels have negotiated
with each other, they have shown already their willingness to
engage in deal-making, and therefore we need to set the conditions
in which they can actually implement the very deals which they
have drawn up in private already.
Q18 Mr Jenkin: On the back of that
question, is not the rather idealised democratic constitution,
attempting to base itself on the reconciliation of all the various
factions, really misconceived, for the present circumstance? Should
we not encourage them to adopt an emergency constitution which
is going to allow perhaps a single individual to impose much more
control than is possible with a minority government, which is
one prospect?
Dr Herring: What you need is coherent
actors and there are going to be a number of them in Iraq; there
just is not going to be one. That would be magicking someone out
of the air to do it. There is no-one who could play that role,
there is no-one who would be accepted, they would simply be fought.
We have someone in that role; it is called the Coalition, and
you are not going to find an Iraqi to do that role. What you need
is not just, of course, fluffy civil society, actually you need
a military balance in Iraq, an emergent set of forces which made
it clear, in western Iraq, "You cannot conquer western Iraq,
so stop trying." As long as the Coalition is going to keep
on trying to conquer western Iraq they are going to fail to do
so; and are they going to back the Government in Baghdad indefinitely,
trying to conquer western Iraq? As soon as the Coalition does
not back that attempt at conquest, that attempt at conquest will
have to stop; and if that becomes part of the emergent forces,
in terms of strength, and I think you do have to look at strength
as well as civil society, so it is a balance of those coherent
political actors and the military situation on the ground.
Q19 Mr Jenkins: Running an army is
expensive and running a militia is expensive, and whilst you have
a territory of very poor people there is only so much you can
squeeze out of poor people. Who exactly is funding these militias?
Dr Herring: They are smuggling
oil.
Dr Rangwala: The oil-smuggling,
essentially. All the political parties in the south engage in
extensive siphoning off of the oil or smuggling of the oil across
borders, and in that respect, at least, they get a very large
proportion of their income and very extensive amounts of funds
from dealing with Iraq's most valuable natural resource: oil.
Dr Herring: Also the United States,
all the money it has poured into Iraq, vast volumes of that have
just been disappearing, left, right and centre. To give you a
specific illustration of how ludicrous the current situation is,
an Iraqi soldier gets about $317 a month, the Police get about
$50 or $60; they are being issued with $1,000 pistols which they
can sell on the black market, and only a tiny proportion of those,
or even I think the US do not even bother to take a note of the
serial numbers to keep track of those, and this is according to
the US's own official figures. If you want to fund your insurgency
join the Iraqi Army or join the Police; they are what Glen and
I call embedded insurgents. You get a wage for doing it, you get
nice, expensive weapons which you can sell on, or just use during
the evenings, and then you go back to work in the morning, if
you bother to show up. The US official figures say "These
are the Iraqi security forces," little asterisk, and down
at the bottom it says, "Just by the way, we don't know how
many of these people actually show up."
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