UNCORRECTED TRANSCRIPT OF ORAL EVIDENCE To be published as HC 1145-i

 

THIS TRANSCRIPT AWAITS FULL CORRECTION

 

HOUSE OF COMMONS

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE

TAKEN BEFORE THE

FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENCE COMMITTEES

 

IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN

 

SIR MARK LYALL GRANT, JOHN HUTTON, DAVID MILIBAND and LIEUTENANT GENERAL PETER WALL

 

Evidence heard in Public

Questions 1 - 78

 

USE OF THE TRANSCRIPT

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Oral Evidence

Taken before the Foreign Affairs Committee

on Tuesday 28 October 2008

Members present:

Mike Gapes (Chairman)

Mr. James Arbuthnot

Mr. David S. Borrow

Sir Menzies Campbell

Linda Gilroy

Mr. Dai Havard

Mr. David Heathcoat-Amory

Mr. Adam Holloway

Mr. Eric Illsley

Mr. Bernard Jenkin

Mr. Paul Keetch

Robert Key

Mr. Malcolm Moss

Mr. Ken Purchase

Sir John Stanley

Richard Younger-Ross

 

Examination of Witnesses

Witnesses: Rt Hon John Hutton MP, Secretary of State for Defence, Lieutenant General Peter Wall CBE, Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Commitments), Rt Hon David Miliband MP, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, and Sir Mark Lyall Grant, Director General Political, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, gave evidence.

Q1Chairman: Good afternoon everybody. Will members of the public please switch off their mobile phones or put them on silent mode?

This afternoon, we have a joint session of the Select Committees on Defence and on Foreign Affairs. We did the same thing about a year and a half ago, with the then Foreign Secretary, Margaret Beckett, and the then Defence Secretary, Des Browne. Today, we are delighted to have with us two Secretaries of State who are new to the joint session. I understand that this is the Defence Secretary's first appearance before the Defence Select Committee. You have the bonus of the Foreign Affairs Committee as well-so, welcome to you. The Foreign Secretary is well known at least to us on the Foreign Affairs Committee, and we welcome you once again. I also thank your colleagues, Lieutenant General Wall and Mr. Lyall Grant, for joining us today.

This question and answer session focuses specifically on Iraq and Afghanistan. We might stray on to some related issues, but we will try hard to focus on those two areas. Let me begin by asking about Iraq. What is your assessment of the current security situation in Iraq generally and in the area around Basra where our British forces are?

John Hutton: Thank you for that introduction, Mike. I was in Basra last week, so I can report what I saw for myself in and around the city. In the context of Basra and the southern part of Iraq, the security situation is probably better than it has been for some considerable time. Committee members will be very aware of the reasons for that. The security situation generally in the south of Iraq is significantly better. That has been brought about by a combination of reasons, and UK forces have played a sterling role in bringing about that transformed situation. Operation Charge of the Knights was a critical event, as were the Sons of Iraq, the Awakening movement and efforts at political reconciliation and broadening the depth and base of Iraqi civil society.

There is no doubt in my mind that the situation in and around Basra has been completely transformed. I was able to spend an afternoon in Basra. I sat down and had tea, coffee and dates with local Basrans, while my security was provided entirely by Iraqi security forces. There are reasons for us to be optimistic and confident about the security situation in Iraq generally and particularly in the south. That is not to say that al-Qaeda and the other militias do not continue to pose a real and serious threat, because they do. We know, for example, that they are capable of launching spectacular untargeted attacks against civilian populations, but the general situation is better than it has been for several years. That gives us all grounds for optimism and confidence about the future direction of policy in Iraq.

 

Q2Chairman: Foreign Secretary, do you wish to add anything?

David Miliband: No, I agree with that.

 

Q3Sir Menzies Campbell: For how long do you expect the present level of British troops to be maintained in Basra?

John Hutton: For as long as is necessary on the basis of the advice that we receive from our military commanders on the ground. In his statement to the House in July, the Prime Minister made it clear what the two significant roles for British forces now are in Iraq. We must complete the training and mentoring of the Iraqi 14th Army Division. That work is progressing well. It is a capable unit that is taking on more and more front-line security responsibilities. I met the commanding officer, who is a very fine man with very capable commanders. Our military transition teams on the ground are doing a fantastic job of working with and helping the 14th Division to take on an increasing security responsibility. That work is going well and will be linked to the advice that we receive. The work will be largely completed by early next year.

The other principal role and mission is to complete the handover of Basra International airport. I hope, touch wood, that that will be largely completed by the end of the year. Our security presence in the south of Iraq is conditional on the situation on the ground, but, as the Prime Minister said in July, we can look forward to a significant change of mission for UK forces in Iraq during the first half of next year. That remains on track.

 

Q4 Sir Menzies Campbell: My difficulty with that answer is that the word "necessary" is capable of subjective meaning and interpretation. What is the Government's definition of what is necessary, if that is the target for the maintenance of the existing level of troops? What is necessary in that context?

John Hutton: I do not think that it is entirely subjective. The two principal missions that we are there to fulfil-the completion of the training of Iraqi security forces in the south and the handover of Basra International airport-will be met by objective criteria. We will work closely with the Iraqi Government and the Iraqi security forces on both of those things. We have no intention of maintaining forces in Iraq other than those necessary for the completion of the mission that we have set out. Last week in Baghdad I spoke to the Iraqi Defence Minister Abd al-Qadir about what might be an ongoing role for UK forces as we move to a more normal, bilateral defence relationship with the sovereign state of Iraq.

I assure hon. Members and the public that our mission is clear. It will be completed, I hope, in the early part of next year. The only sensible caveat for me to put on the table is the obvious point about security conditions on the ground. If the security environment were to deteriorate, we would have to look seriously at all those issues. At the moment we are on track and we have two finite and clear missions that are progressing well. We hope that in the early part of next year, we can make significant decisions about UK force levels in Iraq.

 

Q5 Sir Menzies Campbell: May I assume from that answer that if the next general election were held in 2010 on the last day possible, we could expect British forces to have been substantially withdrawn from Basra?

John Hutton: Yes.

 

Q6 Sir Menzies Campbell: Is it conceivable that the present Government would wish to fight that election without British forces having been withdrawn from Basra?

John Hutton: Well, that question is probably above my pay grade in government.

Sir Menzies Campbell: Do not sell yourself short, Secretary of State.

David Miliband: It sounds like a bid to come on to our campaign committee. We will certainly consider all your suggestions for our campaign strategy. Surely the important point is that we move as a country from thinking about Iraq in terms of Basra's security and the role of our forces there, towards thinking about a security strategy and an economic and political strategy for the whole of Iraq-its diverse regions, north and south, as well as in the centre and Baghdad. That is the transition to a "normal" relationship that one would like to have with a range of friendly countries. It is a significant step and will mean that the debate on Iraq moves to a broader base.

 

Q7 Mr. Arbuthnot: Secretary of State, in view of what you have said about staying for as long as is necessary, how did you react to the Iraqi Prime Minister's comment, "I think that their stay is not necessary for maintaining security and control"?

John Hutton: I had the chance to meet Prime Minister al-Maliki when I was in Baghdad last week and I raised the issue directly with him. He is obviously aware of the mission and the role that we have, together, set for UK forces in Iraq. Completing that mission is something that he wants us to do-training the 14th Division and the transfer of Basra International airport. So he is completely satisfied with role and the mission of UK forces.

We are capable, given the force deployment that we have there, of supporting Iraqi security forces in hard operations, if that is necessary. But we are at one about the next few months on what the UK forces should be doing and on how we are working with our Iraqi partners in preparing the ground for this fundamental change of mission.

I take from the conversation that I had with the Prime Minister nothing other than a union of minds and an agreed position about what UK forces are doing and how we can work together for the significant change of mission next year. There is nothing between the Prime Minister and Government in Iraq and the points that our Prime Minister made in the House in July.

 

Q8 Mr. Arbuthnot: Really?

John Hutton: Yes.

 

Q9 Mr. Arbuthnot: It sounds a bit strange when you say that it is necessary to keep forces into the new year and he says it is not.

John Hutton: The point that I am trying to make, James, is that, in order to complete the two missions that I have described, that is going to be necessary. So on that basis we have a union of minds between ourselves and the Iraqis on the current level of UK forces.

 

Q10 Mr. Arbuthnot: How did you react to his comment that the British troops stayed away from the confrontation, giving the gangs and militia the chance to control the city? Did you find that a bit strange, as we did?

John Hutton: Yes. It is not true to say that UK forces did not help and support Charge of the Knights; we did. We provided substantial support for those operations, which the general might want to enumerate. Our withdrawal from Basra city was done in and with the full agreement of the Iraqi Government and our coalition partners. My view on all those matters remains as I said in my opening remarks. I think that UK forces have played a sterling role in making progress in dealing with the security problems in and around Basra. British forces need and deserve credit, not criticism, for that work.

 

Q11 Mr. Arbuthnot: I agree with that, but do you think that, in what he said, he was perhaps displaying over-confidence that might make a new status of forces agreement that much more difficult, both for the British to create with Iraq and for the United States to create with Iraq?

John Hutton: I very much hope not, because we need such an agreement. Again, I raised that point specifically with the Prime Minister and his colleagues when I was in Baghdad last week. I can relay to Committee members the clear view of the Prime Minister of Iraq, which is that it will be necessary to reach an appropriate agreement before the end of the UN mandate at the end of the year. That was his clear view, expressed to me, and we obviously welcome that. There has to be a proper understanding about the legal framework within which UK and coalition forces operate in Iraq as we approach the end of the year. It would not be sensible for there to be any problem in reaching an agreement in the appropriate time scale.

I did not detect-again, I have to tell the Committee how I saw it and how it appeared to me, on the ground-anything other than a willingness on the part of the Iraqi authorities to reach an agreement that is acceptable to both sides in an appropriate time frame.

 

Q12 Mr. Jenkin: Would not it be true to say that, however brilliant our armed forces have been in Basra, the limitation on the size of the deployment, and on some of the things that they were allowed to do for political reasons, has tested the patience of the Baghdad Government and of our American allies in Baghdad, which is why the conclusion now is that, sizeable as our footprint is there, it is really just too small to make a practical impact in terms that Baghdad feels and understands? That was particularly evident when, during Charge of the Knights, we did not feel we had the capacity to deploy on to the streets of Baghdad when the Americans did.

John Hutton: No, I do not agree with that. I think that our forces and the size of our deployment in Iraq and around Basra now are appropriate for the mission that they are discharging. I also do not believe that it is true or a fair presentation to say that the UK made a minimal or ineffective contribution to Charge of the Knights or in any way contributed to the deterioration of security in and around Basra. I do not accept those criticisms at all.

