Government response
Introduction
The Government welcomes the Defence Committee's report
on the future of NATO and European Defence. The report rightly
highlights the key strategic, political and capability challenges
facing NATO, on which we believe significant progress was made
at the Bucharest Summit on 2-4 April.
The Government would like to address the conclusions
and recommendations made by the Committee. In particular, we agree
that it is essential that there is a better public understanding
of what NATO is doing and why it is doing it—both in terms
of supporting and sustaining the necessary investment, and in
recognising the need for military forces to be deployed in operations
overseas, with all the risks that that entails. The Committee's
report will itself help in that regard. A new Strategic Concept
would also certainly help that understanding. Steps were taken
towards this at the Bucharest summit.
Succeeding in Afghanistan must remain at the top
of NATO's agenda, and we agree that some Allies could be doing
more in terms of sharing the burden and risk. However many Allies
have made increases in their commitment to Afghanistan, which
was further built on at the Bucharest Summit. We must also not
discount the contributions made by other nations simply because
they are not deployed alongside UK forces.
We agree that many European nations need to invest
more in defence. If NATO is to improve its military capabilities
then, of course, each member of the Alliance needs to invest appropriately
in their own deployable and sustainable capabilities.
We also agree that a stronger, expanded and more
cooperative relationship between NATO and the EU is essential.
However, it is important to note that co-operation on the ground
between the two organisations is good, and delivering real results
in Kosovo and Afghanistan. We also agree that the Lisbon Treaty
has the potential to enhance the EU's role in Defence and we welcome
the Common Security and Defence Policy provisions set out in the
Lisbon Treaty.
Response
1. (Recommendation 1) We do not share the
Secretary of State's confidence that the last NATO Summit at Riga
was a success. We recognise that some important progress was achieved,
particularly in endorsing the comprehensive approach in Afghanistan
and in agreeing the Comprehensive Political Guidance. Nevertheless,
we believe that, overall, Riga was a disappointment and that the
forthcoming Summit at Bucharest needs to set a clear path to achieving
far more. (Paragraph 10)
The Riga Summit should be seen in context: it was
not a full Summit meeting in the mould of Istanbul in 2004 or
Bucharest this year. Rather, it was a Summit convened to focus
on important transformation issues. The importance of NATO agreeing
the need to adopt a comprehensive approach to operations, and
of endorsing the Comprehensive Political Guidance, should not
be underplayed in the Alliance's realignment to respond better
to a changing security environment.
2. (Recommendation 2) The Government's stated
priorities for the Bucharest Summit, and the criteria by which
its success will be judged, are unambitious and disappointingly
vague. They do not provide Parliament with a sufficiently detailed
breakdown of the UK's aspirations which limits our ability to
measure the success of the summit. (Paragraph 13)
The UK's priorities for the Bucharest Summit were
set out in the Department's Further Supplementary Memorandum of
12 February 2008 in response to the Committee's request for an
outline of "what the UK would like on the agenda for the
NATO Heads of Government Summit at Bucharest in April 2008".
The UK's priorities were outlined as:
- a reaffirmation of Allied solidarity
and purpose in current operations;
- giving NATO the tools to work more effectively
as part of a Comprehensive Approach to security challenges and
in operations;
- agreement to press forward in modernising NATO
structures and procedures to manage complex expeditionary operations
and orchestrate the development of Allies' capabilities;
- an invitation to one or more countries currently
engaged in the Membership Action Plan (MAP) to join the Alliance,
if they are judged to have met the required standards following
the completion of the MAP cycle; and
- a commitment to deliver NATO's most pressing
military requirements for operations, notably trainers/mentors
and helicopters (including through the UK-initiated NATO work
to identify and overcome technical/logistical problems currently
inhibiting deployment of some Allies' helicopters).
As indicated by the Prime Minister is his statement
to the House on 24 April (Official Report, Columns 111—112WS),
good progress was made in each of these areas at the Summit.
3. (Recommendation 3) We are also concerned
that the Government fails to list seeking improvements in the
relationship between NATO and the EU as one of its key priorities
for the summit. We believe that improving that relationship is
essential for the future effectiveness of both NATO and the EU.
(Paragraph 14)
Political constraints are still preventing the kind
of open and fully-interactive relationship we want to see between
the NATO and the EU, but the important thing is that practical
co-operation on operations is good, and delivering real results
in Kosovo and Afghanistan. The political difficulties in this
area are very real, but we are doing our best to resolve them
and to ensure that they do not get in the way of the delivery
of security on the ground.
4. (Recommendation 4) We call upon the Government,
in its response to this report, to provide us with a comprehensive,
detailed and frank assessment of the successes and shortcomings
of the Bucharest Summit. (Paragraph 15)
A detailed assessment of the Bucharest Summit was
given by the Prime Minister's Written Statement to the House on
24 April—Official Report, 24 April 2008, Columns 111-112WS
(http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmhansrd/cm080424/wmstext/80424m0001.htm#08042475000014)
5. (Recommendation 5) The possibility of a
global NATO—with a global mission and global partnerships—remains
deeply contentious within the Alliance. Agreeing the scope and
nature of NATO's mission should, arguably, be one of the highest
priorities at the Bucharest Summit, with that agreement defined
clearly in a new Strategic Concept. (Paragraph 40)
The Comprehensive Political Guidance (published at
the Riga Summit in November 2006) builds on the extant Strategic
Concept to provide a framework for NATO's planning over the next
10 to 15 years, including the need for NATO to be able to mount
expeditionary operations (both Article 5 collective defence and
discretionary) in the Euro-Atlantic area and at distance. Combined
with NATO's developing work on Partnerships and on a Comprehensive
Approach, this provides the strategic framework against which
NATO can plan to operate, and a good vision for change. These
elements—together with the Declaration of Atlantic Security
that was commissioned at Bucharest—will strengthen the Alliance's
vision of its role in meeting the security challenges of the 21st
Century, and help set the scene for a new Strategic Concept. However,
the timetable for appointing the new administration following
the US Presidential elections later this year means that this
will be difficult by the NATO's 60th Anniversary in 2009; rather,
we expect that work on a new Strategic Concept will be commissioned
at the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit.
