Select Committee on Innovation, Universities and Skills Written Evidence


Memorandum 6

Submission from the British Music Rights

THE WORK AND OPERATION OF THE COPYRIGHT TRIBUNAL

INTRODUCTION

  1.  British Music Rights is the consensus voice of Britain's composers and songwriters, music publishers and their collecting societies. The members of British Music Rights are the British Academy of Composers & Songwriters, the Music Publishers Association (MPA), the Mechanical-Copyright Protection Society (MCPS) and the Performing Right Society (PRS).

  2.  We welcome the initiative by the Innovation, Universities and Skills Select Committee to look into the work and operation of the Copyright Tribunal with specific reference to the final Recommendations of an independent review put forward in 2007.

  3.  We are at the disposal of the Innovation, Universities and Skills Select Committee to expand further on our submissions below and also to answer any specific questions the Select Committee may have regarding our members' most recent experience of the Copyright Tribunal in the reference concerning tariffs for the online and mobile delivery of music.[12]

I.  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  4.  The Copyright Tribunal has a pivotal role to play in settling the terms and conditions of licences and licensing schemes proposed by collecting societies in cases where potential licensees claim they are unreasonable. Accordingly the Copyright Tribunal is of considerable importance to the UK's composers, songwriters and their music publishers whose livelihood depends upon the licensing of their music by their collecting societies.

  5.  Referral to the Copyright Tribunal is typically instigated by commercial music users such as broadcasters, record companies and telecommunications companies as well as by licensees whose businesses are not premised predominantly on music use, such as airlines.

  6.  MCPS and PRS represent some 50,000 composers, songwriters and music publishers, all of whom (with the exception of fewer than 10 multinational publishers) are either individuals or SMEs. Their members derive well over 80% of their income from the use of their music in the UK from the licensing and royalty collecting activities of MCPS (in respect of the reproduction of their music in recorded form) and PRS (in respect of the performance and broadcast of their music).[13] The amount they each earn from individual uses of their music licensed on their behalf by MCPS and PRS respectively can usually be counted in pence or, more commonly in fractions of a penny. It is only through the multiplicity of licences that MCPS and PRS are able to secure on their behalf that some of them are able to derive a meaningful income. It should be noted that even this is not always achievable. In 2006 over 90% of PRS members earned less than £5,000 in royalties from PRS, and less than 5% earned over £20,000.

  7.  The experience of MCPS and PRS of the operation of the Copyright Tribunal since its inception has been that cases referred to it have turned out to be unduly lengthy and costly, involving complex and legalistic procedures, with the result that their members are invariably prejudiced, regardless of the final decision. Any delay in promulgating new licences and licensing schemes has a direct impact on the individual members of MCPS and PRS, both in terms of having to wait longer to be paid for the use of their music and in terms of such payments being depleted by virtue of their share of the costs of Copyright Tribunal proceedings.

  8.  As new means of delivering music emerge and new business models are being developed and implemented in the online and mobile environments the incidence of users seeking to challenge new licences and licensing schemes is set to grow exponentially. Reform of the working and operation of the Copyright Tribunal is not only long overdue—we have been pressing for reform since well before the Leggatt Review launched in 2000[14]—but it is now critical for the health of the music industry and the growth of the UK economy that reform is both thorough and swift.

II.  RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMPLETED REVIEW OF THE COPYRIGHT TRIBUNAL[15]

  9.  British Music Rights welcomes the recommendations made by the UK Intellectual Property Office following its comprehensive review of the Copyright Tribunal. The recommendations address most of our long standing concerns for a more commercial approach and for greater transparency and efficiency in the workings of the Tribunal.

  10.  We welcome the proposal for a more commercial approach generally and the following recommendations in particular:

    (1)  a more even handed approach to the parties on each side to a reference including:

    (a)  the recommendation that any challenge to a licence should be based on fact to balance the requirement that the workings behind any proposed licence are also disclosed; and

    (b)  the recommendation that licensing bodies (collecting societies) should be able to refer their proposed schemes to the Copyright Tribunal in the same way that users are entitled to refer schemes to which they object; we believe this will avoid abuses of the system and consequent delays;

    (2)  active case management, which we believe will lead to greater efficiency and therefore cost effectiveness in the handling of cases by the Copyright Tribunal;

    (3)  the adoption of the Civil Procedure Rules, so bringing the Copyright Tribunal into line with the Woolf reforms implemented in the civil courts in 1999 and which are likely to result in less adversarial proceedings;

    (4)  the encouragement of the parties to consider alternative dispute resolution; and

    (5)  the commitment to funding the work of the Copyright Tribunal.

