UK NSR 02
Memorandum from the Ministry of Defence
THE DEFENCE CONTRIBUTION TO COUNTER-TERRORISM AND NATIONAL RESILIENCE
As the committee will be aware the counter-terrorism and resilience challenges facing the UK and the Government's response have evolved significantly since the committee's 2002 inquiry "Defence and Security in the UK" and the 2003 inquiry into the then draft Civil Contingencies Bill.
The Home Secretary remains responsible for the security of the citizens of the UK. The Government's Counter Terrorism Strategy (CONTEST), which was presented to Parliament in July 2006, is led by the Office of Security and Counter-Terrorism in the Home Office. It aims to reduce the risk to the UK from international terrorism so that people can go about their business freely and with confidence. The strategy is structured around 4 'P's: Prevent, Pursue, Protect and Prepare. The aim of the Prepare strand of CONTEST is 'where we cannot stop an attack, to mitigate its impact' and this work is led by the Cabinet Office's Civil Contingencies Secretariat. The role of the Ministry of Defence in the delivery of CONTEST is a supporting one. Nonetheless the MOD does provide a range of support in each of these areas to a greater or lesser extent. This note deals with MOD activity in the UK, on the understanding that this is where the Committee wishes to focus its inquiry, rather than covering the entire range of our counter terrorist activity worldwide - a somewhat larger and more complex area than appears to be envisaged by the Committee.
Similarly the committee will recognise that, in the UK, defence plays a supporting role to the civil authorities who lead the response to disruptive natural challenges. Support in this area is provided through the well-understood principle of Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA). This is set out in detail in Joint Doctrine Publication 02, "Operations in the UK: The Defence Contribution to Resilience". In short, defence support can be provided where the responsible civil authority lacks either the capability or the immediate capacity to deal with a situation. Defence support is normally the last resort, with mutual aid or commercial options having first been exhausted.
The Committee's note asked for the MOD's assessment of the threat to the UK. The MOD contributes to cross-government mechanisms in order to assess the threat to the UK from terrorist activity and natural hazards. For CONTEST purposes, the lead authority is the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC). The MOD has seconded several members of staff to JTAC in order to contribute to its work. JTAC's assessment is that the threat from international terrorism to the UK and UK interests overseas is extremely serious, more ambitious in scope than we have seen before and will probably be with us for the foreseeable future. The Government is committed to tackling this threat and the MOD will play a full part in this.
The Cabinet Office Domestic Horizon Scanning Committee (DHSC) performs a similar role in assessing non-malicious risks which could impact on the UK in the near future (approximately 12 months). The MOD provides a representative on that committee and contributes more widely to the cross-Government planning support co-ordinated by the Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS).
The CCS also manages the cross-departmental Resilience Capability Framework (RCF) which underpins medium term planning and capability building for Resilience. The RCF consists of a risk assessment process which draws on the work of the DHSC and JTAC to identify the highest risks, both malicious threats and non-malicious hazards, which could impact on the UK over a 5-year period and the development of planning assumptions outlining the potential consequences of these risks. These planning assumptions set the bar for civil Resilience capability-building at national, regional and local levels. The MOD contributes to all elements of this work, including providing representatives for all related committees. Many of the major risks identified through this process are increasing due to the inter-connected nature of modern societies and some, such as widespread flooding and an influenza pandemic, would have a major impact on our way of life in the UK. The lead responders for such events do not include defence, but we contribute to the lead responders' plans, not least in order to identify any potential role for defence. We carefully consider any requests for assistance from the civil authorities, whether in the planning for or response to a crisis.
The assessments of these bodies provide the basis for the MOD's CT and Resilience planning. Based on this methodology, and as a result of extensive and detailed consultation with the lead civil authorities, the MOD currently makes available a range of capabilities. We do not categorise our support along single service lines as the Committee's note asked for, but the capabilities we currently make available are as follows:
· A quick reaction capability to deter and defend against serious threats to the integrity of UK airspace, including air defence radar.
· A maritime capability to deter and defend against serious threats to the integrity of UK territorial waters.
· Counter-terrorist capabilities in support of the police on land or sea.
· Public order support in extremis to the Police Service of Northern Ireland.
· Fishery protection vessels in support of DEFRA.
· A maritime search and rescue capability in support of the Maritime and Coastguard Agency.
· An Explosive Ordnance Disposal 'render-safe' capability.
· Scientific support to police operations including a Technical Response Force with access to a wide range of relevant scientific expertise.
· Ministry of Defence Police support to the protection of key points in the critical national infrastructure.
· A regional command and control capability to provide an ability to co-ordinate larger scale defence contributions.
· Civil Contingency Reaction Forces, drawn from the reserve forces, which are potentially available if required to support the responsible authorities for dealing with civil contingencies.
These capabilities are part of the MOD's planned force structure and, as such, effectively guaranteed to the lead authority. The MOD conducts regular liaison with each of these organisations to ensure that the capabilities earmarked remain appropriate and exercises them to validate extant planning and identify any improvements needed. They are then reflected in Defence Planning Assumptions which are reviewed regularly.
In addition to these commitments, the MOD can also make available, on a case by case basis, defence assets to support operations led by other organisations. In 2007, defence provided such support on 90 occasions. These included:
· Logistics support to police operations through the use of the defence estate.
· Aerial imagery and analysis support to police search operations.
· Flood defence assistance in the Yorkshire / Humber and Gloucestershire regions.
· Logistics support to Severn Trent Water during the Gloucestershire floods.
The above capabilities are held principally for the purposes of standing or contingent operations overseas and are not planned for regular use on behalf of the civil authorities. Where they are not being used to support overseas operations however, they can be made available to the civil authorities where it is appropriate to do so.
It would also be appropriate to highlight the progress which has been made in the development of civil capabilities. Over the last few years, with the passage of the Civil Contingencies Act and the development of the National Capabilities Programme, the emergency services and other responders have made significant improvements in their own capabilities. One consequence of this is that the threshold for the requirement for defence support has risen significantly. Examples include: the response to the Buncefield fire in 2005, which would previously have relied upon support from the Defence Fire Service; the Fire and Rescue Services' New Dimension programme which has been used in recent flooding events; and the acquisition of enhanced aerial capabilities by the Metropolitan Police. So although the risk of disruptive challenges is arguably increasing, the support required from defence is not necessarily rising. Nonetheless, we remain committed to providing the support needed where this is identified.
Defence also contributes significant assets to activities overseas aimed at preventing terrorist attacks and pursuing terrorists. Most of this work has to remain confidential, for obvious security and diplomatic reasons, but it includes: counter-terrorist capacity building with partner nations; the collection and analysis of intelligence on terrorist networks; and the maintenance of a range of capabilities to conduct disruption operations against potential terrorist attacks. These activities support the Government's wider counter terrorism agenda and contribute to the security of the UK, but are not addressed in detail here as they may be considered to fall outside the scope of the Committee's inquiry. Please let me know if the Committee does wish to broaden the terms of its inquiry in this respect.
In addition to playing its part in co-ordinating cross-Government effort and contributing to others' evolving plans, the MOD does of course keep its policy in this area under constant review. As well as participating in the further development of CONTEST, the review of the Civil Contingencies Act currently being planned, and Home Office reviews of aspects of protective security, the MOD exercises its plans regularly and reviews all standing operations in the UK on an annual basis. We look forward to discussing these policies and plans with the Committee. The Committee will be aware that the Rt Hon Adam Ingram MP has been asked by the Prime Minister to review the Defence contribution to the Government's Counter Terrorism and Resilience strategies. His work is progressing well and he expects to report his findings by the summer.
22 February 2008
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