6. (Recommendation 6) Given the global nature
of the threats we face, we believe there is no alternative to
the Alliance fulfilling a global role. Its willingness and ability
to act on a global basis to tackle threats where they arise is
fundamental to NATO's continued relevance. If NATO limits itself
to a regional role in defence of the territory of the North Atlantic
area alone, its value will be diminished, particularly to the
United States, and its future will be in doubt. (Paragraph 41)
The key strategic challenges which NATO must deal
with are international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction and their means of delivery, and the instability
caused by failed and failing states. Whilst collective defence
remains the core purpose of the Alliance, the nature of potential
Article 5 collective defence operations continues to evolve. Large
scale conventional aggression against Allies in mainland Europe
is highly unlikely; but, as shown by 9/11 (following which NATO
invoked Article 5 for the first time), future attacks may originate
from outside the Euro-Atlantic area, involve unconventional forms
of armed assault, the use of asymmetric means, and even weapons
of mass destruction. Defence against terrorism and the ability
to respond to challenges from wherever they may come have therefore
assumed an increased importance. In today's networked world, regional
crises are no longer a regional problem. As agreed in the Alliance's
Comprehensive Political Guidance, NATO must therefore be ready
to contribute to conflict prevention and to engage actively in
non-Article 5 crisis response operations, often at distance from
its traditional Euro-Atlantic area of interest.
NATO's experience since the end of the Cold War points
to the increasing significance of stabilisation operations and
of military support to post-conflict reconstructions efforts.
The respective roles of NATO, the UN, the EU and other international
organisations (the World Bank and NGOs, for example) in on-going
operations and in future crises put a premium on the comprehensive
approach: on practical, close co-operation and co-ordination among
all elements of the international response.
7. (Recommendation 7) During the Cold War,
defining the role and purpose of NATO was straightforward: to
contain and counter the Soviet threat. In the post-Cold War world,
NATO faces a far more diverse range of security challenges. As
a result, NATO's role and purpose is far harder to define. Consequently,
there is a lack of understanding, amongst the public in Europe
and North America and within the Alliance itself, about the purpose
of NATO in the 21st Century. We call upon the governments of all
NATO countries to do more to explain to their citizens the relevance
of NATO in today's uncertain world. If people do not understand
what NATO is for or why it is important to them, their support
for it will inevitably decline. (Paragraph 50)
Following the end of the Cold War, the security environment
has changed rapidly. NATO cannot afford to stand still, and in
response needs a continual process of transformation. But if NATO
really is to transform in the way we believe is necessary to meet
the challenges of the modern world, NATO needs to carry the public
with it. All Allies need to be better at explaining what NATO
is doing and why it is doing it. It is essential that our publics
understand and recognise the need for change—both in terms
of supporting and sustaining the necessary investment, and in
recognising the need for military forces to be deployed in operations
overseas, with all the risks that that entails.
As part of this process, a Strategic Vision for ISAF
was published at Bucharest which sets out clearly what NATO hopes
to achieve in Afghanistan.
8. (Recommendation 8) We believe that NATO
needs to revise its Strategic Concept as a matter of the highest
priority. The new Concept should define, far more clearly, the
role, purpose and relevance of the Alliance in the context of
today's security challenges. The new Strategic Concept should
also reflect the fact that, in terms of its operations, NATO is
about more than the projection of military force alone; it is
about implementing the Comprehensive Approach, and providing the
stability in post-conflict situations to allow reconstruction
and development to take place. NATO should launch a review of
the Strategic Concept at the forthcoming Bucharest Summit for
agreement at its 60th anniversary summit in 2009. (Paragraph 60)
See response to recommendations 5 and 6 above.
9. (Recommendation 9) United States support
for NATO is fundamental to the continued existence of the Alliance;
without it NATO would become redundant. But the US will only support
NATO if the Alliance serves the national interests of its members,
and particularly the United States. To remain relevant to the
United States, and to demonstrate that relevance to the American
people, the Alliance must be capable of tackling today's and tomorrow's
security challenges. To do so, NATO must become more capable,
more deployable and more flexible, and the European Allies together
need to demonstrate clearly what they contribute to NATO. (Paragraph
65)
NATO is an Alliance of like-minded democracies with
common values, providing bedrock for consensus and common purpose
in defence of those values, now and for the long term. However,
the smooth-functioning of any relationship relies on common effort
as well as common values. This will not change. But European Allies
could and should do more. The UK has sought to promote capability
initiatives in NATO and the EU which would strengthen NATO and
European Security and Defence Policy capabilities alike, and regularly
calls on European Allies and partners to spend more appropriately
and effectively on defence. An insufficient commitment by European
Allies to carry their fair role and responsibilities in NATO will
do harm to the Alliance, and make its less effective as a result.
10. (Recommendation 10) We are committed to
NATO and believe it continues to serve the UK's national interests.
The UK's support for the Alliance should not be uncritical or
unquestioning, and there are important areas, such as force generation,
Burdensharing and capabilities, where NATO must improve. However,
we believe NATO remains an indispensable alliance, the essential
embodiment of the transatlantic relationship and the ultimate
guarantor of our collective security. NATO must remain at the
heart of the UK's defence policy. (Paragraph 69)
The true strength of NATO lies in building and delivering
transatlantic consensus for action, and providing the critical
framework of interoperability to enable it to do so. It is an
Alliance that is based on shared values and standards, backed
up with a clear recognition that the security of its American
and European Allies is indivisible. It is the ultimate guarantor
of Europe's security and the means for achieving its collective
defence, and remains central to the UK's security interests.
Of course, NATO is not perfect, and there is more
work to be done in certain areas, as the Committee's Report identifies,
and the UK continues to be in the vanguard arguing for further
reform in the Alliance.
11. (Recommendation 11) The purpose of the
NATO-led ISAF mission is to achieve stability and security in
Afghanistan, to deny al-Qaeda and the Taliban the environment
in which to operate, and to implement the Comprehensive Approach
by delivering the security necessary to enable reconstruction
and development to occur. This requires a sustained, long-term
military and financial commitment by all contributing nations.
(Paragraph 83)
12. (Recommendation 12) There is currently
some disagreement between the NATO allies about the objectives
of the ISAF mission and the means of achieving them. All agree
on the importance of the Comprehensive Approach, but there are
differences in the interpretation of its meaning and implications.
Achieving a common understanding of ISAF's mission in Afghanistan
should be a key priority for NATO at the Bucharest Summit. This
is essential if there is to be greater strategic coherence to
the Alliance's operations. (Paragraph 84)
13. (Recommendation 13) Succeeding in Afghanistan
is, and must remain, at the top of NATO's agenda. All 26 members
of the Alliance contribute to the ISAF mission, and their efforts—together
with those of the 14 non-NATO nations who participate in ISAF—are
vital to the stabilisation and reconstruction of the country.
