Examination of Witnesses (Question 160-179)
MR PHIL
WOOLAS MP, MS
JAN THOMPSON,
MR CHRIS
DODWELL AND
MR SCOTT
WIGHTMAN
25 MARCH 2008
Q160 Martin Horwood: Would you go
so far as to say that your goal is now stabilisation at 450?
Mr Woolas: No. Our goal is two
degrees.
Q161 Joan Walley: Could I go back
to Colin Challen's point about the 1% of GDP and how we are actually
monitoring? I did not really pick up in your reply how the Government
is really monitoring in a very detailed way progress that is being
made both in terms of expenditure but also in terms of meeting
targets.
Mr Woolas: The answer to that
question is a long and sophisticated one. The goal that is set
for us is to take the needs of the climate into economic decision-making.
This is something that all countries are having to do. That includes
the private sector as well as the public sector decision-making
both in mitigation measures and in adaptation measures. We see
the Climate Change Bill as being hugely important in setting that
overall framework and the budgets that come from that. The fact
that financial decisions will have to be taken in future as regards
not just the financial balance sheet but the carbon balance sheet
will bring about a huge change in behaviour and attitudes of decision-makers
in our country in both the private and public sector. I do not
want to give a flip answer that says yes, we can do that. The
fact is we cannot do that at the moment, but it is certainly our
goal that we will be able to do that within a timetable that is
useful for us in Copenhagen and in order to announce those budgets
in the Budget Statement of the Chancellor next year.
Q162 Joan Walley: Given the reference
that the Environmental Audit Select Committee had on The Archers
on Sunday and given what you have just said about needing a long
and complicated answer, we have to somehow or another find a way
of communicating to people everywhere, not just in The Archers,
just how much progress we are making.
Mr Woolas: Chairman, I did not
know this very welcome bit of news. We have actually a lobbying
strategy for the BBC drama department to try and mainstream this.
If the nitrate vulnerable zones can make it to The Archers
then I am glad that this issue has as well. The way in which we
see this—and I say "we" in terms of Her Majesty's
Government, not just in terms of Defra—is that we are having
to create a new policy framework that can bring about the changes
that we need domestically and internationally, but it takes time
to do that. As the many measures that have been put in place by
their nature are complex it is difficult to communicate them in
simple self-evident ways. We believe our timetable domestically
dovetails with the international timetable. The big picture where
I know that your inquiry is focussed as well is that the domestic
actions that we take are part of an international framework. That
international framework is not yet agreed. This is why the dilemma
that was referred to with regard to the United States and China
is paralleled domestically. We had a debate in the House about
60% and 80% and which is best. It is the contribution to an international
effort that matters and therefore we have to put this jigsaw puzzle
into place internationally and domestically. If I sound frustrated
it is because I think we are in the early days of putting that
framework in place. I have no doubt whatsoever that it is being
done across government in all the different policy areas, adaptation
and mitigation.
Q163 Chairman: There are a number
of policy areas which are sort of acted out in a very international
context, defence being one of them. That is an area where Britain
has not been afraid to step out well in front of a lot of its
traditional allies to make commitments, rightly or wrongly, with
quite dramatic effects. On climate change, I think it would be
very helpful if Britain was willing to show a similar degree of
leadership and courage and it would be rather more positive and
productive if it did so. I think the response from Mr Dodwell
about the 550 ppm being too high, which I entirely agree with,
I am sure every member of this Committee does, is a very welcome
one. I hope the Government will not be afraid to go a lot further
and say we should specifically be aiming perhaps at a maximum
level of between 450 and 500 ppm. I know it would be very challenging
to achieve that. It would need actions far in excess of anything
contemplated by Britain or the EU at present. I think to make
that statement would wake people up a bit. I think there has been
a degree of complacency. It comes back to the point I made at
the beginning. We are talking about cutting emissions by 2050.
By 2020 or 2030 the concentration level may already be so high
that whatever we do in 2050, we are not going to get it back.
Mr Woolas: I think the European
Union package is extremely important in that regard. I share your
frustration that the concentration of the public debate and comment
is on the 2050 target, missing the point that was made before
by yourself as well as others on the cumulative nature of that
target. The policy area that we are engaged in here is unchartered.
