Government response
The fact that this report does not comment on
the progress of maritime operations in Iraqi waters is not a reflection
of the relative importance we attach to those operations. We acknowledge
the important contribution which all three Services are making
to the security of the region. (Paragraph 12)
1. The Government is grateful for the Committee's
acknowledgement of the important contribution which all three
Services—and Ministry of Defence civilians—are making
to the security of Iraq and the region. Our Service personnel
and civilians are performing a range of valuable roles: developing
the capacity of the Iraqi Ministry of Defence and Iraqi Security
Forces (ISF); supporting ISF internal security operations if requested,
and helping to protect Iraq's territorial integrity and strategic
assets such as the oil platforms.
We note the progress of the US surge in and around
Baghdad and welcome the apparent reductions in the level of violence,
both against Coalition and Iraqi Forces and the civilian population.
But it is important not to overstate the successes of the surge.
The level of violence in Iraq is still worryingly high. It remains
to be seen whether the improvements in the security situation
represent a lasting reduction in insurgent, militia and sectarian
violence or whether the violence will once again increase after
the US withdraws the surge element of its Forces. (Paragraph 26)
2. The Government agrees that the reductions in the
level of violence in Iraq are very welcome. Overall levels of
violence are significantly lower than 12 months ago, and some
areas are experiencing their lowest levels since 2004. Despite
these improvements in security in many parts of Iraq, we, our
coalition partners and the Government of Iraq are by no means
complacent, and we agree that the level of violence in Iraq remains
of deep concern. A certain level of violence is likely to remain
commonplace in Iraq for some time, but the coalition and the Government
of Iraq are making every effort to achieve further improvements
to the security situation. These efforts are building on the factors
behind the reductions in violence over the course of 2007: operations
by the increasingly capable Iraqi Security Forces and coalition
forces, including as part of the surge; the willingness of the
Iraqi people to reject terrorism, for example through the formation
of Concerned Local Citizens groups, and a desire on the part of
the militias to move away from violence and towards the democratic
political process. A further priority is to cement the improvements
in the security situation by making real progress on reconciliation
and economic development, to give Iraqis a stake in the future.
The Iraqi Government must make the most of the
reduction in violence to move the political process forward to
achieve meaningful and lasting political reconciliation in Iraq.
In the long-term, it is only through reconciliation, both nationally
and locally, that Iraq can develop into a secure and stable country.
(Paragraph 27)
3. We fully agree with the Committee that political
progress and national reconciliation are one of the keys to lasting
stability in Iraq. The Government continues to press Iraq's political
leaders to make early and substantive progress on reconciliation.
The recent approval by the Council of Representatives of the Justice
and Accountability law—which will allow former members of
the Baath party to return to public life—is a significant
step in this direction, but more needs to be done. The priorities
for the Government of Iraq are to improve inclusive decision-making
in government and to pass legislation that is central to building
confidence between communities and political parties, including
on provincial powers, elections, detainees, hydrocarbons, revenue
distribution and the constitutional review.
In the long-term stability and security in South
Eastern Iraq will only come about through progress with political
reconciliation. But, as at the national level, political reconciliation
at the local level demands a degree of security for the political
process to function. (Paragraph 40)
4. The transfer of security responsibility for Basra
province to Provincial Iraqi Control on 16 December 2007 was a
major step forward, and all four provinces that comprise Multi-National
Division South East's area of operations have now achieved this
milestone. We do, though, agree with the Committee that long term
stability and security can only come about through political reconciliation.
There have been some encouraging developments on this front. For
example, 22 political parties and other groups, including the
Sadrists, signed a 'Charter of Honour' on 4 December, agreeing
to maintain security and work for stability and growth. This indication
of a new level of commitment to the political process on the part
of all Basra's parties was followed on 18 December by a press
conference which brought together Governor Wa'ili, General Mohan
and a delegation from the Office of the Martyr Sadr (OMS) on the
same platform. We will continue actively to support and encourage
Basrawis as they take charge of their own affairs and develop
local solutions to current and future security challenges.