It is essential the Alliance works together in delivering the
Comprehensive Approach—creating the secure and stable conditions
to enable reconstruction and development to take place and to
allow space for political progress to be achieved. (Paragraph
92)
14. (Recommendation 14) This also underlines
the importance of clarifying the ISAF mission in a way that is
compatible with the Comprehensive Approach and which all NATO
member states will support. A number of issues need to be urgently
addressed: the appointment of a UN international coordinator,
a divided military command chain, differing perspectives on the
mission amongst ISAF troop contributing nations, confusion about
dealing with narcotics, the effectiveness of the civil aid effort
to win hearts and minds, and corruption within elements of the
Afghan administration. Indeed, a clearer definition of success
in Afghanistan at Bucharest would be extremely welcome. (Paragraph
93)
15. (Recommendation 15) Failure in Afghanistan
would be deeply damaging for the people of that country. It would
have serious implications for the Alliance's cohesion and credibility.
But NATO's continued existence does not depend upon the outcome
of its operations in Afghanistan. In any circumstance it would
have a role because of its command structure, its mechanisms for
harmonising equipment and promoting interoperability between its
members, and its function as a political forum for essential discussions
about defence and security. However, if the Alliance cannot demonstrate
its ability to undertake expeditionary operations, the support
of the United States for NATO over the long-term will be diminished.
(Paragraph 94)
The Government agrees with the Committee's assessment
of the purpose of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, and that this
requires a sustained, long-term military and financial commitment
by all contributing nations. The Bucharest summit saw a joint
declaration of intent for continuing to assist Afghanistan—the
public vision statement—as well as an internal Political-Military
strategy that all nations subscribed to, summing up our common
approach in the country.
The Government also agrees that succeeding in Afghanistan
must remain at the top of NATO's agenda. We continue to work with
our partners in ISAF to ensure that operations in Afghanistan
are being run in the best possible way. Kai Eide's appointment
as UN Special Representative to the Secretary General in March
was a significant step forward for the coordination of the international
effort in Afghanistan. Likewise the public vision statement and
new Political-Military plan will help to refine and unify the
strategic approach that Allies take on a variety of issues.
We also agree that NATO's existence is not contingent
upon success in Afghanistan, but recognise that it will reflect
upon perceptions of the Alliance's utility. Continued operational
success for the ISAF in Afghanistan is therefore important to
how all allies regard NATO, as is the most equitable sharing of
the burden of risk across the Alliance that it is practicable
to achieve.
16. (Recommendation 16) NATO has encountered
substantial difficulties in generating sufficient forces for Afghanistan
and there are large disparities in troop contributions between
different members of the Alliance. In some of the larger troop-contributing
nations, there is a perception that the burden in Afghanistan
is not equitably shared and that some countries are making sacrifices
that others are not prepared to accept. (Paragraph 95)
17. (Recommendation 17) We recognise that
not all members of NATO have the capabilities to deploy their
forces on expeditionary operations and that some have found it
hard to obtain the popular or parliamentary support required to
increase their deployments. We welcome, in particular, the pledges
made recently by Denmark and the Netherlands to the ISAF mission
which show how such barriers can be overcome. (Paragraph 96)
18. (Recommendation 18) More troops are needed
in Afghanistan if the ISAF mission is to succeed. We look to our
other allies to make additional contributions where they can,
be it through increased force levels, pledges of military equipment,
or by offsetting the costs of operations. We hope that further
progress in force generation can be achieved at the Bucharest
Summit. Such progress will be essential to the future of the ISAF
mission. (Paragraph 97)
The ability of every nation to contribute to the
ISAF is dependant on a range of factors, not least other overseas
deployments and the size and capabilities of their armed forces.
We are committed to making the case to all Allies for as many
forces as possible for operations in Afghanistan, but we recognise
that there will never be a perfectly equitable division.
One example of our efforts to assist those wishing
to contribute but lacking obviously deployable forces has been
the establishment of the Helicopter Initiative with France at
the Bucharest Summit. This is a fund which any nation can contribute
to, in order to help pay for training and equipment upgrades to
be made on helicopters that would subsequently be capable of deploying
to Afghanistan. Ten allies made clear at Bucharest their intention
to provide direct support to this Initiative, and detailed discussions
are now underway on the nature and extent of their involvement.
Bucharest also saw a significant number of additional
contributions made by member nations, most notably from France
who confirmed the deployment of an additional battalion of French
troops to the East of Afghanistan. This enabled President Bush
to announce the movement of a substantial US force from the East
to Kandahar in the South. A number of other Allies, including
Poland, Romania and Slovakia also announced increased contributions.
Canada confirmed that it would remain in Kandahar until 2011.
19. (Recommendation 19) The ultimate decision
over whether to deploy forces on operations is, and must remain,
a matter for each sovereign member state of the Alliance. UK Forces
are deployed in Afghanistan without any caveats imposed upon their
use, but the public and Parliament maintain a close interest in
how those forces are used. The ability of any nation to commit
its forces on operations is governed by the willingness of the
public to sustain those commitments and by ability of any nation
to sustain expeditionary operations. However inconvenient, caveats
are an inevitable part of military life. The real challenge is
to prevent them from impairing operational effectiveness. There
is no doubt that caveats can have a detrimental effect on the
coherence of NATO's operations. Although some important progress
has been made in removing these restrictions there remains a long
way to go. Further progress is essential at Bucharest. (Paragraph
111)
20. (Recommendation 20) The debate on national
caveats would benefit from greater clarity about which countries
do and do not impose caveats on their force commitments to ISAF.
We call upon the MoD, in its response to this report, to provide
a full breakdown of the national caveats imposed by each member
of the Alliance on the use of their forces in Afghanistan and
to state which countries impose no restrictions. (Paragraph 112)
The Committee has recognised the political and military
difficulties surrounding the subject of national caveats and shares
our view on the importance of keeping up pressure on other nations
at international summits such as Bucharest. We agree with the
committee that caveats add to the complexity of the campaign in
Afghanistan—although it should be noted that they do also
enable countries to deploy their forces when otherwise they might
not. We continue to take every opportunity to press for nations
to decrease or remove the caveats that they operate under.
