Memorandum from Professor Clive Archer
1. BACKGROUND
1.1 This presentation will examine the role
of the Northern European states in the European Security and Defence
Policy (ESDP) of the European Union, especially in the recently-formed
Nordic battle group.
1.2 The "Northern European" states
are here defined as the Nordic and Baltic states, that is Denmark,
Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
In this short presentation, special reference will be made to
the role of the UK in the relationship of these states to the
ESDP and NATO.
1.3 The Nordic and Baltic states are covered,
and treated together, because of their closeness to each other,
both geographically and in their general international cooperation,
and because a number of these states have cooperated on security
matters, not least in the setting up of the Nordic battle group.
1.4 However, these eight states have differences
in their security policies, especially with Finland and Sweden
not being NATO members. Furthermore, Norway and Iceland are not
European Union members. Nevertheless, Finland and Sweden have
engaged closely with NATO, especially in operations in former-Yugoslavia;
and Norway and Iceland are both tied closely to the EU through
the European Economic Area (EEA) and by their membership of the
Schengen agreement.
1.5 The Petersberg tasks covered by the
ESDP—"humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks
and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace
making"—include ones familiar to Nordic troops in their
previous UN roles as peacekeepers. However, the mention of "combat
forces" suggests a harder edge to these operations, as could
the addition by the Brussels European Council in 2004 of the new
tasks of "joint disarmament operations, the support for third
countries combating terrorism and security sector reform."
1.6 From the start of ESDP, Denmark has
recused itself from the defence aspect of the Policy under the
"Edinburgh opt-outs" it obtained from the Maastricht
Treaty. It is involved in the more general aspects of the ESDP
and in its increasing civilian crisis management aspects. The
Danish prime minister, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, after his re-election
in November 2007, stated that he wanted a national referendum
on dropping these opt-outs, including the defence one. The governing
parties and a number of the opposition parties support an end
to the Danish defence "opt-out".
1.7 The UK has had a history of military
cooperation within NATO with Denmark and Norway, both during the
Cold War and after. In the wake of the end of Cold War, the UK
also made an important contribution to the development of the
defence of the three Baltic states. For example, Sir Garry Johnson
led a team of retired officers from NATO states that advised the
countries on security issues in the 1990s.
2. RESOURCES
AND FORCES
2.1 The five Nordic and three Baltic states
are all "small" in population terms, though clearly
the Nordic states are also comparatively rich in GDP per capita
terms, Norway topping the world lists (after Luxembourg) in those
stakes.
2.2 During the Cold War and even shortly
after its end, Norway and Sweden were steadily ahead of Denmark
and Finland in both dollars per capita and percentage of GNP spent
on defence. This could be seen even in 1992 when Norway spent
3.3% of GNP on defence, whereas Denmark spent 2.0%, Sweden 2.5%
and Finland 1.9%. However, the final years of the Cold War had
seen Finland increase its figure from 1.5% in 1985, while Sweden's
dropped from 3.3% in 1985. The starting figures for Estonia, Latvia
and Lithuania in 1992 were, respectively, 0.6%, 0.5% and 0.7%.
Since the end of the Cold War, all the figures for the percentage
of GNP spent on defence have converged: Denmark 1.4, Estonia 1.6,
Finland 1.4, Latvia 1.3, Lithuania 1.2, Norway 1.6, Sweden 1.6
(cf. UK 2.3; IISS figures for 2005; Iceland has no defence budget).
2.3 These states have contributed their forces
to a number of operations under a variety of "hats",
some UN, some NATO, some multilateral ad hoc and some ESDP. The
table below shows personnel contributions in 2006-07 as:
| | |
| | | |
|
| Denmark | Finland
| Norway | Sweden
| Estonia | Latvia
| Lithuania |
| | |
| | | |
|
| UN ops | 65 | 77
| 139 | 158 | 2
| 0 | 0 |
| UN obs | 50 | 25
| 37 | 28 | 2 |
0 | 0 |
| Others | 518 | 0
| 15 | 4 | 38 |
119 | 59 |
| NATO | 731 | 500
| 460 | 688 | 148
| 44 | 162 |
| EU | 3 | 177 |
22 | 67 | 33 | 2
| 1 |
| Total | 1,367 |
779 | 673 | 945
| 223 | 165 |
222 |
| | |
| | | |
|
| (obs observer; ops operations; NATO: + 15 from Iceland; based on IISS figures)
| | | |
| | | |
| | |
| | | |
|
2.4 Finland and Estonia were the only Northern European
states with more than 10% of their deployed forces devoted to
ESDP operations in 2006-07. Most of the "other" operations
were those in Iraq where Denmark was the greatest contributor.
