Examination of Witnesses (Questions 463
- 479)
MONDAY 26 NOVEMBER 2007
DR GARETH
ENTICOTT, DR
CHRIS CHEESEMAN
AND DR
ROBBIE MCDONALD
Q463 Chairman: Good afternoon, ladies
and gentlemen. Can I welcome to the first part of our proceedings
Dr Gareth Enticott from Cardiff University, Dr Chris Cheeseman,
Badger Ecologist, formerly from the Central Science Laboratory
and somebody who has been kind enough to assist us in our inquiry
in the past; our additional star witness is Dr Robbie McDonald,
I think you were very kind and volunteered to come to talk to
us.
Dr McDonald: Last minute substitution
I think.
Q464 Chairman: That was very kind
of you. You are the Head of Wildlife Disease Ecology section of
the Central Science Laboratory. One of the things which is talked
about as an ingredient in controlling bovine TB into the future
is biosecurity. This is a term which people talk about but do
not always define and there is not always a great deal of detail
discussed about it. We thought we would get three reputable experts
in front of us to try and probe and improve the Committee's understanding
of biosecurity. I would like to start, if I may, with Dr Enticott
because I read your paper Biosecurity, "Sound Science",
and the prevention paradox: Farmers' understandings of animal
health and I did feel so much better having read it because
all the things that you had heard from farmers we have heard them
as well. It was quite useful to have the reassurance but I felt
that there was a very important point underneath what you were
saying about, if you like, some of the—and I use the word
carefully—casual as opposed to scientific observations of
matters connected with biosecurity. The thesis that you seemed
to advance was that farmers carried on with anecdotal reporting
about biosecurity issues and that gradually reinforced their views
about biosecurity and its effectiveness and therefore made it
very difficult to have a more rigorous approach to biosecurity.
At the end you seemed to say that we have to change the language
in terms of the way that we approach the subject. Perhaps you
could just start by talking a little bit about the work and what
inspired it and what conclusions you did draw from the way that
farmers perceived the term biosecurity.
Dr Enticott: The work is funded
by the ESRC which is the Economic and Social Research Council.
What inspired it goes back 11 years when I was doing my PhD, living
in a village and drinking unpasteurised milk and wondering why
all the other villagers were drinking unpasteurised milk when
the farms went down with the TB outbreak, so it was an accidental
coming across. The issue for me is that farmers understand risks
but biosecurity is different to understanding risk. They have
a good knowledge of risk, why their animals might go down with
a disease, TB included; their knowledge of biosecurity is different
because it is a new word, shaped by what happened during foot
and mouth and their reactions to that. Farming is a kind of cultural
industry in a sense and they understand that dealing with the
disease differs with different styles of farming. Biosecurity
is very much associated with a very intensive style of farming.
There are some differences in term of the priorities and what
counts as biosecurity. If you ask them what it means they will
talk about disinfectant straight away; that is the legacy of foot
and mouth. They will also talk about fencing straight away in
the context of TB, so separating badgers. Then they go down the
less serious and things tail off. If you talk to other people
you get a very much more holistic view of this. Some of the terms
which people use—this is a problem which I will come back
to—are different. For example the closed herd differs between
farmers and vets and scientists in particular as to what that
means; what actually counts as a closed herd differs. A lot of
the research we have been doing looks at this mismatch between
their experience and what science says about what is good practice,
what is biosecurity. This is no different to research done in
public health, and preventative measures around public health.
Whenever this kind of prevention paradox where you have these
very general ideas—keep a closed herd, put some fencing
up and that kind of thing—that does not match with our own
experience. You will always get exceptions to the rules and it
is those things which guide people's behaviour. It also makes
people think, in this case in particular, that going down with
TB is a matter of luck and farmers—certainly the ones in
high risk areas—are very fatalistic about going down with
TB. They do not think there is much they can do about it. That
is as much an interaction between farmers' own understandings
of TB and biosecurity as it is an interaction with the way in
which scientists talk about biosecurity in vague terms and in
general terms as well. I would also say that a lot of these kinds
of activities which that misunderstanding promotes—I could
talk about those maybe afterwards—a lot of that is amplified
and promoted by what has gone on over the last nine years within
TB. There are also other things like foot and mouth so that trust
element in Defra and in science all promotes this misunderstanding.