Unfortunately, due to the sensitive information that
can be deduced from such caveats, it is not possible to provide
the breakdown requested by the Committee. Such caveats are confidential
matters between the individual nations concerned and NATO/ISAF
21. (Recommendation 21) NATO's experience
in Afghanistan since 2003 has served to highlight areas in which
the Alliance needs to improve. It has revealed the need to equip
NATO better for expeditionary operations, to improve further defence
planning and force generation processes, and to improve significantly
its expeditionary military capabilities. To this extent, Afghanistan
has helped to promote the military transformation of the Alliance,
even if there remains a long way to go. (Paragraph 115)
We agree that the NATO experience in Afghanistan
has reaffirmed the need for greater expeditionary capability,
and is a principal driver for NATO transformation. We continue
to strongly drive the NATO work on Defence Planning Reform that
should lead to a more integrated and efficient planning process,
with increased co-ordination among planning disciplines and the
political and military parts of the Alliance, to help deliver
those capabilities needed to meet major shortfalls. We also launched
the Helicopter Initiative with France at the Bucharest summit,
as described above, which we hope will make a major contribution
to improving NATO's expeditionary military capabilities.
22. (Recommendation 22) New commitments to
achieve real, tangible improvements in Alliance capabilities will
be a key test of the success of the Bucharest Summit, but their
worth will be measurable only in the light of their delivery over
time. (Paragraph 116)
At Bucharest, Heads of State and Government supported
ongoing work to meet the demands of current and future operations,
including by overcoming shortages in reserve forces, increasing
support for multinational logistics, ensuring increased interoperability,
supporting efforts to remedy the shortage of mission capable helicopters
in Afghanistan, and supporting the further implementation of NATO
Special Operations Forces Initiative. Although we agree success
in some of these areas will only be measurable in time, it is
vital that NATO regularly monitors these efforts to ensure progress
in being made.
23. (Recommendation 23) NATO currently faces
shortfalls in military capabilities in a range of areas, most
significantly in strategic airlift, reconnaissance, surveillance
and intelligence assets, and interoperable communications. These
capabilities are fundamental to current operations in Afghanistan
and are also crucial if the Alliance is to fulfil its ambition
of having the capacity to conduct future expeditionary operations.
(Paragraph 129)
The 2007 NATO Defence Requirements Review concluded
that the key shortfall areas against the Alliance's level of ambition
are Strategic Lift, Joint Medical, Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence
(TBMD), Air Support, Deployable Airbase Activation Capabilities
and Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR).
The Alliance must now work to address these shortfalls if it is
to fulfil the set level of ambition by 2018.
24. (Recommendation 24) In terms of fulfilling
its expeditionary role, one of the key capability shortfalls confronting
the Alliance is that of political will. This, in turn, depends
on a perception of a shared danger and a shared requirement to
respond. Expeditionary operations are predominantly discretionary
by nature; there is a choice to be made about participation in
any given mission. Alliance expeditionary operations, such as
the current Afghanistan deployment, must be underwritten and sustained
by the political will of the countries involved, both individually
and collectively. Its absence undermines the capability of the
Alliance. As important as it is to deliver tangible military capabilities,
such as strategic airlift, the generation of the political will
necessary to fulfil its expeditionary role is the greatest challenge
currently facing NATO. (Paragraph 135)
NATO cannot function without political consensus
and effective military capability; both are equally important.
Political will is multi-faceted:
- At the broadest level, it is
reflected in the relative importance attached to defence as a
whole—through the resources given to it and on how and where
these resources are spent. Low defence spending by some European
countries, which directly impacts on NATO's military effectiveness,
is one measure of the priority they attach to its effectiveness
and / or to their responsibility in delivering this. The UK urges
Allies which consistently set defence budgets at significantly
less than 2% of their GDP to raise spending to above that level,
because we believe that such low levels of spending prevent them
from meeting their full responsibilities as Allies and displace
these responsibilities unfairly onto others.
- Political will is also reflected in the degree
to which Allies commit to NATO activities and operations. Relative
national priorities inevitably differ and will be reflected to
a degree in where we place our main effort. But NATO is a collective
defence and security Alliance; we all subscribe to NATO's Strategic
Concept, to the Comprehensive Political Guidance and to decisions
taken by consensus by the North Atlantic Council, and should accordingly
be prepared to provide appropriate military support. The UK continues
to press Allies for the delivery of outstanding key requirements
for NATO operations and the NATO Response Force, while playing
its own part in this.
- Finally, there is that aspect of political will
linked to the acceptance of risk on operations. Allied Governments,
but more frequently national parliaments, have been too prone,
albeit with the best of intentions, to set caveats on their national
troop deployments which curtail their involvement in riskier aspects
of NATO operations, and thus their utility to the Alliance. Caveats
on the deployment of personnel to southern Afghanistan are the
most glaring example. The UK recognises that the deployment of
forces is a sovereign national decision. But responsibility to
NATO, including in accepting military risk, is too readily discounted.
We continue to urge Allies to play their full part in NATO operations.
The Committee's report can help in making this case to other Governments
and parliaments.
25. (Recommendation 25) The creation of the
NATO Response Force (NRF) is a significant achievement by the
Alliance and promises, in theory, to help improve Alliance capabilities
in the long term. However, if the NRF is to be effective it will
be important for the Allies to achieve consensus on when, where,
and why to use it. It is also essential that the force requirements
of the NRF are met in full. (Paragraph 144)
The NRF exists both to provide a real operational
capability and to set the framework within which nations can develop
their military capabilities. It remains NATO's tool of first response,
bringing together the flexible, expeditionary capabilities the
Alliance needs for both Article 5 and non-Article 5 operations.
Although it was declared fully operational at the Riga Summit,
there continues to be a debate about how and when the NRF should
be used, and there are problems in generating the forces to meet
the Combined Joint Statement of Requirement—a problem exacerbated
by the call for forces for current operations.
As an interim measure, therefore, whilst operational
demands remain high, NATO is developing a graduated approach to
building up the NRF based on a robust, permanent core capability
which can spearhead operations across all mission sets, and provide
the foundation of a larger force package at rather less high readiness.
Whilst a temporary, pragmatic approach to a near-term problem,
it reinforces the importance of pushing ahead with transformation,
and to make more of NATO's (ample) resources deployable. This
will entail tough national political decisions by Allies on prioritising
spending, and on ensuring national defence spending at an appropriate
level.
26. (Recommendation 26) We believe NATO should
abandon the present "costs lie where they fall" arrangement
for funding the NRF. We believe an appropriate alternative would
be to finance the NRF through NATO Common Funding. Putting the
NRF on a more stable financial footing is essential if it is to
be an effective force. The current arrangements impose unpredictable
financial burdens on troop contributing nations and act as a significant
political disincentive for deploying the NRF. (Paragraph 145)
Most of the costs associated with the NATO Response
Force (NRF) are those related to maintaining appropriate force
elements at the right levels of readiness and sustaining them
on operations. The Government believes that these costs are properly
borne by the nations providing the force elements rather than
through common funding. Depending on the specific mission, certain
costs that could not be attributed to a single nation, like a
theatre HQ and key local items of infrastructure and communications
systems, might by agreement be eligible for common funding. And
NATO has a time-limited arrangement (until the end of 2009), by
which common funding can be used to defray the costs associated
with the short-notice deployment of elements of the NRF. This
is intended to allow nations a reasonable period of time in which
to acquire—individually, collectively or by ensuring access
to—the strategic lift capability they need to be able to
deploy their own forces. There is, however, very little evidence
so far to indicate that these arrangements for common funding
strategic lift have resulted in an increased willingness by nations
to offer forces to the NRF.