The reduction in the number of attacks on UK and
Coalition Forces in South Eastern Iraq since August 2007 is significant.
However, the fact there has been no corresponding reduction in
the number of attacks against the civilian population of the city
is a matter of concern. Violence in Basra Province continues to
undermine the development of civil society. The relative security
of Basra is said to owe more to the dominance of militias and
criminal gangs, who are said to have achieved a fragile balance
in the city, than to the success of the Multi-National and Iraqi
Security Forces in tackling the root causes of the violence. Although
the reduction in attacks on UK Forces can only be welcome, this
alone cannot be a measure of success. The
initial goal of UK Forces in South Eastern Iraq was to establish
the security necessary for the development of representative political
institutions and for economic reconstruction. Although progress
has been made, this goal remains unfulfilled. (Paragraph 41)
5. The security situation in Basra is not benign—we
have never said otherwise. But Basra accounts for only a very
small proportion of overall levels of violence in Iraq. The strategy
of coalition and UK forces is to help improve security and build
the capacity of the Iraqi Security Forces to the level where the
Iraqi authorities are able to take on security responsibility
in a province. The transfer of security responsibility for Basra
province to Provincial Iraqi Control therefore represents a significant
sign of progress, and the security situation since has tended
to confirm the validity of our strategy and assumptions. Basra
has been relatively stable, with the Iraqi media and our own contacts
reporting that that Basrawis are going about their daily business
without undue concern about security. There have of course been
security challenges, such as the disturbances provoked by the
Soldiers of Heaven cult on 18 January during the Shia festival
of Ashura, but the ISF have worked well together to bring them
under control quickly and effectively, with limited coalition
support.
6. We would dispute the suggestion that the relative
security of Basra is the result primarily of militia dominance
rather than the actions of coalition forces and the ISF. Shia
militias undoubtedly have an important influence in Basra, and
that is why we and the Iraqi authorities are making vigorous efforts
to persuade them to pursue their aims through the democratic political
process rather than by using violence. But our forces have done
much to improve security in Basra, both through our work to develop
the capacity of the Iraqi Army, Iraqi Police Service and Department
of Border Enforcement and through specific operations, increasingly
in a supporting role to the ISF. Moreover, the ISF have played
an increasingly prominent role in delivering security in Basra,
particularly under the strong leadership of Generals Mohan and
Jalil and since the transfer of security responsibility to Provincial
Iraqi Control. Firm action is being taken against rogue militias
and criminal elements who seek to undermine security or oppose
progress, for example by tackling militia influence and corruption
in the Iraqi Police Service. We will continue to provide advice,
support and encouragement to strengthen the capability and professionalism
of the ISF as they take the lead in tackling Basra's security
challenges.
7. We agree that, in order for security in south-eastern
Iraq to be self-sustaining, Iraqis need to experience the benefits
of representative political institutions and economic reconstruction.
The improved security situation has allowed real progress to be
made on those fronts, although there is clearly more still to
do. We are, for example, urging local leaders and political parties
to respect the democratic process, and to provide honest, effective
and inclusive government for the people of Basra. We hope that
Provincial Elections later in 2008 will strengthen the democratic
process and continue to draw militia elements away from violence
and into the political arena. The Basra region has considerable
economic potential and we are continuing to foster economic development
throughout the province, including through the economic initiatives
announced by the Prime Minister in October 2007. The Government
of Iraq has committed to taking forward a series of initiatives
aimed at kick-starting private sector-led growth in Basra, which
the UK is supporting through the Provincial Reconstruction Team
(PRT). The focus of these initiatives is to help unlock Iraq's
own resources. The Basra PRT is also building the capacity of
the provincial government in managing public finances and the
economy, including planning and costing of budgets. This will
help rebuild infrastructure and provide essential services such
as healthcare and education. We will continue civilian capacity-building
work with the local authorities towards this end, tackling the
corruption that threatens to limit economic growth.
Iranian influence in Iraq is longstanding and
religious and cultural links between Iranians and Iraqis is strong,
particularly in the Shia South. However, reports that elements
within Iran are fuelling the violence in Iraq through the supply
of arms are deeply troubling. (Paragraph 47)
8. The Government also recognises the longstanding
religious, cultural, economic and other links between Iran and
Iraq. The range of interests that Iran has in Iraq mean that it
has much to gain from a stable, secure and democratic Iraq.