We have a debate about what targets are scientifically required
and then we try to translate those into what is realistic in terms
of investment decisions and available technology in the energy,
transport and domestic home and building sector. There is no law
of economics or politics that says the two have to match, but
my goodness me we have to make them match. Therefore, one's decisions
within the context of the EU targets have to be based on that
trajectory that allows the peak and allows the mid-term goals
to make the 2050 target possible. My own view—this does
not mean anything but just for the interest of the Committee,
I hope—is quite optimistic and it is optimistic not just
because of discussions with colleagues in the political world
but discussions with colleagues in the industrial world. I think
corporate leaders in the energy sector and in the major emitting
sectors absolutely get this and I think they see economic competitive
advantages as long as the political framework does not sell them
down the river in terms of carbon leakage. So I am quite optimistic
and I think the UK plc is in a very strong position and I think
that mindset is what we need to inculcate across our industries.
Q164 Chairman: I would certainly
agree with that. In the United States in many areas business is
ahead of politicians because they understand that. Given the importance
of keeping up-to-date with the science, do you think there might
be ways in which the UN process could be better integrated with
the work of the IPCC? The sort of mismatch between science moving
on and a track that is rather fixed for international response,
is there a way of relating those two more closely?
Mr Woolas: In a formal way in
the process?
Mr Dodwell: They are formally
linked. There were sessions on the IPCC report in Bali. The negotiators
were made very well aware of what was going on. There is going
to be another workshop in April on the IPCC and what the direction
is that the IPCC should take forward. We must not allow ourselves
to over-simplify the consequence of what that science means and
how you then translate that into action. The science is settled.
The science is becoming more and more clear about the urgency
for action. The economic arguments that were being put forward
are being overturned. The Stern work on costs has demonstrated
it makes more sense to take costs than not. It is about how you
then translate that into global action and that is the feasibility
point. When Lord Stern was setting down the difficulties of reaching
450 ppm he was not saying that because it is going to cost too
much; he was actually saying it because of the feasibility of
getting that scale of action globally to take place in the time
that we have got. Perhaps the focus now needs to be on what Scott
has been talking about, about political conditions. It is about
getting these messages out to the places where the decision-makers
are going to be, where the real decisions are going to be taken,
where the rubber hits the road and where the investment decisions
are going to be made about infrastructure in developing countries,
that is what we have to be focusing on. There are strong links
in from the IPCC into this. To tell you the truth, the reality
is that we need to change the instructions that the negotiators
are given in a number of the countries that we are talking about.
They need to come to the negotiations with a fresh mandate, a
fresh remit and you will not do that simply by moving through
the evidence base, however appealing and logical that might be.
Q165 Colin Challen: I cannot really
agree with this argument. Germany has officially set a target
of a 40% cut in its emissions by 2020 and ours is languishing
at between 26 and 32. Why are they able to go further than anywhere
else? I know you cannot speak for the German government but the
argument holds. Why are they not waiting for other people to anticipate
the objections and then work around them and then perhaps adjust
their targets upwards and so on? It seems like we are anticipating
failure and almost planning for it. It makes it a fait accompli
when we go into these negotiations saying we accept that the Chinese
or the Indians or the Japanese are going to be rather rough with
us so let us just see how we can accommodate them. We should go
in there on the strength of our ambitions rather than simply saying
it is all international but that means that we cannot have higher
ambitions.
Mr Woolas: I am really sorry to
hear the point of view that the UK is not up there with Germany.
The German stance is based on a target to be reached if there
is an international agreement. In the crunchy negotiations, for
example, the week before last at the European Council on European
Steel and Motor Manufacture the United Kingdom's environmental
credibility was extremely strong. The starting point is that we
are a country that benefited from North Sea oil and gas, that
the urgency in terms of energy security has not been as great
over the decades—and this is not a party political point,
I hope—as it has been in other countries and to that extent
we are playing catch-up in the area of renewables. Will we catch
up? Yes, I think so. You should judge whether that statement is
meaningful, not me. I believe that our policies and our actions
stand up to scrutiny in these international forums where the United
Kingdom as part of the European Union is seen as a leader not
just in words but in deeds as well. The proof of the pudding is
in the eating. I am sure I will have this debate with my German
colleagues in the months to come.