More widely, it is an assumption of NATO membership
that all Allies will contribute what and where they can, using
the forces and capabilities they have previously declared as being
available to the Alliance. There is also an understanding that
the level of Allies' contributions will vary from operation to
operation, over time, and according to their capabilities and
wider circumstances. This principle makes NATO unique, and sets
it apart from other security organisations. The common funding
formula used by the United Nations, for example, in which the
rich nations of the world pay most of the peacekeeping budget
whilst other provide most of the peacekeepers, would not be appropriate
in a collective security Alliance, where the military risk and
financial cost of operations should by principle be borne by all
according to their ability.
The UK continues to urge all Allies to play their
full part in NATO operations. That means being better at making
the case to the public, and the case for appropriate defence spending
more widely. We are also looking at innovative funding solutions
to help countries deploy their helicopters and other key capabilities
on operations. But the adoption of common funding for NATO operations
(including the NRF) would risk dividing the Alliance into "payers"
and "players"; would be a disincentive for Allies to
invest in their own defence capabilities; would mean that countries
like the UK would pay twice (having paid for their own capabilities
nations should not then have to subsidise those that contribute
less than their expected share); would have a read across to the
funding of EU capabilities and operations; and undermine NATO's
core collective defence principles.
27. (Recommendation 27) The contribution made
to date by Allied Command Transformation to the improvement of
the Alliance's expeditionary capabilities is difficult to measure.
We are also concerned by reports that its focus on long-term capability
development has been overshadowed by the operational demands of
Afghanistan. ACT potentially has an important role to play in
improving NATO capabilities in the long-term and in developing
the Alliance's concepts and doctrines for the future. As important
as current operations in Afghanistan unquestionably are, ACT must
not be diverted from this central purpose. ACT must also improve
its relationship with Allied Command Operations and with the European
Defence Agency. (Paragraph 151)
The Government is a firm supporter of ACT but recognises
that it is still emerging from its embryonic stage and that problems
remain. We share the Committee's view that there is a danger that
work on short term support to operations can detract from the
longer term transformational objectives. We want to work with
ACT to focus its work on the main transformational priorities,
improve its internal processes and improve ACT's external relationships
with NATO HQ, Allied Command Operations (ACO) and the European
Defence Agency. But ACT's role is to support nations wishing to
develop interoperable capabilities, not provide them itself, and
so better engagement on the part of Allies is also important.
28. (Recommendation 28) The ability of the
NATO Alliance to deliver real and lasting improvements in military
capabilities depends on the willingness of Allies to commit sufficient
resources. There can be no greater demonstration of political
will in NATO, or the lack of it, than the amount of money each
member of the Alliance is willing to spend on defence. There exists
a clear, persistent and growing gap in defence expenditure between
the European members of NATO and the United States and there seems
little prospect of this being reversed. (Paragraph 165)
See response to recommendation 24 above.
29. (Recommendation 29) Despite a longstanding
commitment by all members of the NATO Alliance to spend a minimum
of 2% of their GDP on defence, only six out of the 24 European
members of NATO actually achieve that target. But defence spending
is not simply about quantity; it is about what the money is spent
on. We believe that in addition to the 2% target the Alliance
should establish detailed capability targets, and timeframes,
against which the performance of Allies could be measured. (Paragraph
166)
Defence budgets are a matter for individual nations.
But we believe that Allies should be looking to invest at least
2% of their GDP in defence, and consistently lobby those who fall
below this level to increase their defence spending in real terms.
Defence expenditure which is consistently and significantly below
that level prevents nations from contributing appropriately to
the Alliance, and places a disproportionate burden on those which
do.
30. (Recommendation 30) If the European members
of the Alliance want to be taken seriously, if they want the United
States to remain engaged in, and committed to, NATO, and if they
want greater influence in the overall direction of Alliance policy,
they must commit the necessary resources and improve their capabilities.
We are concerned that an Alliance with such large, and growing,
discrepancies in defence expenditure will not be sustainable in
the long term. (Paragraph 167)
See response to recommendation 9 above.
31. (Recommendation 31) Membership of the
Alliance within the North Atlantic area should continue to be
based on the ability of applicant countries to meet NATO's performance-based
Membership criteria rather than the imposition, by the Alliance,
of arbitrary territorial boundaries. Welcoming new members at
the Bucharest Summit, or granting Membership Action Plans to those
who meet NATO's criteria, would be a powerful signal that the
Alliance remains committed to its open door policy. (Paragraph
171)
32. (Recommendation 32) We call upon the Government
to state clearly, in advance of the Bucharest Summit, which countries
it intends to support in their applications for full membership
of NATO and for Membership Action Plans. (Paragraph 172)
The Government is keen to keep the door open to those
European countries that share NATO's values and meet is standards,
as enshrined in Article 10 of the Washington Treaty. The UK was
pleased that, at Bucharest, membership invitations were extended
to Albania and Croatia; and clear perspectives of future membership
given to Macedonia, Georgia and Ukraine.
33. (Recommendation 33) Previous enlargements
of NATO have made an essential contribution to the development
of stability and democracy in Europe. Many of NATO's newer members
have made significant contributions to Alliance operations and
are improving their military capabilities. Equally importantly,
enlargement to date has played an important role in extending
and embedding democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. (Paragraph
176)
NATO is an alliance based on shared values and standards.
Membership—indeed, the very goal of NATO membership—contributes
to regional security, and democratic, economic and human rights
reform. NATO's enlargement, and more broadly its Partnership for
Peace initiative, has played a vital role in managing fundamental
changes to the shape of Europe following the end of the Cold War.
34. (Recommendation 34) The performance of
Albania, Croatia and Macedonia in meeting the criteria for NATO
membership will be assessed at the Bucharest Summit. Providing
they meet those criteria there is no reason why they should not
be admitted into the Alliance. (Paragraph 181)
At Bucharest, Albania and Croatia were invited to
join NATO and will now begin accession talks. It was disappointing
that an invitation was not also extended to Macedonia because
of a bilateral dispute with Greece over its constitutional name.
