Conclusions and recommendations
1. We
conclude that, although we have some sympathy for the Government's
stress on the EU's "delivery deficit" rather than its
"democratic deficit", and for the Government's desire
to bring the EU institutional reform process to a speedy conclusion,
we accept that the loss of the Constitutional Treaty undermines
the effort to make the EU's Treaty base more comprehensible and
transparent. (Paragraph 27)
2. We recognise that
the compressed timetable during which the most important decisions
on the EU's new Treaty were taken, over a few days in June, was
driven by the EU's Presidency-in-office. The Government could
and should have provided more information to Parliament during
Spring 2007 about its approach to the renewed EU Treaty reform
process. It should also have pressed for a less compressed timetable
in June. Parliament was entitled to expect adequate time to be
consulted and to be able to make an input into the contents of
the Treaty, through the Government. After the Treaty was finalised,
Parliament was also entitled to have adequate time to make a thorough
examination of the Treaty's detailed impact on the EU and the
United Kingdom constitution. Parliament has been denied these
opportunities, on both counts. We conclude that the procedure
followed meant that the 2007 Intergovernmental Conference mandate
was agreed with little scope for UK public or Parliamentary debate
and engagement. This sets an unfortunate precedent which is in
our view damaging to the credibility of the institutional reform
process itself. (Paragraph 38)
3. We conclude that
the Government is correct to argue that political positions and
political will among the Member States are more important than
institutional changes in determining the quality of EU foreign
policy. We are also sympathetic to the Government's wish to see
the end, for at least some years to come, of further EU institutional
reform. However, we are concerned that the Government risks underestimating,
and certainly is downplaying in public, the importance and potential
of the new foreign policy institutions established by the Lisbon
Treaty, namely the new High Representative and the European External
Action Service. We recommend that the Government should publicly
acknowledge the significance of the foreign policy aspects of
the Lisbon Treaty. (Paragraph 67)
4. We conclude that
the insertion of principles and objectives for all EU external
action into the Treaty on European Union is a sensible way of
encouraging greater EU policy coherence while two main EU Treaties
remain in place. (Paragraph 71)
5. We conclude that
the European Council's new ability under the Lisbon Treaty formally
to determine "strategic interests and objectives" for
all areas of EU external action represents a symbolically important
assertion of Member State authority over "Community"
policy areas, although it remains to be seen whether this will
have any significant impact in practice. (Paragraph 81)
6. We conclude that
the section of the amended Treaty on European Union giving authority
to the European Council to make strategic determinations for EU
external action is unnecessarily ambiguous and should be clarified
by the Government in its response to this Report. (Paragraph
84)
7. We welcome the
Bill's provisions giving Parliament the right to accept or reject
individual proposals to extend qualified majority voting. However,
we are concerned at the implications of the provisions whereby
Parliament could be invited to set aside this right in respect
of "any later draft decision", as long as a Minister
certifies that the decision in question is an amended version
of the original decision. We see nothing on the face of the Bill
that would preclude this power being invoked in circumstances
where the "amended version" of the draft decision contains
further transfers to qualified majority voting not found in the
original decision. If this were to be the case, transfers to qualified
majority voting might take place without specific Parliamentary
approval. This could represent a breach of the undertaking given
by the Prime Minister. We recommend that further consideration
be given to procedures which would allow Parliament to decide
separately on "amended versions" of initial draft decisions
to transfer items to qualified majority voting. We further recommend
that all amendments to the Treaty, including extensions of qualified
majority voting, should be done by primary legislation and not
simply by a vote of the House. (Paragraph 88)
8. We conclude that
the simplification of the nomenclature for Common Foreign and
Security Policy decisions introduced by the Lisbon Treaty represents
an improvement on the current situation. (Paragraph 95)
9. We conclude that
the Commission's loss of the right to make Common Foreign and
Security Policy proposals is welcome because it represents an
important assertion of the intergovernmental nature of the Common
Foreign and Security Policy. (Paragraph 97)
10. We conclude that
greater clarity would have been helpful in the Lisbon Treaty wording
on the Council of Ministers' new ability to vote by qualified
majority on proposals from the High Representative. (Paragraph