Q166 Joan Walley: When we were out
in Brussels last week there was no doubt whatsoever about the
leadership role of the UK in respect to the debate that was going
on with Germany and the car and steel manufacturers. I think the
point that we are trying to get across is that when we came back
from China there was this sense that there are these processes
which are going on which are being driven by the science and it
is almost as though the negotiations have got into that kind of
measured Civil Service speak, whereas actually because of the
urgency with which we need to meet the targets up to 2050 there
needs to be a greater political drive to do more now so that we
are not into that fight ten or 20 years down the line. It is almost
like a football team that is facing relegation, no matter what
it does it cannot get the points that it needs to get to be where
we need to be to avoid the tipping point. It is about that political
urgency and we are wondering how the UK Government is driving
that into these measured every so often debates that are taking
place. It has got to be driven as well as guided by the science.
Mr Woolas: In international forums?
Q167 Joan Walley: Yes.
Mr Woolas: Let me try and reassure
you. The diplomatic effort that the United Kingdom is putting
into this issue through its Foreign and Commonwealth Office, through
the Business and Enterprise Department and through my own department
in particular is, in my view, unparallel since the Second World
War. Of the four priorities laid out by the Foreign Secretary
for our FCO, this is one of the four, we are currently doubling
the number of people directly engaged in the Foreign Office in
this campaign and we see it as a campaign. We are trebling the
number of individuals in overseas posts who are dedicated to this
issue. We already have over 500 full-time equivalent posts across
the world dedicated to this issue and we are quadrupling the programme
resource for this issue. That is the scale of the importance internationally
that the United Kingdom puts on this, that our coordination between
business and enterprise, Defra and the FCO is very deep and broad.
We have strategies for individual countries as well as individual
regions and obviously international fora. We believe that our
scientific resource is the United Kingdom and we maintain the
objectivity—it is absolutely crucial to our strategy that
that is not seen as a politically motivated point—and our
businesses are part of that strategy as well. It was the Chief
Executive of BP that told the Washington renewables summit only
two weeks ago, 8,000 delegates, in the presence of the President
of the United States of America, that there would be a carbon
market because corporations would lead on that. The chief executives
and chairmen of our big companies are at the forefront of the
international debate. It is inevitable—and, Chairman, you
will know exactly what I am saying—that when one travels
overseas one is very, very proud of the United Kingdom's effort
and when one returns to the newspaper reading room downstairs
you get a different picture. We welcome the pressure that is put
upon us by the United Kingdom, by select committees, by Parliament,
by institutions and by the NGOs because it strengthens our hand
internationally. The fact that we have broadly a consensus across
the political parties and across the House is a strength for the
United Kingdom and not a weakness and maintaining that is very,
very important to our strategy. Maybe it is because we take it
too seriously that the urgency does not come over, but the Secretary
of State and Number 10 and the Prime Minister are intimately involved
in these strategies. Bearing in mind the point that has been made
that we need to get this paradigm shift at prime ministerial level,
all of our actions and efforts are backed up by the Prime Minister
in negotiations and discussions with his counterparts overseas.
The United Kingdom is I believe, as part of the European Union,
seen as a leader of that urgency. I will redouble my efforts on
your recommendations to get that urgency across.
Chairman: Without in any way disagreeing
with your analysis—I think I broadly share it—we will
take that as positive encouragement to pile on the pressure in
our reports!
Q168 Mr Stuart: Just before I move
on to developing countries, one of the weaknesses of the Kyoto
framework is its lack of clarity beyond the five-year timeframe.
How do you think that could best be tackled?
Mr Woolas: Could I just say, Chairman,
in response to the previous point, the Chairman of the Defra Committee
made comments in the House supportive of the UK position in the
run-up to the Bali Conference. Those comments strengthened the
hand of the United Kingdom because they were by a chairman of
a select committee, from the Opposition Party as it happened,
and that was commented up by the United States Government. I know
we had a flippant exchange a moment ago but I do not underestimate
the importance of the deliberations of the select committee, not
just in its relationship with the UK Government but how we are
seen overseas, and the status of our Parliament is very important.
