ISTAR 03

 

Memorandum from the Royal Aeronautical Society

 

Introduction

 

1. The Royal Aeronautical Society (RAeS) is the Learned Society for the Aerospace and Aviation community. Based in London, it has a worldwide membership of over 19,000, with over 13,000 in the UK. Its Fellows and Members represent all levels of the aeronautical community both active and retired with around a half of these as professional engineers. In addition, the Society has over 120 organisations that are members of its Corporate Partners scheme. It has Airpower and UAV Specialist Groups, with members drawn from industry, academia and the services.

 

Background

 

2. The term UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) is now being replaced by both North American and European authorities by the term Unmanned Aircraft (UA) System (UAS) for two main reasons: If UAVs are to file and fly alongside manned aviation in non-segregated airspace, they must be equivalent to and regarded as aircraft; the key feature of a UAS is the 'system', which may comprise several UAVs, control stations and launch and recovery elements.

 

3. The UAV is not a new concept and early UAV work dates from the pioneering days of powered flight. The US Military used target drones fitted with cameras for aerial surveillance during the Viet Nam conflict. Israel pioneered the development and military use of a new generation of UAVs, but it was the U.S. that rapidly adopted the technology and is now investing heavily in advanced platforms and associated payload technologies. The U.S. armed forces have accumulated considerable operational experience and have deployed armed UAVs in Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. alone intends to invest over $2 billion in UAS research and procurement over the next five years.

 

4. Currently over 39 countries have developed or are developing UAVs of varying sizes and with varying levels of technical sophistication. A 2005 census revealed some 400 UAV programmes in existence or under development.

 

UK Experience with Unmanned Aircraft Systems

 

5. The UK experience with UAV technology has not been entirely happy, pace the Phoenix programme. However, procurement of the Watchkeeper for tactical surveillance missions and the UOR-procured US Reaper armed ISTAR asset, marked an important shift in the priority attached to unmanned platforms. Further training and operational experience in UAS operation has been obtained in cooperation with the US. UK forces are flying Predator over Afghanistan (and possibly also Iraq) with RAF pilots based at Nellis Air Force Base near Las Vegas. According to anecdotal evidence, this has been highly successful, and through very close integration with the US operators there, a great deal has been learned. UK Forces on the ground have been using the Lockheed Martin Desert Hawk to excellent effect for short range ISTAR. For local commanders, it is extremely useful to have an integral asset giving an 'over the horizon' view and again, anecdotal evidence suggests that UK forces have learned much from the experience. The BAE SYSTEMS Herti UAV has also been deployed operationally in Afghanistan.

 

6. In the longer term, industry-government support for projects such as the Taranis UCAS demonstrator will facilitate UK national technology acquisition in advanced unmanned combat platforms, with advanced propulsion systems and increased capacity for autonomous operation.

 

7. In general, the MoD and the UK armed services were perhaps slow to appreciate the potential of unmanned systems and the value of UAS operations is still only beginning to be recognised in MoD and only in specialised areas. However, it is evident from the Afghanistan deployment and commitment of research funds to technology acquisition in this area that the general awareness of UAS is very much better than before and improving at a pace. The Society believes that ISTAR is one of the specialised areas where UASs are being taken seriously and that MoD ISTAR planning has been and is being further reassessed as a result of UAS experience.

 

UAS and ISTAR

 

8. The advantages of the UA for any mission can be summarised under the rubric "dull, dirty and dangerous". The use of unmanned platforms for ISTAR missions would certainly conform to the "dull" specification and, in many circumstances, would be classed as "dangerous". Use in contaminated conflict environments (such as those caused by chemical or nuclear weapons) is considered 'dirty'.

 

Persistence

 

9. The particular benefit of a UA approach to ISTAR is the persistence offered by long endurance vehicles. Endurance can now be measured in days rather than hours. An Israeli UAS will be deployed later this year in a maritime surveillance role capable of 50-hour autonomous missions. A comparable manned patrol aircraft would have a 6-8 hour endurance, with higher operational and maintenance costs.

 

10. The persistence characteristic applies equally to the "piloting" functions as well as the "observer" function. Personnel can be rotated during the course of a mission reducing the effects of fatigue on real-time observation and analysis. Equally valuable, a "second opinion" can be sought to verify targets and to take offensive action if required.

 

Vulnerability

 

11. UAs are also largely invisible and inaudible from the ground, which when combined with persistence makes them a formidable capability especially over difficult and hostile terrain. However, should the platform be located, it is potentially more vulnerable to counter measures as reaction to ground fire may be slower, and the system intrinsically less able to evade hostile action.