9. Any Iranian links to certain armed groups in Iraq,
whether through the supply of weapons, training or funding, are
unacceptable. The Iranians are well aware of our concerns, as
Ministers and officials have on many occasions raised this kind
of Iranian interference in Iraq with the Iranian authorities.
We continue to press Iran to cut its links with armed groups operating
in Iraq, and to do more to improve border security and fight terrorism.
In Iraq, coalition and UK forces are helping to develop the capacity
of the Iraqi Security Forces - and in particular the Department
of Border Enforcement—to protect Iraq's borders and stem
the flow of weapons into the country.
10. We are also encouraged by the strong sense of
Iraqi sovereignty across the political spectrum in Iraq, and welcome
the Government of Iraq's clear indications that it will not tolerate
outside interference that undermines the prospects for a secure,
stable and democratic Iraq.
There has been significant progress over the course
of the past year in building the capacity of the Iraqi Army in
South Eastern Iraq. Major improvements have been made to the capacity
and readiness of the 10th Division, to its ability to operate
independently of the Multi-National Forces, and to the equipment
made available to it. We welcome the creation of the new 14th
Division for Basra as a way of addressing the problem of loyalty
which had confronted the largely Basrawi recruited 10th Division.
We also welcome the MoD's assurance that General Mohan has adopted
a robust approach to the development of the Iraqi Security Forces
in Basra. But the job is not yet complete. Despite its increasing
capability, the Iraqi Army in South Eastern Iraq still requires
the support of UK Forces, particularly in logistics and intelligence.
The MoD should explain in its response to this report how it is
addressing this lack of "rear end" capability in the
Iraqi Army, when it expects this capability gap to be filled,
and for how long it expects UK Forces to be required to lend support
to the Iraqi Army. We also call upon the MoD to provide in its
response an analysis of UK expenditure on, and the results of,
projects for the provision of equipment and infrastructure to
the Iraqi Security Forces, including Operation OSIRIS. (Paragraph
59)
11. The significant progress made by the Iraqi Army
in southern Iraq is testament to the hard work of British forces
and the determination of the Iraqis themselves. As UK forces in
southern Iraq have moved into 'overwatch', their main focus is
on monitoring, mentoring and training the Iraqi Security Forces
in order further to enhance their capacity and confidence to be
able to operate effectively without coalition support.
12. Our monitoring, mentoring and training efforts
to date helped establish the ability of the Government of Iraq
and Iraqi commanders to maintain an Iraqi owned security framework
within southern Iraq. As part of our ongoing work, we will continue
to provide support in particular specialist and enabling areas
of the Iraqi Army that are in need of further development, such
as telecommunications, transportation, logistics and intelligence.
Whilst the Iraqi Army currently requires some logistic support
from coalition forces, its logistic capability continues to mature.
In addition to our monitoring, mentoring and training activity
in southern Iraq, UK advisors have also been embedded within the
Multi National Security Transition Command—Iraq Headquarters
to provide support and guidance throughout the logistics chain,
from the units on the ground to the Iraqi Ministry of Defence.
As a result of coalition efforts, the Iraqi Army (and other elements
of the ISF) has implemented a viable logistic structure which
enables them to identify and monitor their own equipment levels
and requirements, distribute equipment to their battalions and
set priorities at all levels. Intelligence within the Iraqi Army
is managed as a staff branch similar to that of the British Army,
with an Iraqi Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) company in
each division. The UK's monitoring, mentoring and training efforts
with the ISR companies continue to focus on intelligence gathering,
analysis and execution, but the fact that the Iraqi Army are able
to conduct successful intelligence-based operations demonstrates
that their intelligence capability is continuing to mature. We
will continue to provide assistance to the ISF until we, the Iraqi
Government and our coalition partners are confident that the ISF
can operate effectively without such support.
