UK NSR 08

 

Memorandum from Clive Murgatroyd

 

 

 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 

Defence policy does not look sufficiently far ahead to take full account of the potential impacts of climate change. As defence acquisition responds to policy, capital expenditure decisions are being made without full consideration of the climate-induced risks that might reduce the effectiveness and affordability of defence capabilities.

 

INTRODUCTION TO SUBMITTER

 

Clive Murgatroyd is an independent defence consultant and a lecturer at the Defence College of Management and Technology, Cranfield University. Recently retired as a Commander in the Royal Navy, he has wide experience of maritime and joint operations, defence acquisition, and policy, concepts and doctrine development. He spent his last appointment in the Ministry of Defence leading the Surface Effects and Self Defence Capability Planning Group within the Directorate of Equipment Capability (Above Water Effects) and was Chairman of NATO's Maritime Capability Group 1 on Above Water Engagement. He is currently studying for a Master's degree and is researching the impacts of climate change on defence policy and acquisition.

 

BACKGROUND

 

1. In the Government's sustainable development strategy for the UK, 'Securing the Future',[1] published in March 2005, climate change was identified as 'the greatest threat'. Commenting on the Ministry of Defence (MOD) Sustainable Development Action Plan in July 2007, Defence Secretary Des Browne said: 'The Armed Forces currently operate in places around the world where access to scarce resources can contribute to conflict, and communities are directly affected by environmental devastation. We are now certain that climate change contributes to instability, and will have implications for future operations. The extent of climate change that we can expect over the coming decades will potentially present MOD with considerable security challenges. Defence must adapt to meet these challenges by working to understand the impact on our personnel, equipment and estate.'[2] Taking actions to limit climate change (mitigation) and prepare for its effects (adaptation) will be fundamental activities for the MOD as it seeks to acquire and sustain capabilities that will be in service in 2050 and beyond, by which time significant climate change impacts are expected.

 

DEFENCE PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS AND MILITARY TASKS

 

2. The projected impacts are likely to undermine current Defence Planning Assumptions (DPAs), requiring a reassessment of the balance of capabilities that may be necessary to meet the military tasks. The current taxonomy of military tasks, as published in the December 2003 Defence White Paper,[3] is probably sufficiently generic to require little amendment in the short-to-medium term. How defence can meet the tasks will, however, need to be evaluated against the climate-induced changes to the strategic environment. UK's armed forces are already operating above the long-term concurrency level that they are structured and resourced to sustain.[4] This is only possible by accepting risk against lower priority goals, but some of these are likely to become much more important in the future.

 

3. Examination of a selection of the military tasks shows how climate change impacts could affect DPAs, indicating where action to rebalance capabilities may be necessary. Accurate and continuous Strategic Intelligence (Military Task (MT) 1.1) on the effects of climate change, particularly on vulnerable populations, will be needed to provide indicators and warnings of potential conflict and humanitarian suffering so that early action can be taken to prevent, stabilise or contain a crisis.[5] An expanded understanding of the environment from Hydrographic, Geographic and Meteorological Services (MT 1.3) will also be required, both for forecasting extreme events and for rapidly assessing any changes to hydrography and topography that could impede operations.

 

4. Many of UK's overseas territories (MT 3.1) are islands in regions already susceptible to hurricanes. The frequency and intensity of such extreme events are likely to increase, threatening the lives of populations and the agriculture and infrastructure on which they depend. By mid-century climate change is expected to reduce water resources in many small islands to the point where they become insufficient to meet demand during low rainfall periods.[6] Indeed, increased temperatures and droughts may compromise the habitability and sustainability of the Cyprus Sovereign Base Areas (MT 3.2), at a time when their strategic location is likely to be increasingly important.

 

5. Forces provided for Defence Diplomacy, Alliances and Support to Wider British Interests (MT 3.3) can assist the work of other government departments in building confidence and security as climate impacts develop but, with extreme weather causing floods, damage to crops and possibly disease, and with conflicts breaking out over the availability of water and food, the demand for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (MT 4.1) Operations and Evacuation of British Citizens Overseas (MT 4.2) is likely to grow.

 

6. Peacekeeping (MT 4.3) and Peace Enforcement (MT 4.4), probably under NATO, EU or UN auspices, will become particularly important to deter, contain and stabilise situations that could otherwise compound the effects of climate change by limiting or even preventing mitigation and adaptation activities. Planning for such operations may also need to consider the direct use of armed forces to enforce mitigation activities such as countering illegal deforestation, although the national dynamics within the UN Security Council may hinder such positive action.

 

7. Conventional threats and acts of terrorism are unlikely to diminish in the face of climate change, so war-fighting capabilities will continue to be needed to conduct Power Projection (MT 4.5), Focused Intervention (MT 4.6) and Deliberate Intervention (MT 4.7) operations, but they will need to be effective under even harsher climatic conditions than those currently being experienced in Iraq and Afghanistan, and with limited access to fresh water, food and fossil fuels.