  11.  We attach[16] some specific concerns of MCPS and PRS about the proposal for the UK Intellectual Property Office to become involved in developing licensing schemes and which should be taken into account in the implementation of the Recommendations.

  12.  Subject to these, we look forward to assisting the UK Intellectual Property Office in whatever way may be required in order to achieve the swift implementation of those Recommendations and we urge this Select Committee to do everything within its power to expedite such implementation.

III.  FURTHER ISSUES

  13.  Notwithstanding the excellent outcome of the UK Intellectual Property Office's Review of the Copyright Tribunal, subject to prompt implementation of its recommendations, we invite the Select Committee to take into account our views on the following issues:

The structure of the panel

  14.  The Copyright Tribunal is often required to adjudicate on licensing schemes involving millions of pounds over their lifetime. These schemes, once settled upon, are often in place for generations and have strong precedential value. We therefore maintain that the chairman of the Copyright Tribunal should be a judge of high standing and certainly at least a High Court judge. We note that other jurisdictions, notably Australia, the USA and Canada to name but three appoint senior judges to chair their equivalent bodies.

  15.  The criteria for appointing the lay members of the Copyright Tribunal have been less than transparent. Our members' experience is that the expertise or relevant experience of many of the lay members has all too often been hard to discern. Indeed we note that the UK Intellectual Property Office Review established that lay members appear not to have been chosen for their expertise.

  16.  Whilst we agreed with the UK Intellectual Property Office's recommendation that lay members should be abolished in the light of the reasoning they put forward, the Select Committee should nevertheless be aware that we have previously proposed that lay members should be selected for relevant expertise or that, alternatively, they should be provided with adequate training. We still believe that this could be beneficial and, indeed, a great support to the Chairman. Some of the cases which come before the Copyright Tribunal involve complex economic arguments and/or require the benefit of some experience or knowledge of the music industry.

  17.  A more usual approach in the context of tribunals would be for each side to nominate an appropriate lay member who would not have a conflict of interest but who would have some understanding of that side's field of operation. We also remain ready and willing to contribute towards some appropriate training for lay members.

  18.  In the circumstances we would not wish the lay members to be abolished if our above proposals are put into effect.

Double Jeopardy

  19.  It is vital that the Copyright Tribunal confines its remit to the supervision of licensing terms and conditions and that it does not become involved in considering any regulatory aspects of the workings of collecting societies. The latter are within the jurisdiction of the Office of Fair Trading and, in the case of matters affecting interstate trade, DG Competition of the European Commission. The collecting societies must not be subjected to double jeopardy.

Orphan works

  20.  It has been suggested that the Copyright Tribunal should be empowered to license works in cases where the copyright owner cannot be identified or traced upon reasonable inquiry. We understand that section 190 of the Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988, which provides a mechanism for addressing this problem when it arises, has only ever been invoked twice.

  21.  To the extent that the copyright owners of musical works may be unidentifiable or untraceable, we believe that the scale of this problem is de minimis. The royalty collecting societies, both in the UK and across the world, have between them very comprehensive databases containing all the relevant information about virtually all the millions of works protected by copyright. Therefore anyone making reasonable inquiries should approach the relevant collecting society as a matter of course. In the rare case of the collecting societies not being able to provide the inquirer with the information required we would agree that the Copyright Tribunal should be the final resort for obtaining the necessary licence.

  22.  We suggest, however, that it is premature to make any decision on the role of the Copyright Tribunal in the case of orphan works as their treatment is currently being considered both by the UK Intellectual Property Office and the European Commission following the recommendation in the Gowers Report[17] that there should be an exception to copyright for orphan works.

January 2008

APPENDIX 1

REVIEW OF THE COPYRIGHT TRIBUNAL MCPS-PRS ALLIANCE RESPONSE

1.  INTRODUCTION

  The Mechanical-Copyright Protection Society ("MCPS") and the Performing Right Society ("PRS") are the mechanical rights and performing rights collecting societies respectively operating in the United Kingdom in respect of musical works. Whilst remaining separate societies, MCPS and PRS operate through an operational alliance. Together they represent some 50,000 thousand individual UK songwriters and composers of musical works and their publishers, the majority of which are SMEs, as well as hundreds of thousands more right holders from abroad via arrangements with overseas collecting societies.