13. As part of our work aimed at supporting and hastening
the Government of Iraq's ability to build capable ISF, we recognised
in 2004 that a programme to provide basic equipment and infrastructure
would be required to complement our programme of training and
mentoring. This programme was intended to bring the ISF up to
an appropriate baseline of capability from which to develop their
capacity. As set out in a series of minutes laid before Parliament,
between 2004 and 2006, the UK used Project OSIRIS to gift a range
of military equipment and facilities for use by the ISF, to the
value of £82.8M. Military and security-related equipment
gifted included patrol cars, radios, water trucks, x-ray machines,
metal detectors, logistic support centres, materials to build
HQs and police stations as well as other infrastructure projects.
We have also procured public order equipment, weaponry, helmets,
boots, medical stores, refurbishment of existing buildings and
ammunition. Built into the programme is the ability to sustain
equipment, for example through the provision of spares needed
for vehicles.
14. Since the Iraqis now have sufficient structures
in place to procure their own equipment, we do not currently foresee
any requirement to gift further equipment to the ISF. The mechanism
remains in place should the requirement arise in the future. While
it would not be practical to provide an itemised assessment of
the efficacy of this equipment, it is our clear view that, as
a whole, this investment has played a significant role in enabling
the ISF to develop the capabilities and capacity to take responsibility
for security in the four provinces in MND(SE).
The development of the Iraqi Army and the Iraqi
Police Service as credible, capable, and effective Forces, which
enjoy the confidence and support of the Iraqi people, is fundamental
to the long-term security of Iraq and to the drawdown and eventual
withdrawal of UK Forces. If Iraq is to evolve into a stable, functioning
and prosperous country, the Iraqi Army and Police must be properly
equipped and trained. The Iraqi Government must ensure that corruption
and militia infiltration are rooted out and that the Army and
Police are properly supported by the Defence and Interior Ministries.
We call upon the MoD to explain in its response to this report
how the training of the Iraqi Security Forces—both the Army
and the Police—will progress once the number of UK Forces
in Iraq has been reduced to 2,500. (Paragraph 64)
While we welcome the efforts reported to have
been made by General Jalil to counter murderous, corrupt, and
militia-infiltrated elements within the police in Basra, we remain
concerned about the present state of the Iraqi Police. Progress
with reforms has been painfully slow and serious questions appear
to remain about the loyalty of a significant number of officers.
Unlike the Army, which shows clear signs of progress in achieving
operational independence, the Police would seem to have a long
way to go in becoming truly effective and in gaining the trust
of the population. Given the scale of the problems which still
need to be tackled, there would seem to be a need for an ongoing
commitment by the UK to training and mentoring the Iraqi Police.
We call upon the MoD to explain in its response to this report
how it proposes to continue its mentoring and training programme
following the proposed reduction of UK Forces. (Paragraph 65)
15. The Government's current focus for the security
line of operation in southern Iraq is on monitoring, mentoring
and training the ISF, with UK forces leading on the development
of the Army, and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office coordinating
our work with the Iraqi Police Service.
16. The UK has a well-developed strategy to assist
the training and mentoring of the Iraqi Army. This starts with
basic infantry training for large numbers of recruits, before
moving on to the provision of training to a small number of competent
Iraqi officers who will themselves become the trainers. Iraqi
trainers are at that stage mentored through their programmes,
and the approach then changes to one of monitoring Iraqi-led training
programmes once they are sufficiently mature. This work will remain
our top priority after the proposed drawdown in UK force levels
in southern Iraq from the spring. As now, a battle-group will
continue to be dedicated to monitoring, mentoring and training
activity, and other elements of the force will also deliver specific
capacity-building tasks.
17. The Government will also be maintaining the commitment
to reform, train and mentor the Iraqi Police Service (IPS) throughout
2008. In Basra, the combined civilian and military policing team
will continue its work to support the Chief of Police, General
Jalil, in combating corruption and developing training capacity
in and around Basra. Whilst the IPS still faces challenges, General
Jalil has now removed or transferred hundreds of unsuitable police
from the Basra force, dissolved the most corrupt units (including
the militia-affiliated remnants of the Serious Crimes Unit and
National Investigation and Information Agency), and removed senior
commanders whom he judges unfit for leadership. The local Internal
Affairs Department has also arrested around 40 officers for corruption.