Q465 Chairman: You conducted interviews
with 60 farmers, some of them in England and some of them in Wales.
How many of the farmers you interviewed actually practised good
biosecurity as has been advised by Defra. Again, one of the points
you make in your paper is that Defra has issued a lot of different
bits of advice on biosecurity and I wonder if, in addition to
commenting on the degree of biosecurity that you observed in the
farmers you interviewed, whether this sort of evolving advice
from the Defra Husbandry Working Group had in a way undermined
the effectiveness of what are deemed to be good biosecurity measures.
Dr Enticott: It is difficult to
say whether farmers have good biosecurity because I guess good
biosecurity only matters when there is a risk.
Q466 Chairman: Do you have a working
definition of what we mean by biosecurity?
Dr Enticott: There are working
definitions.
Q467 Chairman: Did you happen to
alight upon one which you felt comfortable with? Can you just
give us a flavour because it seems to be a general term that is
used by not always defined?
Dr Enticott: My definition is
the farmers' definition; I want to know what they understand by
it. There is a very broad definition, preventing disease and illness
getting on the farm, but that is a very broad definition. Obviously
I am interested in what the farmers think about it and what it
means to them as opposed to what it might mean to someone else.
Q468 Mr Gray: We are considering
whether or not farmers are achieving good biosecurity. In order
to work out whether or not they are achieving good biosecurity
surely we have to start with some kind of pre-set notion as to
what it is they ought to be achieving. Would you say that your
definition of biosecurity is that you want to hear what the farmers
think it is? Surely we should be saying what we think it is and
then ask the farmers whether or not they are achieving it.
Dr Enticott: I understand that,
it is a good point. There does need to be some kind of formal
understanding of what counts as good biosecurity otherwise farmers
will rely on their own views of what it means. Biosecurity is
a very ambiguous word; it means a lot of different things to different
people. In the paper you have I may say in there that I do not
think it is a good word to use. In fact for many reasons I do
not think it is particularly helpful to talk about it in relation
to TB. We can talk about it in a more general farming context
and I think you could argue that talking about biosecurity in
relation to TB has wound people up in a sense and generated a
sense of distrust and marginalisation from what should be going
on to resolve the issue. There are definitional terms which need
to be addressed otherwise you do end up with this misunderstanding.
Q469 Mr Gray: My own constituency
in Wiltshire is one of the very high risk areas and I know the
farmers there very well indeed. I am just puzzled as to what you
think maybe farmers ought to be doing, leaving aside the definition
of biosecurity. What, in your view, should farmers be doing in
places like Wiltshire which they are not currently doing?
Dr Enticott: I do not know what
they are currently doing.
Q470 Mr Gray: From the 60 you interviewed.
Dr Enticott: It is not really
a question of what they should be doing; I think it is more a
question that if biosecurity—whatever that means—is
an important part of resolving the problem of TB—if that
is the case—then how do you encourage farmers to do that
if they are not already doing it? The issue to me is that people
have talked over for eight years—and the select committee
notes will say this—that we need to develop a better communication
strategy between farmers and the Government. I do not think that
has happened.
Q471 Chairman: In fairness, Dr Enticott,
you are not a scientist.
Dr Enticott: No—I am a social
scientist.
Chairman: You observe the phenomenon,
in this case of farmer behaviour, in the context of this. Dr Cheeseman
may in due course be able to give us a more scientific approach
to this.
Q472 Paddy Tipping: You just mentioned,
Gareth, the fact that there is no communication strategy between
Defra and the farmers. Why is that? Why is Defra so disregarded?
Secondly, as a social scientist, you know that people look at
good practice; are there are exemplars of good practice that somebody
who is highly regarded in the farming community says: "I
do it this way" and people would then follow that example?
Dr Enticott: I do not think I
said there was not a communication strategy; I said it has not
really been developed as fully as it could be.
Q473 Paddy Tipping: Effective communication.
