Conclusions and recommendations
ISTAR and Network Enabled Capability
1. Network
Enabled Capability (NEC) is a key future defence capability. In
its response to our Report we expect the MoD to provide us with
an update on the progress being made to address the challenges
to delivering NEC and the latest estimates of when the NEC Maturity
States are expected to be achieved. NEC is an area we plan to
monitor closely. (Paragraph 11)
The increasing capability and importance of UAVs
2. The
capabilities of UAVs have increased significantly in recent years
and the pace of change is likely to continue in line with technological
advances. The United States in particular has made substantial
investment in UAV technology. We note that the MoD has recognised
the important contribution that UAVs can make, particularly in
relation to ISTAR. (Paragraph 24)
UAVs acquired as UORs
3. The
MoD has acquired UAV systems for current operations as Urgent
Operational Requirements (UORs). In its response to our Report,
we expect the MoD to set out its future plans for the UAV systems
acquired as UORs and where the future costs fall within the defence
budget. We also expect the MoD to set out its longer term strategy
for acquiring UAVs systems, given the concern expressed by industry
that keeping the UAV systems acquired as UORs in service for a
long time could undermine the UK's national capability in this
area (Paragraph 28)
Performance of UAVs on current operations
4. The
MoD has acquired UAVs as Urgent Operational Requirements (UORs)
for current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. These UAV systems,
such as Hermes 450 and Reaper, are providing "battle winning
capabilities" and are proving effective in the counter-insurgency
style of operations which our Armed Forces are involved in. (Paragraph
34)
5. The UK's Reaper
UAVs, acquired from the US, are operating in Afghanistan. They
are delivering vital ISTAR capability at the Theatre/Operational
level and the procurement of a US system has provided substantial
advantages to the UK. The MoD has assured us that the UK retains
operational sovereignty over its Reaper UAVs—it can maintain,
upgrade and use them independently. This is an issue we plan to
monitor closely. In its response to our Report, we expect the
MoD to set out what issues might arise relating to operational
sovereignty and the UAV systems procured from the US if the UK/US
Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty is not ratified. (Paragraph 38)
6. We commend Thales
UK for the speed at which it delivered the Hermes 450 UAV system
to our Armed Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan following the award
of the UOR contract. The system is providing vital high quality
ISTAR information to our troops on the ground (Paragraph 42)
Lessons learned from current operations
7. We
note that, from the experience of current operations, the MoD
is broadly content with the assets it has, such as UAVs, which
collect ISTAR information. However, the MoD considers that further
improvements are required in relation to the Direct, Process and
Disseminate elements of the ISTAR chain. (Paragraph 45)
8. Our inquiry has
focused on UAVs and their contribution, primarily as collectors
of ISTAR information, to current and future ISTAR capability.
The MoD has a number of key programmes, such as Defence Information
Infrastructure and DABINETT, to improve how the ISTAR collection
effort is directed and how the intelligence and information collected
is processed and disseminated. In its response to our Report,
we expect the MoD to provide us with an update on the progress
made to date on these two key programmes. We plan to examine the
Direct, Process and Disseminate elements of the ISTAR chain in
future inquires into ISTAR. (Paragraph 47)
9. We recognise that
when UAVs are operating in hostile environments some losses can
be expected. It is essential that the risk of such losses is minimised,
particularly in relation to the large UAVs such as Reaper which
carry sensitive payloads. In its response to our Report, we expect
the MoD to set out the lessons identified from the UAVs lost on
current operations, how it plans to address them, and to update
us on the number of UAV losses. (Paragraph 51)
10. We note that for
some of the UAVs acquired as Urgent Operational Requirements,
the MoD is using new approaches to contracting such as "ISTAR
by the hour". We welcome new approaches to contracting for
defence equipment, particularly where such approaches improve
reliability and availability. We look to the MoD to evaluate whether
these new approaches are delivering the expected benefits and,
if they are, to consider how they might be used more widely.
(Paragraph 54)
Watchkeeper programme
11. We
note that the Watchkeeper UAV programme is currently forecast
to be delivered within the approved cost and to the planned in-service
date. We look to the MoD to identify the factors which have resulted
in the good progress to date on this programme and how they could
be applied on other equipment programmes. (Paragraph 59)
12. We note that,
when it enters service, the Watchkeeper UAV system should provide
substantial advancements over the Hermes 450 UAV system both in
relation to the air vehicle and the ground network enabled infrastructure.
(Paragraph 64)
13. The air vehicle
for the Watchkeeper UAV system is derived from the Hermes 450
which was developed by an Israeli company. We note that a UK joint
venture for Watchkeeper has been created and will hold the intellectual
property. Thales UK assured us that the UK will have sovereign
capability relating to the Watchkeeper UAV system (Paragraph 67)
Bandwidth and frequencies
14. UAVs
are collecting increasing amounts of ISTAR information, in a range
of different formats, which is then disseminated to users. This
is putting increasing pressure on the available bandwidth. The
MoD is alert to this issue and is "bandwidth conscious".
