Examination of Witnesses (Question Numbers
40-59)
RT HON
JOHN HUTTON
MP, LIEUTENANT GENERAL
PETER WALL
CBE, RT HON
DAVID MILIBAND
MP AND SIR
MARK LYALL
GRANT
28 OCTOBER 2008
Q40 Richard Younger-Ross: In terms
of Kurdish politics, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the Kurds
would fight each other, let alone fight Saddam's forces. Are all
the Kurdish parties united in the view that they will work for
a mixed Kirkuk?
David Miliband: That would be
a large claim. In my two visits to Erbil, and in meetings here
with Prime Minister Barzani, I have emphasised that there is a
huge amount to be gained from opting in to Baghdad politics and
by trying to strike bargains on Kirkuk and elsewhere. I would
not want to say that all aspects are therefore committed to unity,
but the Kurdistan Regional Government has given a strong message
about its commitments, which now need to be seen through.
Q41 Mr Havard: There is a report
from the International Crisis Group today that suggests a deal
called "Oil for Soil". It suggests a trade-off of resources.
That report has come out this afternoon and I received it before
I came to the sitting—I am not trying to trap you. The idea
is that the Kurds would become, if you like, an argument deferred.
I spent a week in Baghdad last November arguing about the provincial
elections process. Is the elections process not the thing that
will help to reconcile the different groups?
David Miliband: As we discussed
earlier, the provincial elections and the political positioning
that is going on are healthy signs and a good thing. There remain
issues within Iraq about Kirkuk and, if you are talking about
the Kurds, with the PKK and terrorism in Turkey and the Turkish
Government's military response. That is why it is important to
be pretty sober about working against the violence in Iraq and
about all factions and communities opting in to the political
system. Yes, the elections are a vital way in which to divide
the spoils.
Q42 Chairman: We will move on
to Afghanistan in one minute, but I have a final question on Iraq.
You saw the Syrian Foreign Minister yesterday. One of the problems
that Syria and Jordan raise is the very large number of refugees—a
total of more than 2 million. Is there any possibility that the
Government will assist either Jordan or Syria to cope with the
huge burden that they are dealing with at the moment?
David Miliband: I had a very useful
three hours of talks with the Syrian Foreign Minister yesterday
and you will have seen from the joint statement that we put out
a specific reference to the 1.5 million Iraqi refugees in Syria.
He did not raise with me the question of British assistance for
the return of those people; it is a bilateral matter for Iraq
and Syria. Obviously, I emphasised the importance of Syria continuing
to crack down on the flow of fighters and arms into Iraq, which
is a significant part of developing Iraq's security.
Q43 Chairman: What about Jordan?
Is there any possibility that we will help Jordan, which is not
a particularly wealthy country, and is a close ally and friend
of ours?
David Miliband: That is not something
that the Jordanians have raised with us on the shopping list of
bilateral issues. Obviously, there are several hundred thousand
Iraqi refugees in Jordan, but the matter has not been at the heart
of our relationship.
Chairman: Fair enough. Let us move on
to Afghanistan.
Q44 Mr Arbuthnot: Afghanistan,
as you said earlier, presents a much more challenging environment
than Iraq. How would you assess the security situation? Is it
more or less stable than a year ago?
David Miliband: Do you want me
to answer that?
Mr Arbuthnot: Actually, an answer from
both of you would be helpful.
David Miliband: John should say
something on that, because he has just come back from Afghanistan.
The truthful answer is that the situation is different in different
parts of the country, and it is important to separate reality
from perception. To that extent, there is a propaganda war as
well as a real war. As an overview, one can say that in conventional
fighting, the coalition forces, including ours, more than hold
their own. The Taliban and its various groups were decisively
repulsed on a number of occasions. That explains the turn of the
Taliban to traditional insurgency tactics and why many people
now describe the operation as a more conventional counter-insurgency
operation than as a traditional military operation. It is also
important to recognise that there is a particular set of dynamics
in Kabul, where there have been high-profile attacks on aid workers,
not on the military. That is the overview, and we can now get
into the different situation in different parts of the country.