I say that because it did feed back in Bali. On the point about
the lack of clarity beyond Kyoto, I turn to my colleagues for
advice on this area.
Ms Thompson: You are right, the
current Kyoto commitment period ends in 2012. Obviously as part
of the new international agreement we will be seeking to negotiate,
we will be looking at further commitment periods under Kyoto or
under some other mechanism for going beyond that. The ambition
will be under a new international agreement to try to set mid-term
targets which could go up to 2020 and of course, beyond that,
a long-term target if that is possible. Incidentally, negotiating
something of that complexity in a timeframe going through to December
2009 is not a very leisurely pace at all, as I think was mentioned.
I think that is quite ambitious to try to achieve. To respond
also a point made earlier—if it is going to take us until
December of next year to agree a long-term goal how are we ever
going to do the rest in the timeframe—just to be clear,
all these processes are running along in parallel in the negotiations.
What was agreed at Bali was that we would look to reach an international
agreement by December 2009 that would cover a number of elements,
a number of building blocks: the shared vision, which will include
a long-term goal; also what concrete mitigation actions are required
by all parties; adaptation actions; what technology actions are
required; what financing is required, and how that would work.
Putting all that package together is quite a complex process as
you will understand and will take a bit of time, but it is all
moving forward. Certainly there would be an ambition to look for
a longer target period, but this would all depend on the nature
of the negotiation, what is agreed and how that will work; so
it is difficult to pre-judge that at the moment.
Q169 Mr Stuart: What is the British
Government's attitude towards rolling targets, so that there is
not this automatic end-point five years on, so at least there
is some form of forward-look at all times?
Ms Thompson: It could well be
part of the agreement that is negotiated.
Q170 Mr Stuart: To move on to developing
countries, China and India are treated just the same as the UAE
or Chile, do you think there is a growing recognition among developing
countries that they should be differentiated between?
Mr Woolas: Yes, and I think it
relates to the question you asked previously, Mr Stuart. The point
was made at the Gleneagles meeting and Japan last week that the
world, as I have already said, did not stay static in 1990, but
it is the trajectory that matters. I think increasingly the point
you make is the case. I also think that the issue of forestry
and deforestation will give further emphasis to that point.
Q171 Mr Stuart: On what basis could
new country groupings be decided and how often should they be
re-evaluated, because there are some Annex 1 countries that are
poorer than the other countries? How can the dynamics that change
between countries be assessed?
Mr Woolas: The United Kingdom
has an open mind as to how that will and should play out. It is
one of the big areas where we do not want to pre-empt the discussions
and negotiations. You are absolutely right to say there is an
increasing awareness that, if you measure the wealth of a country,
there are countries with a higher GDP per capita outside of the
commitments than there are of those within in it. I think deforestation
and aforestation will increasingly play a part. I think the carbon
market itself, as it develops, will change the relationships of
where people see themselves standing and where they actually stand.
I think the real world impacts of climate change will bring about
a greater urgency, as has been called for by members of the Committee
beforehand, and change the relationship. This phrase "common
but differentiated", which is a precursor to any contribution
to any international forum, and one's allegiance to that phrase
is almost a litmus test of one's commitment, the defining of what
that means is what this issue is all about. Once you get into
the definition of it there are then different models as to how
you can take it forward.
Q172 Mr Stuart: Minister, we are
interested in your vision of where we should be going.
How do these countries get separated? I know you are saying you
are leaving it to the negotiation, but we need to go in with some
idea. We are not trying to dictate to developing countries, but
equally we need to have some idea of how we think fairly and equitably
that responsibilities can be divided amongst different developing
countries?
Mr Woolas: By trajectory and by
sectors.
Q173 Mr Stuart: You are basically
looking at sectoral approaches?
Mr Woolas: Sectoral approaches
are subservient to the wider targets, national and international,
but nevertheless extremely important amongst those sectors that
are the major emitters; and, secondly, where the projections show
we are going in terms of emissions within each country.
Q174 Mr Stuart: Do you see China
and India accepting binding sectoral targets even if they were
not accepting of binding targets overall?