As far as our coalition partners are concerned, we act in close co-operation and agreement with them about tactics and deployments. We have done so throughout the period that you have described, Bernard, and we will continue to work closely with our allies on all those points to ensure that our mission is effective in Iraq. It has to succeed, it is succeeding and I believe that UK forces on the ground in Basra continue to discharge their role and function with extraordinary professionalism, which I am sure that everyone in this Committee and in the country will be proud of.

 

Q13 Mr. Jenkin: Nobody doubts the last point; that is not the point at issue. However, there is a sense that British armed forces in Basra have not been fully in the loop of decision making in Baghdad. For example, can you tell us the date on which British armed forces in Basra were informed about Charge of the Knights?

John Hutton: That might be something that General Wall will address.

Lieutenant General Wall: Operation Charge of the Knights is something that we could spend a lot of time on. We found out about the operation at approximately the same time that General Petraeus discovered it. It was a hastily put together operation, as we all know. Fortuitously, it turned out to be very successful. I think that, as it unfolded, we were probably apprehensive that it would not work as well as it has. In fact, it has changed the landscape in Basra very considerably, and you have seen that for yourselves.

We could get into a lengthy discourse about what happened on the day; the extent to which British people were bypassed and then pulled into the conduct of the operation, and the extent to which American people, who were mentoring the Iraqi formations that were brought down to Basra to increase the size of Iraqi forces there to make the operation a success, were actually outpaced by the speed at which the Iraqis themselves moved and took a bit of time to catch up. We could go into all of that.

The fact is that, as the Secretary of State has articulated, we now have an extremely vibrant relationship between our forces and the Iraqi 14th Division and a number of other Iraqi agencies around Basra. That relationship is bought into completely by General Austin, the corps commander, and General Odierno, the force commander who recently succeeded General Petraeus, who himself opined that the way that our forces had tailored themselves to the post-Operation Charge of the Knights situation in Basra was a model for the conduct of the mentoring of Iraqi forces around the rest of the country.

So, I do not think that we have anything to be circumspect about in that respect. I think that the size of the force that we have is entirely appropriate for the task that we are seeking to complete. The assessment of the Iraqi 14th Division is very positive. Those who have been down there recently and had a chance to say, "Look at the situation three months ago and compare it with what's going on now," will have seen an exponential increase in the confidence and competence of the Iraqi 14th Division. Things are set fair for our aspirations, as articulated by the Prime Minister in July, to be delivered in the fairly near future.

 

Q14 Robert Key: May I return briefly to the status of forces agreement? Are we negotiating that agreement unilaterally, or in parallel with the United States? Will we have to wait for the United States to conclude their agreement before we conclude ours? Please could you explain how the agreement is operating, because there are only eight weeks to go?

John Hutton: We are discussing that agreement with the Iraqi Government, in parallel with the discussions that they are having with the Americans. We intend to use the basic text that is being settled between the Iraqis and the US forces as the basis upon which we ourselves would reach an agreement with the Iraqis.

 

Q15 Robert Key: How will that affect the coalition navies-the Royal Navy, the US Navy and of course the Australian Navy-that are, of course, fulfilling a vital role at the moment in securing the waterways and also in training the Iraqi navy? Do you anticipate that our British naval forces will stay in those waters after the withdrawal of the British Army?

John Hutton: The agreement would cover the Iraqi territorial waters, of course, and we will obviously have discussions with the Iraqis about the precise nature and mission in support of the Iraqi Navy. However, the status of forces agreement will have to be comprehensive and cover every territorial dimension.

 

Q16 Mr. Keetch: I want to ask a question about what we have heard from my colleagues about the sense that British forces were bypassed and that the Iraqi Prime Minister said that he wants them to leave the country. My constituents ask-I am sure that all constituents ask this-"What are we still doing there?" If our mission is only to train, which is important, and to do movement of the air base, would it not be better to take the troops and put them into Afghanistan, where they are needed all the time?

John Hutton: I dare say that we shall talk about Afghanistan in more detail in a second, but the force levels in and around Basra are necessary for the completion of the mission in the context that I have described. Assuming that we are successful in the two outstanding missions and, as we begin to draw down our forces, which I hope that we shall be able to do early and into next year, what then happens to the forces is a decision that we shall have to make. As for deployments into Afghanistan, if that were an issue, we would turn to our military advisers for advice on whether additional forces were needed in Afghanistan and, if so, what additional forces. There is a strong case to be made for additional helicopter assets in Afghanistan, and obviously there is the opportunity to transfer the Merlin fleet from Iraq for those purposes. There is an obvious need for more helicopter assets in the theatre at Helmand and across Afghanistan as a whole, but we have not made decisions about future and further UK troop deployments into Afghanistan. As for Iraq, we are focused on completing the mission and getting the guys home as soon as that is possible.

David Miliband: Chairman, I wonder whether there is not a missing element in some of our discussion on the three issues that have been raised so far, such as the decision in December in respect of provincial Iraqi control. The whole purpose of provincial Iraqi control was to set the stage for Iraqis to make decisions about their own force deployments and the promotion of security. I am sure on the Defence Select Committee-certainly on the foreign affairs side-there were extensive debates in the run-up to December about the basis on which the provincial Iraqi control decision would be taken. Was it one that included the Americans? Was it one that included the Iraqis? The answer is both cases was yes. Was it based on objective criteria? Yes. Of course, the most extensive discussion was whether it would work.

When British forces vacated the Basra palace, would it be maintained by Iraqi security forces or would it be overrun by militia forces? That decision was taken very carefully and it was taken rightly, as has now been proved, because the training of the 10th Division of the Iraqi army and the partial training of the 14th Division had built up Iraqi capacity to such an extent that they were able to make key decisions and take control of their own affairs. That does not mean that the work is complete, because there remains the work with the Iraqi 14th Division and the airport work. It is important to say that, in respect of Operation Charge of the Knights and whatever the ins and outs of who knew what, and when, it is significant that, after 15 December, we wanted the Iraqis to take those sorts of decisions.

Chairman: We will come to some of the political issues in a minute, but on this area I call Dai Havard.

 

Q17 Mr. Havard: Can I return to the status of forces agreement? If there is not one, the UN mandate expires and there is nothing. Is there a prospect of that being extended? In all the discussions, we have been running a detention facility, part of which has been an internment facility. In terms of the legality of the process of our people on the ground, how is that being catered for in the discussions, and should there not be a status of forces agreement, how will that be protected?

John Hutton: There has to be an understanding between ourselves and Iraq about the status of our forces come the end of the year. That was the view of the Prime Minister of Iraq, and it is also our view. As I said in relation to Robert's question, we are proceeding with detailed negotiations that started after my visit to Baghdad last week to agree terms of reference points on the compass with the Iraqi Government about what a UK SOFA would cover. That work is under way and, as I said, we would use the Iraqi-US text as the benchmark for a UK-Iraq status of forces agreement.

Obviously, if we get closer and closer to the end of the year and a status of forces agreement does not look like it is materialising, we will have to look at other options, including the prospect of the roll over of the UN mandate. Clearly, we should conduct the negotiations with the Iraqis in good faith. The Iraqis are very clear and were very clear to me and the Prime Minister that an agreement has to be reached before the end of the UN mandate. We are proceeding on that basis. In the situation you also referred to, Dai, in the context of detention, we have two detainees. Obviously the legality of that detention has to be properly secured. We would like to return those two to the appropriate jurisdiction of the Iraqi criminal courts. They are accused of murdering two British soldiers several years ago. Their families and all of us in this country want those people to stand trial for the murder of two British servicemen.

As members of the Committee will be aware, there is legal action in the court to test the legality of the transfer of those two detainees into the Iraqi criminal courts. I hope that we can find a way of resolving that pretty quickly. The families need to see justice done. We have clear assurances from the Iraqis about how those two detainees will be treated. We have a clear understanding about the applicability of the death penalty, but I think very, very strongly-it is impossible to put this into words-it is time these two stood trial. That is what we must focus on. Assuming that we can get these issues resolved and the two transferred to Iraqi criminal jurisdiction, we will have no detainees in Iraq.

 

Q18 Sir John Stanley: When the sum is finally made of the political benefits or otherwise of our entry into Iraq, it will rest for most people on what has happened to human rights. It is not difficult to think of some very big human rights pluses as a result of the removal of the nasty, semi-terrorist, one-party regime of Saddam Hussein, but equally some glaring minuses have occurred. Hundreds of thousands of innocent Iraqis have lost their lives; millions have been turned into refugees; religious minorities, not least the Christians, who were tolerated under Saddam Hussein, are now persecuted and terrorised; women's rights have gone backwards; and large numbers of the population have been exposed to rampant criminality. What confidence do you have, Foreign Secretary, that when we leave we will, in human rights terms, be able to say that we have left Iraq better than we found it?

David Miliband: It is important to try to disaggregate different aspects and to look at different parts of the community. If you go to Urbil and talk to the people there about the sense of security that the Kurds feel in the north of Iraq, you will get a very clear picture of the improvement in their human rights and their position. If you talk to people caught up in the sectarian feuding in Baghdad, you will obviously get a different impression. The commitment to an inclusive political system is very strong. The fact that Iraq is helped by the huge revenues that are coming from increasing oil production encourages the spirit of compromise.

The legislative achievements over the past three or four months, notably in respect of provincial elections and other provincial powers, suggest that although you are right to say that the historical ledger will be balanced and there will be some very negative things on the ledger, equally there will be some significantly positive aspects on it, too. I have always said that, in the end, our job is not to review the rights and wrongs of the past five years; it is to make sure that the next five years take forward the positive trends and tackle the negative ones-we have to be open about the fact that there are negative trends as well as positive ones. Not only on the security side, but on the political and economic side there are positive trends on which to build and, gradually, they can surpass the negative ones.

 

Q19 Sir John Stanley: Taking your invitation to look forward, what confidence do you have that the half of the population that is female will fare better under a Shi'a Government in Iraq than under the secular Government that preceded it?

David Miliband: The greatest protection is the equal rights that they are afforded under the Iraqi constitution. It is vital that we ensure that that is followed through in all of our dealings with the Iraqi Government-and, it should be said, in our dealings with Iraq's neighbours, too. That is part of the geopolitics aspect, and it is relevant. The stability of Iraq depends in part on the way its neighbours engage, but the greatest protection for women or for minorities in Iraq-Kurds, Christians and others-comes from their constitutional status and the ability of the Iraqi state to enforce those rights.

 

Q20 Sir John Stanley: I accept your points about what the constitution says, but how adequate a protection is that in real terms? All the evidence so far suggests that, no matter what is written in the constitution, on the ground women in many parts of Iraq are facing a pretty torrid time.