The truth is that the situation in the east has significantly
improved, including in the last few months. We were looking at
figures on that this morning, so we can talk about the east, about
terrorist attacks on individuals in Kabul and we can talk in detail
about the situation in Helmand, but the important point today
is that in the conventional theatre, the conventional confrontation,
coalition forces win decisively. There is no evidence of the Taliban
rolling back gains that have been made by coalition forces. Equally,
it is important to say that the new asymmetric tactics being used
by the insurgency are difficult to fight against and pose a different
kind of challenge. They challenge the minds of the Afghan people,
as well as challenging them physically. That is why the Afghans
want to hear a clear message that we recognise that this is a
long-term mission, and that it is an economic, social and political
mission as well as a military one. Also, as I keep saying, our
forces and those of other countries are making an enormous difference,
because if they were not there, it is clear that there would be
a decisive victory for the other side, notwithstanding the gains—which
I hope we will talk about—in building up the Afghan national
army. From most of the reports that I have read, from the different
Committees and the statements that people have made, most of the
people in this room recognise that the Afghan national army, which
is 60,000 or so-strong at the moment, is one of the vital signs
of hope in Afghanistan.
John Hutton: There is not much
I would add to that, other than that it is obviously the case
in the south, where Task Force Helmand is based, that there has
been an increase in violence aimed at us and our Afghan security
partners. As David said, I was there last week, and I know that
many of you guys have been there yourselves and seen it on the
ground. Despite the increase in violence, however, there are reasons
to be clear that we are continuing to make progress. Although
it sounds paradoxical—an increased level of violence, but
signs of progress elsewhere—that is often the hallmark of
some insurgency campaigns. In addition to the work of our forces,
which deserves the highest praise, the progress that struck me
most when I was in Helmand is the growing capability of the Afghan
national army, which is visible in Helmand. It took the lead recently,
as you will know, in operations around Lashkar Gah, when the Taliban
attempted to raid the city. It proved itself to be a highly effective
and capable force of men, so we are seeing an increased capability
on the Afghan side. Governor Mangal continues to do an exceptionally
good job in leading the civilian reconstruction work, and some
of the political processes that are essential adjuncts to the
security operations that we have mounted. In Kabul itself, my
understanding is that there has been a reduction in the number
of violent incidents. I know that there are problems in some of
the surrounding districts. David is quite right, it is a huge
mistake to over-generalise. There is evidence of progress, but
there is also evidence of how tough this campaign is going to
be on the security side; the Taliban are well resourced and they
are fighting us hard.
Q45 Mr Arbuthnot: May I ask if
you will accept that it is your job to set out a narrative of
what we are doing there, in such a way as to convince the British
public first, that we have right on our side, and secondly, that
we have a strategy that is likely to succeed? So far, that seems
to be a bit of an uphill struggle. What do you think needs to
be done to put that right?
David Miliband: The way I would
put it is, first, the British people want to know that we have
a clear rationale for being there. I think the rationale is provided
by the fact that in the '90s, Afghanistan became the home for
al-Qaeda. That is the founding rationale for our mission in Afghanistan.
Secondly, what is that mission? It is to make sure that the Afghan
Government are able to provide their own security, so that they
are not overrun by the Taliban and its allies, which would create
a safe space for al-Qaeda, so there is a clear mission there.
Thirdly, a rationale and a mission need a strategy, which must
be a comprehensive strategy, not simply a military one. It is
important to draw attention to the Prime Minister's statement
last December, which set out in some detail a comprehensive approach.
That approach covers the economic, the political, the social,
but also the military. Those four factors need to work together,
with a different balance in different parts of the country. What
has become more evident over the past 10 months since the Prime
Minister's statement is the interdependence of the situation in
Afghanistan with that in Pakistan. If we had been having this
meeting last year, we would have talked about Pakistan, but probably
not with the importance that it has today. I guess that it is
common ground between us that stability and security in Afghanistan
will not be achieved without stability and security in Pakistan
and vice versa. Therefore, the comprehensive strategy needs
to be applied on both sides of the border. After apologising for
the length of my answer, I turn to the final question of the capacity
of the international forces and the home forces—Afghan and
Pakistani—to implement the strategy. It is right to say
that over the past three or four months the international community
has had a responsibility to raise its game. The appointment of
Kai Eide as the UN representative filled a void that existed for
too long. Moreover, there was the unification of command under
General McKiernan of the ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom functions.
There is also a need for the Afghan and Pakistani Governments
to up their game. John met Afghanistan's new Interior Minister
who has the vital job of improving Afghanistan's governing capacity.
We have also had contacts with President Zardari in the months
since he took office. His Government need to have governing capacity
as well. In the end, the two Governments need to work together.