However, Denmark withdrew 470 ground troops (and its Iraqi interpreters)
from Iraq in August 2007, leaving about 50 military there.
3. THE NORDIC
BATTLE GROUP
3.1 In early 2004, the EU adopted the battle group (BG)
concept as forming the basis for a rapid response operation, especially
in situations where NATO was not involved. The Berlin-plus agreement
has allowed for coordination with NATO over deployment, though
Turkish-Cyprus disagreements seem to have over-shadowed these
arrangements. Of the planned battle groups, one was to come from
the Northern European region, though states there have decided
to contribute to three of the battle groups (Finland will contribute
to a German-led BG, as well as to the Nordic BG, and Latvia and
Lithuania to a Polish-led BG).
3.2 The "Nordic battle group" is to be on standby
for six months from 1 January 2008 with contributions from Estonia,
Finland, Ireland, Norway and Sweden. This unit will consist of
2,800 soldiers with about 2,300 from Sweden, 200 from Finland,
150 from Norway, 80 from the Republic of Ireland and 50 from Estonia.
The idea is that the force should be able to act in conflict areas
within ten days of a decision to intervene and the intervention
time is seen as 30 days with a possible extension to 120 days.
The Nordic battle group is led by Sweden which provides a light
mechanised rifle battalion as the core unit, with the other contributors
providing support resources. For example, Ireland will contribute
an Explosive Ordnance Disposal and Improvised Explosive Device
Disposal contingent with its own security detail. In November
2007, the final exercise of the battle group took place in northern
Sweden with a simulated crisis protecting an election process
within a "nation in turmoil". The battle group could
be one of those deployed to Chad and the Central African Republic
as part of the support for the UN-African Union peacekeeping mission
to Darfur.
4. THE UNITED
KINGDOM'S
ROLE
4.1 The UK's permanent joint headquarters at Northwood
is to be used as the operational headquarters (OHQ) for the Nordic
battle group. During the standby period, the MoD has promised
that Northwood will provide the OHQ building, technical and administrative
support with trained staff. It seems this will be the strategic
HQ for any distant operations.
5. PROBLEMS AND
PROSPECTS
5.1 A main concern about the battle groups, as with the
ESDP more generally, is that of duplication, especially with NATO
activity. If the ESDP competes with NATO for increasingly scarce
resources, does it not detract from the Western defence effort?
5.2 A counter-argument is that the ESDP undertakes operations
where NATO either would not go or where NATO wishes to hand over.
In some cases it may be more politically acceptable (both for
providers and recipients) than NATO action. Furthermore it has
further engaged non-NATO forces in a more leading role than they
could take in NATO-led operations. For example, the Nordic BG
has seen Sweden take a lead role and Finland & Ireland devote
resources that would have been less readily available for NATO.
Also it has stretched, in a positive way, the defence efforts
of small states such as Estonia. The Nordic battle group has seen
key Nordic states work more closely together on defence matters
than before. Finally, the three Baltic states will soon be contributors
to three battle groups. This will integrate them further into
the Western defence system and also tie them more closely to the
security policies of the European Union. Nevertheless, these basically
political points do not resolve any questions of lack of resources.
5.3 The proof of the battle groups will be in their use.
There has been a precursor in Operation Artemis in the Ituri region
of the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003 to which Sweden made
a significant contribution, and which seemed to have some success.
The next possible use is in Darfur as noted in 3.2 above. A hard
test could come with Kosovo and this will be a trial of the Berlin-plus
arrangement, NATO-ESDP relations generally, as well as the political
cohesion of the Euro-Atlantic region. Another possible area for
activity could be Cyprus, but deployment there would only come
after a political agreement accepted by all parties and the UN.
One aspect of the battle group concept is that it is supposed
to be flexible enough to deal with "events", especially
crises coming out of the blue. Its next task may well be of such
an unpredictable nature.
Director, Manchester European Research Institute
Manchester Metropolitan University
3 December 2007
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