Examination of Witnesses (Questions 64
- 79)
TUESDAY 26 JUNE 2007
MR NADHIM
ZAHAWI
Q64 Chairman: I am grateful to you
for rushing. Please could you introduce yourself and say what
the polling that you have given us is based on?
Mr Zahawi: My name is Nadhim Zahawi.
I am a Chief Executive of YouGov plc. I also happen to be the
son of immigrants to this country; my father is Kurdish, from
northern Iraq, and my mother is from Basra. I travel to Iraq quite
often. I was there till Friday, for three days, in Urbil. We conduct
research across the whole country for the media and for corporates
and Government.
Q65 Chairman: Have things in Iraq
got better or worse over the last few months, would you say?
Mr Zahawi: In certain governorates
and regions the data coming back is things are getting much better,
so the picture is obviously uneven.
Q66 Chairman: Which areas are getting
better?
Mr Zahawi: Obviously, the north,
for example, in the Kurdish region, things are demonstrably better,
people have more regular electricity supply, clean water, there
is a rebuilding programme taking place, both in the cities and
the villages, and so life is much, much better. In most of the
southern governorates, people would say life is much, much better
for them, too. It is really Baghdad and the Sunni triangle where
life is perceived by people as getting much worse since 2003.
Q67 Chairman: That is since 2003,
but in recent months, in the last six months, are things getting
better or worse?
Mr Zahawi: I would say, incrementally
better, but it is within the margin of error.
Q68 Mr Jenkin: Are Coalition Forces
still a stabilising element in Iraq, in your view?
Mr Zahawi: Yes, they are, on many
levels. One of the great problems is that, obviously, there is
no effective Government in Iraq, there are centres of power. The
Iraqi Army, in essence, if it were not for the Coalition's influence,
would probably break up into those factions; i.e., the Iraqi Army
has not coalesced around a Government, a flag, the country, bits
of the Iraqi Army have different loyalties.
Q69 Mr Jenkin: We have been hearing
how the Iraqi Army is comprised of a rather fluid element, that
people collect their weapons and then disappear. Is the Iraqi
Army taken of becoming a prevalent force?
Mr Zahawi: My instinct would be,
I do not think so. I think that the problem we face is that these
power centres call the shots, so you get the Sunni conscripts
who will collect their weapons and then go off to Mosul and pass
on the weapons to the militias there. The same happens with the
Shi'a conscripts, who just go down to whomever they belong to,
religiously or politically, it is usually the same thing, in the
south of Iraq, and the weapons are just passed on. The problem
that you have is that the Government is just not effective, in
the sense of bringing everything together. Even the ministries,
the way the ministries operate, what you get is, "Oh, well,
this ministry belongs to this particular party and therefore we
can't do anything with them, because we happen to be from a different
party." You really have not got a real Government, you have
got these power centres, who have carved up bits of Government
for themselves. It is almost a false creation which, without the
Coalition being around, would break up into its constituent parts.
Q70 Linda Gilroy: Can the Government
develop a capacity and the will to tackle the sort of violence
that we have been hearing about this morning? If so, over what
timescale?
Mr Zahawi: From what I have witnessed,
it can, if you reorganise the Government into what I think is
the only solution that is left now, after what has happened over
the past three years, and that is into a sort of federation, where
you have very clear leaderships in those three different parts
of Iraq; there is no other way. If you look at what is happening
in the Kurdish region, and already they have had a couple of bombings
recently, the leadership there has coalesced around a parliament
and a system which now is in control, it has respect for the people,
it runs things; of course, there are hurdles still to overcome,
but essentially it is in control of that society, the rule of
law is respected, in the region. I do not think it is any longer
possible to have that as a collective; you almost need to recognise
that and break it down into a federation. The bigger issue is
obviously Baghdad, and Baghdad will need to have its own administration;
you could have the federation where the president is a rotative
president, every year, from the three bits of the country. There
is no way a government for the whole is going to carry the country
with it. You will have the south saying, "Well, if we're
going to have a Sunni in control we're just not going to join
in;" the Sunnis saying, "Well, a Shi'a is in control;
of course, he's not going to do us any favours," and whatever.
