Memorandum from Daniel Keohane
What is EU defence policy?
The Balkan crises in the 1990s showed that Europe,
and the EU specifically, was incapable of dealing with security
problems in its backyard (or indeed elsewhere). Following a Franco-British
agreement at St. Malo in November 1998, the European Security
and Defence Policy (ESDP) was born at the Cologne summit of EU
heads-of-government in June 1999. From the beginning ESDP has
been about implementing the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP)—that is to say it is a strictly inter-governmental
policy, decided unanimously by EU governments, and neither the
European Commission nor European Parliament play any role.
Furthermore, ESDP is not an EU version of NATO,
because the EU is not a military alliance. There is no mutual
defence commitment in the current EU treaties similar to NATO's
Article V, and EU defence is not about territorial defence. In
essence, EU defence is an extra-EU crisis management policy, helping
prevent conflict and re-build societies emerging from war. As
a result, the EU approach to international security is broad,
with the intention to use a wide range of tools from diplomats
and development workers to judges and police, and—where
necessary—soldiers. This is because today's threats, such
as terrorism or collapsing states, cannot be addressed using only,
or even predominantly, military means. NATO's approach, in contrast,
is much narrower since it mainly uses military resources.
ESDP missions
Since 2003, the EU has completed or is carrying
out 19 ESDP missions. Although they have been relatively small
in size—the largest was a 7,000 strong peacekeeping operation
in Bosnia, which now numbers 2,500—for the most part they
have achieved their goals. Most ESDP missions have not been primarily
military operations (although military personnel have helped plan
most missions). More interesting has been their complexity and
range, such as quelling civil unrest in Macedonia; reforming the
Congolese army and the Georgian judicial system; training Iraqi
police, judges and prisons officers; training Palestinian and
Afghan police forces; and monitoring the border between Ukraine
and Moldova.
In addition, the EU is increasingly the only
international organisation that can help provide security in certain
situations, as has been the case in Indonesia and Israel. From
2005-06 the EU successfully oversaw the implementation of a peace
agreement in Aceh, and since 2005 it has monitored the Rafah crossing
point in Gaza. And demand is growing. In September the UN Security
Council mandated the EU to send a peacekeeping force to Eastern
Chad. It is due to begin its deployment in early 2008, and will
comprise of 4,000 soldiers. Plus EU governments have agreed to
send 1,800 police, judges and customs officials to Kosovo, who
will operate alongside 16,000 NATO peacekeepers, to help prevent
a return to war-fighting in that region.
Demand for EU action is likely to continue growing
in the future. The enlargement of the EU to 27 members brought
it closer to the arc of instability that runs around its eastern,
south-eastern and southern flanks. Plus, Turkey and other countries
of the western Balkans may enter in the coming decades. The EU
will therefore have many weak and malfunctioning states on its
borders. It is bound to become more involved in countries such
as Georgia and Algeria. Across the Atlantic US priorities will
likely remain focused on countries such as Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan
and North Korea, and potential conflicts such as China-Taiwan
and India-Pakistan. Washington will probably be reluctant to become
too involved in conflicts around the EU's eastern and southern
flanks.
The EU will need to develop a more effective
set of policies for stabilising North Africa, the Balkans and
the countries that lie between it and Russia. Many of these policies
will involve trade, aid and political dialogue. But EU strategy
towards its near-abroad will also have to include a military component.
Europeans should not expect the US to put out fires in their own
backyard. After all, the principal rationale for creating the
EU's defence policy was to improve on the EU's poor performance
in coping with the Balkan crises of the 1990s. Plus, the EU's
efforts to tackle conflicts in its neighbourhood may require more
than "mere" peacekeeping and state-building, as it has
been doing in Bosnia and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Military capabilities
To meet their growing demands, EU governments
will need access to adequate military resources. The 27 EU governments
collectively spend close to €200 billion on defence. This
means that, collectively, EU governments are the world's second
biggest defence spenders after the US. That amount of money should
be enough to cover Europe's defence needs. But despite these hefty
financial resources, Europeans do not have nearly enough soldiers
they can use. The EU-27 governments have close to two million
personnel in their armed forces, but they can barely deploy and
sustain 100,000 soldiers around the globe. This amounts to a measly
5% of EU armed forces. Plus some member-state armed forces are
already over-stretched because of non-EU commitments in places
such as Iraq and Afghanistan.
Part of the reason for a lack of deployable
soldiers is that there are roughly 370,000 conscript troops in
the EU. Conscripts—a legacy of Cold War military planning—are
useless for foreign deployments. Another reason for Europe's lack
of military muscle is a shortage of useful equipment, such as
transport planes and communications technology. Inefficiency abounds
in European spending on defence equipment, with too many small
procurement programmes for essentially the same capability. To
illustrate: the EU-27 currently spend roughly €30 billion
a year on some 89 equipment programmes; the US spends much more
(roughly $100 billion annually) on only 27 projects.
European governments have been slowly reforming
their armies since the end of the Cold War—some with more
success than others—shifting from a focus on territorial
defence to an emphasis on international deployments. The good
news is that military reform is now widely recognised at the EU
level as absolutely necessary if the EU is to fulfil its security
aims. Member-states have agreed on a "headline goal"—a
list of military capabilities EU governments have agreed to acquire—commitments
they are supposed to meet by 2010. Although the EU, like NATO,
has not yet managed to convince European governments to rapidly
improve their military capabilities, the process of military reform
in Europe will continue. Plus a number of major equipment investments
started by EU defence ministries should enter into service in
the coming years. These capabilities include A400M transport planes;
A330 air tankers; Eurofighter, Rafale and Joint-Strike-Fighter
jets; and three new Franco-British aircraft carriers.