The Alliance was clear that an invitation would be forthcoming
as soon as a mutually acceptable name has been agreed between
Macedonia and Greece. We hope that this agreement can be achieved
as soon as possible.
35. (Recommendation 35) Georgia's ambitions
for joining NATO will depend upon its performance in meeting the
Alliance's criteria for participation in a Membership Action Plan.
Although we are not in a position to judge for ourselves whether
Georgia currently meets those criteria, we support, in principle,
its long-term ambition to join the Alliance. (Paragraph 189)
The Government supports Georgia's Euro-Atlantic aspirations
and was pleased that Georgia was given a clear perspective of
eventual membership of NATO. There will now be a period of intensive
engagement between NATO and Georgia to address the outstanding
nations pertaining to its application for a Membership Action
Plan.
36. (Recommendation 36) Before joining NATO,
Georgia must demonstrate clearly and unambiguously the strength
of its commitment to democracy and further democratic and political
reform. It must also work to resolve the conflicts in Abkhazia
and South Ossetia, though much depends on the willingness of Russia
to play a constructive role. For NATO, there are real and legitimate
concerns about admitting a country with unresolved conflicts within
its borders. But if NATO insists upon the resolution of the conflicts
before Georgia is allowed to join NATO, this will effectively
hand Russia a veto over Georgian membership of the Alliance. (Paragraph
190)
NATO Foreign Ministers will consider further Georgia's
progress—including their domestic reform, and developments
in resolving the frozen conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Georgia's membership of NATO is a matter for NATO Allies and Georgia;
no third party has a veto.
37. (Recommendation 37) Although Ukraine has
indicated its desire to be considered for a Membership Action
Plan, it seems highly unlikely that NATO will decide to make such
an offer at the Bucharest Summit. The Ukrainian population is,
at best, seriously divided on joining NATO and, at worst, opposed.
For NATO to accept as a new member a country whose population
did not support such membership would in our judgement exacerbate
the problems considered earlier in this report. While in principle,
if Ukraine demonstrates its commitment to the principles of the
Alliance and fulfils the criteria for membership outlined by NATO,
the Alliance should consider an application for membership, that
application should in the longer term be determined only after
great weight has been given to the wishes of the people of Ukraine.
(Paragraph 195)
At Bucharest, Ukraine was given a clear prospect
of future membership of NATO, and support was offered for their
request for a Membership Action Plan. The Government looks forward
to a period of intense co-operation between the Alliance and Ukraine
until they are admitted into NATO's Membership Action Plan.
Although there is strong government support in Ukraine
for closer ties with NATO, public opinion on whether Ukraine should
join NATO is currently low. The most immediate task for the Ukraine
government will be to implement a transparent information campaign
to reach out to all Ukrainians to address some of the significant
information gaps. The UK is looking at ways to help with this
process.
38. (Recommendation 38) NATO should continue
to be open to the acceptance of new members in the Euro-Atlantic
area. The promise of NATO membership provides the Alliance with
a means of encouraging countries on its borders to embrace internal
democratic reform and the reform of their armed forces; it is
a powerful tool of defence diplomacy. However, it is important
that as new members join the Alliance they bring with them additional
capabilities or, at the least, a commitment that would add to
NATO's capabilities in future. New members cannot only be consumers
of security; they must also contribute to the common defence.
(Paragraph 199)
The Government is keen to keep the door open for
further enlargement, which we believe will reinforce security
in its own right; not least in driving up standards and democratic
reforms in those countries aspiring to membership. But we must
also remain clear that NATO is a performance-based Alliance, and
all Allies—and those nations wishing to join the Alliance—must
be willing and capable of contributing to NATO's collective defence
and operations and mission.
39. (Recommendation 39) Membership of NATO
should continue to be performance-based; if a country meets the
criteria for membership, it should be permitted to join. We believe
it is essential that NATO's open door policy is maintained on
this basis. Ending the Alliance's open door policy on membership
is not in the interests of the Alliance itself or European stability
as a whole. Signalling that the Alliance has reached its outer
limits, or ruling out further expansion, would consign those countries
left outside NATO's borders to an uncertain future, potentially
creating instability on the Alliance's Eastern fringes. Perpetuating
this instability is not in the interests of any member of the
NATO Alliance. (Paragraph 200)
NATO is a Euro-Atlantic security alliance and this
sets natural boundaries for its membership. But NATO does not
exist in a vacuum, and the Alliance has built up an extensive
network of partners on its borders through Partnership for Peace
(23 participating nations), the Mediterranean Dialogue (7); the
Istanbul Co-operation Initiative (4); and the so-called Contact
Countries such as Australia, New Zealand and Japan. NATO's Partnerships
is one of its success stories: contributing to all our security
and promoting our shared values. Partnerships have become very
much part of NATO's core business in the 21st Century. We are
determined to develop these relations further. As NATO continues
in its transformation, and as it engages more frequently on operations
outside its traditional Euro-Atlantic area of interest, it is
vital that it's Partnerships—in all their guises—keep
pace and adapt to ensure that they remain relevant to the needs
both of the Alliance and its Partners.
40. NATO should continue to work closely with
nations beyond its borders and should work to enhance further
its relationships with Australia, New Zealand and Japan. Formalising
the relationship between NATO and these countries is desirable,
but this need not involve full membership of the Alliance. Extending
full NATO membership beyond the Euro-Atlantic area carries distinct
risks; there is a danger it could dilute the coherence of the
Alliance, create yet more questions about its role and purpose,
or complicate decision-making. However, NATO should continue to
embrace the concept of global partnerships and seek to intensify
cooperation with like-minded allies. (Paragraph 210)
NATO needs to operate in an increasingly complex
and global environment and to respond to security challenges from
wherever they may come. It has developed a range of partnerships
to help it do this. This does not mean NATO should become a global
security organisation. Rather, it means that NATO needs to strengthen
its ability to work with a range of countries—such as Australia,
New Zealand and Japan—which share its interests and values,
and are prepared to participate in NATO-led operations and missions.
41. (Recommendation 41) EU Battlegroups are
a significant innovation and promise, in theory, to improve European
capabilities, force generation and interoperability. Given the
poor level of European capabilities and the difficulties encountered
in generating sufficient forces for Afghanistan, such improvements
can only be welcome and would represent a significant capability
gain. A key test of whether Battlegroups represent a useable military
capability will be the ability of these force packages to fight,
but, as in Afghanistan, this requires a level of political will
on the part of the troop contributing nations that may not exist.