David Miliband: I do not know whether it is right to say "all the evidence". The picture is more balanced than that. When I talked to Des Browne after his visits to Basra or to John after his visit, or when I talk to our own locally employed staff-men and women whom I met in Baghdad-yes, they can point to parts of the country where basic rights are under threat, but equally they can point to parts of the country where those rights are being enforced. The important thing is that we continue to make very clear, not only through the work of John Hutton and myself but through Ann Clwyd's work as the Prime Minister's representative on human rights in Iraq, that that remains a vital part of the conclusion of foreign engagement in Iraq on the military side.

The other thing to say, because I am sure that we will come to this in relation to Afghanistan, is that there are huge differences between Afghanistan and Iraq. That will be a recurring theme in this discussion. We are talking about a rich country and a poor country; a country with defined borders and a country without them; a country with a history of a centralised and effective state and a country without. It is, however, striking that in both contexts the process of building a national army presents one set of challenges, and the process of building a decent police force that is free of corruption and is able to ensure that citizens' rights are protected is a very different story. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the police side is more challenging than the army side, although the Iraqi police force is further ahead than the Afghan one.

Chairman: We will come to Afghanistan later.

 

Q21 Mr. Heathcoat-Amory: I would like to ask our witnesses about the number and status of prisoners in Iraq, specifically the number of detainees-people in detention who have not been charged with or convicted of a crime. How many detainees are there in Iraq, and how many of them were detained by British forces and handed over to the Iraqi Government or to other coalition forces?

John Hutton: I will ask the general to come to that, but as far as UK detainees are concerned, as I said earlier, there are only two. In the context of US detainees, I think that there are more than 20,000. I could not comment on the number of those who may at some point have been detained by UK security forces, but as I said, we only have two detainees. We are not fulfilling a role that involves detaining any more Iraqis on the UK base, but-

 

Q22 Mr. Heathcoat-Amory: I need to know the number of detainees originally detained by British forces. That is a figure that we must have.

John Hutton: As I said, at the moment, there are only two, but as for the total number that have been detained historically, I do not have it. I do not know whether-

Lieutenant General Wall: We will have to go through our records and offer you some evidence in writing, if we may, on both those issues: first, as the Secretary of State said, those whom we have detained held in our own internment facility in the south and subsequently released in accordance with the formal procedures that we have been running; and, secondly, those whom we may have passed into American or Iraqi custody.

 

Q23 Mr. Heathcoat-Amory: I am rather surprised that you do not have that number, given the damage done to the coalition effort by past ill-treatment of Iraqi detainees, but the Chairman and I look forward to receiving the numbers. Let me ask an allied question-

Lieutenant General Wall: Can I come back on that point? We only pass detainees to those people about whom we have absolute assurances on handling and contact. We are in regular contact with the International Committee of the Red Cross and others about how that is done, and we have very clear-cut memorandums of understanding with other parties. I can reassure you that that is being properly conducted.

 

Q24 Mr. Heathcoat-Amory: That touches my second question. Are we certain that those assurances are valid, and do you accept that we have a responsibility under human rights legislation, including the Human Rights Act 1998, for the subsequent treatment of detainees? In other words, when we capture somebody in Iraq and hand them over, whether to American forces or the Iraqi Government, we retain a responsibility. We must not just receive an assurance, but we must follow that through to ensure that they are not subject to inhuman and degrading treatment.

John Hutton: Yes.

 

Q25 Mr. Heathcoat-Amory: You accept that that is our responsibility. Are you sure that ,on the ground, people who have been detained by British forces are not subsequently ill treated?

John Hutton: We are. With your indulgence, Chairman, I will have to set out more detail on this matter for the Committee in writing. I am happy to do that. We expect the highest standards to be followed and we always look for clear agreements from the Iraqi security authorities that the proper procedures will be followed. That is important.

 

Q26 Chairman: I want to be clear about what has just been said. Several hundred people were detained in 2003-04, and many will have been passed on to the Americans or the Iraqis or released. In recent months and years, there has been a considerable rundown of the numbers of people who are held. Secretary of State, are you saying that there are currently only two?

John Hutton: Yes, that is true. I think that the general would like to add more detail.

Lieutenant General Wall: You are right, Mr. Gapes, that at one point we had several hundred people in our detainee internment facility in Basra. Through a regular review process, those for whom there was not a strong case for retaining as detainees were released. The majority were set free rather than handed over to other authorities. At one point, we got down to zero. The two people that the Secretary of State has mentioned were then detained. For our own legal reasons, we are keen to pursue the prosecution of those two people.[1]

Chairman: That is helpful. It would be helpful if you could send us a note with more information.

 

Q27 Mr. Jenkin: I have two brief points. We were told on a visit that it was very circumspect to have what they called the healing hand of an American serviceman on the shoulder of the detainee at the point of arrest, because that meant that we would not have primary responsibility for the detainee; the Americans would, which was much more convenient than having the responsibility ourselves. Is one of the reasons for the numbers going down that the Americans have been making the arrests and not us?

Lieutenant General Wall: No, the reason they have gone down is that recent operations in Basra have been conducted primarily by Iraqi forces. It is they who have been detaining people, where appropriate.

John Hutton: In fact, the number of US detainees has been falling, not rising.

 

Q28 Mr. Jenkin: Another aspect that we learned about on our visits is that we feel legally obliged to keep our detainees in substantially better conditions than we house our own armed forces. In particular, we are obliged to keep detainees in hardened accommodation, whereas many of our soldiers living in Basra are in unhardened accommodation. How do you feel about that anomaly, Foreign Secretary?

David Miliband: I would like the general to set out the full facts first, and I will then tell you my view. The situation is more complicated than you have just described.

Lieutenant General Wall: Because of the requirement to satisfy international standards for the holding of detainees, you are absolutely right that some of the accommodation for some of the time has been better than that enjoyed by some of our soldiers living in ad hoc locations out in the desert and so on. That is unavoidable.

Mr. Jenkin: In the contingency operating base too.

Lieutenant General Wall: In Basra air station, that is not the case at the moment. All of our people are living in hardened accommodation.

David Miliband: You asked me a direct question. It is important to put it on the record that that relates to some of our people, some of the time. It is important that people do not get the impression that there is a policy of putting our people at greater risk than those we are required to look after. There is a commitment that our troops, diplomats and aid workers from the Department for International Development will have the highest possible standards of security. You referred to comfort or living standards, but the example you gave related to their security-the hardness of their accommodation. In relation both the security of their accommodation and their living conditions, we obviously want the highest possible standards for our own people.

 

Q29 Sir Menzies Campbell: Would the information available to you reveal whether any of those who were detained by British forces ultimately found themselves in Guantanamo Bay?

Lieutenant General Wall: We have conducted a study recently and I can confirm that that is not the case, but we shall include that in the evidence we provide.

 

Q30 Chairman: Can I ask you about the prospects for the forthcoming elections in Iraq? How confident are you, given the great difficulty that there was in agreeing an election law and the internal divisions within the Iraqi Government and Parliament, that the timetable and system will stick and that the elections will be free and fair?

David Miliband: I spoke to our ambassador in Iraq today and our conversation included this issue. For the sake of clarity, the provincial elections are scheduled for January and the national elections for September/October next year. I think it is very significant that the Sunni groups have rejoined the national Government. That has set the stage for quite a bit of the legislative change that has gone through over the past few months.

I think that the political manoeuvring that is going on around Iraq in advance of the provincial elections is very encouraging, because political manoeuvring is precisely what politicians should do, at least some of the time. The preparations that they are making for the elections in Iraq speak to the commitment of an increasing range of groups to the electoral process there. Certainly in Basra, the range of Shi'a groups who are trying to make sure that they are properly positioned for the elections in January is significant. The various Sunni factions are also preparing for the provincial elections. There is a high degree of confidence that the provincial elections will be a good advertisement for the improvements in Iraq. The national elections, obviously, are significantly further ahead, but the improvements in the security position-and again this may be a parallel that will come back to you later in the discussion-all point towards successful elections next year.

 

Q31 Chairman: Can I take this a step further? The national reconciliation has been pretty sporadic, has not it? There have been some successes but there are also clearly some very difficult unresolved issues, including Kirkuk and attitudes to de-Ba'athification. How confident are you that the reintegration of the so-called Sons of Iraq, who were mentioned earlier, or former Ba'athists, will be successful?

David Miliband: There are quite a lot of issues bundled there. Did you mention the Sons of Iraq? They are now being paid by the Iraqi Government and there are significant plans for incorporating a large number of them into the Iraqi Army-there cannot be a commitment to all of them, but it will be a significant number; the figure of 10,000 is in my head from the briefing. That is welcome and significant.

In respect of a range of other groups and the electoral process, it is important to remember that the previous provincial elections were boycotted by a significant number of groups, with a turnout of less than 1% from those communities. I think we have come a long way from that position over the past five years.

 

Q32 Chairman: What about de-Ba'athification-the new law?

David Miliband: We all know that the decisions taken in 2003 were some of the most controversial decisions taken in the immediate aftermath of the war. The fact that the new laws have gone through is a symptom of the fact that a spirit of political compromise has been established at national level. However, as I was saying to Sir John Stanley about constitutional rights, it is one thing to write them, and another thing to put them into practice. The fairest thing to say about the de-Ba'athification law is that it is good that it is law, but now it has got to be put into practice. It is something where the proof of the pudding will be in the eating.

Chairman: We will move on to some economics-related questions.

Q33 Mr. Purchase: Before we move to that topic, let me say that although the Foreign Secretary suggested in response to questions from Sir John Stanley that we are not looking at the past, I would say that we have to learn some very serious lessons from the past about how all the episodes in Iraq have been conducted militarily and civil society-wise.

At the heart of all of this is the struggle for resources, or economics. I wonder whether either the Secretary of State for Defence or the Foreign Secretary want to give their assessment of the battle for resources, how it is going, and what the prospects are for some equitable distribution in Iraq and for the Iraqis to control the process for themselves.

David Miliband: There are significant prospects, not just in Basra where we have the most effort but all around the country. In part, that is a function of oil production, which is now up to 2.5 million barrels a day-more or less the same as pre-2003 levels. It is a source of massive income for Iraq. The fact that in Iraq we are talking about the distribution of tens of billions of dollars shows the scale of the economy that is in prospect. However, it is not only in oil that Iraq has a significant economic base: its people are very well educated and it has a significant economic history.

One of the areas where we have to try to make a contribution is Iraq's trading operations with its neighbours. It is striking that one of the blockages to the efforts of the Basra Development Commission, which is keen to take forward its work, is the blockage on Iraq-Kuwait trade. Part of the work that we have been doing in the Foreign Office is with the Iraqis and the Kuwaitis and, significantly, the Turks, who have significant aspirations for investment in the Basra area, to try to open up Iraq-Kuwait trade. Some of the early signs of progress are quite significant.

