Memorandum submitted by the Department
for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (FL 139)
DEFRA CONTRIBUTION TO THE INDEPENDENT LESSONS
LEARNED REVIEW OF THE SUMMER 2007 FLOODS
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 As the Lead Department for Flooding
in England, Defra wishes to take this opportunity to contribute
its views on issues being considered in the Independent Review
of the Summer 2007 floods ("the Pitt Review").
1.2 The flooding very sadly caused a number
of deaths and had severe impacts on many thousands of householders
and businesses. It presented major challenges for all responders
and others involved in the flooding. This includes the Environment
Agency, emergency services and local authorities as well as the
insurance industry, utility services and the voluntary sector.
The Regional Government Offices and central Government Departments
(including Communities and Local Government, Civil Contingencies
Secretariat as well as many parts of Defra) also played a significant
role. Defra pays tribute to the extraordinary work that was done
by all organisations involved in the flooding and recognises that
many individuals within them made personal contributions that
were well above and beyond the call of duty.
1.3 As with all major floods, and whilst
each event is to some extent unique, there will always be lessons
to be learned that should help make the response next time even
more effective. That is the purpose of this report; it is intended
to offer constructive comments on what worked well and what could
be improved for next time. Defra is separately identifying lessons
for its own internal management of future flood events and some
communications issues between Defra and the Environment Agency
are being pursued bilaterally.
1.4 Some of the discussion in this report
reflects comments about the demands that the flooding created
for Government Office Regional Resilience Teams, made at an event
hosted by Defra's Contingency Planning and Security Division in
September 2007. Regional Government Offices will clearly be making
their own contributions to the Pitt Review but some of the issues
they raised, especially on the demands created by Central Government,
and the limitations on their ability to provide full and detailed
information on the floods and their impacts, have been recognised
in this report.
2. DEFRA ROLE
IN RELATION
TO FLOODING
2.1 Defra is the Lead Government Department
for flooding in England. Our role is to:
— Set the policy, administrative and
legal framework for delivery of the flood (and coastal erosion)
risk management service in England.
— Provide most of the funding (£600
million in 2007-08) for delivery of that service and set the outcomes
and targets that should be delivered for that investment. Funding
is directed mainly at the Environment Agency to build and maintain
physical defences and also provide flood warning systems. Funding
is also provided to local authorities and internal drainage boards
for their flood and coastal erosion risk management activity.
— Lead on emergency planning, ensuring
that effective planning for flood emergencies takes place at national,
regional and local level including by leading the flood emergencies
work-stream under the Cabinet Office led Capabilities Programme.
This includes assessing the capability of all responders to deal
with a range of emergencies.
— Ensure that the cross-government
response to flooding and recovery is initiated when floods occur,
including collecting and disseminating information on the causes
and impacts of the floods. This continues until such time, if
at all, that central machinery within Civil Contingencies Secretariat
takes over and CLG takes over the recovery role.
2.2 The operational role in managing flooding
incidents is entirely the responsibility of local emergency responders
led by the police in the Gold, Silver and Bronze commands.
2.3 Defra is reviewing its internal procedures
for responding to serious flooding in the light of experience
of the Summer floods.
2.4 As part of our Making Space for Water
(MSW) programme, Defra is engaged in a major review of its policies
for flood and coastal erosion risk management. This will set a
new, long-term strategic direction which aims to ensure a fully
sustainable, strategic and holistic approach. This includes a
number of key issues of which the Pitt Review will wish to be
aware, including:
— Extending flood warnings (which currently
apply only to river and sea flooding) to other forms of flooding
eg surface water and groundwater.
— Extending risk mapping to those other
forms of flooding (as well as to coastal erosion).
— Creating a new Strategic Overview
by the Environment Agency for all flood and coastal erosion risk
management which would embrace—but not be limited to—the
above issues. In June, stakeholders were consulted on the role
that the Agency should perform in relation to all forms of inland
flooding. Parallel consideration is being given to managing surface
water flooding as part of the Defra Water Strategy.
2.5 This is clearly relevant to much of
the experience of the Summer Floods and we ask the Pitt Review
to consider how surface water flood risk management could be improved.
2.6 Defra is also the Lead Government Department
for drinking water and sewerage emergencies and the Department's
Water Supply and Regulation Division has response plans in place.
These plans were last fully exercised in December 2005 and most
recently revised in April 2007. Defra works closely with water
company emergency planners and the Drinking Water Inspectorate
(DWI).