 

Costs

 

12. Although the smaller UAs do offer savings in terms of operational and maintenance costs, they should not be seen as a cheap option, nor are they necessarily expendable in anything other than human terms. This may be more valid for the smaller tactical UA platforms currently deployed by US forces in tactical, platoon level operations, but not in the case of the more sophisticated platforms such as Reaper. The larger more sophisticated UASs are costly to acquire and also need an extensive support and operational team both within the theatre of operations and at the centre of operations. Although the requirement for trained pilots to 'fly' UA platforms such as Predator and Reaper, it is a sensible and pragmatic way forward now.

 

Autonomy

 

13. Much is being learned from operation by the much more autonomous Global Hawk by US forces and by German and Australian forces through their assessment of it. More autonomous systems may reduce the operational costs of UAS operation. It will also reduce the bandwidth communication requirements that under intense battlefield conditions can cause problems for other users and applications. However, autonomous operation with armed UA vehicles raises questions about rules of engagement. It is likely that weapons release will still require human intervention.

 

Reliability Issues

 

14. UA vehicles, while undoubtedly more reliable than even five years ago, are also more prone to failure and to pilot error (exacerbated by the difficulties of responding quickly to flying conditions and landing the vehicle under problematic weather conditions). Weather may generally set lower levels of availability, with tighter restrictions on landing and take-off conditions.

 

Performance Considerations and New Roles and Applications

 

15. Since a UA does not have a human pilot (nor - at present - human payloads) their performance need not be constrained by human health and safety considerations. In addition to persistence, a UA can climb, dive and turn faster and more tightly than manned aircraft ('pull more G force'), giving them superior aerobatic capabilities. This has led the US Air Force to call for Unmanned Combat Aircraft Systems (UCAS), which are confidently predicted to outperform future manned combat aircraft in the next decade or two. Such UCAS will also deliver ISTAR capabilities. Several European countries, including the UK, are pursuing the early stages of UCAS programmes.

 

The Nature of UAS and Compatibility with Network Enabled Capability (NEC)

 

16. As the level of automation increases in UAS, there is an ever-increasing dependence on information and communications technology (ICT). Smaller, more powerful computing infrastructure with lower power requirements, rapidly evolving automation software, and robust and secure telecommunication bandwidth are enabling ever greater operational capabilities for UAS. Increasing software sophistication and its widespread replication not only give economies of scale (as with many ICT systems) but also reduce the training burden on operators. Robust, mature and certified software delivers predictable responses under a wide range of conditions.

 

17. The system nature of a UAS, heavily based on ICT, can be designed to be highly compatible with NEC. The UA and the UAS can be regarded as (ISTAR) nodes in the NEC Network. Systems designed to comply with emerging NEC standards will enhance interoperability and synergy. For this to be possible, the management of UAS ISTAR requirements has to take a range of different functional views from project level up to enterprise level, which is entirely consistent and compatible with the procurement approach recommended for all NEC-related projects and programmes.

 

UAS-ISTAR as a "purple" asset

 

18. One of the main objectives of NEC is the provision of a relevant, common operational picture (COP) to every Defence user. For this to be possible, several requirements exist; including sensor systems conforming to NEC interface standards, a suitable infrastructure and dynamic rule set to construct the numerous relevant COPs and the ability to distribute them to the respective users. This is not unique to UAS - all ISTAR assets face the same challenges. The most important thing is for ISTAR projects, including UAS, to be designed to meet the enterprise-level requirements of NEC.

 

19. Inter-service rivalry in the development and deployment of UAS-ISTAR assets is a persistent issue, certainly for the US military. However, while the current UK experience appears to be somewhat better the Phoenix was a Royal Artillery (RA) -sponsored project and was seen as a RA Reconnaissance and Target Acquisition system (possibly also with battle damage assessment (BDA) capability. Any suggestion that it might be used for surveillance and intelligence purposes was fiercely contested. In summary, the other challenge is a cultural and organisational need to take an enterprise level view of capability management. It is vital that the UK should continue to develop a cross-service approach to this asset, particularly for the wider battlespace and strategic perspective. Currently, the Reaper is operated by the RAF, while Watchkeeper will be deployed by the Army. While there is no reason to suppose that use of these assets and the data they obtain will not be well coordinated, the MoD should ensure that all UAV assets are developed and deployed according to an overall strategy for UAV-related activities.

 

Cooperation between allies

 

20. There is good cooperation at many levels internationally and in the unmanned systems community generally, there is good sharing of common operational experience (although the Israelis seem guarded about some aspects). Bilateral, multilateral, NATO and EDA groups all share their experience, and the US-UK relationship has been particularly fruitful. International professional organisations make a point of encouraging the sharing of experience at conferences and workshops. The Royal Aeronautical Society is part of this community and provides a context and a forum for the discussion of evolving UAS technology and operations.