There is a wealth-creating base, but we need to make sure that it has the capacity for export as well as domestic consumption.

John Hutton: I would add two things to that, Ken. The future of Basra international airport will be very important. The airport will be a key facilitator for some of the wider economic development that we around this table, in this room, would want to see in southern Iraq.

The work of the Basra Development Commission and the Basra Investment Promotion Agency will be very important, and we will be looking to provide the maximum possible support in those areas. I would like more British companies to get interested in Iraq and the opportunities for development there. As the Foreign Secretary said, the potential is enormous. I think particularly of the Basra area.

As our military mission changes, and it is changing, we have to focus on this new aspect of our relationship with Iraq, but, as the Defence Secretary, I would say that the essential precondition for our now being able to have this conversation about economic development and opportunities-they are huge-was making significant progress on the security front. Without that progress, it would be very hard to talk to British companies, for example, about the opportunities for investment in and around Basra.

The recent agreement that Shell made with the Iraqi Government on gas flow is a harbinger, I hope, of similar deals, particularly around the energy sector. We should be and we are resolved to focus on this in the months and years ahead. We should try to maximise the opportunities for British companies to do good business in Iraq, for the mutual benefit of themselves and, not least important, Iraqi citizens.

 

Q34 Mr. Purchase: I am pleased to hear you say "good business", because that is the key to future peaceful development in Iraq. In the meantime, of course, there are some serious delays in the work on the hydrocarbon law. It is understood that major companies are awaiting development of that law before they make investment decisions. I hope that there will be interesting times for British businesses and that they will be able to conduct their business fairly, but what assessment do you make of the lack of progress on the hydrocarbon law?

David Miliband: The hydrocarbon law has just been referred again to the Council of Representatives, but before we get too excited about that, we have to remember that it was first referred to the council about 18 months ago and has been stuck in limbo since then. I completely share your frustration about this. The truth is that there is an argument going on about the division of the spoils, but the spoils are so large as to make it worth all sides getting on with the division and with making a living.

I think that the lack of trust that has existed between the different parts of the governing coalition is a contribution to that. All I can say to you is that we press very hard at every opportunity for all sides to recognise the opportunity as well as the responsibility that exists to get a hydrocarbons law through. It was right that the provincial powers law had to go through first, but there remains an overwhelming case for the passage of the hydrocarbons law.

Kirkuk was mentioned earlier and that is a very important part of this. The work of UN Representative di Mistura is critical to getting the Kirkuk question settled. It is not for us to settle it; it is for Iraqis to settle it, but it does require, in the end, a compromise. The danger at the moment is that the best will be the enemy of the good for each of the different factions. In fact, even with the oil price where it is today rather than where it was four months ago, it is well worth their doing the deal and getting the compromise, because the resources are very substantial.

 

Q35 Mr. Borrow: Is it the view of the Government that, given the scale of the resources available to the Iraqi Government, the role of the UK in terms of its bilateral relationships is not to build some of the infrastructure or provide resources to build the infrastructure that is needed, but to expect the Iraqi Government to use their own resources for that infrastructure, and that our role is very much one of providing advice and expertise to assist them in doing that, rather than providing direct aid to a country that should have the potential to provide aid to other countries, rather than expecting it from the UK and other western countries?

David Miliband: Yes, that is the right perspective. It is not a poverty-stricken country; it is a middle-income country that is able to generate some resources.

 

Q36 Mr. Keetch: Gentlemen, may I ask about some of the regional issues that we face, starting with Iran? Back in April, General Petraeus said that basically Iran was fighting a "proxy war" against the Iraqi state and coalition forces-that it was arming the Jaish al-Mahdi and other special groups. By August, General Lloyd Austin, the US No. 2, said that the JAM was "relatively inactive". Indeed, a congressional report said that it was believed that the Iranian influence was "fading". Do you share the view that the Iranian influence on the ground in Iraq is fading?

John Hutton: I shall ask General Wall to comment on that specifically, but let me offer one or two observations. We have to watch that space very carefully indeed. That is partly a security issue, around the border in particular, and it is about how we can make sure we do not see reinfiltration of the JAM and the special groups back into Basra and the surrounding area. Operations have been conducted to try to intercept that. We have to be very vigilant on that.

On the political space, as I am sure the Foreign Secretary would confirm, we have always made clear to Iran what we think about its involvement in these areas. We do not like it, and we have been very specific about that. It is totally unacceptable for foreign countries to support armed militias that stand outside the political process and are dedicated to undermining the political progress that is being made, and we have been very clear about that. Specifically in relation to current issues relating to the JAM and special groups, perhaps General Wall will say something.

Lieutenant General Wall: It is absolutely right to say that these rogue elements of Jaish al-Mahdi, special groups or whatever we want to call them now, are much less in evidence on a day-to-day basis in Basra than they were a year ago, almost to the point where the main causes of instability in Basra-those are very limited at the moment; they are almost absent altogether-have much more to do with criminal activity and a little bit of internecine score settling. However, I do not think that these rogue elements, who were very active against us, as you will recall, last summer with indirect fire and over the early part of the winter with improvised explosive devices and so on, have gone dormant for good. There is a sense that they may well have regrouped to an extent and may well be receiving specialist training, probably sponsored by the Iranians, and that they therefore could re-engage, should they have the motivation to do so, while we remain operating in and around Basra alongside Iraqi security forces, so there is still a latent threat there, I assess.

 

Q37 Mr. Keetch: So although we could say that there is no threat currently, it certainly has not gone away. Are we as convinced as we ever were that there is a direct Iranian link to that potential threat?

Lieutenant General Wall: We would be very rash to assume that it had gone away for good, and it is a reasonable assumption that there is Iranian orchestration.

 

Q38 Mr. Keetch: May I quickly ask about the threat on the sea? We are all familiar with what happened to the Royal Navy a little while ago in its dealings with some of the maritime special groups. Has the threat level on the seas and waterways declined in the same way, or been withdrawn, as it has perhaps on land?

John Hutton: It has, as far as I know.

Lieutenant General Wall: We have to be extremely cautious in that respect, and we have resumed the patrolling that was going on at the time that the RN15 incident happened. Our sense is that the risks are not as evident as they were then, but we should not assume that that sort of capability could not be recreated, not so much by the Iraqi navy as by the republican guard.

David Miliband: May I come in on the political side? All Iraq's neighbours have long-standing and deep economic, cultural and sometimes family ties with Iraq, and those are legitimate. What is not legitimate is the support of armed groups that are trying to undermine the elected Iraqi Government. What is happening is that Iraq's neighbours are slowly coming to terms with the growing strength of the Iraqi Government. We see that in the meetings of Iraq's neighbours. If we compare last year's meetings with this year's, Iraq is more self-confident, and its neighbours are having to adapt their positions a little to Iraq's growing assets and strengths. That is not to say that Iraq is in a position to define all the relationships that it has with others, but it is now a more equal relationship than it was two or three years ago-and possibly even a year ago. In that sense, the growth of Iraqi capacity and the development of Iraqi wealth and politics is able to make the weather; and that is a very good thing.

 

Q39 Richard Younger-Ross: May I touch on the potential for internal conflict? The Foreign Secretary mentioned the oil wealth in Kirkuk. The Kurds will always argue that they were in Kirkuk and were pushed out by Saddam. The Iraqi Government will argue that it is a mixed area at the moment. The Kurds have put their forces into Kirkuk, and the Iraqi army had to move in to persuade the Kurds to withdraw. What threat is there of internal conflict in that case; and, if so, what is being done to avert it?

David Miliband: Do you mean armed conflict?

Richard Younger-Ross: Yes.

David Miliband: I think that the different parts of Iraq and the different communities there know better than anyone the costs of conflict, so there are big incentives to avoid it. However, it remains the case that in various ways, Iraq is a deeply violent society, and it would be wrong to pretend that it is the sort of terrain that any of us would recognise from home.

However, I believe that the forces of division are significantly more contained than they were a year or two ago, that the commitment of the political representatives of the various communities is greater than it was a year or two ago, and that the benefits of maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq are significant-and, equally important, more visibly significant to the different communities. At this stage, I do not see any community seeing its future as opting out of the Iraq state.

John Hutton: There is an obvious security situation as well. It was crystallised recently with the attacks on the Christian community. The Iraqi Government responded very strongly in an Iraqi-led security operation backed up by US forces. There are other issues. You mentioned Kirkuk, but I would put Mosul on to the table as well. Ongoing concerns there are being addressed. Mosul is part of Iraq where there is a continuing al-Qaeda presence. We have to be conscious of all those things.

 

Q40 Richard Younger-Ross: In terms of Kurdish politics, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the Kurds would fight each other, let alone fight Saddam's forces. Are all the Kurdish parties united in the view that they will work for a mixed Kirkuk?

David Miliband: That would be a large claim. In my two visits to Irbil, and in meetings here with Prime Minister Barzani, I have emphasised that there is a huge amount to be gained from opting in to Baghdad politics and by trying to strike bargains on Kirkuk and elsewhere. I would not want to say that all aspects are therefore committed to unity, but the Kurdistan Regional Government has given a strong message about its commitments, which now need to be seen through.

 

Q41 Mr. Havard: There is a report from the International Crisis Group today that suggests a deal called "Oil for Soil". It suggests a trade-off of resources. That report has come out this afternoon and I received it before I came to the sitting-I am not trying to trap you. The idea is that the Kurds would become, if you like, an argument deferred. I spent a week in Baghdad last November arguing about the provincial elections process. Is the elections process not the thing that will help to reconcile the different groups?

David Miliband: As we discussed earlier, the provincial elections and the political positioning that is going on are healthy signs and a good thing. There remain issues within Iraq about Kirkuk and, if you are talking about the Kurds, with the PKK and terrorism in Turkey and the Turkish Government's military response. That is why it is important to be pretty sober about working against the violence in Iraq and about all factions and communities opting in to the political system. Yes, the elections are a vital way in which to divide the spoils.

 

Q42 Chairman: We will move on to Afghanistan in one minute, but I have a final question on Iraq. You saw the Syrian Foreign Minister yesterday. One of the problems that Syria and Jordan raise is the very large number of refugees-a total of more than 2 million. Is there any possibility that the Government will assist either Jordan or Syria to cope with the huge burden that they are dealing with at the moment?