3. PREPARATION
FOR FLOODING
AND RESPONSE
BY EMERGENCY
RESPONDERS
3.1 The Pitt Review will consider in detail
the response to the flood emergency, including the adequacy of
flood warnings and the way in which Category 1 responders acted.
As a contribution to the Pitt Review, a separate report on the
way in which the Fire and Rescue Service (FRS) responded is being
led by Sir Ken Knight. The Environment Agency and others will
also be providing inputs to the Pitt Review. Para 7.1 sets out
some particular further issues which the Pitt Review is asked
to consider, while the following lesson applies to information
available to the public.
Lesson 1—Defra considers that the
(somewhat variable) information available to local residents should
be improved, with local radio playing a vital role.
3.2 Defra keenly awaits the findings of
the Pitt and Knight reviews and will work across Government, and
with the Environment Agency and others in responding as positively,
and as quickly, as possible to the recommendations. This has been
the approach to lessons learned reports from previous floods and
emergency exercises with action taken to implement or otherwise
address lessons identified.
4. CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
RESPONSE
Across Government/Agencies
4.1 From its standpoint, Defra considers
that there was strong collaborative working and cooperation across
all Government Departments and Agencies and that there was an
equally strong central response. The major pressures that the
floods created did not impose any barriers or resentment; indeed
the sense that "we are all in this together" seems to
have engendered a spirit of cooperation and mutual support.
4.2 We also consider that the arrangements
for escalation of the Government response to the Civil Contingencies
Committee/COBR worked well, including joint working between CCS
and Defra in establishing the Pitt Review. We also welcome the
way that Communities and Local Government readily accepted responsibility
for leading on recovery issues and we consider that the Cross
Government Flood Recovery Officials Group has provided an invaluable
network in support of that role. However, we would ask the Pitt
Review to form an independent view of the arrangements that operated
between Departments.
4.3 We also consider that lessons can be
learned in terms of improving briefing and information sharing
which are considered in Section 5.
Lesson 2—Cross Government/Agency Relations
Defra's emergency planning for flooding should be amended,
including to set out more clearly the arrangements for:
(a) escalating the response to flooding within
Government;
(b) making clear the relative responsibilities
of Defra (flood protection and emergency management) and CLG (recovery);
(c) maintaining networks with officials across
all Government Departments; and
(d) establishing Lessons Learned reviews.
5. BRIEFING AND
INFORMATION
Introduction
5.1 These floods demonstrated the importance
of ensuring that there are clear and robust arrangements in place
for capturing and sharing information on the floods and their
impacts, and also for responding to questions from the media and
others. Defra acknowledges the significant effort that was made
by the many people and organisations involved in providing and
collating briefing often against extremely tight deadlines and
in the face of competing priorities.
5.2 This section identifies possible changes
in the procedures for briefing and information which should both
improve its quality and utility while reducing the burdens on
those who have to produce and collate it.
Flood Reports
5.3 Information on what happened and the
impact came in from three main sources:
— Regularly updated situation reports
from each affected Government Offices for the Regions.
— Regional Environment Agency "HELP"
reports which were collated twice daily by the EA National Incident
Room in Bristol to produce a national Sitrep.
— Common Recognised Information Picture
(CRIP) reports produced by the Civil Contingencies Secretariat
which collated information contained in the EA and GO reports.
5.4 The EA and GO Sitreps, and the CRIP
reports, generally provided invaluable information on the floods
and their impact. However, the sheer quantity of the information,
arriving at different times during the day, was often difficult
to assimilate and use in eg accurate and up to date Ministerial
briefings. This reinforced the need, identified in previous floods
and in Exercise Triton (2004), for timely access by all to reliable
data on the floods. This might be facilitated by an Extranet site
for live provision and receipt of briefing material on the flood
event which is accessible to Ministers and officials. Prior to
the floods, CCS and CLG had been working on proposals for such
an Extranet site to handle a range of emergency incidents and
this work should be taken forward urgently. The establishment
of a "battle rhythm" reduces the demands for ad hoc
briefings, sets a timetable to work to, and provides assurance
that the response is being managed. It also ensures information
is delivered at particular times; allows it to be assimilated
for briefings and meetings, and sets realistic expectations.
Lesson 3—Timely shared briefing and
possible Extranet site Defra, CCS and CLG should work together
to identify means of achieving timely access by all relevant recipients
to reliable data on the floods within an established "battle
rhythm". This might be through an Extranet site for flooding
and possibly other emergencies.