  Right holders earn on average some 80% to 90% of their income from the collective management of their rights by collecting societies. Collective management benefits licensees using high volumes of music and who wish to have access to the full repertoire, both national and international, without the need for individual prior clearance. It is also beneficial to individual right holders for whom the low unitary value for each individual usage of their music makes the licensing and collection of royalties from users both unreasonably onerous and uneconomic. It is important to keep in mind that the societies represent vast numbers of small individuals and that for the most part they each earn a small amount from each scheme or tariff promulgated by their societies.

  MCPS-PRS is a member of British Music Rights and the submission of BMR fully reflects our views on the recommendations as to reform of the Copyright Tribunal (CT). It was felt, however, that it may be useful if, as the parties directly involved on a day to day basis in scheme development and negotiation with licensees, we offer some more detailed observations regarding the practical implications of Recommendations 5, 6 and 7. We hope these observations may prove useful in further consultation in the creation of practice directions or other guidelines or set methodologies as envisaged by the Recommendations.

2.  RECOMMENDATION 5: THE REASONING BEHIND LICENCE SCHEMES AND TARIFFS SHOULD BE CLEARLY SHOWN

  MCPS-PRS welcomes this Recommendation. In our experience we find generally that an open and transparent approach to scheme development enables more effective negotiation with licensees and licensee groups. We believe, however, that there are some practical considerations to be borne in mind when setting out the extent and detail of the reasoning that will have to be shown, particularly in the light of some of the points made in paragraphs 7.17-7.22 of the Review.

2.1  Establishing a tariff

  The main area of difficulty in licence negotiations, and therefore of contention, tends to be in determining and agreeing the underlying "unit price". How much is a minute of music worth? Ultimately this is a point for commercial negotiation between a buyer (the music user) and a seller (the collecting society on behalf of all its right holder members). The value of music is not measurable on a scientific basis involving "actuarial figures and projections" but rather is dependent on finding the right balance between three factors, namely:

    —  the value as perceived by our members;

    —  the value to the licensee's business, which is often a new business where a new licensing scheme is being developed, as perceived by the licensee; and

    —  accepted precedents and/or comparables established via existing tariffs if and to the extent there may be any that are relevant in the case of a new business.

  Once the underlying value has been determined we rely on concrete factors wherever these exist to set the guidelines for establishing a tariff based on that underlying value. These include, for example, box office takings or other licensee revenues, size of the premises, product sales, audience figures, music usage and so on.

  Our methodology for setting tariffs for new areas of business is necessarily reliant on licensees providing realistic estimates and projections about their new businesses and a high degree of co-operation from them. However, regardless of the depth of research conducted in advance and the level of co-operation from licensees, market predictions and revenue projections relating to new products are, in our experience, notoriously unreliable.

  We also have to be responsive to the fact that a user may want to launch their new product to market before the evidence exists to enable us to make realistic projections. Rather than insisting on a systematic approach based on "actuarial figures and projections", which will only cause unwelcome delay in some cases and may in any event be impossible prior to launch, we need to be flexible. This can sometimes involve offering a flat-fee non-precedential trial licence which allows the licensee to launch their product and gives us the chance to make an informed licence proposal once the market for the product is more established.

  Furthermore, the scale and nature of any dispute may be relevant to what sort of detail on the reasoning behind any scheme should be given. If a long established scheme is sought to be varied by a licensee, then perhaps the onus should be more on the licensee to justify the reasoning behind the need to vary. Also some regard should be had to the "value" of the actual licence in dispute so that any obligation to provide reasoning is proportionate.

  Because of all the above factors it is very important that any rules or guidance as to what has to be provided and how it has to be provided is flexible and not too systematic or prescriptive.

2.2  Disclosure of methodology

  An essential part of the process in establishing any scheme is to explore all possibilities, whether internally, with our members or with other third parties, before promulgating any scheme. Many possibilities may be rejected in the process. This may well involve confidential and/or commercially sensitive discussions and exchanges which neither we nor our members would wish to have to disclose. Whilst we accept that societies should be required to explain their reasoning to the CT in the event that a scheme or tariff is disputed, they should not be subject to an unreasonably onerous or oppressive obligation to divulge all prior documentation and reasoning.

  Furthermore, the extent and scope of information and documentation that the CT should require to be disclosed should be proportionate to the value of the licence at issue and relevant to the aspects in dispute.