David Miliband: I had a very useful three hours of talks with the Syrian Foreign Minister yesterday and you will have seen from the joint statement that we put out a specific reference to the 1.5 million Iraqi refugees in Syria. He did not raise with me the question of British assistance for the return of those people; it is a bilateral matter for Iraq and Syria. Obviously, I emphasised the importance of Syria continuing to crack down on the flow of fighters and arms into Iraq, which is a significant part of developing Iraq's security.

 

Q43 Chairman: What about Jordan? Is there any possibility that we will help Jordan, which is not a particularly wealthy country, and is a close ally and friend of ours?

David Miliband: That is not something that the Jordanians have raised with us on the shopping list of bilateral issues. Obviously, there are several hundred thousand Iraqi refugees in Jordan, but the matter has not been at the heart of our relationship.

Chairman: Fair enough. Let us move on to Afghanistan.

 

Q44 Mr. Arbuthnot: Afghanistan, as you said earlier, presents a much more challenging environment than Iraq. How would you assess the security situation? Is it more or less stable than a year ago?

David Miliband: Do you want me to answer that?

Mr. Arbuthnot: Actually, an answer from both of you would be helpful.

David Miliband: John should say something on that, because he has just come back from Afghanistan. The truthful answer is that the situation is different in different parts of the country, and it is important to separate reality from perception. To that extent, there is a propaganda war as well as a real war.

As an overview, one can say that in conventional fighting, the coalition forces, including ours, more than hold their own. The Taliban and its various groups were decisively repulsed on a number of occasions. That explains the turn of the Taliban to traditional insurgency tactics and why many people now describe the operation as a more conventional counter-insurgency operation than as a traditional military operation. It is also important to recognise that there is a particular set of dynamics in Kabul, where there have been high-profile attacks on aid workers, not on the military.

That is the overview, and we can now get into the different situation in different parts of the country. The truth is that the situation in the east has significantly improved, including in the last few months. We were looking at figures on that this morning, so we can talk about the east, about terrorist attacks on individuals in Kabul and we can talk in detail about the situation in Helmand, but the important point today is that in the conventional theatre, the conventional confrontation, coalition forces win decisively. There is no evidence of the Taliban rolling back gains that have been made by coalition forces.

Equally, it is important to say that the new asymmetric tactics being used by the insurgency are difficult to fight against and pose a different kind of challenge. They challenge the minds of the Afghan people, as well as challenging them physically. That is why the Afghans want to hear a clear message that we recognise that this is a long-term mission, and that it is an economic, social and political mission as well as a military one. Also, as I keep saying, our forces and those of other countries are making an enormous difference, because if they were not there, it is clear that there would be a decisive victory for the other side, notwithstanding the gains-which I hope we will talk about-in building up the Afghan national army. From most of the reports that I have read, from the different Committees and the statements that people have made, most of the people in this room recognise that the Afghan national army, which is 60,000 or so-strong at the moment, is one of the vital signs of hope in Afghanistan.

John Hutton: There is not much I would add to that, other than that it is obviously the case in the south, where Task Force Helmand is based, that there has been an increase in violence aimed at us and our Afghan security partners. As David said, I was there last week, and I know that many of you guys have been there yourselves and seen it on the ground. Despite the increase in violence, however, there are reasons to be clear that we are continuing to make progress. Although it sounds paradoxical-an increased level of violence, but signs of progress elsewhere-that is often the hallmark of some insurgency campaigns. In addition to the work of our forces, which deserves the highest praise, the progress that struck me most when I was in Helmand is the growing capability of the Afghan national army, which is visible in Helmand. It took the lead recently, as you will know, in operations around Lashkar Gah, when the Taliban attempted to raid the city. It proved itself to be a highly effective and capable force of men, so we are seeing an increased capability on the Afghan side. Governor Mangal continues to do an exceptionally good job in leading the civilian reconstruction work, and some of the political processes that are essential adjuncts to the security operations that we have mounted.

In Kabul itself, my understanding is that there has been a reduction in the number of violent incidents. I know that there are problems in some of the surrounding districts. David is quite right, it is a huge mistake to over-generalise. There is evidence of progress, but there is also evidence of how tough this campaign is going to be on the security side; the Taliban are well resourced and they are fighting us hard.

 

Q45 Mr. Arbuthnot: May I ask if you will accept that it is your job to set out a narrative of what we are doing there, in such a way as to convince the British public first, that we have right on our side, and secondly, that we have a strategy that is likely to succeed? So far, that seems to be a bit of an uphill struggle. What do you think needs to be done to put that right?

David Miliband: The way I would put it is, first, the British people want to know that we have a clear rationale for being there. I think the rationale is provided by the fact that in the '90s, Afghanistan became the home for al-Qaeda. That is the founding rationale for our mission in Afghanistan. Secondly, what is that mission? It is to make sure that the Afghan Government are able to provide their own security, so that they are not overrun by the Taliban and its allies, which would create a safe space for al-Qaeda, so there is a clear mission there. Thirdly, a rationale and a mission need a strategy, which must be a comprehensive strategy, not simply a military one.

It is important to draw attention to the Prime Minister's statement last December, which set out in some detail a comprehensive approach. That approach covers the economic, the political, the social, but also the military. Those four factors need to work together, with a different balance in different parts of the country. What has become more evident over the past 10 months since the Prime Minister's statement is the interdependence of the situation in Afghanistan with that in Pakistan. If we had been having this meeting last year, we would have talked about Pakistan, but probably not with the importance that it has today. I guess that it is common ground between us that stability and security in Afghanistan will not be achieved without stability and security in Pakistan and vice versa. Therefore, the comprehensive strategy needs to be applied on both sides of the border.

After apologising for the length of my answer, I turn to the final question of the capacity of the international forces and the home forces-Afghan and Pakistani-to implement the strategy. It is right to say that over the past three or four months the international community has had a responsibility to raise its game. The appointment of Kai Eide as the UN representative filled a void that existed for too long. Moreover, there was the unification of command under General McKiernan of the ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom functions.

There is also a need for the Afghan and Pakistani Governments to up their game. John met Afghanistan's new Interior Minister who has the vital job of improving Afghanistan's governing capacity. We have also had contacts with President Zardari in the months since he took office. His Government need to have governing capacity as well. In the end, the two Governments need to work together. One thing that was not happening this time last year, but is happening now, is that the Afghan and Pakistani Governments are working together. Under the previous regime in Pakistan, there was mutual suspicion, not to say hatred. The fact that President Zardari and President Karzai are now seeking to work together and that today is the day of the mini Jirga, which brings together the two countries, is something that needs to be built on.

 

Q46 Mr. Keetch: Following that point, Foreign Secretary, we have asked you in the past about raising the game of some of our colleagues out there. The reality is that no one around this table doubts the commitment of the British forces. We welcome the improvement of the Afghan forces, but are we really seeing greater involvement of other NATO countries on the ground? Until those countries start to play their role, we will not see a real transformation. Group after group have said the same. The New York Times said in October that there was a downward spiral. General Riley told the Defence Committee in July that no one could say that we were winning. Our own Foreign Affairs Committee heard very concerning reports at the UN just a couple of weeks ago. Unless and until we see our NATO allies playing their full role, we will not see a real turnaround in the situation.

David Miliband: It is important that we do not just see this as a binary divide by which either you are doing your job or you are not. There is a range of ways in which we want more countries to do more. However, there have been significant developments since I last appeared before the FAC, including the decision of the French Government to increase their capacity, and the incorporation of the French into the heart of NATO command structures, which should happen at the 60th anniversary of NATO meetings next April. We want all countries to play their maximum role. Some of the smaller European countries have high numbers per head of the population-Croatia is in my mind. I know that it is not yet a European country, but it has aspirations to be a member of the European Union-and they are there without caveats. I am thinking also of Estonia.

It is also important to say that it is not just a military mission. The economic, political, social and development roles are important as well. You veered into the question that James Arbuthnot started with, which is the question whether we are winning or losing. John says that there is progress, but there is real struggle in different parts of the country and we need to disaggregate that to see that this is a fight to test the strength of both the Afghan Government and the coalition forces in different ways.

 

Q47 Mr. Moss: On the occasion of the Foreign Affairs Committee visit to the United Nations, to which Paul Keetch just alluded, we heard rather disquieting evidence from a senior Afghan diplomat about the security situation in Helmand province deteriorating literally by the week. In fact, he told us that, at the time he was speaking, there was only one district in the whole of the province under Government control. Is that still the case?

John Hutton: It does not correspond to my understanding of the situation. I would be grateful to receive more information from you about that. We have a security presence in eight of the 13 districts in Helmand province and, as I said in my answer to the original question from James, in addition to the work of the ISAF forces, which are doing some fantastic work with the Estonians, the Danes, ourselves and the Canadians in Regional Command South, we are seeing a growing a capability on the part of the Afghan National Army itself. First and foremost, that has to be one of our critically important objectives. It is not my view of the situation that, in the way you have put it, there is only one district under effective Afghan-governed control in Helmand, no.

 

Q48 Mr. Moss: If the situation was better than we were told, why is it reported that the commander of Task Force Helmand asked for an additional 4,000 men to help in the province?

Lieutenant General Wall: He was reported on Sky News as having opined that if he had more forces, he could make use of them in terms of increasing the proportion of Helmand both geographically and by the percentage of the population that can be secured over time and enjoy Afghan governance. However, we need to be absolutely clear about the case for increased force levels in a general sense in Afghanistan. The case can be made, but it needs to be linked to progress in a number of other areas, particularly in relation to the business of governance. There is no point in making the investment of securing more space and effectively increasing the perimeter you are defending against random Taliban incursions-let us be clear that that is all it can manage to do at the moment and that the Taliban cannot win this campaign militarily, no way-unless you are in a position to move in the governance reconstruction and stabilisation effects. These have to be inspired by the Afghans themselves. We have learned that quickly this year in particular. If we do it for them and they stand by and watch, it just does not count; it is just another bit of concrete. However, if it is something that is used as a vehicle for engendering Afghan governance at a tribal and district level, it has a significant resonance.

At the moment, the area that we are holding as part of this clear, hold and build strategy is just about consistent with the Afghan Government and Governor Mangal's ability to deliver some form of governance within that area. As we have always said, this is going to be sequential, incremental and gradual and will take quite a bit of time. That is how it will be done. The notion that you make progress by flooding in more forces in the short term without all those other factors being able to be brought to bear is, we believe, misleading.

 

Q49 Chairman: A number of my colleagues want to come in on that point. I will try to get everybody in, but can I just clarify something, Lieutenant General? You said "the area we are holding." Could you give us some indication of how big that area is?

Lieutenant General Wall: It is the main swath of the Helmand valley. It is five key districts-from Garmsir in the south up through Lashkar Gah up to Gerishk, Sangin and Musa Qala. Unfortunately, it encompasses a large proportion of the agricultural land available for agricultural purposes and more than 60% of the population of Helmand, which by the way, is the biggest province in Afghanistan and is more than half the size of the whole of regional command east. This is not a trivial undertaking or achievement.