Ministers and MPs
5.5 Ministers, from all affected departments
visited affected areas; kept Parliament informed in regular Statements
on the developing flooding situation and the Government's response;
and then, during the Summer Recess, held weekly phone-ins for
MPs to raise constituency concerns. This open and accessible approach
by Ministers helped MPs to raise issues and to feed back information.
Lesson 4—Public and Parliamentary access
to Ministers These floods demonstrated the value of Ministers
being open and accessible including visiting affected areas, making
regular statements to Parliament and hosting weekly phone-ins
for MPs. Such arrangements could be firmly embedded in future
emergency planning.
Reporting responsibilities
5.6 The EA reports tended to concentrate
on the causes of the flooding, flood warnings and possibilities
of future flooding taking account of weather forecasts and river
peak flows. EA provided some information on other flood impacts
and the management of incidents that were within the Agency's
responsibilities (eg the potential breaches of Ulley Reservoir
and Bentley Flood Bank). However, a much wider range of material
was provided by the GOs, covering for example loss of water and
power supplies, impacts on industry and agriculture and school
closures. GO reports also provided details of how particularly
serious incidents (actual or potential) were being managed eg
the risks to Walham Switching Station and the impact of the loss
of Mythe water treatment works. The management of such incidents,
and their possible impacts, were a major concern and were often
included in Statements to Parliament so requiring absolutely up-to-date
and accurate assessments of the position.
5.6 There were significant differences in
the scope of the information provided by EA and the Government
Offices in relation to properties flooded. EA reports were of
3,000—4,000 properties affected by fluvial (ie river) flooding
whereas several days later the GOs were reporting over 30,000
houses flooded from all sources, including surface water. This
contributed to some delay in the reporting of the scale of flooding
in Hull.
5.7 Later on, a "flooded property"
was only regarded as one where the habitable part had been affected
(ie excluding those where the only damage was to outbuildings,
garages and gardens). This substantially, and entirely reasonably,
reduced the numbers counted. A similar definition might have been
applied to exclude those business premises which had suffered
little impact.
5.8 There were some calls for greater clarity
of roles between Gold commands and the Department. Defra were
asked for local operational detail on the use of tankers for agricultural
water which might have been directed at Gold as that is where
the relevant players were and where operational detail is owned.
The information flow from Gold up to London could encompass that
sort of detail—perhaps in an agreed template—rather
than leading to a series of ad hoc questions.
Lesson 5—Reporting responsibilities
Clear arrangements should be established setting out which
organisations are responsible for reporting on what, when (ie
timing during the day) and on what basis (eg to count households
only where the habitable condition has been affected and perhaps
only those businesses suffering interrupted trading). As a broad
demarcation, GOs might report on all impacts and the emergency
response; EA might report on the causes of the floods, predictions
of future flooding, and response to incidents being managed by
the EA.
Core briefing
5.9 Defra, CLG and CCS each produced sets
of "core briefing" material for use in responding to
policy and media enquiries. Inevitably these sets of briefing
contained much similar information but often also something that
the others didn't. We could consider whether alternative arrangements
are feasible that might avoid duplication and a risk of conveying
different messages.
Lesson 6—Shared and rationalised briefing
The briefing produced by central Departments might be reviewed
to see whether it could be rationalised and shared to ensure consistency
and avoid duplication of effort. An Extranet site as in Lesson
3 might help achieve both objectives.
CCS Briefing
5.10 The CRIP reports produced by CCS were
adopted as the authoritative source of cross-Government briefing.
Defra consider they were very useful for that purpose but wish
to consider some minor issues, eg on the content and format of
the reports, with CCS. CRIP reports might be absorbed into any
future Extranet site.
5.11 We would also ask CCS to review the
purpose of their "Top Lines" brief which seemed to comprise
a mixture of quotations from Ministers and general advice but
was given restricted circulation.
Lesson 7—CCS Briefing CRIP reports
should remain the primary form of cross-Government briefing (subject
to consideration of some detailed issues with Defra and a more
significant review if an Extranet site as in Lesson 3 comes to
fruition). The "Top Lines" brief should be reviewed.
Demands on Government Offices for the Regions
and local authorities
5.12 Government looks to GOs to provide
information on the floods, and their impacts, which is necessary
for understanding the major issues, responding to questions from
the media and Parliament and for generally managing the central
response. However, GOs and other core responders will be heavily
involved in the operational response to flooding and this must
be their top priority.
