Memorandum 8
Submission from Prospect
INTRODUCTION
1. Prospect is a trade union representing
102,000 scientific, technical, managerial and specialist staff
in the Civil Service and related bodies and major companies. Our
members include 4,000 scientific and technical staff in five research
councils and 68,000 scientists, engineers and technologists overall.
Many of our members work in sectors where biosecurity is a key
part of their professional lives, for example in defence and animal
research. This response is informed by the expertise of these
members.
The current capacity for research on dangerous
pathogenic material in the UK and the capability to conduct research
on the causative agents of disease that may emerge at a future
time
2. Prospect members work with micro-organisms
up to hazard group 4 (causing fatal and untreatable diseases).
There are few such laboratories in the UK, probably amounting
to less than 10 overall, but these include facilities at the Health
Protection Agency and a couple of other Research Council Institutes.
Most large universities with established medical microbiology
departments will have a level 3 facility ie working with micro-organisms
that cause fatal diseases in healthy hosts but with treatment
available. Veterinary disease institutes, such as the Veterinary
Laboratories Agency at Weybridge, also work to level 3 as will
institutes involved in work on TB or HIV.
The state of biological containment facilities
in the UK
3. Public sector facilities include Porton
Down, which are world-class. All facilities need to be of equal
or greater standards than legislative requirements. Clearly there
has been much publicity over the state of containment facilities
at Pirbright.
Laboratory inspection regimes and the rationale
and practicalities of the licensing system
4. Prospect would expect facilities to be
regularly inspected at senior corporate and local levels. It is
important that inspection procedures do not become too regimented,
as this can cause things to be missed. HSE also regularly inspects
high containment facilities, though clearly the regulatory and
inspection regimes are likely to change in the light of the recommendations
of the Callaghan Review. Prospect would recognise the benefits
of both a single inspection/enforcement authority for animal and
human pathogens and the importance of avoiding potential conflicts
of interest. With HSE taking on this responsibility we will wish
to have confidence that its operational staff implement HSE instructions
on making and maintaining contact with employee representatives.
Biosafety training provision for staff working
in containment facilities
5. It is of utmost importance that staff
working with high containment facilities receive appropriate training.
For example, the Defence Scientific and Technical Laboratory (DSTL)
provides a hierarchy of training. These start with taught courses
at level 2. Staff are then required to work at level 2 and receive
hands on training for more than a year and to serve a probationary
period before progressing to level 3. For level 4 the requirement
is to work at level 3 and receive hands on training for more than
a year as well as serving a probationary period and undertaking
high level consultation with safety experts.
Measures implemented when pathogenic material
cannot be accounted for
6. As staff are security cleared and high
containment facilities are access controlled, this is not perceived
as a major problem. Records are kept as a matter of routine, though
these may be of limited value due to the ease of generating more
material. It is impossible to guarantee that records will never
be falsified.
January 2008
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