3.  RECOMMENDATION 6: A CHALLENGE TO THE TERMS OF A LICENCE SHOULD BE BASED ON FACT

  We agree that licensees should be required to support their objections to the terms of a licence with fact, and the disclosure of the figures as envisaged in paragraph 7.23 of the Review. We also consider they should also justify the reasoning behind their position or any alternative licensing terms that they promulgate.

4.  RECOMMENDATION 7: THE CT (WITH THE EXTRA RESOURCES MENTIONED IN RECOMMENDATION 18) SHOULD TAKE AN ACTIVE PART IN FORMULATING METHODOLOGIES FOR THE OBJECTIFICATION OF THE CRITERIA FOR THE CONDITIONS OF A LICENSING SCHEME

4.1  Role of Tribunal in scheme development

  We welcome and support the opportunity of working with the officials of the CT in order to assist with understanding the schemes and tariffs at issue in any particular case and so to promote efficiencies within CT proceedings.

  However, we would welcome some clarification as to the scope of this Recommendation and, in particular, whether it is envisaged that the officials are to be consulted at any stage during the development of a scheme or tariff or whether they are only to become involved if and when a scheme or tariff has been referred to the CT. If it is to be at the former stage, is such consultation with CT officials to be compulsory? MCPS-PRS is concerned that the CT's involvement will create an additional layer of consultation and complexity and could delay the introduction of new or revised schemes to the detriment of right holders and licensees.

  Alternatively, is it proposed that the Tribunal and societies together will formulate a series of general overarching principles to which societies must have regard in respect of any licensing scheme?

4.2  Resource

  We note that it is proposed that two members of CT staff should undertake the work envisaged in paragraph 7.29 of the Review.

  Subject to the clarification sought above, it should be noted that scheme development is an ongoing and key element of the societies' business in which we invest considerable resource as well as time and effort in training that resource. Several members of our staff are engaged full time in developing and consulting on new schemes as well as in reviewing, amending and renewing existing schemes and tariffs. They also draw on support and expertise from other areas of the societies' business including the legal, research and distribution teams. They have, as a consequence, developed considerable breadth and depth of knowledge and expertise not only on the schemes and tariffs promulgated by the societies but also in relation to the markets in which their licensees operate.

  It would be quite an undertaking to raise the expertise of CT staff in such a wide range of markets and music users, quite apart from other rights users, to a sufficient level to assist in the scheme development process. Furthermore, in the context of a dispute, the knowledge of Tribunal staff could not be a substitute for evidence supplied by the parties.

  We also stress the importance for licensees of the timely introduction of licensing structures. It would be very important to ensure that Tribunal involvement in scheme development does not create unacceptable delays.

4.3  Publication of a practice direction as to what data should be provided to support the basis for terms and conditions of licences

  Guidance as to what data needs to be provided will be of great assistance and we do agree that this should lead to increased efficiency of the Tribunal. It is important, however, that any such guidance takes account of the sheer breadth and variety of the relevant licences. We do have genuine concerns that it may prove impossible to draft a meaningful Practice Direction that would fit all the possible licensing schemes for the use of music and that this is likely to be restrictive rather than helpful in developing new schemes. We operate a wide range of over 100 schemes and tariffs, each of which is tailored to specific circumstances of music usage, whether offline or online and whether involving performing rights, mechanical rights or both. These are subject to periodic review, amendment or renewal at different times. We also develop new schemes and tariffs at an increasing rate in consultation with users to meet new market and technological demands and the criteria for each of these vary according to the individual circumstances. It is vital that societies should have the freedom to be responsive to market demands.

4.4  Discussions with CT officials should not be seen to indicate approval

  We completely endorse the concern that the impartiality of the Tribunal should not be prejudiced in any way and therefore it is also important that the discussions with the CT are not at a deep enough level as to affect the commercial terms but are directed more at the presentation of the explanation of them. We also repeat that, for the reasons set out above, we are concerned that such discussions should not unduly delay the licensing process for users as this would be against the interest of all parties.

5 September 2007


















12  
"Online" decision CT84-90705: http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ctribunaldownloadingdecision.pdf Back

13   Whilst the majority of members have traditionally derived the greatest share of their income from MCPS, this balance has shifted with the recent decline in CD sales with the result that the balance between the two income sources is, on average, more or less even. Back

14   Published August 2001. See http://www.tribunals-review.org.uk/index.htm Back

15   BMR detailed comments on specific recommendations, August 2007 http://www.bmr.org/page/submission-48 Back

16   See Appendix 1. Back

17   Published December 2006. See: http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/6/E/pbr06_gowers_report_755.pdf Back


 
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