5.13 GOs have also said that it was often
difficult to obtain information on impacts, especially in the
detail sometimes requested by central Government. GOs had to rely
heavily on local authorities to provide the information. LAs were
themselves generally heavily involved in managing the flooding
impacts and could not devote resources to eg counting properties
and schools affected, even though central Government regarded
this as key information. Moreover, GOs said that the number of
houses affected was still not final by mid-September. These limitations
on data completeness and accuracy need to be understood and "health
warnings" applied to its use.
Lesson 8—Demands on GOs etc Central
Government should:
(a) work with GOs to ensure that effective
arrangements exist for provision and coordination of briefing
that do not adversely affect the local emergency response—again
an Extranet site as referred to in Lesson 3 may help provide a
solution; and
(b) recognise that any information provided
by GOs etc may be incomplete, involve significant estimation,
and may therefore need health warnings when used.
6. MAJOR FLOOD
IMPACTS ON
DEFRA POLICY
AREAS
Reservoir Safety
6.1 The transfer of enforcement responsibilities
to the Environment Agency and other changes in the Water Act 2003
have been a major step forward in improving the reservoir safety
regime. However, the significant possibility of failure of the
Ulley Reservoir highlighted a number of issues relating to reservoir
safety which should be considered by the Pitt Review. In particular
it raised questions about the inspection regime and risk classification.
The Environment Agency has submitted a number of recommendations
to the Pitt Review Team for reform of the legislation and other
approaches to reservoir safety. Defra recognises that these are
valid issues for consideration and looks forward to seeing the
resulting recommendations from the Pitt review.
Lesson 9—Reservoir safety Defra
considers that the Environment Agency proposals for legislative
and administrative reform of the reservoir safety regime are worthy
of careful consideration.
Lesson 10—Ulley reservoir We invite
the Pitt Review to consider the effectiveness of the way in which
the Ulley Reservoir incident was managed and assessed.
Water supply and sewerage
6.2 Defra's role as the Lead Government
Department for drinking water and sewerage emergencies is explained
in para 2.6.
Communication
6.3 During an emergency, water companies
will be subject to demands for information from Defra, DWI (in
their regulatory role) and the local Gold command. Defra takes
as its lead Section 208 of the Water Industries Act 1991, from
which the Security and Emergency Measures Direction 1998 (the
"SEMD") was issued. This Direction places planning and
reporting requirements on water companies in the event of a drinking
water or sewerage emergency. Defra needs timely and regular reports
for use in briefing Ministers and for Ministers to use when reporting
to Parliament. Consistency in reporting would best be achieved
by companies adopting and maintaining a core "script"
for all their communication needs. There may also be lessons to
be learned in respect of managing expectations: partial use of
data, without the qualifications applied by the originator, can
falsely raise hopes and then discredit the good work that is being
done in difficult circumstances.
Lesson 11—Communication In responding
to any emergency, it will be necessary for water companies to
quickly put in place arrangements for ensuring information flows
to Defra and the Drinking Water Inspectorate (in their regulatory
role) and to Gold Command are consistent and frequently updated.
Alternative water supplies
6.4 The figure of 10 litres minimum per
person per day is a planning requirement notified by the Secretary
of State. It was set at the time of the 1998 Direction after consultation
with water companies, Department of Health and DWI. This is regarded
as a minimum amount and for smaller incidents over a 2-3 day period
may be exceeded. Mythe was exceptional in terms of the number
of people without water and the time period that they were without
mains drinking water, with alternative supplies having to be provided
for approximately two weeks. The rationale for this 10 litre target,
and its adequacy in absolute terms, should be reviewed in the
light of the Mythe experience.
Lesson 12—Alternative water supplies
The adequacy of 10 litres/person/day as the minimum requirement
for alternative water supplies should be reviewed in the context
of a major and sustained emergency such as Mythe.
Resilience of water and sewerage (and wider)
infrastructure
6.5 Water companies are responsible for
making sure their assets are protected against flood risk and
receive advice from the Environment Agency, and against security
risks on the advice of the security services. Action by water
companies may include making improvements to connectivity to allow
rezoning of their networks in the event of loss of part of the
infrastructure, and this is a commonly used technique in incidents.
In the light of the impact on water and sewerage facilities of
this year's floods, there is a need to examine whether other infrastructure
is similarly vulnerable and the extent to which this has been
and/or should be recognised and addressed in such things as water
companies' 25-year water resource management plans. The floods
also showed the need for all critical infrastructure, including
power and telecommunications, to be resilient to flooding.
Lesson 13—Resilience of water and sewerage
(and wider) infrastructure In light of the Mythe incident
to examine whether there is a need to reconsider the measures
taken to reduce vulnerability of the water and sewerage infrastructure
to flooding and other threats. There is also a need to consider
resilience to flooding of other significant infrastructure eg
power and telecoms installations.