As a result, we have seen an increasing number of successful policing
operations, carried out in conjunction with the Iraqi Army, including
raids on weapons caches and the arrest of criminal and militia
members. We are also working with coalition partners to build
a police force that is able to sustain itself in the long term,
with personnel in Baghdad helping to build Iraqi capability to
lead and develop a competent nationwide police force. Into 2008/09,
the UK will focus on strategic level engagement with the Ministry
of Interior and in three areas: leadership development; strengthening
the Ministry of the Interior's institutional functions; and building
key policing capabilities, especially in Internal Affairs. This
programme of work will not be affected by any reduction in UK
force levels in southern Iraq.
It will be important for the MoD to monitor closely
the progress of the Merlin and Chinook programmes and, if necessary,
take appropriate action to prevent slippage so that these helicopters
are available for operational use as soon as possible. (Paragraph
70)
18. The Government can reassure the Committee that
it is monitoring closely the progress of the Chinook Mark 3 and
Merlin programmes.
19. A joint Ministry of Defence/ industry project
team has been established for Chinook Mark 3, and detailed programme
planning and cost, schedule and performance (or 'earned value
management') data are reported and shared on a regular basis.
This allows us to ensure that any potential risks, overruns or
overspends can be identified and addressed at the earliest opportunity.
We have put in place a number of other measures to ensure that
the Government obtains best value from the contract with Boeing,
including an incentive fee arrangement to encourage the earliest
possible delivery of these much-needed assets to the front line.
Following the main investment decision, we expect the first Chinook
Mark 3 helicopters to be available for operations in late 2009,
with the rest expected to follow in 2010. NATO's announcement
in December 2007 that they are entering into a contract for the
provision of additional airlift to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan
will help ease the burden on UK and NATO helicopters, freeing
them up for military tasks.
20. The project team responsible for Merlin also
oversees carefully all aspects of the helicopter's procurement
and provision of in-service support. The programme to transfer
six Merlin Mk3a helicopters from the Danish Government is on schedule
and will conclude with the declaration of full operating capability
in July this year.
We welcome the deployment of additional armoured
vehicles to our Forces in Iraq and are reassured that the Urgent
Operational Requirement (UOR) process is delivering much needed
equipment to our Forces in theatre. The deployment of additional
Mastiff and Bulldog armoured vehicles has significantly improved
the force protection available to our Forces in Iraq. However,
we are concerned that current operations are reducing the planned
lives of equipment and that this could lead to potential capability
gaps in the future. We are also concerned that equipment returning
from operational theatres—whether it was procured through
the routine acquisition process or as UORs—will require
substantial expenditure to repair, refurbish, support and store,
and it appears that no provision has been made for this in the
MoD's budget. This will make the management of the MoD's budget
increasingly difficult. We expect the MoD, in its response to
our report, to set out how it plans to address any capability
gaps arising from the intensive use of equipment on current operations,
its estimate of the costs needed for repairing and refurbishing
equipment returning from operational theatres, and how this will
be funded. (Paragraph 72)
21. We welcome the Committee's recognition that many
of the new equipment capabilities deployed on operations in Iraq
have proved extremely effective. Whilst some items of equipment
have indeed reached their maintenance intervals earlier than we
would anticipate once a new capability has been fully rolled out,
we do not at a fleet management level envisage that operations
will affect original assumptions about the vehicles' working lives.
22. In order to maintain equipment capability and
avoid degeneration, we may repair and overhaul military vehicles
used on operations more often than would routinely have been planned
for in through-life costing assumptions. But the precise impact
of activity on current operations and the subsequent costs of
recuperation to a balanced force are complex issues, which depend
on a range of factors. We have therefore initiated a substantial
study to provide a detailed assessment of these issues, including
the costs relating to operational usage, which will help to inform
future equipment and financial planning.
