APPENDIX A
TB DATA COLLECTION
BY STATE
VETS
1. In the wake of their analysis of TB49
data gathering[8], the VLA researchers made two key recommendations:
2.(i) If epidemiological data collection
becomes the primary goal of the breakdown investigation there
will be the need for continual monitoring of the completed forms
to ensure high quality data is obtained.
3.(ii) The two goals of widespread data
collection and prompt management of the incident may turn out
to be competing. To avoid this it is recommended that the TB99
[the anticipated successor to TB49] adopt a modular approach in
which the incident management section of the form is separated
from the epidemiological data collection section.
4. TB99 was indeed created in a modular
fashion. Its fate, however, illustrates why state vets are so
poorly informed. TB99 was employed from 1999 to January 2005.
The Independent Scientific Group (ISG) attempted to ensure that
TB99 provided adequate information for epidemiological analysis.
But this proved difficult, as the draft document moved back and
forth between the ISG and state vets and as it was tested in partnership
with farmers.
5. By February 1999, the final draft of
TB99 had already moved away from focusing on epidemiological groups
and back to individual animals",[32] thus weakening its epidemiological
purpose. An outbreak of Classical Swine Fever soon resulted in
a serious backlog of TB99 data, whilst FMD resulted in no TB99
forms being completed at all and the entire data collection exercise
became "fragile".
6. By March 2002, it became clear that Part
2 of the TB99 form—the part focusing on husbandry—was
not being completed properly by veterinary officers. By July 2002,
the ISG was expressing concern at Defra's failure to ensure the
collection of adequate numbers of "controls". The original
aim had been to apply TB99 to every outbreak farm within the badger
culling trial areas and also to apply TB99 to three control farms
(with no breakdown) for each breakdown farm. But the failure to
gather enough control data began to make the whole data gathering
exercise "pointless".[32]
7. An analysis of the minutes of the ISG
suggests that Defra and the State Veterinary Service regarded
the protection of human and animal health as a greater priority
than research, missing the point that the former could not be
achieved without evidence from the latter.
8. ADAS was contracted to complete TB99s,
at a cost of £280 each. But the whole operation became farcical,
as state vets who had failed to complete the forms in the first
place then complained that they had to spend time checking the
accuracy of forms completed by ADAS. Meanwhile, farmers—who
were ultimately to benefit from the research that taxpayers were
funding—complained that completing the form with a vet was
too "onerous". An independent audit of the data left
the statistician who was supposed to analyse it feeling "depressed".[32]
9. In July 2004, the SVS said that statutory
duties meant that it would not be able to complete adequate TB99
forms for that year. In January 2005, TB99 was abandoned in favour
of a new Disease Report Form, which lacks an epidemiological objective.
The epidemiological elements of TB99 were instead replaced with
a simplified Case Control Study (CCS2005) which was to be a single
year study.[33] Only in 2005, using this CCS, did state vets gather
adequate cases and controls to inform epidemiological analysis.
This was due to "a simpler form to complete, well-organised
project management and the trouble-shooting abilities of [the
SVS representative on the study group]".
10. At the time of writing, Animal Health
continues to use the Disease Report Form to gather evidence during
a TB breakdown. Contrary to the recommendations of the VLA, however,
it does not use a modular approach to provide epidemiological
evidence. Instead, the focus is supposedly on controlling the
specific incident.
11. Yet the methodology is inadequate even
for this purpose. In 2005, EU inspectors reported that the data
is "not evaluated at local or central level in order to ensure
that the decision concerning [the] source of infection/disease
spread was correctly done and consequently appropriate measures
would be taken",[34] as described in Recommendation (i) above.
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