 

8. Whilst overseas tasks will be placing significant demands on already stretched forces, it is also likely that as the incidence of storms, floods and fires in the UK increases, there will be additional calls on regular forces and reserves to assist the civilian authorities and emergency services (MT 2.1), both with manpower and with niche capabilities such as helicopters and boats. The damaging floods of 2007 suggest the level of activity to be expected in future,[7] such that establishment of an organisation similar to Australia's State Emergency Services (SES),[8] perhaps using retired military personnel and other suitable volunteers, might be a useful enhancement to national resilience. Requests for Military Aid to the Civil Power may also increase should there be internal unrest following an influx of climate refugees, many of whom may try to arrive by sea, threatening the integrity of UK waters (MT 2.3). The demand for fishery protection is also likely to rise as increasing sea temperatures lead to migration or collapse of fish populations and fiercer competition for dwindling resources.

 

9. The incidence of MTs will depend on how successfully the world moves to a low carbon future. For example, the strategic significance of fossil fuel supplies should eventually diminish, although in the immediate future it is likely to increase, requiring in the short-to-medium term continued (and probably enhanced) engagement in politically unstable, oil-rich regions, and the maintenance of secure sea lines of communications (SLOCs). In the longer term, food is likely to prove the most important commodity to protect along the SLOCs, particularly if crops fail and food becomes scarcer as a result of regional climate impacts. A consequent shift in focus of national interests may require changed assumptions about the reach and sustainability of defence capabilities.

 

10. From this short analysis it is clear that the tempo of operations in a climate-stressed future is likely to be continually high, with an emphasis on delivering lower order strategic effects,[9] preventing crises, setting the secure and stable conditions to bring situations under control and actively restraining the spread, duration and influence of climate-induced crises. There will be frequent humanitarian and disaster relief operations and sustained and widespread constabulary operations in support of national and international mandates. There will also be an enduring need to secure SLOCs and there will be more short notice home commitments.

 

DEFENCE CAPABILITIES

 

11. If the UK's ability to conduct successful military operations is not to be constrained, the defence acquisition process must deliver adaptable capabilities that take the wide range of climate change effects fully into consideration. Planning for the acquisition of defence capabilities responds to Defence Strategic Guidance (DSG). Although DSG is classified, much of its strategic context can be inferred from one of its source documents, the Development, Concept and Doctrine Centre's 'Strategic Trends',[10] last issued in March 2007 and baselined in December 2006. Strategic Trends looks thirty years ahead and identifies climate change as one of its 'Ring Road issues' that is projected to touch the lives of everyone on the planet.

 

12. Unfortunately, although many of the associated risks have been postulated out to 2036, Strategic Trends does not provide a sufficiently long view of the possible impacts of climate change and, as it pre-dates the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's (IPCC) Fourth Assessment Report,[11] the impacts considered are probably understated. As the MOD is currently committing to capability solutions that will be in service for up to forty years (such as the new aircraft carriers), an understanding of the climate risks out to at least 2050 is needed to shape policy and the acquisition process, and thereby adequately inform future force structures and major capital investment decisions.

 

13. However, although the new National Security Strategy (March 2008) accepts the threat of climate change,[12] it states the government's determination to 'shift the overall balance of defence procurement towards support of current operations, while at the same time continuing to invest in a broad range of capabilities for the long term'.[13] There is therefore a risk that there will be even less consideration of possible climate impacts on defence acquisition. Whilst I agree that it is vital to support current operations, capability planners must also be encouraged to assess the possible impacts of climate change as far into the future as possible to ensure the delivery of appropriate capabilities.

 

14. Therefore, to properly underpin the acquisition process, DSG will need to look further than the scope of Strategic Trends and incorporate DPAs that reflect the likely scale and concurrency of future operations by analysing the IPCC scenarios[14] from a defence perspective, and testing current and future capabilities against SAG (Studies and Assessment Group) scenarios and vignettes that take climate change into consideration. These scenarios should then be used to inform the Baseline Review and Audit stage of the Through Life Capability Management (TLCM) process,[15] to determine critical thresholds in the response of individual capabilities to climate change.

 

15. I would like to highlight two complications that compound the problem of adapting to a climate-changed future. The first is the dependence on fossil fuels. MOD's sustainable development strategy and climate change strategy, which are scheduled for publication in late 2008, are likely to direct UK's armed forces to contribute to the achievement of Kyoto Protocol emission targets, and any revision of the targets that might be agreed in Copenhagen in 2009, by reducing their use of fossil fuels substantially. Peacetime activities, especially training, could be acutely affected, even without the soaring costs of fuel that are already forcing a move away from live training towards the use of synthetic environments. With every expectation that fuel costs will continue to rise in the future, especially as resources decline, even the residual requirement for fossil fuels is likely to result in a significant impact on running costs for many defence capabilities. Alternatives to fossil fuels should therefore be investigated as a matter of urgency.