Mr Woolas: I think the area where
the deal is to be done is over that issue combined with technology
transfer and finance.
Q175 Mr Stuart: I think you have
already answered my question on the separation between the two.
How can we have confidence that we can reduce emissions in line
with IPCC recommendations if there remain no binding targets on
major emitters such as India and China at the end of this process?
Mr Woolas: Chairman, I do not
think we can. That is my assessment.
Mr Dodwell: We are now seeing
calls not just from those who are looking at different frameworks
but actually from the countries within the discussions, the least
developed countries who have just tabled a submission saying that
they want to see differentiation amongst developing countries.
I think the challenge, as the Minister was pointing out, is in
how one blends those different sorts of obligations but comes
up with something meaningful in the terms you are talking about.
We are doing some work now internally to look at what the impact
of different options for developing country and developed country
targets might be in terms of overall emission impact. I understand
why the Committee is looking at this; it is obviously something
we need to have an idea of; but were the UK to come forward with
an ideal proposal of "This is what an international framework
should look like", that is the surest guarantee that we will
not achieve it. We are not in a position where we can effectively
just put forward a framework. The reality of the negotiations
is that countries are now developing their own ideas about what
action they are willing to take. You have got China taking its
national plan forward, that I am sure you have heard about; and
India is developing its own plan as well. What we need to try
to do is to encourage them to push forward to the next stage of
development, the next stage of ambition, with those plans, and
to get into conversations and dialogues with them about, "You've
committed to this domestically. Will you be willing to commit
to it as part of an international framework?" We now need
to be effectively adding those plans together, working out whether
there are additional measures you can take on a sectoral approach
which are necessary to oil the wheels and to actually make this
a virtuous discussion, a virtuous circle, where we are all competing
to go a little bit further, rather than the "after you"
discussions we have got ongoing at the moment. What we are doing
is listening to the proposals others are coming forward with;
we are analysing them; we are modelling their impact.
Q176 Mr Stuart: We are clear on how
the diplomatic process works: the truth is you have got to be
intellectually coherent. It is important, the point the Minister
just made, that he does not believe we can be confident in meeting
the IPC projections if we do not have binding targets on the major
emitters even in the developing world. I think that is a statement
of intent from the British Government and it does apply to China
and India. That will be a sea- change if they do sign up to binding
targets that are not just sectoral?
Mr Woolas: I think, Chairman,
the point Ms Swinson was making then comes in to play, and that
is the unknown, is what will be the impact for change in the United
States of America; what the chemistry will be in the international
negotiations as a result of that. It is clearly linked to the
question of finance. The situation we are in at the moment post-Bali,
and I can see why it looks a bit stuck, is that since Bali, apart
from the informal discussions, there have not been any formal
meetings of the Bali processes; as Jan says, the first one is
next week. We are in a position at the moment, we are in that
bit of a negotiation whereby the protagonists are still publicly
repeating their well-known positions, and it is breaking that
which is important. I believe, as I have already said, that the
area where it will most likely be broken (given that I do believe
we need those binding targets) will be in the area of sectors
and finance; because it is in those areas where countries can
see their economies can grow whilst, at the same time, cutting
their emissions.
Q177 Martin Horwood: Do you think
that positive but still slightly anarchic approach to binding
targets is going to be enough to convince the American Congress?
Are they going to vote for a system that does not seem to impose
really comprehensive binding targets on developing countries?
Mr Woolas: It is a question of
what those targets would be, is it not? I think you are right
to urge caution. In our public debate in this country I think
we are naive as to the intentions of the Senate and the Congress.
They will look after the United States' interests, and unless
they are convinced that there are appropriate binding targets
from other countries, particularly the major developing countries
of China and India, their judgment will be that American public
opinion would not wash any targets that they saw as being detrimental
to US interests. I described it previously as the "ultimate
mutual issue of destruction", and it is that which we have
to break. In my view, that means the commitments from the major
developing countries, and the reassurances in return that we can
give them, are the most important show in town.