 

Q50 Chairman: Is it true, however, that the five districts to which you refer have come under attack to the extent that provincial buildings and Government facilities have been destroyed? Would it be correct to say that from day to day, or week to week, those areas vary, depending on what the situation is?

Lieutenant General Wall: No, that would be misleading. The one thing that is significant about the effort is that it has been incrementally moving in only one direction, with the exception of Musa Qala, which, as we know, has changed hands and is now, yet again, in Government hands, fortuitously. The Secretary of State was there the other day and can vouch for that. That was the fourth district that we had secured. I do not see any prospect of those reverting to strong Taliban influence.

The fifth one, Garmsir, has been brought about this year by the work of the American marines, who came to Helmand and did some excellent work, and we now have that perimeter secured as well. That is in the southern part of the tract that I have described.

 

Q51 Mr. Illsley: On that point, you said that the ISAF forces control five of the 13 Helmand provinces. I do not want to keep coming back to this, but we were told on 7 October, quite clearly, by the Afghan UN ambassador that we controlled only one province in Helmand out of the 13: we had controlled four in the previous weeks but they had fallen and we only controlled one. So the impression that we got from that meeting in New York was that we had little control over Helmand, which tends to contradict what you are saying to us now.

Lieutenant General Wall: I think that is fair.

 

Q52 Mr. Illsley: Foreign Secretary, on Pakistan and Afghanistan, and our forces and the Taliban, when the Foreign Affairs Committee was in Afghanistan three or four years ago, we were told that some of the former warlords still held their own private standing armies. For example, in the north of Afghanistan, one former warlord had a standing private army of 8,000 men, which is a substantial number given the number of NATO forces in Afghanistan at any time. Given their control of narcotics, borders, customs duties and so on, some warlords had incomes in the order of £250 million per annum, which funded the private armies. Is that still an issue in Afghanistan? Are those people part of an equation? Is the tribal nature of the country such that, at any time, those people could go offside again and become part of the insurgency? What are we doing to try to keep them onside?

David Miliband: That is a very good point. The short answer is yes, but be careful with a short answer with such a complex situation. First, I try not to refer to "the Taliban", because it is a complex beast and it is important to be clear about that from the outset. So when the Afghan Government talk about reconciliation and those affiliated with the Taliban who are willing to engage and play by the constitutional rules, they are making sense, because some are criminal associates of the Taliban, some are ideologically committed and some have personal links. It is important to recognise that it is a complicated picture.

Secondly, the insurgency to which you referred in Afghanistan involves a wide range of groups. It involves some al-Qaeda and a range of Taliban groups and includes a set of criminal elements. I would not describe the warlords, in your phrase, as part of the insurgency, but they are certainly beyond the control of the state. It is also true that the tribal nature of Afghanistan's society is, in some ways, its defining feature and it would be wrong to pretend that that has disappeared or been eradicated. Afghanistan has never had a central Government in Kabul whose writ has run right across the country. Until we went to Helmand there was no Government presence there. That brings home the scale of what is being done. That is even before you get into the business of the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistan Taliban, and the differences between them, which one can do.

The short answer is yes, a significant number of arms remains; yes, there remains a significant tribal nature to the society; yes, although one has to be careful when using the word "armies", there are a significant number of armed people under control; and, yes, in some parts the narcotics industry funds that. The fact that 18 provinces are now poppy-free is obviously significant and good, but there are significant links. That is why is right, in some ways, to talk about narco-terrorism.

John Hutton: It is also important to note that the NATO Ministers in Budapest had a lengthy discussion about the impact of narco-terrorism on the campaign in Afghanistan. We made decisions there about refocusing effort and support for the Afghan police authorities in tackling this issue. We provide significant support to boost Afghan capabilities in tackling narco-crime. Is there more that we need to do? I am sure that there is, and we need to find the right way forward on that. There is an indissoluble link between narco-crime and the insurgency, and if we are serious about making progress there, we have to be serious in this area too. I can report to the Committee that it is the very clear view of the new Interior Minister that this is one of his priorities for action. We all have to focus on this issue, and we all have to see some progress on it. We are determined to work with the Afghans to do exactly that.

 

Q53 Mr. Holloway: Is not all this a little delusional? How on earth are we to make this work if we continue to support a deeply corrupt and inept Government? One person not unknown to Her Majesty's payroll said the other day that we started off with a strategic insurgency out of Quetta, and what we have got now in Helmand is a peasants' revolt. How are we to solve this problem if we continue to have the kind of Government that there is in Kabul at the moment?

John Hutton: No, I do not think that our strategy in Afghanistan can be described in the way that you have described it. I think that it is pretty hard-headed and that we know the areas where we need to see improvements. We do not kid ourselves about that.

 

Q54 Mr. Holloway: What about the Kabul Government and corruption?

David Miliband: Corruption in and around the Government, or corruption that is associated with the Government, is raised in every single meeting that any member of the British Government has with the Kabul or other authorities.

 

Q55 Mr. Jenkin: So what?

David Miliband: So what? The first suggestion was that we do not recognise corruption as a big issue, but we do. It is important, indeed central, not just to our confidence but to the confidence of the Afghan people in their Government. Secondly, the long-awaited move of Mr. Atmar into the Interior Ministry has been central to the argument about the need for the Afghan Government to crack down on corruption. Thirdly, this has to take place locally as well as nationally, so, yes, there are responsibilities on Kabul, but there are also responsibilities down the line, hence the importance of the gubernatorial structure-the governors of each province. Frankly, if you have clean governance at a provincial level, that makes a huge difference, and anyone you talk to in Helmand will tell you that the presence of Governor Mangal in Helmand is a significant change.

 

Q56 Mr. Holloway: Precisely, so how can we have any chance of winning when we have a President whose only telephone number in Helmand province is that of Sher Mohammed? How are we going to win with a Government in support of such a Government?

David Miliband: It is important to put on record that President Karzai is the elected leader of the Afghan people, and that that is why we deal with him.

 

Q57 Mr. Holloway: Yes, but do we want to win?

David Miliband: Secondly, the idea that he has only one contact in Helmand would be a surprise to anyone who has spent any time in his company.

 

Q58 Mr. Holloway: I think you know what I am saying.

David Miliband: Is it right that we are absolutely robust about the responsibilities from top to bottom of Afghan government and Afghan society to recognise the cancer of corruption and what needs to be done about it? Yes, we are, and we are at one with you in trying to make sure that not only our views, but the views of the international community, and, critically, of the Afghan people, are also put clearly.

 

Q59 Mr. Heathcoat-Amory: All successful wars need precise war aims, which, when achieved, terminate the campaign. I understood that British intervention in Afghanistan is tied to our own security and to denying international terrorism a platform, but that seems to have become, by process of expansion, an aim of pacifying an enormous country and of propping up a weak Government when the country has seldom in its entire history been properly unified. We have seen a process of mission creep. Is there not a case for redefining our aims much more precisely, and linking them to our own security?

David Miliband: David, I have had this pleasure before when I have come to a meeting of the Committee and said something at the beginning to define our position, but half an hour later you have accused me of saying something that pretends that you were not in the room when I said it.

I used the phrase, "What is our rationale in Afghanistan?" in answer to James Arbuthnot 28 minutes ago, at the start of the Afghan part of the session. I said that our rationale was completely linked to the fact that if Afghanistan became a home for al-Qaeda to launch attacks on the west, that would be a threat to our national interest. That is point one.

Secondly, I said that our mission is to ensure that the Afghan Government are able to protect their own people from the Taliban and their allies undermining and overthrowing Afghanistan's Government, and that as soon as that was done our military mission would be completed. The fact that it is the 174th poorest country in the world means that we may have a development mission there beyond that, but the reason for our military presence is absolutely clearly linked to the need to ensure that Afghan forces can prevent the overthrow of the democratically elected Government.

There was no mission creep in what I said, so I do not understand how you can assert that.

 

Q60 Mr. Heathcoat-Amory: There has been mission creep since before you were Foreign Secretary, to be fair to you, but our aim has become the overcoming of an insurgency. If our aim throughout the world is to support democratic Governments against overthrow, truly our national mission is without end. I want to know what the definition of success is, and when we can come home. The best way of doing that is to link it much more precisely to our own security. Frankly, recent international terrorist threats, as far as we can assess them, have not been solely or even mainly derived from Afghanistan.

David Miliband: That is because we are there.

 

Q61 Mr. Heathcoat-Amory: It is desirable to have a democratic, strong Government in Afghanistan, but that is too far removed from our own security to be a realistic or precise war aim that we can judge that we have met and so end the campaign.

David Miliband: Obviously, that is a ridiculous argument. You are saying that there is no reason for us to be there. I am saying that we are there to prevent the Taliban from overthrowing the Government and thereby providing a home for al-Qaeda. You are saying that there is no evidence that al-Qaeda is a threat in Afghanistan. Precisely, but that is because we are there.

There is a democratic Government in Afghanistan, and not a Taliban Government providing a home for al-Qaeda, because there are international forces there. There cannot be anyone in this room who believes that if there were no international coalition there, the Afghan Government and security forces alone would be able to prevent the overrun of the country.

The Afghan National Army now has 60,000 people and it is on track to have 134,000 by 2012. That is a good proximate indicator of the development of the capacity of that Government to protect their territory. That is the mission as it was in 2001. The reason for being in Afghanistan in the numbers that we are is that a weak state such as Afghanistan-it is one of the weakest in the world-became the home for al-Qaeda. There are arguments and debates to be had about the right tactics in-country, but the mission is one that we should unite around and it is clear. It means that when Afghanistan is able to defend its country from overrun, it will not need us.

 

Q62 Sir Menzies Campbell: I enjoyed those rather surreal exchanges. May I put two propositions to you: one military and one political? The military proposition is, "We're not going to win this war. It's about reducing it to a manageable level of insurgency that's not a strategic threat and can be managed by the Afghan army. We may well leave with there still being a low but steady ebb of rural insurgency." The political proposition is, "If the Taliban were prepared to sit on the other side of the table and talk about a political settlement, then that's precisely the sort of progress that concludes insurgencies like this." I suspect that the language is familiar to you, because it is that of Brigadier Mark Carleton-Smith, the former British commander. Does that language now reflect and represent the objectives of the British Government in Afghanistan?

David Miliband: The objectives of the British Government in Afghanistan are set out by the Prime Minister in his statement to Parliament in December. The point that the brigadier makes seems to me to be wholly consistent with what I was trying to persuade David Heathcoat-Amory we were saying: we are there because there is a strategic threat that the Afghan Government will be overrun if we are not. When we are convinced that they can prevent themselves from being overrun, they will not need us.