Water company responsibilities for sewerage
6.6 If there is no mains water then householders
will not be able to flush toilets, except with buckets of water.
To what extent is it reasonable to expect other sanitation facilities
(portaloos and other such equipment as may be used at festivals,
pop concerts, etc) to be available and deployed? Should tankered
water supplies to local facilities such as schools and community
centres be used to maintain some sanitation facilities within
the community? If sewage treatment works have failed, then sewage
will keep flowing through the system, rather than being allowed
to back up. This may result in pollution of watercourses, but
this avoids sewage backing up into homes.
Lesson 14—Water company responsibilities
for sewerage In the light of the experience of the recent
floods, what might reasonably be required of water companies and
other agencies in the event of failure of the sewerage system
as a consequence of the loss of mains water supply? What are the
statutory responsibilities?
Water Company Mutual Aid
6.7 The water industry has set up arrangements
for companies to help each other in the event of an emergency.
This is in the form of identified Mutual Aid that can be loaned
to the company in difficulties, under agreed terms. Companies
may loan tankers, bowsers and personnel, etc according to what
is needed. They also make use of the service provided by Water
Direct. It has already been recognised that there is a limit to
the size of incident that can be managed by a company's efforts
together with Mutual Aid. These larger incidents are termed Major
Incidents. A generic framework has been produced for planning
for such incidents, in which it is recognised that a multi-agency
response is required. During the Mythe incident Severn Trent Water
made full use of the water company Mutual Aid available to them
and purchased bottled water from Water Direct. In addition, and
beyond the Mutual Aid arrangements, additional tankers were sourced
from food industry companies, as were additional supplies of bottled
water. At the time, there was some criticism of the logistical
arrangements for maintaining these alternative supplies of water.
Severn Trent Water engaged the services of DHL to help with this
and, later, further support was provided by the MoD. Defra's requirement
for planning for Major Incidents means that companies will have
to have put in place arrangements covering these sorts of eventualities.
The water company plans are independently certified each year
and the next round of certification reports will be received in
April 2008. These will outline the extent to which companies have
examined scenarios and have put a multi-agency response in place.
Lesson 15—Water Company Mutual Aid
In the light of the Mythe incident there is a need to consider
whether water company Mutual Aid is sufficient. There should be
a review of whether there are sufficient resources of key equipment
within the industry and of any logistical issues in relation to
access, mobilisation and use.
Regulatory role of the DWI input to local Gold
command centres
6.8 Established procedures are in place
between water companies, DWI, and relevant local health officials
namely HPU (CCDC) and LA (EHO) regarding water quality incident
management and consumer warning notices. Using its powers under
the Water Industry Act 1991, DWI is investigating whether any
offence was committed or any regulations were breached following
the loss of water supply from the Mythe water treatment works
and will report independently. DWI is also in dialogue with HPA
nationally and the water industry about improved advice to health
professionals. Defra welcomes the action that DWI has set in train
and recommends that the DWI findings and conclusions, which will
be made public, are included in the lessons learned review.
Lesson 16—Regulatory role of the DWI
and input to local Gold command centres The DWI is the regulator
with statutory powers in respect of drinking water quality including
the testing that water companies are required by law to carry
out normally or during abnormal operational circumstances including
emergencies. DWI is also the technical advisor appointed by SoS
to advise government on such matters. This responsibility may
not be sufficiently well-defined in the existing operational guidance
on health and related matters that is available to local Gold
commands dealing with a water supply emergency.
Water for livestock
6.9 There is no statutory requirement for
water companies to supply water to industrial premises and offices
or to farms or livestock units. The statutory obligation only
extends to the supply of domestic customers but the SEMD requires
that in a water supply emergency, companies must have due regard
to livestock. Some farms have private drinking water supplies
or winter storage reservoirs but others, particularly those with
large indoor pig or poultry units or large dairy herds, are largely
dependant on the public supply.
6.10 In the aftermath of the flooding of
the Mythe Water Treatment Works, animal welfare issues became
a serious concern at a number of livestock farms in the area affected
by the loss of the public supply. Animal Welfare is the responsibility
of the farmer and farmers should have contingency plans. But the
industry norm is for plans that enable them to survive a short
term interruption of supply of eg 48 hours. The RSPCA and NFU,
with assistance from Defra, the Government Office for the South
West, Severn Trent Water and Welsh Water, put in place arrangements
for supplying tankered supplies to vulnerable units. But it was
an ad hoc response rather than a considered part of the plan.