Q178 Martin Horwood: Given the importance
of American political opinion on this, and given therefore the
importance of those binding targets on developing countries, and
the debate in developing countries on opinion in America, how
much effort are you devoting (and this might be a question for
Mr Wightman as well as yourself, Minister) to trying to shift
opinion in those developing countries? You have talked about what
sounds like a very welcome increase in the numbers of people in
the headcount and in the resource, but how much of that is aimed
at developing countries and what are they actually aiming to do?
Mr Woolas: Thank you, certainly
Scott will want to come in. May I just take this opportunity to
correct a mistake I made. I said we had 500 full-time equivalent
in our postings, but in fact it is 500 people and I do not want
to mislead you in any way whatsoever. The efforts we and the other
European Union countries have in particular in relation to China
and India to convince them of the policy, and convince them of
our points of view, range from the highest level contacts; the
Prime Minister's recent visit to both countries; my Secretary
of State's visit to India in the run-up to Bali; the efforts of
our Chief Scientist; the Government's Chief Scientist, the dialogue
we have at sector and company level—the China-UK Taskforce
is extremely important; and an understanding of the policy intentions
of the Chinese and of the Indian governments is very important.
Scott, perhaps you can amplify on that answer.
Mr Wightman: I think it comes
back to the earlier point we made about the political conditions.
The Chinese Government is not going to sign up to an international
agreement on the basis of some financial inducements, and to agree
to meet the sorts of reductions we think would be necessary in
its emissions trajectory if we are going to secure the sorts of
global emissions reductions that we think are necessary. The Chinese
Government, and all governments, are going to have to believe
that it is actually in their own interests in terms of jobs and
growth that they should shift their economic development path
onto a low carbon track. That is really the focus of our effort
in the case of China and in the case of other governments as well.
We are putting a significant investment into trying to shift political
opinion in China—it is not straightforward. We are creating
an additional 14 positions in our network of posts in China, locally
engaged and UK-based positions in China; that is a significant
increase in our capacity there. We are looking to work with our
EU partners when President Sakozy and Chancellor Merkel have been
engaged with senior Chinese leaders. We know that they are sending
the same messages. We make sure we are speaking with a consistent
voice. The Commission will be there en masse later this month
in Beijing[1].
That is all part of the mobilisation effort. We are working with
the Chinese on the concept of near zero emissions coal plants.
The UK has been at the forefront of developing a European initiative
designed to demonstrate to China the viability of carbon capture
and storage technology, and to try and convince the Chinese that
it is going to be in their long-term energy security interests
to develop that technology and deploy that technology at scale
in China. It is these sorts of initiatives that we are taking
Q179 Martin Horwood: China being essentially
a dictatorship it is fairly obvious where you have to aim your
attempt at shifting opinion and influence. Looking at slightly
more complicated democratic societies like India and Brazil, and
places like this, do you pursue a markedly different strategy
there? What are you aiming to try and do there? Are you trying
to influence public opinion at all?
Mr Woolas: Interestingly, although
you use the word "dictatorship" our analysis is that
the Chinese central government is part of the solution and not
part of the problem. It understands the issue; its policy decisions
are in that context; it is a huge command economy and their deliberations
are based on the recognition that the climate change is hurting
them very hard indeed. In terms of influencing public opinion
in the other countries, obviously one has to be extremely sensitive
not to interfere in sovereign states; and that is why, in answer
to the question before on the American situation, I explained
that we take an open non-partisan attitude; we share our policy
and our scientific information and lobby in that regard. In terms
of trying to influence public opinion there are two [factors]:
the first is the climate; what will happen in Brazil; what will
happen in the Indian subcontinent as a result of climate change;
and the second is the economics. To try to put into local and
regional contexts the Stern Report is very important indeed. There
are Brazilian and South American equivalents, and there are South
East Asian equivalents as well now I think. We obviously undertake
this campaign in a way that is sensitive to the accusation of
interference. Biofuel debate in Brazil, of course, is a completely
different one from that which it is here. We have strategies for
the major countries that are sensitive to these points, so we
are trying to do what you suggest.
Mr Wightman: The Minister is absolutely
right, and you are right, we need to tailor the campaign strategies
to the local conditions based on our analysis of how decisions
are taken and how we can exert influence on those decisions.
1 Note by Witness: This will, in fact, take
place in late April 2008. Back
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