In respect of the politics, as I said earlier in answering Adam Holloway, those willing to play by the constitutional rules should be playing at politics. That means sitting across a table with them in a political debate, and some Taliban have moved over. I do not think that we should be in a position where anyone believes that anyone in the Government thinks that only a military strategy can win, and we should not be in a position where anyone in the Government is saying that if ex-Taliban are willing to play by the rules, they should not come in under the Afghan Government's programme. Of course they should.

 

Q63 Sir Menzies Campbell: Let me see if I can encapsulate that in plain language. Can we stop using expressions such as "winning the war", and are we willing to talk to the Taliban?

John Hutton: Ming, can I say one or two things about all this from my perspective? First of all, Mark Carleton-Smith is a very fine officer.

 

Q64 Sir Menzies Campbell: Those who know him, either directly or by reputation, would not dispute that for an instant.

John Hutton: I accept that. The point that I want to make is this. What Mark was saying probably reflects the right perspective to take in relation to all these matters. We have never said and never sought to argue that the sole focus of our campaign in Afghanistan must be perceived purely in a military context. Securing greater security is vital. But we have always made it clear, and the Foreign Secretary has made it abundantly clear today, that to succeed in the counter-insurgency operation-and we want to succeed-we must succeed and prevail in a number of areas. We must provide greater security-I will come back to that in a second-but we must see more political development and more governance. That relates largely to what Adam Holloway was saying a second ago. We must get tougher on narco-crime and deal with some of the manifestations of corruption.

On the other half of the brigadier's comments on the level of insurgency, I think that we should be realistic about the opponents that we are facing. There will probably be a hard core of irreconcilable Taliban ideologues left on the ground. Mission success in that context therefore means, as the Foreign Secretary and others, including the Prime Minister, have made clear, giving Afghan security forces the capability to deal with and manage that type of situation. That is the reality that we confront.

We must succeed in the counter-insurgency operation for all the reasons that the Foreign Secretary has made clear, to deny the country to the international terrorists who would export their terror to our doorsteps. I would confront people here and elsewhere who say, "Look, it's hopeless. We can't succeed; let's get out." We must always ask the question, "Are you comfortable with the Taliban and their supporters running Afghanistan and exporting international terror?" I do not believe for a second that anyone with any sane views on the matter would countenance that as an outcome that we should be prepared to tolerate.

It will be a difficult campaign. We know that. All the troops who have served over there would tell you that if they were in this room. We are not delusional. We are hard-headed in our analysis of the threat that we face and the realities on the ground, but we must be all the way in to come out of this campaign in a sensible way. That means leaving behind a capable Afghan security force able to deal with the Taliban and their residual supporters. That is what I think Mark Carleton-Smith was trying to say, and in saying that, he has my complete support.

 

Q65 Sir Menzies Campbell: Do I take it from that, then, that we will stay as long as necessary?

John Hutton: Yes.

 

Q66 Linda Gilroy: The debate that we have just been having illustrates, perhaps, how difficult it is to win the propaganda war. Secretary of State, you mentioned that in your opening remarks. Like many MPs, I have about 1,000 constituents deployed in Afghanistan, and I am as keen as anybody to see a realistic debate about the aims, goals and mission, not one that plays into the hands of the insurgents. Is enough attention being paid to winning the propaganda war?

David Miliband: The Government should never come along and say, "Everything is going fine." You can always do better. I do not know about propaganda or communications, but there is the issue of what Afghans believe, and it is very important to have in mind that the big question for Afghans is, will we stick with them? They are, in my experience, very clear about what they want, and they do not want to go back and live under a Taliban-they just do not. They are like any of us in terms of the decent lives that they want to live. But what they need to know is whether we will stick with them, which is why the Taliban take propaganda very seriously and why we, or the Afghan Government, have to take it very seriously.

John or the general can say a bit about on the position here, but, secondly, the MOD facilitates a significant number of journalists going to Afghanistan and doing honest reporting about the situation there. Sky, the BBC, newspapers and journals have been there, and they report what they see, not what they are told. In my experience, that provides a platform for the sort of realistic discussion that is at hand. The-spectacular is perhaps the wrong word-high-profile attacks that the Taliban do, such as assassinations, are designed to kill and to send a message. Sometimes it is harder to have a realistic discussion there, but we should welcome the openness of this and other discussions that try to ensure that not just your constituents and their families, but the whole country understand the rationale, the mission, the allies and the course of the conflict.

Chairman: Could I ask my colleagues to be brief in their questions now? I want to get on to a few areas, particularly counter-narcotics and the internal politics of Afghanistan. But while we are still on the British strategy, I call Robert Key.

 

Q67 Robert Key: I agree with everything that both Secretaries of State have said about the British mission and its importance to the security of our own country, with one exception-the determination to establish a western liberal democracy throughout Afghanistan. I fear that western liberal democracy is so unlikely to grow in that culture that we might sacrifice the very stability that we seek by spending too much time talking about democracy, and not enough time talking about stability.

David Miliband: I know what you are driving at, and in foreign policy, there is a profound debate about whether security comes before democracy or democracy comes before security, or whether they come together. If you accept that the consent of the Afghan people is absolutely central to the argument, and that they do not want the Taliban but the Taliban could overrun them, you quite quickly come to the conclusion that some features of a democratic nation, such as elections, are an important part of the Afghan situation. However, it is very important not to read off from a commitment to ensure that elections take place in as much of the country as possible, and registration is ongoing now, that somehow we are deluded into thinking-I wrote an article about this, actually-that we are building British suburbia in Lashkar Gah. Democratic and genteel suburbia is not being created in Lashkar Gah, and we are under absolutely no illusions about that.

What I would seek to persuade you of is that western liberal democracy is founded, yes, on elections, but also on a whole penumbra of civil, social and democratic rights, such as a free press, the rule of law and an independent judiciary. It would be great to have that in Afghanistan, but anyone who has been there knows that we are a long way from achieving it. What I would try to persuade you of also is that we understand the absolute centrality of security to this. But, to then say, "Look, don't bother with all this business of having an elected Government in Afghanistan," would be a grave mistake, not for PR reasons, but for reasons of consent or progress. I plead with you not to believe that an election is not important. Yes, the Jirga process is very important in Afghanistan. The fact that one is happening today is very significant. It is important to persevere in trying to hold national elections. I am trying to persuade you that that is not because of any of us is naive about building suburbia-we are not-but it is an important part of consent.

 

Q68 Mr. Jenkin: Whichever candidate wins the presidency in America, he is committed to a surge in Afghanistan. No doubt we will be asked to play our part, so it is likely that the Government will come forward with proposals to send an extra brigade to Helmand, is it not?

John Hutton: We welcome the commitment to deploy further US forces in Afghanistan. That will help, but we have not yet received any formal request.

Mr. Jenkin: Let us be realistic.

John Hutton: Bernard, I have the greatest respect for you, but I am not going to sit here today and speculate about any such request. I would say two things. First, we are pulling our weight in Afghanistan. We have deployed more than 8,000 troops-ours is the second largest NATO contingent in Afghanistan. We have always said that there has to be the broadest possible burden-sharing across NATO in the context of Afghanistan. We welcome the additional US forces, which will be helpful, but it cannot be the role of the UK to fill every gap in the ISAF sweep.

 

Q69 Mr. Jenkin: No, I appreciate that, but the strategy that we will be asked to take part in is a surge strategy.

I return to what the general said earlier. Of course it is not just about extra troops doing the same things. The surge is required, and I believe that we can convince the Taliban that they cannot win-indeed, we must do so-but to achieve that we will need to produce the comprehensive approach that we keep talking about but have not quite succeeding in delivering. If we are effectively to militarise the operation further, do we not have to give the military more of the means of delivering the comprehensive approach than they are allowed at the moment?

Is not the correct lesson of Anbar that the American military were able to take handfuls of dollars into the villages in order to buy the support of the tribal war lords in Anbar province? Tying the British Army up with the puny little stabilisation fund, which has to go through a lengthy bureaucratic process that is controlled by the Department for International Development-a Department that answers to an altogether higher moral authority than the Army-is not the way to conduct a comprehensive approach.

John Hutton: If I receive advice that we need to deploy further UK troops in Afghanistan, I shall take that advice very seriously. As all you guys know, I would obviously have to go through the appropriate procedures here in government-the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary and the Cabinet. I have received no such request.

I am not going to sit here today and speculate about force levels. However, as I said in answer to one of Paul's questions about redeployment from Iraq, there is common ground, in Committee and outside, that in some areas we need to improve our deployable capabilities. Helicopters are one obvious example. If it becomes possible, sooner rather than later, to use the Merlins that are currently flying in Iraq, they would be a very useful force addition for our guys in Helmand. I am not going to say that there are not areas of our deployment that we need to look at, to see whether we can enhance them, but I do not think it is sensible for me to sit here today and speculate about overall troop numbers and potential surges.

David Miliband: May I come in on the surge question? It is very striking that anyone who talks to David Petraeus or Ryan Crocker about the experience in Iraq will find that they are the first to say we cannot kill our way out of the problem that we have in Iraq, and we cannot kill our way out of the problem that we have in Afghanistan. In other words, they stand up for the comprehensive approach with more drive and muscle and commitment than anyone from any other arm of Government. It is the military who are the first to say that you need the politics, the economics, and the social development. In that sense, we should be thinking about a political surge and not just a military one.

 

Q70 Mr. Jenkin: But the NGOs will not go there. The security is not good enough for the NGOs to provide the civil and political surge.

David Miliband: The NGOs that have no choice are the Afghan NGOs. We must be careful about making sweeping statements in that respect. Security is important, but we always fall into the trap of thinking that the first recourse is outside forces or NGOs. The first recourse is Afghans, and then outsiders fill the gap, not vice versa.

John Hutton: I met some of the guys working for Oxfam in Afghanistan in Kabul. Virtually all their staff are Afghan nationals. British NGOs are clearly active there, but they are working with locals to deliver a very good service.

 

Q71 Richard Younger-Ross: To make it clear, most members of both Committees have been to Afghanistan, most of us understand why we are there and most of us understand that it may be a long time before we can come out. I think that what frightens us most is that we appear to be going backwards rather than forwards. Just talk to our NGOs: five years ago, they had free access across virtually all the south and the south-east, but in your conversations with Oxfam, you would have been told that that is no longer the case-they do not have free movement. What are we doing to ensure that the NGOs can work freely and drive around the south without fear of being blown up by the Taliban?

John Hutton: That is a question about the level of security generally and how we interact with the Afghan security forces to help to facilitate that kind of mission. The governor in Helmand is committed to doing it, and we work closely with the Afghan police and national army to support that type of activity.