Dr Enticott: You talk to farmers
and firstly you ask them what they do with any communication from
Defra and they say, "Well, I throw it in the bin". The
approach is leaflets and websites; that is not the way to develop
trust in terms of encouraging people to change their behaviour,
which is one of the things we have to do. If you go back through
the years and you look at the Agricultural Extension Services
which used to exist, they worked in a completely different way,
much more personalised. In the paper that is one of the ways in
which, if you are serious about this, then that is what we have
to look at. It is interesting that in Wales that is what they
are actually trying at the moment, a kind of personalised biosecurity
extension service. I am not saying that that is perfect but it
is certainly different from what is going on in England and it
also certainly fits better with the ways in which farmers understand
information and whom they trust. We talked to farmers and asked
them who they trust and they say their vet. I would just say something
else as well, I spoke to some farmers around Gloucestershire as
well and they all mentioned CSL and it is quite interesting that
the CSL might have a role to play in that as well.
Q474 Mr Williams: In understanding
farmers' behaviour in this matter I think you have indicated there
is a sort of fatalism and you can understand that in a way because
in airborne foot and mouth there is very little biosecurity you
can take to stop that happening. Farmers are told not to allow
badgers to enter buildings and yet they know that once they turn
the cattle out to grass they are probably mixing with the same
badgers as are attempting to enter the building. That fatalism
is bound to continue so long as the farmers see the practicalities
of the issue and whatever biosecurity they aspire to will never,
ever achieve an absolute protection.
Dr Enticott: That is right and
from this sense of fatalism amongst the farmers that I have spoken
to it is no surprise they go down with TB at all. They live with
TB; it is something they have had to adapt to. If they do not
go down it is a surprise and that affects the way they assess
risk. Even when you may have a good idea about ways of preventing
TB it is that overriding sense of fatalism: why should I do something
when I am still going to get it? That is a huge problem.
Q475 Dr Strang: What you are saying
is the main reason for farmers not implementing biosecurity measures
is because they do not think it will make a difference because
they think it is a random event as to whether they will have a
breakdown with TB. Is that what you are saying?
Dr Enticott: That is a big part,
yes.
Q476 Dr Strang: What about the ones
that are implementing biosecurity measures? What reasons have
they given for doing so?
Dr Enticott: There are things
which become part of farming consciousness and there are modes
of good conduct within the communities, things like not feeding
on the floor and those kinds of things. Farmers will say to us,
"So and so down the road, he still does it; I can't understand
why he does that, everybody knows if you do that ... ". So
there are things which people accept but they do not override
that fatalism.
Q477 Dr Strang: Are there any particular
biosecurity measures which you found farmers were taking?
Dr Enticott: They object to being
told to fence off their land and buildings from badgers. That
is probably one of the main things they object to.
Q478 Dr Strang: Was cost a major
factor there, the time and effort involved in doing that?
Dr Enticott: Cost and assessing
risk. It may be, but my own personal view is that it comes down
to their view of farming and particularly dairy farming in the
south west for example being quite an open system and not tending
to be intensive. They will use those words "not wanting to
retreat behind barricades and barriers" and that is quite
culturally important to their way of farming. That is quite important,
and the other thing as well is that they would use their own sense
of understanding of nature and the ways in which badgers move
around and being impossible to control basically.
Q479 Mr Drew: Can I follow up on
this notion of the closed herd? I think the most interesting thing
you talked about there is my own experience of what we mean by
a closed herd. When farmers talk to you they will always maintain
that there is a lower incidence of bovine TB where you have closed
herds but when they do go down it is has to be a wildlife reservoir.
The problem I have always found is that when you then cross-examine
and ask if they have brought any animals in you often find that
there have been animals brought in, maybe the odd calf, but is
this a problem in terms of the science—and certainly the
perception of science—about how we can disprove the cattle
to cattle transfer at one level but in reality we are not really
dealing with something that is pertinent in terms of an ability
to isolate that as a factor.
Dr Enticott: There are two things
with a closed herd, one is that it really operates as this exceptions
rule so that people notice that closed herds go down as much as
flying herds or they are in fact more likely to go down in someone
with a flying herd and therefore why should I bother with any
biosecurity? The second thing connected to that is this definition
issue of what is a closed herd. No doubt there are farmers out
there who have never brought anything onto their lands in years
but then when you talk to others about their herd and they say
they have a closed herd but then they talk about the times when
things were brought in. That does not mean that they still do
not have a closed herd; those are kind of allowances. This is
my worry; in talking about a closed herd you have this very generalised
idea which therefore allows for this kind of misunderstanding.
| 
