Examination of Witnesses (Questions 300-319)
RT HON
DES BROWNE
MP, MR ANDREW
MATHEWSON AND
MR HUGH
POWELL
8 JANUARY 2008
Q300 Mr Jenkin: That is a yes.
Des Browne: Fundamentally I do
not accept the premise that underpins your question. I am not
prepared to answer a question the underlying premise of which
I do not accept.
Q301 Mr Jenkin: I will take that
as a yes because if it turns out to be true then you would agree
that it would have to be renegotiated.
Des Browne: I am quite content
to come and give evidence to this Committee at which you both
ask the questions and answer them, but—
Q302 Mr Jenkin: Can you give me an
assurance?
Des Browne: I am in no doubt that
NATO will remain the cornerstone of the United Kingdom security
policy and the only organisation for collective defence in Europe.
The Reform Treaty does not change that. The Reform Treaty text
makes clear that NATO is the foundation for collective defence
of its members and the instrument for implementing that commitment;
it is clear. It remains of course intergovernmental and decisions
of effect in defence will need to be made by unanimity.
Chairman: Moving on to capabilities,
Linda Gilroy?
Q303 Linda Gilroy: What are NATO's
main capability gaps? What capabilities does the Alliance need
to acquire to fulfil its expeditionary role? What is the UK doing
about addressing them?
Des Browne: The key to its expeditionary
role as far as NATO is concerned is that it needs a range of deployable
and sustainable capabilities. I have read the evidence that those
other witnesses who have given evidence before this Committee
in this area have given, and I thought that in particular General
Fry and others who addressed these questions answered them quite
comprehensively, so I do not propose to repeat that. The key deployment
capabilities are strategic lift, ISTAR and expeditionary logistics
and communications. There was a vision set for the development
of these capabilities in Prague in 2002 and there are gaps still
to be filled in that vision, but progress has been made in terms
of specifics in strategic lift to which we have already referred
and there is on-going work to improve the supply of helicopters.
In wider doctrinal issues, however, such as adopting context of
approach, having flexible expeditionary forces and moving away
from traditional, static territorial defence, we have made progress,
and we are, as a nation, making investment in all of these areas,
in strategic lift and in ISTAR, in expeditionary logistics and
communications, and we are working with our Alliance partners
in the context of the transformation to improve the Alliance's
capabilities in this regard. However, there is still a lot to
be done. The list is there from Prague.
Q304 Linda Gilroy: You say in your
memorandum that implementation remains patchy and there are concerns
over funding, technical feasibility and a lack of multi-national
co-operation. In a way does that not take us back to some of the
earlier questions on burden-sharing and making sure that other
countries are stepping up to the mark as far as expenditure on
defence is concerned?
Des Browne: Of course it does.
Q305 Linda Gilroy: While you have said
that 72% of the Prague capabilities commitment have been implemented,
it is actually the more expensive ones, and indeed you could say
the more necessary ones, including strategic lift, that remain
to be addressed?
Des Browne: That is right but
then we have the Strategic Airlift Interim Solution and the Strategic
Airlift Capability initiatives which are being instigated which
are making progress in this regard. I think we have seen in a
comparatively short period of time more progress over the last
couple of years than we have seen since Prague.
Q306 Linda Gilroy: So will we see
more progress at Bucharest?
Des Browne: I think we will continue
this process and continue to reinforce the arguments for why this
is in the national interests of individual members but also in
the interests of NATO for them to make a contribution to these
initiatives.
Q307 Linda Gilroy: Moving on to NATO's
transformation agenda, we have discussed a bit of that earlier,
but in terms of meeting these capabilities is it as much about
that transformation and readiness? Have the operational demands
of Afghanistan facilitated or impeded the transformation agenda?
Des Browne: I think to some degree
I have already answered that question. My view is that the operational
demands of Afghanistan have facilitated that transformation. We
have seen that and I have given examples of the sort of transformation,
but one of my colleagues may wish to expand on this.
Mr Mathewson: In a sense the operational
demands of Afghanistan have become, as it were, the transformation
agenda. They have now become the testing ground and the comparator
for what NATO has to do. As an example, the NATO Response Force
was set up as an engine for transformation. In fact, it has not
been possible to commit the forces to the NRF that were originally
intended, but the reason for that is that NATO is actually doing
real work and forces are now heavily committed in Afghanistan,
and it is now Afghanistan that is driving transformation, driving
the change in the capabilities that nations need to develop, becoming
the test-bed for how we need to change the headquarters, becoming
the test-bed for the relevance of the command structure, so the
transformation agenda is comprehensive; it covers structures and
capabilities and ways of working.
Q308 Linda Gilroy: So if Afghanistan
is driving that what role is the Allied Command Transformation
playing? You will probably have seen from our earlier evidence
that many people think it is not performing as well as it is expected
to. What is your view on that, Secretary of State?
Mr Mathewson: I think the Allied
Command Transformation is an important part of the Alliance. It
is very important that as well as having Allied Command Operations—
Q309 Linda Gilroy: Why is it important
because most people we hear from tend to say that it proves very
frustrating, even for those that are involved in it, and it is
particularly frustrating that it is sited where it is, which tends
to take it very far away from where things are happening at the
front-line and certainly gives it the appearance of not contributing
very much.
Mr Mathewson: I think it is important
because as well as having Allied Command Operations fighting the
current battle and handling the issues of the day, it is important
that there is part of the Alliance which is thinking further ahead,
and that is what the role of ACT is; it is to think about how
the Alliance develops its concepts and its doctrines over the
future, for example, to develop thinking on the comprehensive
approach. I recognise the concern about being where it is. On
the other hand, that is a strength, and it is a question of balance.