Again, I take issue with your description of the situation in Afghanistan. With respect, it is a great disservice to present the situation in those terms. I do not believe that the situation is going backwards, as you described it. I accept that there are fundamental problems that still need to be addressed, but in Helmand one can see signs of progress, which I tried to describe earlier. One can see similar evidence of progress, both civil and economic, in other provinces in Afghanistan. I urge everyone to be careful about how they describe the situation in Afghanistan and not to fall into the trap of over-generalising.

 

Q72 Richard Younger-Ross: We are having successes. We have had military battles and have managed to force the Taliban to change their tactics, but in that success, we appear to be creating other problems for ourselves. One of those is the security situation. Freedom of travel is far more restricted than it was. Politicians in Helmand cannot drive to Kabul; they must hitch lifts on military aircraft when they can, because it is not safe for them to travel otherwise. Also, terrorists have simply deployed to the other side of the border, into an area of Pakistan where the writ of even the Pakistan Government does not run. How are we going to deal with those two problems?

David Miliband: Can I come in? The point that you are making about highways is very significant. It is important for trade, but it is also important for the other functions that you describe. In the end, it is partly an army matter, but it is also a police matter, which refers back to the discussion that we started to have about the difficulties in respect of the police. If you are asking whether sufficient priority is being given to the highways question and people's ability to get around, I would say yes. I was in Afghanistan in February with Condoleezza Rice, and it became clear then that the question of highway security needed to go up the agenda, and it has done so significantly.

As for your other question, I am not sure which part of the 2,600 km border with Pakistan you were referring to, but the generic point is that we need pressure and a comprehensive approach on both sides of the border. To take one example, in the federally administered tribal areas, the female literacy rate is less than 3%. Political parties are not allowed in the FATA-they have not been allowed since 1948. They were not allowed under us, and the Pakistanis have continued that. It is not falling into the trap of being wide-eyed about liberal democracy to believe that those facts are a significant hindrance to decency and security on the Pakistani side of the border.

The Pakistani Prime Minister was in China this week at the ASEAN summit, and he made the point that there are 120,000 Pakistani troops on the frontier. They are mainly from the frontier corps, interestingly enough, rather than the elite parts of the Pakistani army. The comprehensive approach that we are talking about on the Afghan side needs to be taken on the Pakistani side as well, but with one significant difference: the Pakistani army is the most effective part of the Pakistani state, and it needs to orient itself towards the threat that it faces from Afghanistan, not the threat that it used to claim Pakistan faced from India.

 

Q73 Chairman: We have 10 minutes left, and I am conscious that you have both been generous with your time. I intend to finish in 10 minutes, but I will take the Pakistan question a little bit further, as well as a couple of other matters.

There is a problem, is there not, in that the Afghan Government do not accept the Durand line as an international border? People can walk across an international border by walking from one side of a village to another, or by crossing a street. What can we do to get co-ordination between the Pakistani and Afghan Governments, so that there is real security on that border and all our other efforts are not undermined?

David Miliband: Sir Mark Lyall Grant, rather than just Mark Lyall Grant, as he was introduced at the beginning, is not just the political director of the Foreign Office: he was our High Commissioner in Islamabad. You have heard enough from me, so why does not he chip in on this Pakistan point?

Sir Mark Lyall Grant: The whole Afghanistan-Pakistan relationship is extremely difficult, but, as the Foreign Secretary said earlier, there is a strategic opportunity now, with the change of President in Pakistan. President Zardari made a very significant step by inviting President Karzai to come to his inauguration as soon as he was appointed, and they have met two or three times since then. It is necessary to use that political good will and underpin it so that there is more of a structured relationship between the two countries, which, beneath the presidential good will, allows the military relationship, the intelligence relationship and the trade relationship to flourish. Once you start doing that, you can deal with extremely difficult questions such as the Durand line, which, as you rightly say, the Afghans do not recognise and the Pakistanis do. That can be dealt with only if the overall bilateral relationship works.

If that relationship works properly, you have the opportunity to conduct joint military operations, which is probably a lot more effective than unilateral action on either side. If we can get to a stage at which that top-down relationship can be filled out, cemented and concreted, with a network of relationships between the intelligence agencies, the armed forces and the national security advisers, you have a chance of building a joint strategy, rather than two separate strategies, which is what you see at the moment.

 

Q74 Chairman: Given your knowledge and experience of Pakistan, how optimistic are you that the politics of Pakistan will allow that to develop?

Sir Mark Lyall Grant: There is an opportunity. Pakistan faces some very severe challenges, the most serious of which in the short term is the economy. We have been working on providing international support for the economy in Pakistan, because if Pakistan defaults on all its international loans, political stability will be threatened and all our other objectives and the Pakistan Government's objectives will be undermined. The first task is to shore up the economy. Pakistan is currently discussing with the International Monetary Fund a possible package that would help to do that. If that works, I think that there is a chance.

President Zardari was elected by a large majority, and he has a working majority in the Parliament. The Opposition are broadly supporting what he is trying to do on counter-radicalisation and counter-insurgency, so there is an opportunity. I would not like to say that it will definitely succeed-one can never say that about a place such as Pakistan, which has seen a lot of ups and downs over the years-but there is a strategic opportunity, and it is really important that the international community takes advantage of that to make a difference regarding the Pakistan-Afghanistan relationship.

 

Q75 Sir John Stanley: Foreign Secretary, just so that this question is not misunderstood, I want to make it quite clear that I absolutely believe that if we let Afghanistan fall back under Taliban control, it will be a serious risk to our national security and to a great many other countries, quite apart from being a human rights catastrophe for every woman and girl in that country. Having said that, would you accept that the writ of the Karzai Government, at the very best and most optimistic estimate, does not run beyond approximately one fifth of the area of that country? Would you accept that that is broadly correct?

David Miliband: I would not accept that statistic, no. Equally, I have said that Afghanistan has never been run from Kabul like a traditional state. There remain parts of the country that do not answer to the writ of the Afghan Government, but I would not stick to the 20% figure; I do not see where you have pulled that from.

 

Q76 Sir John Stanley: I think that you would accept that if Afghanistan is going to be a unified state, governmentally and politically, we clearly have a huge and long-term job to do to create real government the length and breadth of the country. We are in for the long haul. The Defence Secretary has said today that as far as the UK is concerned, we are there for as long as it takes. Many of us in this Room meet many other parliamentarians from different countries. We know that Canada, the Netherlands, Australia, Germany and, indeed, many other countries that are committed in Afghanistan are just teetering now as to how much longer they will stay there. Apart from the Americans, ourselves and the Afghan Government, which other countries can you tell us are committed to being in Afghanistan for as long as it takes?

David Miliband: Let me just give one example. I totally take the prefacing that you made for your remarks. I completely accept the good faith that you expressed on that and I totally accept your point that no one should create unrealistic expectations about how quickly the situation will change. In respect of your question, it is striking that for all the difficulties, with caveats and the rest of it, the German Government should just have agreed, within the last month, to increase their troop contribution as well as their aid contribution. I do not say that in a "gotcha" way or in an "I've played my joker and that answers the point" way, because you are raising a very serious point about how the burden is shared across the western world. I do not say it in order to say, "There, it's not a legitimate question you've asked, but we've answered it."

However, for all the difficulties in Canada or Holland, it is worth reflecting on the fact that Germany, the country that has had probably the biggest debate about whether to send anyone to Afghanistan, should have increased its numbers. The Germans did not have to do that, but they have done it. Bernard Jenkin asked earlier how we would answer if a new US President picked up the phone to us. That will be a question for all the other NATO allies as well. It is right to say that it is tough and difficult, but it is not right to be of the view that we are the last people on the bridge. I do not think that is right.

 

Q77 Sir John Stanley: I asked, Foreign Secretary, whether you could name any country apart from the Americans, ourselves and the Afghan Government that, as a matter of policy, will be there for as long as it takes.

David Miliband: There are 41 countries there, and I do not have in my head whether all of them have been asked this question in the same sort of way, but I gave you the example of Germany. I can talk to you about the discussions I have with foreign ministerial colleagues. Some of them have, per head of population, taken a greater toll than we have, but I think that there is widespread recognition that this is a long haul. The truth is I have not been through the 41 nations and found out how many of the Foreign Ministers have been asked the question, but I do not think any Foreign Minister is under illusions that it is a quick fix. I believe all of them recognise the importance of this to their country and want to make a contribution towards it.

John Hutton: It might be helpful, Chairman, if I sent a note to the Committee itemising those members of ISAF, our supporters in this campaign, that are talking to us and have made commitments to increase their dispositions and deployments in Afghanistan. I hope the Committee would find that quite reassuring.

Chairman: It would indeed. The final question will be asked by Ken Purchase.

 

Q78 Mr. Purchase: When the Foreign Affairs Committee was in Afghanistan, we heard repeated time and again this mantra: "Why are we in Afghanistan? Well, if we don't go to Afghanistan, Afghanistan will come to us." Those people were not talking just about the terrorist tactics of religious fanatics in Paris, Rome or London; they were talking about narcotics. We see Afghanistan on the streets of Birmingham, London, Manchester-in fact, every city in the UK. You have a huge job to do but, Foreign Secretary and Defence Secretary, should we not be putting a great deal of effort into stopping the trafficking routes that are well known in Afghanistan and thereby preventing the massive export to the west of Afghan narcotics? Would that not be a major contribution to producing stability in Afghanistan?

John Hutton: Yes, we need to focus more effort on this. That is exactly what NATO Ministers resolved to do at our meeting in Budapest: not to target the small farmers, because that would be a mistake, but to target the narco-traffickers and those who run the laboratories. There will be more effort to tackle that problem.

It is also worth reminding ourselves of one interesting statistic. The most recent UN survey of the situation in Afghanistan found that there had been a decrease in opium production and a significant decrease in opium cultivation. I am not for a second saying that the problem has been resolved-that would be stupid; quite manifestly it has not-but there is a recognition now, shared between ourselves and the Afghan police authorities, that we must get much more serious about tackling the problem if we are to have wider success in our efforts in Afghanistan. We are committed to doing that.

Chairman: Secretary of State for Defence and Foreign Secretary, thank you for coming. Lieutenant General Wall and Sir Mark Lyall Grant, thank you. This has been a useful and valuable session, and we are grateful. Thank you very much.

 

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[1] Note by witness: Details of the number of individuals held in the UK Divisional Internment Facility have been published monthly on the MOD website since January 2007.  There are currently two individuals in that facility.  The facility has never, in fact, been empty since it was opened. The two detainees currently in the UK facility in Iraq have been in UK custody since December 2003.