One thing that was not happening this time last year, but is happening
now, is that the Afghan and Pakistani Governments are working
together. Under the previous regime in Pakistan, there was mutual
suspicion, not to say hatred. The fact that President Zardari
and President Karzai are now seeking to work together and that
today is the day of the mini Jirga, which brings together the
two countries, is something that needs to be built on.
Q46 Mr Keetch: Following that
point, Foreign Secretary, we have asked you in the past about
raising the game of some of our colleagues out there. The reality
is that no one around this table doubts the commitment of the
British forces. We welcome the improvement of the Afghan forces,
but are we really seeing greater involvement of other NATO countries
on the ground? Until those countries start to play their role,
we will not see a real transformation. Group after group have
said the same. The New York Times said in October that
there was a downward spiral. General Riley told the Defence Committee
in July that no one could say that we were winning. Our own Foreign
Affairs Committee heard very concerning reports at the UN just
a couple of weeks ago. Unless and until we see our NATO allies
playing their full role, we will not see a real turnaround in
the situation.
David Miliband: It is important
that we do not just see this as a binary divide by which either
you are doing your job or you are not. There is a range of ways
in which we want more countries to do more. However, there have
been significant developments since I last appeared before the
FAC, including the decision of the French Government to increase
their capacity, and the incorporation of the French into the heart
of NATO command structures, which should happen at the 60th anniversary
of NATO meetings next April. We want all countries to play their
maximum role. Some of the smaller European countries have high
numbers per head of the population—Croatia is in my mind.
I know that it is not yet an EU country, but it has aspirations
to be a member of the European Union—and they are there
without caveats. I am thinking also of Estonia. It is also important
to say that it is not just a military mission. The economic, political,
social and development roles are important as well. You veered
into the question that James Arbuthnot started with, which is
the question whether we are winning or losing. John says that
there is progress, but there is real struggle in different parts
of the country and we need to disaggregate that to see that this
is a fight to test the strength of both the Afghan Government
and the coalition forces in different ways.
Q47 Mr Moss: On the occasion of
the Foreign Affairs Committee visit to the United Nations, to
which Paul Keetch just alluded, we heard rather disquieting evidence
from a senior Afghan diplomat about the security situation in
Helmand province deteriorating literally by the week. In fact,
he told us that, at the time he was speaking, there was only one
district in the whole of the province under Government control.
Is that still the case?
John Hutton: It does not correspond
to my understanding of the situation. I would be grateful to receive
more information from you about that. We have a security presence
in eight of the 13 districts in Helmand province and, as I said
in my answer to the original question from James, in addition
to the work of the ISAF forces, which are doing some fantastic
work with the Estonians, the Danes, ourselves and the Canadians
in Regional Command South, we are seeing a growing capability
on the part of the Afghan National Army itself. First and foremost,
that has to be one of our critically important objectives. It
is not my view of the situation that, in the way you have put
it, there is only one district under effective Afghan-governed
control in Helmand, no.
Q48 Mr Moss: If the situation
was better than we were told, why is it reported that the commander
of Task Force Helmand asked for an additional 4,000 men to help
in the province?
Lieutenant General Wall: He was
reported on Sky News as having opined that if he had more forces,
he could make use of them in terms of increasing the proportion
of Helmand both geographically and by the percentage of the population
that can be secured over time and enjoy Afghan governance. However,
we need to be absolutely clear about the case for increased force
levels in a general sense in Afghanistan. The case can be made,
but it needs to be linked to progress in a number of other areas,
particularly in relation to the business of governance. There
is no point in making the investment of securing more space and
effectively increasing the perimeter you are defending against
random Taliban incursions—let us be clear that that is all
it can manage to do at the moment and that the Taliban cannot
win this campaign militarily, no way—unless you are in a
position to move in the governance reconstruction and stabilisation
effects. These have to be inspired by the Afghans themselves.
We have learned that quickly this year in particular. If we do
it for them and they stand by and watch, it just does not count;
it is just another bit of concrete. However, if it is something
that is used as a vehicle for engendering Afghan governance at
a tribal and district level, it has a significant resonance. At
the moment, the area that we are holding as part of this clear,
hold and build strategy is just about consistent with the Afghan
Government and Governor Mangal's ability to deliver some form
of governance within that area. As we have always said, this is
going to be sequential, incremental and gradual and will take
quite a bit of time. That is how it will be done. The notion that
you make progress by flooding in more forces in the short term
without all those other factors being able to be brought to bear
is, we believe, misleading.
