Select Committee on Defence Written Evidence


Supplementary memorandum from Terence Lewis

  I have submitted to this Committee on two occasions and in two different roles. The first was a written submission sent on 9 May 2007 in my role as Civilian Advisor in Cardiac Surgery, Medical Director of Plymouth Hospitals and current NHS Medical Director to ASCAB. That letter is in your possession and is self explanatory. More recently, on 21 June 2007, I attended the Council House in Birmingham and gave an oral submission on behalf of Plymouth Hospitals NHS Trust as one of the largest MDHUs in the United Kingdom.

  Following that event, I would like to make some written comments on issues emerging from that meeting and, therefore, in my role as Medical Director of Plymouth Hospitals, taking into account the documentation made available at the time of the meeting from the existing clinical units.

  It seemed to me that the submissions and the paperwork coming from the clinical units, including Birmingham, valued the link with the military but with reservations. The MDHUs raised concerns regarding the clinical exposure of military staff to patient case mix to allow the development and maintenance of the skills required on deployment to care for injured military patients. There were concerns regarding the appropriateness of the care for military patients in a holistic manner, close to their families and communities, with an aim to returning them to duty within an acceptable period of time, as well as concerns of the practicality of the delivery of the above within the host Trust's clinical, financial and strategic envelope. The submission from Birmingham was surprisingly defensive, but I do understand that they have had a difficult and unjustified bad press. One or two of the MDHUs giving evidence were too small to provide the wide range of clinical expertise and specialties, which are necessary for the provision of a modern Trauma Centre, especially important where military trauma is involved. Peterborough commented on the difficult paradox of receiving military patients at the same time as losing military medical staff operationally.

  The impression arising from the day was of an extremely Birmingham centred discussion. I can understand that the Select Committee would want to support Birmingham as strongly as they felt able, however, there does need to be some balance. The MDHUs were hardly mentioned in any of the available literature and the Briefing Paper was a remarkable document, entirely Birmingham focused without any understanding of the limitations of this form of provision or thought for strategic development. Indeed Plymouth, which was not even mentioned by name, is by far the largest, most comprehensive integrated tertiary service provider amongst the MDHUs with 1200 beds under one roof and virtually every tertiary service including Neurosurgery, Cardiothoracics, Pancreatic and Hepatic Medicine and Surgery, as well as being one of only two or three Trauma One Units in the UK according to the Templeton Criteria. There is already a military managed ward (Stonehouse Ward) and there is one of the largest collection of ITU/Critical Care beds in Europe within the one building. There is a heli-pad within 50 yards of the resuscitation admission area and a fixed wing airport half a mile away with an international airport only 35 minutes away and a motorway into a hospital site which is never gridlocked. Sellyoak is a relatively small hospital, part of a much larger Trust, and their rationalisation by 2012 will give the same kind of configuration and centralised expertise as already exists in Plymouth.

  Most importantly the demographics of the service personnel involved needs to be considered very seriously. It is inappropriate for complex and often protracted therapies to be undertaken far away from family, children, schools and community. Three Brigade Royal Marines, who have a high and early involvement in theatre of war, are centralised around the Plymouth area. There is a military ethos and tradition to the place and the community is tight-knit and self supporting, this includes medical services. It is entirely inappropriate that these patients are obliged to be cared for elsewhere when the capability manifestly exists within their own community. With the reorganisation of military centres, it would seem to me that the most appropriate UK distribution of battle casualties should reflect this, perhaps the James Cook in the North, Birmingham in the Midlands and Plymouth in the South. James Cook and Plymouth are fairly similar organisations with a comprehensive range of services. Birmingham will achieve that following rationalisation and rebuilding in the fullness of time. Plymouth already has a military medical headquarters facility on the Hospital campus, military medical management within the Hospital, and is close to extensive military infrastructure, including Mess facilities. We train and provide staff for RFA Argus which I did not raise at the meeting as I am not sure how appropriate it is to air Argus" rather sensitive role in public. Be that as it may, we provide a highly comprehensive advanced battle receiving station in the absence of day to day management of repatriated battle trauma, which seems wholly inappropriate. With three centres, such as this, an integrated and networked approach to the treatment of repatriated battle casualties could be fostered with the flexibility that may be required with surges of activity when necessary.

  One or two other separate points emerged during the day. The first is concerning outcomes. Modern medicine is driven by information. Quality is improved by clinical governance of which audit and an assessment of outcomes is vital. There appeared to be very little, if any, attention given to the discussion of outcomes and how they might be managed during that day. An advantage of a three centre provision for battle casualties would be the possibility of the development of an integrated outcome assessment for these complicated cases where final results may only be realised a considerable time down the line, often within the community.

  Very little discussion was had concerning reservists which are a considerable challenge for employing Trusts and for the military as referred to in my written submission. The tendency for senior medical military personnel to be removed from the clinical environment at a time in their life when they are approaching their most experienced seems perverse and should be addressed.

  There was mention made that military clinical deployments are as a "purple', ie tri-services, organisation. My experience is that the tri-services element of military medicine does happen in the field with Naval and RAF personnel deployed to land operations. Integration elsewhere in my experience is extremely limited. It would seem to me that lip service is paid to the tri-services element of military medicine.

  In summary, speaking with my Plymouth Hospitals strategic hat on, the case for Plymouth to be involved more comprehensively in the provision of military medicine, including being part of a network of three receiving centres for repatriated battle casualties, seems to be very strong. It is an established, single site, major trauma and teaching hospital with virtually the complete range of tertiary services, a medical school and a fast developing research record. There is already significant infrastructure that could be utilised for supporting functions, including accommodation and administration, with the cost savings that that brings with it. To involve Plymouth would avoid concentrating all the eggs in one relatively small basket in Birmingham. Rationalisation of military presence into three major trauma centres, one in the North, one in the Midlands and one in the South, would allow the development of proper networking and a comprehensive framework for the consideration of results and outcomes. Patients would be able to be repatriated to the centre nearest to their parent base unit to allow the unit to be able to continue contact and friends and family ease of access. All DMS staff would see the wounds of war in their Hospital and not just on operational deployments. The DoH is shortly to produce an assessment of civilian trauma services which will be very interesting and is likely to be critical of NHS existing provision. Plymouth is extremely well placed to become a major international contributor to the development of trauma services and I believe that the military should be a part of this. We would be anxious in Plymouth for reasons already explained to augment the presence of military medicine as, left the way that things are, it will become a smaller and smaller proportion of our overall activity. In order for such a development to make strategic sense for a rapidly developing Trust there needs to be the "carrot" of elective work as well as training. All aspects of this provision need to be considered in the round and relationships with the NHS will need to be a fundamental part of such consideration.

  I hope that these points are helpful. I don't believe that any of them, which arise from the meeting in Birmingham in June, fly in the face of my original written submission. I believe the two are complimentary. Please let me know if you require further amplification of any of the points made.

31 July 2007





 
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