We also doubt whether the creation of Battlegroups will lead to
any increases in European defence budgets, which is the key to
improving military capabilities. (Paragraph 233)
The Government agrees that EU Battlegroups are a
significant innovation and we believe that their creation has
increased the EU's crisis management capabilities. Battlegroups
have also acted as a catalyst for transforming some Member States'
armed forces from static to expeditionary—a good example
is Sweden, whose leadership of the EU 'Nordic' Battlegroup has
generated a significant transformation of their armed forces,
and a move away from territorial defence and towards the development
of flexible, expeditionary capabilities.
We are confident that the commitments EU Member States
have made to the EU Battlegroup concept, and the certification
and training requirements that are in place for every Battlegroup
that is on call, mean that Battlegroups do represent a useable
military capability. Specifically it represents one possible answer
to the timely provision of the necessary capabilities for an EU-led
Crisis Management Operation requiring a rapid response. We are
confident that if a situation arose that required the use of an
EU Battlegroup, there would be the required political will for
deployment, although this would be a decision taken by unanimity
amongst Member States on a case-by-case basis.
The rationale behind the creation of the EU Battlegroup
concept was not primarily to increase European defence budgets,
but to encourage Member States to invest in developing the capabilities
that are required for modern crisis management operations. However,
we would of course welcome any increases in Defence budgets that
resulted from Member States transforming their armed forces from
static to expeditionary.
42. (Recommendation 42) The fact that EU Battlegroups
are intended to perform some of the more robust elements of the
Petersburg Tasks suggests some degree of overlap of role and responsibility
with the NATO Response Force. Any duplication must be avoided.
However, if Battlegroups help European nations to improve significantly
their force generation processes, this is likely to help NATO
meet the force requirements of the NRF. (Paragraph 234)
EU Battlegroups are intended to be capable of dealing
with the full range of Petersberg Tasks: Humanitarian and rescue
tasks; peacekeeping tasks; and tasks of combat forces in crisis
management, including peacemaking. We believe this offers an additional
and complementary capability to the NATO Response Force, and that
the most appropriate organisation to respond to any crisis situation
would be considered on a case-by-case basis in consultation with
other international organisations including the UN and the African
Union. The fact that EU Battlegroups are capable of performing
the more robust elements of the Petersberg tasks could be particularly
useful in situations where NATO as a whole is not engaged. We
agree with the Committee that unnecessary duplication must be
avoided and continue to work hard in Brussels to ensure this does
not happen.
The Government agrees with the Committee that if
EU Battlegroups help European nations to improve significantly
their force generation processes, then this is likely to help
NATO meet the force requirements of the NRF. Each European Ally
and / or EU Member State has only one set of forces, and therefore
any increase in Defence capabilities of EU Member States resulting
from EU Battlegroups will also be of benefit to NATO.
43. (Recommendation 43) The EDA potentially
has an important role to play in improving European capabilities,
but the suggestion that the Agency lacks structure and orientation
is worrying. The EDA should focus more narrowly on delivering
real improvements in capabilities, interoperability and deployability.
For the EDA to make a really useful contribution, it needs to
be integrated with NATO's effort in this area, so interoperability
extends throughout the EU and NATO. Yet, in light of its limited
resources, we are not convinced that it can make a great difference.
(Paragraph 243)
The European Defence Agency (EDA) is only four years
old and continues to develop its strategies and processes. We
agree that the Agency should focus more narrowly on delivering
improvements in capability particularly focusing on deployability
and interoperability and we will be reiterating this message to
the Agency when we discuss their 2009 work programme. We believe
that the Agency should be working more closely with NATO on capability
development: to encourage this we have made it clear that we want
both NATO and the EDA to be engaged and working together to improve
helicopter capabilities available to NATO and ESDP.
We do not share the Committee's opinion that the
EDA can make little difference because of its limited resources;
the EDA can add value to capability development in Europe by facilitating
projects between groups of Member States to address capability
shortfalls. Support from the EDA in the form of scoping studies
to help define a shared requirement adds value and fosters multinational
cooperation.
44. (Recommendation 44) We believe it is essential
that, in promoting the development of European capabilities, the
EDA should not duplicate the work of NATO's Allied Command Transformation.
The Defence Procurement Code of Conduct must not become a vehicle
for European protectionism by excluding American products. (Paragraph244)
We agree that it is essential that the work of the
EDA does not duplicate the work of NATO Allied Command Transformation
and wherever possible we insist that the EDA undertake a gap analysis
to ensure that any potential project is not duplicating work already
underway.
The EDA Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement aims
to encourage more use of open competition for the defence equipment
procurements of EU Member States where they previously had used
the exemption under Article 296 of the Treaty of the European
Community. The Code does not restrict or discourage Member States
from looking beyond Europe for its military capability. Neither
is the Code a vehicle for European Protectionism by excluding
competition from the US market place. Te reinforce this very point
as of 30 April, of the 60 contracts awarded as a result of the
Code, 16 contracts have been awarded outside of the contracting
Member States and 2 of these contracts have been to US companies.
45. (Recommendation 45) Turkey's exclusion
from membership of the European Defence Agency is deeply regrettable.
Turkey has an enormous amount it could contribute to Europe's
capabilities and its defence spending is among the highest of
all NATO states. We believe Turkey should be admitted to the EDA
as a matter of priority. (Paragraph246)
We agree that it is regrettable that Turkey does
not have a relationship with the EDA since we share the opinion
that Turkey could make a significant contribution to European
capability. Although Turkey cannot be a full member of the EDA
because it is not a Member of the EU, it can have an administrative
arrangement with the Agency which would enable it to participate
in Agency activities. However this would require a unanimous Council
decision and it has not so far been possible to reach consensus
on this. We continue to make efforts at the highest level to resolve
these difficulties, as described below.
46. (Recommendation 46) A close relationship
between NATO and the EU is essential. The lack of it is inexcusable
given the importance of NATO to EU security. In practice, the
relationship between NATO and the EU is fraught with difficulties.
It is plagued by mistrust and unhealthy competition, and characterised
by a lack of communication and cooperation. Little progress has
been achieved in recent years in improving a relationship which
remained stalled and inefficient. (Paragraph 250)
47. (Recommendation 47) There is a pressing
need for a stronger, expanded and more cooperative relationship
between NATO and the EU. This is essential for both organisations.
(Paragraph 264)
The Government agrees that a close relationship between
NATO and the EU is essential and places a high priority on fostering
strong and effective links between NATO and the EU, respecting
the different political identity of each organisation. We need
to avoid unnecessary duplication of capabilities between the two
thereby also minimising the chance that doctrine and procedures
will diverge. We fully are aware of the political constraints
still preventing the kind of open and fully-interactive relationship
we want to see between the two but we continue to look for opportunities
to urge greater flexibility on both sides and to encourage others
to do the same.