Lesson 17—Water supply for livestock
farms We could review the arrangements for ensuring adequate
water supply to livestock farms.
Agriculture
6.11 The floods had a major impact on agricultural
crops and livestock. Defra agreed various measures to ease the
impacts, for example cross compliance rules were eased to allow
machinery onto recently flooded land. Lessons identified from
the actions taken will be absorbed when there are future floods
or similar events impacting on farmers.
6.12 Current approaches to flood risk management
already provide for payments to be made where agricultural land
provides "planned" flood storage. Defra will review
how crop etc values are factored into cost:benefit appraisals
for investment in capital and maintenance work. Consideration
should also be given to the adequacy of the Environment Agency's
flood warning service in relation to farming businesses (eg to
enable attempts to save livestock). Lesson 17 addresses the provision
of emergency water supplies to livestock.
Lesson 18—Flood Management and Agriculture
Defra should review how crop etc values are factored into cost:benefit
appraisals for investment in capital and maintenance work, taking
account of predicted future flooding/rainfall patterns (especially
the balance between summer and winter floods).
Lesson 19—Flood warnings for agriculture
A review could be carried out of flood warnings for agricultural
businesses.
Food distribution
6.13 There were no widespread losses of
mains power during the floods but, where these occurred, supermarkets
responded well and in several cases already had emergency facilities
or were able to bring them in. There was no loss of power to food
manufacturers and transport problems (eg from flooded roads) tended
to be localised. The threatened loss of Walham Switching Station
led to Defra setting up contacts with the food industry to deal
with potential displacement of people.
Lesson 20—Food distribution The
floods did not seriously challenge the food distribution industry
and supermarkets demonstrated a reassuring ability to cope with
relatively short-term power losses. Defra will consider issues
surrounding emergency food distribution through supermarkets,
drawing on the experience of emergency water distribution in Gloucestershire.
Waste management
6.14 The main waste issues from the floods
were the impact of increased waste arisings on local authority
costs (of disposal including landfill tax liability) and performance
measures for landfill diversion and recycling targets. However,
the additional waste arisings resulting from the floods within
affected councils are no more than around 2% of annual arisings
which is well within the normal annual variation. Some issues
were however untested in the floods (eg flooding of landfill sites).
Lesson 21—Waste management Defra
and HMT have concluded that there is no case for increasing waste
management funding to local authorities; nor for altering their
liability to pay landfill tax; nor for changing their performance
targets.
7. OTHER ISSUES
WHICH DEFRA
INVITES THE
PITT REVIEW
TO CONSIDER
7.1 There are some other significant issues
that Defra ask the Pitt Review to consider:
Flood Forecasting and Warning
— The performance of the Environment
Agency's flood warning service against lead time etc targets.
— EA had flood warnings in place for
areas that had been under water for some time. There may be merit
in creating another category such as "Currently Flooded"
which could be coupled with important safety messages such as
"Don't play in the flood water" and "Be careful
when switching the electricity back on".
— Met Office severe weather warnings
were provided in good time. However, their long term forecasts
might be reviewed against knowledge that the El Nino effect was
apparent last year and the Jet Stream was apparently much further
south than usual.
— The arrangements in place for rapidly
assessing and communicating the scale of the event so that appropriate
escalation of the Government and other response can take place.
— The capacity of the Environment Agency
website to deal with escalated levels of enquiry during a major
flood and whether in the event of the site crashing the contingency
arrangements which show only essential information (eg flood warnings
and the Floodline number only) should be improved to be more informative.
Response to, and management of, the flooding
— The call from some (including parts
of the FRS) for all flood response to be coordinated by a national
emergency centre or single agency. (This would apparently be rather
than the multi-agency response, and Gold/Silver/Bronze commands
led by the police under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. The
current arrangements are consistent with national policy that
the responses to emergencies are best handled by those who know
the locality and are familiar with its geography and disposition
of resources—the Lead Government Department provides the
central coordinating role for national emergencies.)
— The adequacy of the powers available
to emergency responders.
— The adequacy of the equipment available
to emergency responders (including rescue boats and pumps), for
different levels of event, and how any additional equipment should
be deployed.
— Whether Gold Control might in future
be established in an event such as Hull.
— Whether the Environment Agency's
flood response role is clear and appropriate.
— Issues surrounding the Environment
Agency's difficulty in deploying temporary defences in Upton upon
Severn because of road flooding.
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
October 2007
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