We also welcome the planned increase in the number
of Chinook and Merlin helicopters. This should improve helicopter
availability when these helicopters become available for operational
use over the next two years. The purchase of an additional C-17
large transport aircraft will further improve the MoD's strategic
airlift capability and we look forward to receiving the MoD's
end-to-end review of the airbridge—the Air Movements Process
Study—when it is published in December 2007. We will continue
to monitor the MoD's equipment programme, the support to troops
in theatre, and the impact of the current high tempo of operation
on our Forces in our current inquiries into Defence Equipment
and the MoD's Annual Report and Accounts. (Paragraph 73)
23. The Government is working hard to deliver additional
Merlin and Chinook helicopters for deployment on operations and
welcomes the Committee's acknowledgement of these efforts.
24. The requirement for helicopter lift is assessed
across all operational theatres and for Iraq, military commanders
have indicated that they currently have sufficient helicopter
capability to fulfil their tasks. We have therefore been focussing
our efforts on delivering increased capability to Afghanistan,
and good progress is being made. Helicopter flying hours delivered
by British helicopters in Afghanistan have increased by a third
since March 2007 and we have successfully deployed upgraded Sea
King helicopters; the aim is to deploy more in the spring. We
also plan later this year to uplift flying hours for our critical
Chinook and Attack Helicopter fleets.
25. On Strategic Airlift, the procurement of a fifth
and, more recently, a sixth C17 will significantly increase our
ability to transport both equipment and personnel to and from
operations. We will, as agreed, provide the Committee with the
findings of the Air Movements Process Study once it has been completed.
The detention of Iraqis without trial is a matter
of public concern. We call on the MoD to respond in its response
to this report to the questions raised by the Redress Trust about
the handling of detainees in Iraq. (Paragraph 78)
26. The UK retains the right to intern individuals
where they are judged to present an imperative threat to security.
The coalition's right to intern was set out in letters annexed
to UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1546, and continued
in the current UNSCR 1790. We continue to use internment sparingly.
Regular review procedures ensure that internees are released as
soon as they cease to pose an imperative threat to security. Over
the last few months, this review process has led to the release
of all UK-held security internees (although two individuals are
held on remand awaiting trial by the Iraqi criminal justice system).
27. The UK would hold any internees in Iraq at the
Divisional Internment Facility (DIF) at Basra Airbase. Previously,
they were held at the Divisional Temporary Internment Facility
(DTDF) at Shaibah Logistics Base. The DTDF was, and the DIF is,
under UK control at all times.
28. To answer the specific questions posed by the
Redress Trust in its memorandum:
- What is the expected time
frame that units are to place detainees in the custody of the
Divisional Temporary Detention Facility and/or the Divisional
Internment Facility?
- Initially, individuals will
be detained by units on the ground. Units should hold detainees
for only so long as it takes to get them to the Brigade Processing
Facility (BPF) at Basra Airbase. Once in the BPF, detainees may
be interned in the DIF, released, or transferred to the Iraqi
authorities. The initial decision as to whether to release, transfer
to the Iraqi police or intern must be made within 8 hours (extendable
to 12 in exceptional circumstances) of initial detention.
- To what extent are detainees
held by Units (Battle Groups)?
- Only to the extent necessary
to get the detainee to the BPF.
- Will this change with or
during the move to the Divisional Internment Facility?
- No—the principle remains
the same.
- Is the Divisional Temporary
Detention Facility and will the Divisional Internment Facility
be run by the UK or the US, and to what extent?
- The DTDF was, and the DIF is,
under UK control at all times.
- Will it take in detainee/internees
24 hours a day?
- Yes—detainees can be
admitted to the DIF 24 hours a day.
- What procedures are in place
to ensure that Human Rights Act is applied at these facilities?
- We are always careful to ensure
that the human rights of detainees are respected. UK Service personnel
undergo extensive mandatory training, which includes specific
guidance on handling prisoners. All personnel must attend refresher
training every year. Provost Marshal (Army), the Competent Army
Authority and Inspectorate for custody and detention, inspects
all detention camps on a regular basis to ensure compliance with
all relevant human rights obligations. The International Committee
for the Red Cross (ICRC) has regular and open access to our internment
facility and all our internees. The Divisional Internment Facility
has also been visited by a team from the Iraqi Ministry of Human
Rights. Detainees can contact the ICRC at any time, and robust
mechanisms are in place to allow the reporting of any wrongdoing.