But vitally, co-operation between the two organisations
on the ground is good, and delivering real results, in Kosovo
and Afghanistan, and as it has in the past in the Balkans. The
diplomatic difficulties are very real, but we are doing our best
to resolve them and to ensure that they do not get in the way
of delivery on the ground.
48. (Recommendation 48) We do not believe
a grand bargain between NATO and the EU in which NATO provides
the hard power and the EU a soft alternative is either feasible
or desirable. It would be the antithesis of the comprehensive
approach which is so vital to current operations, such as Afghanistan.
Nor do we believe that NATO should be confined merely to territorial
defence of the Euro-Atlantic area. (Paragraph 265)
The Government agrees with the Committee's assessment.
We see NATO as the guarantor of Europe's security and the means
for achieving its collective defence. In addition we support NATO's
engagement as a global security actor, as demonstrated by the
ongoing operation in Afghanistan, where this is consistent with
international law including the North Atlantic Treaty 1949. But
we recognise that there will be (and have been) instances when
NATO will not be involved and so we see the EU as a strategic
player in its own right, able to complement NATO's efforts and
able to conduct its own crisis management operations, using its
more comprehensive range of instruments.
49. (Recommendation 49) We believe improving
the NATO-EU relationship should be a key priority for NATO at
the Bucharest Summit. Although the relationship is unlikely to
improve radically in the short-term, the Summit represents an
opportunity to set a new longterm course in NATO-EU relations.
This should involve an expanded strategic dialogue between NATO
and the EU, possibly by reinvigorating the contacts between the
North Atlantic Council and the EU's Political and Security Committee,
and by identifying a series of small-scale and pragmatic initiatives
to foster greater trust and cooperation between the two organisations.
(Paragraph 266)
At the NATO Bucharest Summit, Heads of States and
Defence Ministers discussed the importance of improved NATO-EU
co-operation based on the inherent complementarity between the
two organisations, with particular focus on developing joined-up
civilian-military operations and capabilities that are available
to both organisations. There was also emphasis on the opportunities
provided by France's intention to take a full role in a transformed
NATO. The Government fully supports this sentiment and is working
with France and other NATO and EU allies to foster greater trust
and co-operation between the two organisations.
50. (Recommendation 50) The provisions for
permanent structured cooperation in the Lisbon Treaty promise
to enhance European defence capabilities and expenditure. If the
Treaty can deliver such long overdue improvements, which can be
called on for EU and NATO missions, they can only be welcome.
Improving military capabilities throughout Europe is in the interests
not only of the EU but also of NATO. However, we remain to be
convinced that PSC will deliver such improvements in practice.
European nations have so far shown little appetite in investing
sufficiently in defence.(Paragraph 274)
51. (Recommendation 51) It is essential that
permanent structured cooperation does not lead to the development
of a two—or three—tier Europe in defence matters.
This would be counter to the interests of NATO. (Paragraph 275)
The Government welcomes the Common Security and Defence
Policy (CSDP) provisions proposed by the Reform Treaty. We believe
they will contribute to the development and strengthening of the
open, flexible, militarily robust, and NATO-friendly European
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) that the UK pioneered and supports.
Permanent Structured Co-operation (PSC) provides
an inclusive process focused exclusively on the development of
military capabilities and is in line with the UK's key objective
of improving European capability development. We do not believe
that it will lead to the development of or a two or three tier
Europe as it is focused exclusively on military capabilities,
and we expect it to be set up in a way that it is accessible (although
challenging) to all Member States.
52. (Recommendation 52) How permanent structured
cooperation will work in practice remains unclear. We call upon
the MoD, in its response to this report, to state clearly how
it expects PSC to work in practice. (Paragraph 276)
Since improved capability development is a key UK
objective, it is likely that we would look to launch PSC as soon
as practicable, in co-operation with other like minded Member
States. However, detailed discussions with other Member States
on how PSC will work in practice will not take place until after
the Treaty has been ratified by all Member States; therefore it
is not possible to provide the Committee with any further information
at this time.
53. (Recommendation 53) The establishment
of an EU mutual defence clause by the Lisbon Treaty overlaps,
to some extent, with the provisions of Article 5 of the North
Atlantic Treaty. This should be clarified at Bucharest. Although
this ensures that non-NATO members of the EU are now committed
to each other's defence, we believe it is essential that nothing
in the Treaty undermines the primacy of NATO for its members.
There must be no unnecessary duplication of commitments or roles
which undermine the common defence. (Paragraph 281)
The provision on mutual assistance reflects the assumption
that EU Member States would come to the aid of other Member States
in the unlikely event that they were the victim of armed aggression
on their territory. EU Member States who are not members of NATO
are now committed to the aid and assistance of fellow EU Members,
to the potential benefit of the UK. The Treaty clearly states
that for its members, NATO remains the foundation of their collective
defence and the forum for its implementation. Article 1(49) (c)
7 says:
"Commitments and cooperation in this area shall
be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it,
remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum
for its implementation"
This makes clear that the Lisbon Treaty does not
change the current situation for EU Member States which are also
NATO members, such as the UK, and that their collective defence
will still be organised and implemented through NATO. The Lords'
report stated: "This is a new provision and represents a
strengthening of the reference to the role of NATO in the Treaties".
The obligation to provide assistance falls on individual
Member States, not the institutions of the EU and there is no
change to the fundamental purpose and core tasking of the European
Security and Defence Policy. The provision does not therefore
provide a basis for the development of an EU collective defence
organisation.
54. (Recommendation 54) We believe that the
key test of the Lisbon Treaty will be the extent to which it makes
a real difference in increasing European military capabilities,
which so starkly lag behind those of the United States, and in
improving the deployability of European forces. We are sceptical
that the Treaty will itself achieve such improvements. This requires
European countries to decide to spend more on defence—decisions
they have so far been reluctant to take. (Paragraph 282)
We agree; our efforts within Europe have been focused
on helping other Member States develop modern deployable, interoperable
and sustainable capabilities required for EU, NATO and UN operations.
The Committee's summation that the Capabilities and resources
spent on Defence in Europe lag behind those of the US is accurate.
We will continue our efforts in both NATO and the EU to encourage
all European allies to spend more wisely on defence capabilities.
We hope that the provisions in the Lisbon Treaty will provide
a renewed political impetus to deliver the capabilities Europe
needs to fulfil its level of ambition.
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