In its response to our Report, we expect the MoD to provide us
with a summary of how it is seeking to address the issue of bandwidth
and its assessment of the progress being made (Paragraph 73)
Airspace and Air Traffic Control
15. UAV
operations in the UK are restricted to segregated airspace as
they cannot currently satisfy the requirement to see and avoid
other air users. We note that the MoD is working with national
and international organisations on this issue. In its response
to our Report, we expect the MoD to set out why it supports the
ASTRAEA programme only in an "observer role" and its
future plans with regard to this programme. We see UAVs, when
permitted to operate in the same airspace as manned aircraft,
as playing a major role in operations relating to both civil and
national defence. (Paragraph 80)
16. We note that the
MoD has announced that it is undertaking a public consultation
on proposals to extend the existing airspace used by UAVs above
Salisbury Plain. We will wish to be kept informed of the outcome
of the consultation and to be updated on the progress of the MoD's
proposals. If the MoD's proposals are accepted, it will be important
that appropriate procedures are put in place to ensure that any
disruption caused by new airspace is kept to a minimum consistent
with the requirements of defence and security. (Paragraph 85)
UAV operators and imagery analysts
17. The
MoD needs the right number of UAV operators with the right skills
to make maximum use of the UAV systems it has acquired and is
in the process of acquiring. We are concerned to learn that there
are substantial deficits in the number of UAV operators in the
Army and that the position may worsen when the Watchkeeper UAV
system enters service at the end of the decade. We will wish to
be updated on the success of the measures being taken to address
the deficits in UAV operators. We note that the MoD considers
that the deficit in UAV operators has had no impact on current
operations. (Paragraph 92)
18. UAVs are delivering
increasing amounts of imagery. In order to optimise the value
of the imagery collected, the MoD requires sufficient imagery
analysts trained in areas such as Full Motion Video. We are concerned
that there is an 18% deficit in imagery analysts in the RAF and
that a recruitment strategy which is being implemented is not
expected to provide additional analysts for some two years. As
with UAV operators, we will wish to be updated on the success
of the measures being taken to address the deficit in this area.
(Paragraph 93)
19. We look to the
MoD, in its response to our Report, to provide us with a list
of the manning pinch points that impact upon the operation of
UAVs, including those trades involved in supporting and maintaining
UAVs. The list should set out the current deficits and the action
in hand to address them. (Paragraph 94)
Service issues
20. We
note that on current operations the RAF is operating the Reaper
UAV and the Army is operating the Hermes 450 and Desert Hawk UAVs.
The MoD has assured us that this approach has not caused any problems
regarding the dissemination of ISTAR information, and that the
focus has been on delivering what was required to the troops on
the ground. In its response to our Report, we expect the MoD to
set out its plans regarding which Service will have lead responsibility
for future UAV systems and what consideration it has given to
a joint UAV command. (Paragraph 98)
Operating with allies
21. We
note that there are arrangements in place to make sure that the
UK's UAV systems are interoperable with those of other nations.
In Afghanistan, the ISTAR information is collected by Predator
A, Reaper and Hermes 450 UAVs, but it can be processed by the
same ground terminals. The MoD assured us that, while there were
some problems with some systems, these were being addressed. We
consider it vital that the MoD ensures that interoperability is
a key requirement when acquiring future UAV systems. (Paragraph
104)
Exploiting the ISTAR information collected
22. The
MoD faces a major challenge to ensure that the systems which process
and disseminate the ISTAR information collected keep pace with
the systems which collect it. The MoD's progress in addressing
this challenge is a matter we plan to examine in future inquiries
into ISTAR. (Paragraph 111)
Industrial issues
23. The
Defence Industrial Strategy published in December 2005 acknowledged
the importance of capabilities and technologies relating to ISTAR
and UAVs. In its response to our Report, we expect the MoD to
provide us with an update on the progress made to date in taking
forward the strategy relating to ISTAR and UAVs. We consider it
vital that industry is kept updated on the industrial strategy
relating to ISTAR and UAVs to help it retain its position in those
technologies where it is currently considered leading edge. (Paragraph
117)
24. The Defence Technology
Strategy published in October 2006 set out the "way forward
for C4ISTAR Technology Development". In its response to our
Report we expect the MoD to provide us with an assessment of the
impact which the Defence Technology Strategy has had to date in
the C4ISTAR technology area and, in particular, the impact relating
to UAS/UAV technology. (Paragraph 124)
25. The updated version
of the Defence Industrial Strategy (DIS) was not published in
December 2007 as planned, as the MoD considered that "it
would be more appropriate for the strategy to be aligned to the
ongoing planning round". The MoD announced on 19 June 2008
that the planning round had been completed. We consider it vital
that the MoD ensures that the updated version of the DIS is published
without further delay, so that industry is provided with the clarity
it requires about future work and where it needs to invest. This
is particularly important for those parts of industry working
in high technology areas, such as those relating to ISTAR and
UAVs. In its response to our Report we call on the MoD to set
out the publication timetable for the updated version of the DIS.
(Paragraph 126)
Future requirements
26. We
welcome the capability investigation that the MoD is sponsoring
to identify the long term military requirements for UAVs and how
these might be best delivered. We will wish to be kept informed
of the outcome of the investigation once it is completed. (Paragraph
129)
27. We are both surprised
and concerned to learn that the MoD does not have a requirement
for a maritime UAV given the ability of UAVs to supplement the
limited helicopter availability in warships. In its response to
our Report we expect the MoD to set out what consideration it
has given to the need for a maritime UAV and the reasons why the
naval ISTAR UAV programme was cancelled. (Paragraph 134)
Autonomous Systems
28. Autonomous
UAVs can offer substantial advantages over traditional UAVs and
many key industrial players see autonomy as the way of the future.
In its response to our Report, we expect the MoD to provide us
with details of the programmes it is funding relating to autonomous
UAVs (Paragraph 140)
Armed UAVs
29. Our
inquiry has focussed on UAVs and their contribution to ISTAR capability.
The MoD has recently used a Reaper UAV to fire weapons during
current military operations in Afghanistan. We did not seek to
examine the ethics and legal implications of armed UAVs. In its
response to our Report, we look to the MoD to set out the broad
ethical and legal issues which arise from using military UAVs
and how it is seeking to address these. We expect the MoD to develop
fully its thinking relating to the future role of armed UAVs and
how this impacts upon future manned armed aircraft, such as the
Joint Strike Fighter. (Paragraph 143)
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