You need to, I think, really look at the structure of government
in Iraq and simply just accept the fact that actually it is made
up of three different countries.
Q71 Linda Gilroy: I take it that
you feel that the Iraqi Government has been totally unsuccessful
at bridging the sectarian divide?
Mr Zahawi: Absolutely. On the
face of it, they will all sit round a single table and appear
to be a government, but the reality on the ground, you do not
have to go very far into any ministry to realise that basically
it is power bases, it is completely factional.
Q72 Chairman: What is your perception
of the way the US surge has gone down, with the presence of more
American troops?
Mr Zahawi: The data coming back
from Baghdad is, and we run a tracking study in Baghdad which
looks at how people perceive security in the capital, it is getting
better, but people think it has just simply been displaced, rather
than it has actually gone away completely. Part of the problem
is you have got this feeling that "Actually they are not
going to have the stomach to be here for very long and therefore
why should I put my head over the parapet and start co-operating,
because if they're not going to be around these militias are going
to come back, and therefore basically I'd better align myself
with whoever has got the biggest gun to protect me."
Q73 Chairman: What about British
troops; what would be the reaction to the withdrawal of British
troops?
Mr Zahawi: I think that, obviously,
what you have in the south, where the British presence is, is
a situation where at least one of the factions there would like
rid of us as soon as possible, because they need to exert more
control over the region, heavily backed by Iran in that area.
I think that the people would feel much less secure if we left,
so the silent majority would feel it a betrayal, because there
would be huge amounts of blood shed and factional infighting to
take control of the area, between SCIRI and the Mahdi Army or
the Da'wa.
Q74 Mr Hamilton: We have just heard
from previous witnesses, a number of them, that the British have
a hands-off attitude in the south and therefore they were encouraging
the view that if the Brits move out very little will change in
the south?
Mr Zahawi: There is a difference
between hands-off but being there with a big stick, if necessary,
and not being there at all and the factions which were co-operating
with the Coalition then becoming exposed to just slaughter, essentially.
Q75 Mr Hamilton: Could I ask, Chairman,
with your permission, an answer to a previous question indicated
that we should look at a federation rather than the separation
of countries: what do you prefer?
Mr Zahawi: I think a federation
would be the most preferred route for, I would say, all the groups,
including the Kurds. In terms of the Kurds, I think a separation,
if you talked to the leaderships there, would be very unhealthy
for them, especially the recent troubles with Turkey. Certainly
a federation, co-operation over things like having a rolling presidency,
co-operation over Baghdad, creating a form of government for Baghdad
in which all three can participate, would probably be the most
preferable route.
Q76 Mr Holloway: If you saw a federation
emerge, would you see large movements of population, as we saw
in the Balkans in the early nineties, where minority groups would
go to their areas?
Mr Zahawi: Sadly, a lot of it
has happened already. Baghdad obviously is an extreme version
of that; i.e., that the Sunni population of Baghdad is down to
about 11%. People have either moved out to Sunni areas or have
left for Syria or Jordan, or the Kurdish region.
Q77 Mr Holloway: So the answer is
yes?
Mr Zahawi: Yes; absolutely.
Q78 Mr Holloway: How much more do
you see though in the rest of the country, what sorts of numbers
would be moving around?
Mr Zahawi: The bit that it will
depend on obviously is where you draw the boundaries, so, again,
the Kirkuk issue, for example; if that ends up being rolled into
the Kurdish federal area then you might see bigger proportions
of movement. Really it depends; it is very hard to put your finger
on it. Obviously, as you have seen and you have witnessed, there
has been an exodus anyway of the Sunni population away from areas
which are becoming dominated by the Shi'as in Baghdad.
Q79 Chairman: Mr Zahawi, thank you
very much indeed for coming to help us. You have a busy life in
YouGov, I know, but it is good to hear that you are doing stuff
in Iraq as well as in this country.
Mr Zahawi: Thank you very much
and I apologise for keeping you, for the delay. I got my timing
wrong.
Chairman: Thank you very much.
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