Memorandum from Lee Bruce and Dr Robert
Crowcroft
This is a submission from Mr Lee Bruce and Dr
Robert Crowcroft. Mr Bruce is an expert on counter-insurgency
strategy and defence having completed a research thesis in History
at the University of Leeds on British military and political policy
in Northern Ireland. Dr Crowcroft is an expert on British political
parties, defence and international affairs. He recently received
a doctorate in History from the University of Leeds on British
politics and statesmanship during the Second World War. He has
published articles in learned journals.
SUMMARY
— Government expenditure should
be focused principally upon human intelligence rather than technological
platforms. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are important in target
acquisition and shaping both battlefield and intelligence environment.
However, it is crucial to recast thinking about Governmental expenditure
toward a more coherent policy for properly exploiting the existing
superiority of our armed forces in the combat environments within
which they presently function.
— UAVs cannot provide information
about the mindset, attitudes and assumptions of the enemy or the
dynamics of their organisational structure. This poses serious
issues about the penetration of actors' intentions rather than
their capabilities, and should have ramifications for expenditure
on ISTAR.
— Nevertheless, UAVs remain a
valuable instrument for UK armed services. Yet their proper exploitation
necessitates much greater commensurate investment in the weapons
platforms—specifically attack aircraft and missile systems—required
to act promptly on the information that UAVs garner. Insufficient
aircraft and weapons pose the risk that valuable intelligence
cannot be acted upon swiftly.
— Given the ever-increasing pressures
on the defence budget, difficult choices must be made. It is absurd
that the War on Terror continues to be fought without reliable
human intelligence capabilities at the disposal of our armed forces.
Before Government devotes resources to capital intensive platforms,
it should guarantee that basic human intelligence structures are
embedded within the UK armed services.
— At a time of heightening international
instability the failure to articulate what UK armed services are
intended to achieve signifies serious neglect. This is evidenced
by the recent conflation of climate change and globalisation as
challenges comparable to Islamic terrorism as a threat to the
security of the British state.
How the information/intelligence collected from
current UAVs is used and what factors are limiting the most effective
use of this information/intelligence
UAVs are employed for a range of target acquisition
and battlefield intelligence operations. To utilise them to their
proper potential now demands that the armed services be granted
more robust Rules of Engagement which permit them to engage and
destroy enemy positions less handicapped by political obsession
with "collateral" damage. Such concern is arguably a
product of public and Westminster perception that warfare is inherently
about peacekeeping, and contrasts starkly with the Clausewitzian
mantra that "Given the same amount of intelligence, timidity
will do a thousand times more damage than audacity".
Unless the Government invests substantially
more resources in aerial weaponry, particularly military strike
aircraft and missile systems, the UK will be unable to properly
utilise UAV capabilities. Lacking sufficient airpower to engage
and destroy enemy forces immediately upon their location, the
value of this knowledge, and by extension the value of the expenditure
on the UAVs, is limited. An example of the successful utilisation
of UAVs operating in tandem with airpower was the June 2006 acquisition
of the location of Al-Qaeda in Iraq commander Abu Musab al-Zarqawi
and his prompt liquidation by US warplanes. At present so much
information gleaned by the UAVs could be rendered worthless by
the lack of sufficient aerial assets to exploit the intelligence
in a timely fashion. The seriousness of this deficiency would
be greatly magnified if the UK became embroiled in conflict with
a technologically sophisticated enemy capable of forward engagement
with UK or allied forces. The danger is that low-intensity operations
mask British vulnerabilities.
At a time of increasing threat from a multitude
of global challenges including the growth of renewed Russian bellicosity
and Islamic terrorism, it is disconcerting that the Government
is cutting the defence budget in real terms. No manipulation of
fiscal rules or "spin" can obscure how poorly funded
the UK's armed services have remained since the end of the Cold
War. It is absolutely vital that leadership be demonstrated by
investing heavily in both ISTAR and a plurality of weapons capabilities.
Whether the MoD is exploiting fully the ISTAR
capabilities offered by UAVs (including drawing on the experience
of its allies)
As outlined above, the UK is incapable fully
utilising its ISTAR capability due to a lack of investment in
military assets. Such funding is unlikely to be forthcoming under
present circumstances due to both the failure to express a coherent
concept of what UK defence policy is intended to achieve and the
Government's political priorities. On the other hand, a determined
and robust application of an interoperable armed service has led
to significant breakthroughs in Iraq by US forces.
How the current and future ISTAR capabilities
offered by UAVs is informing the MoD's overall approach/direction
relating to ISTAR
While the importance of UAVs is clear from the
information above, nonetheless it is critical to rebalance ISTAR
expenditure and planning to produce more effective human outcomes
on the battlefield. The most basic concern of ISTAR planning should
reside with the cultivation and development of human intelligence
resources. This should necessitate a dramatic increase in both
Arabic and Pashtun speakers embedded within the armed forces,
thus reducing the UK's current dependency on employing indigenous
individuals as linguistic experts. The loyalty of such people
can be bought and sold; basing a key part of UK operational planning
during sustained and medium-scale wars upon non-UK, non-armed
forces personnel is illogical. Given the high probability that
the current state of affairs will persist for several decades,
the continuing failure to properly integrate trained linguistic
experts within the armed forces units conducting counter-insurgency
operations represents a fundamental failure in ISTAR planning.
The UK military must be restructured to enable
the embedding of Arabic and Pashtun experts within armed forces
on the front line. In particular, the UK should build-up a large
and indigenous reservoir of personnel with such skills as a matter
of urgency. It is difficult to conceive how counter-insurgency
and ISTAR operations can be effectively conducted without direct
and reliable communication between UK armed forces and locals
in which British personnel control the flow of information and
conversation.
Often it is asserted that the UK has an exemplary
record in counter-insurgency operations, the evidence for which
is the success of conflict resolution in Northern Ireland. Yet
one lesson from this conflict that is presently being ignored
was the interaction between the army, MI5 and the local communities
of both ethnic divides. The real reason for success was the capacity
of the intelligence services to infiltrate and manipulate insurgent
groups. If the UK is to reverse the trend of failure that it is
currently experiencing, especially in Basra, the military must
re-engage with the local populace. But this can only be done if
the armed forces are properly structured for the task of communication.
Again, this is not an impossible goal as the shift in strategic
direction conducted by US General David Peatreus continues to
demonstrate real gains. Human intelligence appears the most potent,
effective and, in fact, in financial terms probably the cheapest,
form of intelligence gathering. The benefits accruing from it
should not be arbitrarily dismissed.
CONCLUSION
Successful utilisation of UAV capabilities is
crucial. But the UK government should be concerned with a commensurate
expansion of the capabilities necessary to exploit it, namely
aircraft and aerial weapons platforms. Simultaneously, it is a
matter of concern that perhaps too great an emphasis is being
placed upon technological solutions and the basic ISTAR capabilities—most
seriously linguistic experts within the military—continue
to be overlooked. Whilst UAV technology can illuminate an adversary's
location and capability it conveys little to UK armed forces about
intentions and broader strategic concerns. Both the technological
and human intelligence aspects to ISTAR must receive greater emphasis;
but it seems self-evident to get the basics right first.
In failing to provide clear doctrinal guidance
upon which defence acquisitions can be made, the Government continues
to articulate an incoherent defence vision. This makes it a near
impossible task to judge the success or otherwise of defence expenditure.
The basic duty of the state is to protect the lives of its citizenry.
Given the gravity of the threat posed by other states, and non-state
actors, the UK should now consider the need to radically increase
its defence spending. ISTAR capabilities would benefit from such
investment.
16 April 2008
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