Q310 Linda Gilroy: In what way is
it a strength?
Mr Mathewson: It is a strength
in that it is a visible expression of NATO in the United States,
so it is part of the transatlantic partnership. It is strength
in that is located alongside the United States Joint Forces Command
and shares a commander with the US Joint Forces Command and there
is therefore the potential (not yet fully realised) for the Alliance
to pull through from the US experience thinking about how Armed
Forces need to develop in the future. I think it is bedding in;
it is setting itself up; there are a couple of parts of it which
I would say are succeeding more quickly. There is a Joint Lessons
Learned Centre at Monsanto in Lisbon which is taking the lessons
out of current operations and feeding them back into the system.
There is a Joint Warfare Training Centre at Stavanger in Norway
which is providing some very effective training to NATO formations
including headquarters teams going into ISAF. It is important
conceptually to have a part of the Alliance thinking further ahead.
It is bedding itself in. I think parts of it are moving forward.
Q311 Linda Gilroy: If those are the
bits that are working, what are the bits that are not working
that need to be improved upon?
Mr Mathewson: I think in terms
of the headquarters arrangement in Norfolk, it is still bedding
in. We would like to see a clearer understanding of the relationship
between ACT and Norfolk and NATO headquarters in Brussels and
ACO and SHAPE and thinking through some of the headquarters level
processes. I think that as part of the transformation of the headquarters
reform agenda we still want to see some further improvement in
the operation of the ACT, particularly at its headquarters level.
Q312 Mr Holloway: You call it transformation
but it is much more an evolution, is it not, or even a muddling
through?
Mr Mathewson: I think it is more
structured than that.
Q313 Linda Gilroy: Does it register
on the Secretary of State's agenda? Will it materialise in discussions
at Bucharest or anywhere else?
Des Browne: I am not actually
sure that the NATO Allied Command Transformation Centre has figured
in any discussions that I have been present at, to be absolutely
candid with you, although I am aware that, among other things,
it made a contribution to the training of the ARRC before
it went to Afghanistan, and a very positive contribution to the
training of the ARRC before it went to Afghanistan. I take
the point you make about the location of it but I understand that
the argument for locating it there was that the United States
were at the forefront of transformation and to effectively hinge
this to United States transformation would allow those lessons
to feed through. However, I have not yet had an opportunity to
go and examine that concept for myself.
Q314 Willie Rennie: Since 1999 the
Helsinki Headline Goal has led to increased synergies between
the capabilities of the European allies, but has it created any
new military capability for the Europeans that did not already
exist?
Des Browne: I think the very obvious
one is EU Battlegroups, which is a military capability that did
not previously exist. The Nordic Battlegroup, for example, led
by Sweden, has become a very effective vehicle for the transformation
of the Swedish military. That is very important and beneficial.
Q315 Willie Rennie: And what is the
purpose of the NATO Response Force? Is it to generate deployable
forces or to promote the transformation of Alliance capabilities?
Does the Alliance have a common understanding of what the NATO
Response Force is about?
Des Browne: I think the answer
to that is that it is both. It is intended to be NATO's tool of
first response but it is also intended to be an important catalyst
for transformation.
Q316 Willie Rennie: And is there
any significance or any effect of the United States' lack of involvement
in the NRF? It is not particularly deeply involved in it. Does
that undermine the utility of the force? Do you think the Americans
see it as a kind of "litmus test" of European commitment?
Des Browne: The answer as I see
it from the point of view of the United States is that it must
be a function of the level to which they have their military capabilities
committed in any event to operational theatres. They have a significant
degree of overstretch.
Q317 Willie Rennie: In your memorandum
you have said that the NRF and the EU Battlegroups are "key
drivers for improving capabilities" in Europe. Could you
give us some specific examples of that?
Mr Mathewson: I think the example
of the Swedish Battlegroup is very important. As of today there
is a Nordic Battlegroup on stand-by with its enablers ready to
go. Before that, the only countries in Europe able to provide
rapid response forces were the UK and France. Now, today, there
is a Nordic Battlegroup on stand-by. It has entered into arrangements
to provide strategic lift. Sweden took part in the Strategic Airlift
Initiative to lease a number of C-17 aircraft. This is capability
which did not exist before the battlegroup existed. This is an
example of a formerly neutral country with previously a focus
on territorial defence generating capacity which is useable for
the sort of expeditionary operations that both NATO and the EU
want to undertake. It has gone into this airlift consortium with
a number of NATO countries, so there is an example of capacity
being generated for the benefit of both institutions.
Des Browne: Hugh Powell thinks
he has another example.
Mr Powell: I wanted to make the
point that readiness and getting other countries to actually put
troops on stand-by is a major capability gain. You mention the
NRF: if you look at the Pakistan earthquake, the fact is that
we managed to get Spanish engineers out to Pakistan. If there
was not a mechanism to get Spain to have these sorts of troops
on stand-by we would never have been in a position to have done
that. As Andrew Mathewson said, we would be back in a world where
the only European country to whom people could look to react would
be the UK. So these arrangements have a burden-sharing effect.
Q318 Willie Rennie: Do the Americans
have the same view? Do they view it in the same positive light?
Mr Mathewson: I am not aware of
any American nervousness about the battlegroups. They see this
as additional capacity, as I think does the United Nations. The
United Nations is rather interested in the potential of battlegroups
to help support its operations. I think they are generally perceived
as a raising in the level of Europe's ability to respond, whether
through NATO or through the EU itself.
Q319 Mr Hancock: Does the Nordic
Battlegroup come with the caveat that they will not be in the
front-line fighting, they will be used for peacekeeping but not
war fighting?
Mr Mathewson: That is the nature
of battlegroup missions.
| 