Q49 Chairman: A number of my colleagues
want to come in on that point. I will try to get everybody in,
but can I just clarify something, Lieutenant General? You said
"the area we are holding." Could you give us some indication
of how big that area is?
Lieutenant General Wall: It is
the main swath of the Helmand valley. It is five key districts—from
Garmsir in the south up through Lashkar Gah up to Gerishk, Sangin
and Musa Qala. Unfortunately, it encompasses a large proportion
of the agricultural land available for agricultural purposes and
more than 60% of the population of Helmand, which by the way,
is the biggest province in Afghanistan and is more than half the
size of the whole of regional command east. This is not a trivial
undertaking or achievement.
Q50 Chairman: Is it true, however,
that the five districts to which you refer have come under attack
to the extent that provincial buildings and Government facilities
have been destroyed? Would it be correct to say that from day
to day, or week to week, those areas vary, depending on what the
situation is?
Lieutenant General Wall: No, that
would be misleading. The one thing that is significant about the
effort is that it has been incrementally moving in only one direction,
with the exception of Musa Qala, which, as we know, has changed
hands and is now, yet again, in Government hands, fortuitously.
The Secretary of State was there the other day and can vouch for
that. That was the fourth district that we had secured. I do not
see any prospect of those reverting to strong Taliban influence.
The fifth one, Garmsir, has been brought about this year by the
work of the American marines, who came to Helmand and did some
excellent work, and we now have that perimeter secured as well.
That is in the southern part of the tract that I have described.
Q51 Mr Illsley: On that point,
you said that the ISAF forces control five of the 13 Helmand provinces.
I do not want to keep coming back to this, but we were told on
7 October, quite clearly, by the Afghan UN ambassador that we
controlled only one province in Helmand out of the 13: we had
controlled four in the previous weeks but they had fallen and
we only controlled one. So the impression that we got from that
meeting in New York was that we had little control over Helmand,
which tends to contradict what you are saying to us now.
Lieutenant General Wall: I think
that is fair.
Q52 Mr Illsley: Foreign Secretary,
on Pakistan and Afghanistan, and our forces and the Taliban, when
the Foreign Affairs Committee was in Afghanistan three or four
years ago, we were told that some of the former warlords still
held their own private standing armies. For example, in the north
of Afghanistan, one former warlord had a standing private army
of 8,000 men, which is a substantial number given the number of
NATO forces in Afghanistan at any time. Given their control of
narcotics, borders, customs duties and so on, some warlords had
incomes in the order of £250 million per annum, which funded
the private armies. Is that still an issue in Afghanistan? Are
those people part of an equation? Is the tribal nature of the
country such that, at any time, those people could go offside
again and become part of the insurgency? What are we doing to
try to keep them onside?
David Miliband: That is a very
good point. The short answer is yes, but be careful with a short
answer with such a complex situation. First, I try not to refer
to "the Taliban", because it is a complex beast and
it is important to be clear about that from the outset. So when
the Afghan Government talk about reconciliation and those affiliated
with the Taliban who are willing to engage and play by the constitutional
rules, they are making sense, because some are criminal associates
of the Taliban, some are ideologically committed and some have
personal links. It is important to recognise that it is a complicated
picture. Secondly, the insurgency to which you referred in Afghanistan
involves a wide range of groups. It involves some al-Qaeda and
a range of Taliban groups and includes a set of criminal elements.
I would not describe the warlords, in your phrase, as part of
the insurgency, but they are certainly beyond the control of the
state. It is also true that the tribal nature of Afghanistan's
society is, in some ways, its defining feature and it would be
wrong to pretend that that has disappeared or been eradicated.
Afghanistan has never had a central Government in Kabul whose
writ has run right across the country. Until we went to Helmand
there was no Government presence there. That brings home the scale
of what is being done. That is even before you get into the business
of the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistan Taliban, and the differences
between them, which one can do. The short answer is yes, a significant
number of arms remains; yes, there remains a significant tribal
nature to the society; yes, although one has to be careful when
using the word "armies", there are a significant number
of armed people under control; and, yes, in some parts the narcotics
industry funds that. The fact that 18 provinces are now poppy-free
is obviously significant and good, but there are significant links.
That is why it is right, in some ways, to talk about narco-terrorism.
John Hutton: It is also important
to note that the NATO Ministers in Budapest had a lengthy discussion
about the impact of narco-terrorism on the campaign in Afghanistan.
We made decisions there about refocusing effort and support for
the Afghan police authorities in tackling this issue. We provide
significant support to boost Afghan capabilities in tackling narco-crime.