- Since the Ministry of Defence
conceded in the Al Skeini that the Human Right Act applies to
UK detention facilities in Iraq during, and of course the House
of Lords judgement itself, have any procedures or conditions of
detention changed, and if so, how?
- The House of Lords held in
2007 that the Human Rights Act (HRA) applies to UK detention facilities
in Iraq. However, the standards of conduct and physical treatment
of prisoners required of UK forces have always been in accordance
with the relevant international humanitarian law, and the domestic
criminal law that applies to UK forces at all times, wherever
in the world they are serving. Service personnel can, and will,
be prosecuted if there is evidence that they have tortured, assaulted
or committed any other offence against a person. Those standards
are not affected in any way by the question of the application
of the European Convention on Human Rights/Human Rights Act.
- Since 2004, training and doctrine have been revised
to reinforce the standards that should be applied at all times.
For instance, improvements have been made to Regimental Police
training to include training on operational custody matters from
point of capture through unit holding to handover to the Military
Provost Staff, with an emphasis on the humane treatment of all
captured persons at all times and in all environments.
- Has the document JDN 3/05
Tactical Questioning, Debriefing and Interrogation or other documents
been modified to reflect the applicability of the Human Rights
Act to detention facilities abroad?
- JDN 3/05 has been subsumed
by JDN 3/06 ("Human Intelligence"), which was published
in April 2006. JDN 3/06 makes specific reference to the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (Paragraph 117b).
- Has the Ministry of Defence
any plans to make the internal reviews and investigations into
detainee abuse available to the Committee for scrutiny?
- While the Ministry of Defence
did not provide any internal reviews or investigations to the
Committee, it submitted comprehensive memoranda of evidence. In
addition, the report by Brigadier Aitken into cases of deliberate
abuse and unlawful killing in Iraq in 2003 and 2004 was published
on 25 January 2008.
- Are procedures now in place
to ensure that important procedures and orders are not lost when
Units are replaced?
- There are (and have been for
several years) detailed Standard Operating Instructions (SOIs)
which set out how detention is to be undertaken. In addition,
pre-deployment training, handovers, and post-tour reports are
undertaken by individuals, units and formations in order to prevent
loss of knowledge and experience. OP TELIC SOI 390 (revised in
November 2006) is the detailed UK instruction for prisoner handling
in Iraq. Every unit deploying to Iraq receives a presentation
on this SOI as part of their initial orientation package. Every
sub-unit undergoes practical testing on the application of SOI
390.
- To what extent do detainees
go though a medical examination before undergoing questioning?
- Upon arrival at the Brigade
Processing Facility (BPF), detainees are given a brief medical
examination by a qualified military doctor to ascertain their
physical condition. A similar medical examination takes place
when they leave the BPF. If an individual is subsequently interned
there will be a full medical examination as part of the arrival
procedure.
As the UK moves towards full operational overwatch
in South Eastern Iraq, the key issues are how many troops will
be needed in theatre, whether overwatch could be performed outside
Iraq, and whether the UK might need to maintain a reserve of troops
to re-intervene if the security situation in South Eastern Iraq
deteriorated significantly. (Paragraph 90)
The MoD has said that, despite transferring security
responsibility to the Iraqi Security Forces, UK Forces will retain
the capability to re-intervene in South Eastern Iraq if the security
situation deteriorates. If that re-intervention capability is
to be credible the UK will need to be capable of drawing upon
Forces from outside Iraq. We call upon the MoD to clarify how
it plans to maintain a re-intervention capacity, which Forces
would be assigned to that role, and where they would be based.