The European Defence Agency
The European Defence Agency (EDA) was set up
in 2004 to help EU governments improve their military capabilities.
The EDA has achieved a lot in its first three years. In particular
three achievements should be mentioned: the Long-Term Vision,
the R&T Joint Investment Programme and the Code of Conduct
on Defence Procurement. The Long-Term Vision project—which
investigated what military skills EU governments will need over
the next twenty years—is important because defence technology
can take a decade or more to develop. Therefore, if EU governments
want to have the right types of missiles or aircraft in 2020,
they should start thinking now about what types of equipment they
would need. In a similar vein, R&T spending indicates what
new kinds of capabilities defence ministries should have in the
future. Given that EU governments collectively spend only €9
billion on research and development (and only a little over €2
billion on research and technology), it is crucial that they eliminate
duplication and collaborate as much as possible.
The Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement deserves
special attention. Some 175 government contracts worth roughly
€10 billion are currently posted on the Electronic Bulletin
Board, which is an impressive result in such a short time. But
the importance of the code lies as much in its principle as its
practice. The idea of more open European defence markets has been
around for decades, but with little or no progress until the code.
Never before have so many European governments agreed that they
should open up their defence markets to each other.
Battle groups
Fifteen battle groups have or are being set
up, mostly multinational units of 1,500 troops, and the first
of these became operational at the start of 2007. Each battle
group should be able to draw on extensive air and naval assets,
including transport and logistical support, for early and rapid
responses to crises. The rationale for these EU combat units is
to give the UN the rapid reaction capability that it currently
lacks. This is why the EU sent a small UN-mandated intervention
force to Bunia in Congo in June 2003, and a deterrent force to
Kinshasa in 2006.
The Lisbon treaty
Europe's lack of military muscle formed a major
part of the discussion of the defence parts of the Lisbon treaty.
EU leaders will formally sign the Lisbon treaty in December 2007,
and if ratified by all 27 members during 2008, the treaty should
improve the way EU defence policy works and is resourced. During
2008, EU defence ministries will start fleshing out what the Lisbon
treaty means for EU defence policy in practice. The most important
change is that the treaty would make it easier for a subset of
EU countries to work together more closely on military matters,
using a procedure known as "structured co-operation".
Those member-states which meet a set of capability-based entry
criteria can choose to co-operate more closely after securing
a majority vote. This clause makes a lot of sense. Military capabilities
and ambitions vary widely among the member-states. So the EU could
rely on a smaller group of the most willing and best-prepared
countries to run its more demanding military missions.
At first glance, the defence group would seem,
in some respects, to resemble the eurozone: some countries may
stay outside because they choose to and some because they do not
fulfil the entry criteria. During 2008, EU defence ministries
will discuss what precisely the entry criteria should be, and
some governments worry that they might be left out depending on
the stringency of the criteria. That said, the wording of the
treaty suggests an easy-to-meet set of capabilities thresholds
for participation in the defence vanguard. For example, the draft
says that one of the criteria that EU member-states should meet
is to supply a combat unit—a national unit or as part of
a multinational formation—that can be deployed between five
and thirty days. In fact, 25 out of 27 EU member-states already
supply these combat units as part of a "battle groups"
plan that EU defence ministers approved in April 2004.
Another innovation for defence policy in the
Lisbon treaty is that member-states can sign up to a "mutual
assistance" clause: if a member-state is attacked it can
ask for help—military or otherwise—from other EU member-states
in accordance with the UN charter. But the six neutral countries
for example would not be willing to give such an outright commitment,
as it would imply the EU is a military alliance. Thus, another
clause explains that this article "shall not prejudice the
specific character and defence policy of certain Member States"—meaning
the neutrals. In addition, to allay fears of Atlanticist governments
such as the UK, Poland, and the Netherlands, that EU defence could
undermine NATO, the treaty says that this EU commitment should
be "consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members
of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and
the forum for its implementation".
The so-called "Petersberg tasks" set
the parameters for EU military missions, which range from humanitarian
relief to ending regional conflicts—essentially peace-support
missions. The treaty adds some new types of military missions
to this list, but they are things the EU has already been doing,
like disarmament operations (such as de-mining), security-sector-reform
(reforming armies and police) and military advice. Each EU government
currently has a veto over every single EU military operation,
and that veto power is enshrined in the Lisbon treaty. Although
unlikely, if a member-state government vehemently opposed a particular
EU military operation it could prevent it from happening. The
treaty also says that governments are requested to provide the
EU with military and civilian capabilities that would help the
Union to deal with international crises—but purely on a
voluntary basis. In other words, there is no obligation on a member-state
to participate in any EU mission if it does not want to. In addition,
the treaty does not establish a standing EU force, never mind
a "European army".
Conclusion
EU defence policy has come a long way since
1999. In early 2008, the EU is due to take on its twentieth mission
in Chad, only five years after the first. Although EU governments
still lack adequate amounts of useful military equipment, there
is at least widespread agreement amongst defence ministries on
what is needed. Plus, the EU is working hard to improve its mix
of military and non-military resources—such as police, judges,
aid workers—for coping with crises. This holistic approach
to international security is what differentiates EU defence from
NATO, which is primarily a military organisation founded on territorial
defence. The hope is that the EU and NATO can find more effective
ways of working together in the future, given that much of their
security agendas overlap, for instance on counter-terrorism.
Research Fellow, EU Institute for Security Services
17 December 2007
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