 

16. The second complication that must be considered is that climate change exhibits manoeuvrist characteristics.[16] A high tempo of unexpected and potentially extreme events could expose political and military weaknesses, with a real danger that they could so overwhelm decision making that increasingly inappropriate actions - or no actions at all - are taken, paralysing UK's ability to adapt and undermining the will to combat the threat. Paralysis is likely to be hastened if there are other stresses such as regional conflicts.

 

17. Defence must therefore establish a framework of capabilities across all of the Defence Lines of Development that can optimise its adaptive capacity,[17] and reduce the risks and uncertainties from climate change. This means a sustainable infrastructure resilient to climate extremes; manpower equipped and trained appropriately for future military tasks; logistics support that is less reliant on fossil fuels; organisations agile enough to pre-empt climate impacts and take timely decisions; equipment designed for operation in extreme climates, with sufficient platforms to maintain presence and deliver lower order strategic effects; and rapid conceptual and doctrinal development that reflects the most up-to-date climate risk assessments.

 

18. Since resources are finite, the uncertainties inherent in predicting the impact of climate change will need to be addressed through the application of risk models across the policy and capability acquisition domains. The UK Climate Impacts Programme has developed detailed guidance on risk, uncertainty and decision-making, which could provide a useful model for MOD to adapt for its own purposes.[18] As MOD will probably wish to transfer as much climate risk as possible to industry, it is essential that defence industry is fully integrated within the capability planning process, to ensure that it can develop and deliver products suitable for, and adaptable to, defence in a changed climate.

 

RECOMMENDATIONS

 

19. Establish the mechanisms that will ensure the armed forces are structured, resourced and sufficiently adaptable to face the uncertain challenges that climate change will pose.

 

20. Develop Defence Planning Assumptions and appropriate scenarios that will support policy that looks sufficiently far ahead to allow the planning of capabilities that will meet the scale and incidence of the likely military tasks.

 

21. Use the revised scenarios to inform the Baseline Review and Audit stage of the Through Life Capability Management (TLCM) process.

 

22. Embed climate risk assessment at all levels across the Defence Lines of Development to inform acquisition decisions that deliver the most appropriate, adaptable solutions within limited resources.

 

23. Optimise adaptive capacity, so that defence planning and responses are sufficiently agile to overcome the manoeuvrist nature of climate change impacts.

 

24. Identify alternative energy sources for defence capabilities.

 

25. Consider the use of retired servicemen and women (and suitable volunteers) to supplement civilian emergency services in an organisation similar to Australia's State Emergency Services, to assist with response to floods and forest fires in UK.

 

 

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[1] HM Government, 'Securing the Future' - UK Government sustainable development strategy (London, Stationery Office, 2005).

[2] Defence News, 'MOD sets itself "Green" challenge', 27 July 2007. <http://www.mod.uk/defenceinternet/defencenews/estateandenvironment/modsetsitselfgreenchallenge.htm> accessed 7 July 2008.

[3] MOD, op.cit. at note 14.

[4] MOD Capability Review (London, Cabinet Office, 2007), p.15.

[5] Assessments of the impacts of climate change on human societies at the regional and local scale will be supported by the Met Office Hadley Centre within the Integrated Climate Programme announced in September 2007.

[6] IPCC, op.cit. at note 3.

[7] Cabinet Office, 'The Pitt Review', Learning Lessons from the 2007 Floods, 2008.

[8] State Emergency Service. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_Emergency_Service> accessed 25 September 2008.

[9] Prevent, Stabilise, Contain, Deter, Coerce. op. cit, at note 14.

[10] DCDC Strategic Trends <http://www.dcdc-strategictrends.org.uk/> accessed 16 July 2008.

[11] Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Fourth Assessment Report (Geneva, IPCC, 2007).

[12] Cabinet Office, The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom - Security in an interdependent world (London. Stationery Office, 2008), p.18.

[13] Ibid. p. 48.

[14] IPCC, Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (Geneva, IPCC, 2000), Chapter 4.

[15] Baseline Review and Audit: Stage 3 of Through Life Capability Management (TLCM), at <http://www.aof.mod.uk/aofcontent/tactical/tlcm/content/tlcmstages/stage3reviewandaudit.htm> accessed 15 August 2008.

[16] Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, JWP 0-01 - British Defence Doctrine 2^nd Edition (Llangennech, JDCC, 2001), p.3-5.

[17] 'The ability of a system to adjust to climate change (including climate variability and extremes), to moderate potential damages, to take advantage of opportunities, or to cope with the consequences. Adaptation can be spontaneous or planned, and can be carried out in response to or in anticipation of changes in climatic conditions.' UKCIP definition of 'Adaptive Capacity', in Robert Willows and Richenda Connell, Climate adaptation: Risk, uncertainty and decision-making (Oxford, UKCIP, 2003), p.111.

[18] Robert Willows and Richenda Connell, Climate adaptation: Risk, uncertainty and decision-making (Oxford, UKCIP, 2003).

 

 

26 September 2008