(Paragraph 97)
29. The successful transfer of responsibility for
security in Basra province to the Iraqi authorities in December
2007 saw UK troops move into the first stage of 'overwatch'. As
we have always made clear, decisions on the optimum number of
UK personnel required in Iraq are taken on the basis of conditions
on the ground and the advice of military commanders. The increased
capabilities of the Iraqi Security Forces and the improved security
situation which helped enable the transfer of Basra province also
allowed us to reduce UK force levels in southern Iraq to around
4,500, as planned, and we have subsequently been able to withdraw
a further 350 personnel. The balance of the force now reflects
the increased emphasis on monitoring, mentoring and training the
ISF rather than on strike operations.
30. We keep under review the number of personnel
who need to be based in Iraq. As a result, we have already decided
that some enabling personnel can be relocated to a support facility
outside Iraq, but within the region; this decision was announced
by the Prime Minister on 8 October 2007. We continue to judge,
though, that, in order to have the maximum effect from the monitoring,
mentoring and training work and be ready to support ISF operations
if requested, the majority of UK forces need at this stage of
overwatch to be stationed in Basra. We will continue to keep under
review the force package in support of operations in Iraq under
review, including the feasibility of relocating forces outside
Iraq.
31. UK forces in southern Iraq retain the capability
to provide support to ISF operations if requested. Routinely,
we would envisage this taking various forms of 'light touch' support
in areas such as operational planning, logistics, and surveillance.
But in the event of a very severe deterioration in the security
situation in a province within Multi National Division (South
East)'s area, the most demanding form of coalition support, a
substantial coalition deployment (or 're-intervention'), could
be considered. The coalition has a contingent capacity in Iraq
to do this if required. Such a level of support would,
however, only be necessary were the deterioration so significant
that the ISF, firstly with their own reinforcements and then with
the range of combat forces MND (SE) could provide, were unable
to manage the situation. Given the increasing capacity of the
ISF, we judge this to be a very improbable scenario.
32. The Ministry of Defence always has additional
forces outside Iraq, which could be made available for deployment
in support of any operation should the need arise. This contingent
capacity will remain, but it is judged highly unlikely that it
will be required in Iraq.
The Prime Minister's announcement that the number
of UK Forces in Iraq will be reduced to 2,500 from the Spring
of 2008 is noted, but important questions remain about the sustainability
of a force of this size. If there is still a role for UK Forces
in Iraq, those Forces must be capable of doing more than just
protecting themselves at Basra Air Station. If the reduction in
numbers means they cannot do more than this, the entire UK presence
in South Eastern Iraq will be open to question. (Paragraph 98)
33. The UK still has a clear mission to fulfil in
Iraq, to which the Government remains fully committed. We expect
conditions on the ground to allow us to further reduce force levels
in southern Iraq to around 2,500 from spring 2008 as we move into
the second stage of 'overwatch'. These forces will be supported
by a logistics and support element based outside Iraq, but elsewhere
in the region outside Iraq. We are continuing to refine our detailed
plans, in consultation with our US and coalition partners and
the Iraqis, but we can assure the Committee that the final force
package will be balanced and robust, and capable of carrying out
the full range of military tasks required in southern Iraq in
2008.
34. The primary focus of the force from spring 2008
will continue to be the monitoring, mentoring and training of
the ISF, with a battle-group dedicated to this activity, and other
elements of the force also delivering specific capacity-building
tasks. This work takes place both at the Basra Air Station and
at other locations such as Shaibah and Umm Qasr. The force will
also retain the capacity to provide various forms of support to
ISF operations if requested, ranging from niche capabilities to—in
extremi—the ability to conduct strike operations. This
would continue the pattern of engagement since the transfer of
security responsibility for Basra province to Provincial Iraqi
Control. We have since then, for example, provided niche air and
intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance
(ISTAR) support to the ISF as they tackled the violence in Basra
and Nasiriyah provoked by the Soldiers of Heaven cult on 18 January
during the Shia festival of Ashura, and our forces have continued
to conduct operations with the ISF to disrupt the movement of
weapons across the border with Iran. Our force in place from spring
2008 will also continue to support the work led by Foreign and
Commonwealth Office and Department for International Development
to staff to help develop reconciliation and representative political
institutions and stimulate economic reconstruction. Finally, the
force will, of course, be able to protect and sustain itself effectively.
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