Is there more that we need to do? I am sure that there is, and
we need to find the right way forward on that. There is an indissoluble
link between narco-crime and the insurgency, and if we are serious
about making progress there, we have to be serious in this area
too. I can report to the Committee that it is the very clear view
of the new Interior Minister that this is one of his priorities
for action. We all have to focus on this issue, and we all have
to see some progress on it. We are determined to work with the
Afghans to do exactly that.
Q53 Mr Holloway: Is not all this
a little delusional? How on earth are we to make this work if
we continue to support a deeply corrupt and inept Government?
One person not unknown to Her Majesty's payroll said the other
day that we started off with a strategic insurgency out of Quetta,
and what we have got now in Helmand is a peasants' revolt. How
are we to solve this problem if we continue to have the kind of
Government that there is in Kabul at the moment?
John Hutton: No, I do not think
that our strategy in Afghanistan can be described in the way that
you have described it. I think that it is pretty hard-headed and
that we know the areas where we need to see improvements. We do
not kid ourselves about that.
Q54 Mr Holloway: What about the
Kabul Government and corruption?
David Miliband: Corruption in
and around the Government, or corruption that is associated with
the Government, is raised in every single meeting that any member
of the British Government has with the Kabul or other authorities.
Q55 Mr Jenkin: So what?
David Miliband: So what? The first
suggestion was that we do not recognise corruption as a big issue,
but we do. It is important, indeed central, not just to our confidence
but to the confidence of the Afghan people in their Government.
Secondly, the long-awaited move of Mr Atmar into the Interior
Ministry has been central to the argument about the need for the
Afghan Government to crack down on corruption. Thirdly, this has
to take place locally as well as nationally, so, yes, there are
responsibilities on Kabul, but there are also responsibilities
down the line, hence the importance of the gubernatorial structure—the
governors of each province. Frankly, if you have clean governance
at a provincial level, that makes a huge difference, and anyone
you talk to in Helmand will tell you that the presence of Governor
Mangal in Helmand is a significant change.
Q56 Mr Holloway: Precisely, so
how can we have any chance of winning when we have a President
whose only telephone number in Helmand province is that of Sher
Mohammed? How are we going to win with a Government in support
of such a Government?
David Miliband: It is important
to put on record that President Karzai is the elected leader of
the Afghan people, and that that is why we deal with him.
Q57 Mr Holloway: Yes, but do we
want to win?
David Miliband: Secondly, the
idea that he has only one contact in Helmand would be a surprise
to anyone who has spent any time in his company.
Q58 Mr Holloway: I think you know
what I am saying.
David Miliband: Is it right that
we are absolutely robust about the responsibilities from top to
bottom of Afghan government and Afghan society to recognise the
cancer of corruption and what needs to be done about it? Yes,
we are, and we are at one with you in trying to make sure that
not only our views, but the views of the international community,
and, critically, of the Afghan people, are also put clearly.
Q59 Mr Heathcoat-Amory: All successful
wars need precise war aims, which, when achieved, terminate the
campaign. I understood that British intervention in Afghanistan
is tied to our own security and to denying international terrorism
a platform, but that seems to have become, by process of expansion,
an aim of pacifying an enormous country and of propping up a weak
Government when the country has seldom in its entire history been
properly unified. We have seen a process of mission creep. Is
there not a case for redefining our aims much more precisely,
and linking them to our own security?
David Miliband: David, I have
had this pleasure before when I have come to a meeting of the
Committee and said something at the beginning to define our position,
but half an hour later you have accused me of saying something
that pretends that you were not in the room when I said it. I
used the phrase, "What is our rationale in Afghanistan?"
in answer to James Arbuthnot 28 minutes ago, at the start of the
Afghan part of the session. I said that our rationale was completely
linked to the fact that if Afghanistan became a home for al-Qaeda
to launch attacks on the west, that would be a threat to our national
interest. That is point one. Secondly, I said that our mission
is to ensure that the Afghan Government are able to protect their
own people from the Taliban and their allies undermining and overthrowing
Afghanistan's Government, and that as soon as that was done our
military mission would be completed. The fact that it is the 174th
poorest country in the world means that we may have a development
mission there beyond that, but the reason for our military presence
is absolutely clearly linked to the need to ensure that Afghan
forces can prevent the overthrow of the democratically elected
Government. There was no mission creep in what I said, so I do
not understand how you can assert that.
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