 

Integration into controlled airspace

 

21. The U.S. and European militaries, as well as potential civil operators, have an urgent requirement to access controlled non-segregated airspace. This is essential for transit from continental bases to fulfil time-sensitive mission needs, as well as for training activities. This has been defined as the "file and fly" requirement to operate UAS vehicles alongside conventional manned aviation without the need for special clearance and flight-control protocols. At a minimum, UAs will need to be provided the capability for routine separation assurance and integration into Air Traffic Management (ATM) procedures but will also need an effective and reliable 'sense and avoid system' for last minute collision avoidance, These capabilities may be both onboard the UA and as part of the mission control system.

 

22. In many cases, UA operation in the U.S. still requires a Special Military Operations order to fly a UAS in controlled airspace. This can take up to two months to implement. However, in 2003, the Air Force received a national certificate of authorization (COA) allowing Global Hawk UAVs to fly in unrestricted airspace. Flights still require five days' notice to the Federal Aviation Authority, however.

 

23. Work is continuing in both the US and Europe to establish protocols for operating UASs in controlled non-segregated airspace, and the necessary technical solutions and regulatory changes are expected to emerge within the next five years. In Europe, several national aviation authorities, including the UK CAA, are working with EASA and EUROCONTROL to coordinate the necessary work. The CAA is about to release the second version of CAP722, the document that deals with the operation of both civilian and military UASs lighter than 150kg in UK airspace. European groups are basing their approach to UA lighter than 150kg on the UK CAA CAP722, which is regarded as a leading source of guidance.

 

24. For the Military, EUROCONTROL, NATO and EDA are developing management papers. On the civilian side, the European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment (EUROCAE) established Working Group 73 in April 2006 to develop the necessary standards for consideration by the authorities. WG73 work is progressing in coordination with both Military and other international organisations. It is predicted that there will be a strong growth in civil applications of 'light UAS' (ie those under 150kg) under national arrangements in advance of definitive EASA and EUROCONROL regulations for UA of more than 150kg. This reflects the extensive use by deployed UK forces of the light 'Desert Hawk' UAS for close range ISTAR.

 

Training and testing issues

 

25. There are European test ranges (for example, NEAT in Sweden and another above the Arctic circle in Finland) where UA operation has little impact on civilian air traffic. However, for much of Europe it is difficult to find suitable airspace for training purposes. There is limited but still useful segregated airspace at Parc Aberporth in Wales, which is already being used by some UA companies. Extension to the Parc Aberporth segregated airspace is currently under consideration. This would be greatly welcomed by the UK UAS community

 

26. Once the EASA and EUROCONTROL regulations are in place, training with certified UA will be easier. However, UA R&D will still require segregated airspace and this will need to be found anywhere that is accessible, practical and affordable. If UK/Europe wishes to compete in the global UAS market place this will have to be made available as a matter of urgency.

 

Industrial Issues

 

27. The importance of UAS technology is well noted in the Defence Technology Strategy (DTS) and also reflected in subsequent R&D investment by the MoD and Industry. The Society also appreciates the need to address Urgent Operational Requirements as in the Reaper acquisition. However, there are two consequences of reverting to a US solution by default. First, it cannot be assumed that technology will be shared from participation in future US programmes nor is it likely that it will come from commercial aerospace developments. Secondly, a typical UAV reconnaissance payload for both military and civil applications might consist of a miniaturized Synthetic Aperture radar slaved autonomously to an Electro-optic sensor. These are both technologies that were identified in DIS 1 as being ones over which the UK needed to maintain operational sovereignty. However, by resorting to a US solution by default, there is no incentive for industry to invest PV funding in these key technologies and maintain the capability in the UK. The related technology trajectory will thus be fractured. The same is true in propulsion where design of advanced stealthy UAS platforms will be dictated by the engine, and where the needs of electrical power generation and heat dissipation management is leading to consideration of an Integrated Power System, provided by a single supplier.

 

28. In the longer term, military UAVs will need to be capable of 'swarming' such that clusters of them can undertake complex tasks (both attack and reconnaissance) in dangerous circumstances on day one of the war. This capability, which is already within the grasp of US UCAVs, is unlikely to be exported in any transparent way that allows operational sovereignty to be exercised by the UK on these classes of platforms. As a result, the UK MoD will need to fund the necessary research to create an on-shore capability in mission system design. In addition, airframe-engine combinations will probably reach their design limit ahead of that of systems, sensors and software which have the potential (as in the fixed-wing fast jet case) continually to evolve and thus provide affordable, incremental capability upgrade. Again, this needs to be an area of investment for the UK MoD.

 

29. Overall, the arrival of the UAS is also effecting a change to the industrial landscape. New suppliers at all levels of the supply chain are being drawn into the market to provide novel technical and cost-effective solutions. This trend was to some extent noted in the Defence Industry Strategy; but the MoD should continue to monitor these developments and to make the necessary adjustments in acquisition and industry strategy in order to encourage the evolution of an effective UK based UAS capability.

 

17 April 2008