105)
11. We conclude that
the Government's confirmation that any movement of further Common
Foreign and Security Policy decisions from unanimity to qualified
majority voting under the "passerelle" procedure would
be subject to a prior vote in Parliament, even where the Lisbon
Treaty itself does not provide for national Parliamentary involvement,
is welcome, although we recommend elsewhere that all Treaty changes
are the subject of primary legislation. However, our concerns
remain about the possible use of the provision in the Government
Bill which would allow "amended versions" of decisions
moving items from unanimity to qualified majority voting to avoid
a separate Parliamentary vote. (Paragraph 112)
12. We conclude that
it seems highly likely that, under the Lisbon Treaty, the Common
Foreign and Security Policy will remain an intergovernmental area,
driven by the Member States. We welcome this. (Paragraph 118)
13. We conclude that
the process of the EU's enlargement to now 27 Member States has
been a success. (Paragraph 130)
14. We conclude that
the inclusion for the first time of a Treaty reference to the
EU's neighbourhood policy represents a welcome expression of the
importance of the Union's relationships with states surrounding
it. (Paragraph 133)
15. We conclude that
the new post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs
and Security Policy has the potential to give the EU a more streamlined
international presence and to contribute to the more coherent
development and implementation of external policy. We further
conclude that it is clear that the High Representative is there
to enact agreed foreign policy. (Paragraph 154)
16. We conclude that
there are grounds for concern that the holder of the new post
of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy could face work overload. We recommend that the Government
engages with the other Member States and—when known—the
nominee for the post to ensure that the potential benefits of
the new post are not jeopardised by a plethora of duties and excessive
workload. (Paragraph 155)
17. We conclude that
the Lisbon Treaty provision for the new High Representative to
speak at the UN Security Council will make little difference to
current practice. It will not undermine the position of the UK
in the United Nations system nor the UK's representation and role
as a Permanent Member of the Security Council. (Paragraph 157)
18. We conclude that
it is regrettable that the Lisbon Treaty does not state explicitly
that the new European Council President may not simultaneously
hold any other office. (Paragraph 162)
19. We conclude that
the reshaped role of the President of the European Council could
help to generate consensus among EU leaders and lead to greater
continuity in the chairing of the European Council. However, we
are concerned by the current degree of uncertainty which surrounds
the role and by the potential for conflict with the High Representative
in representing the EU externally. This could undermine one of
the main aims of the current Treaty reform process in the external
field. We recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government
sets out more clearly its conception of the role of the new European
Council President, and its assessment of the likelihood that this
will be realised. We further recommend that the Government initiates,
in the course of discussions with its counterparts on the appointments
to the new posts, the drawing-up of a memorandum of understanding
on the respective roles which the European Council President and
the High Representative are to play in the external representation
of the Union. (Paragraph 170)
20. We conclude that
the personal characteristics of the individuals who are appointed
to the key posts of European Council President, High Representative
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and President of the
Commission—in particular, their capacity for teamwork and
hard work—will play a critical part in determining whether
the new EU foreign policy arrangements work effectively. We recommend
that the Government should place a high priority on working constructively
with its European partners to ensure that the right individuals
are selected for these posts. (Paragraph 177)
21. We conclude that
the new European External Action Service may serve a useful function
as a means of reducing duplication between the Council Secretariat
and the Commission and facilitating the development of more effective
EU external policies, operating in parallel with rather than as
a substitute for national diplomatic services. However, the Lisbon
Treaty gives only a bare outline of the role of the new External
Action Service, leaving most of the details of its functioning
to be determined. This could well be a case of "the devil
is in the detail". We conclude that the establishment of
the European External Action Service will be a highly complex
and challenging exercise. Given the scale and significance of
the issues that remain to be resolved, it is vitally important
for the Government to be fully engaged in negotiations on these
matters, in order to ensure that the European External Action
Service works as effectively as possible, and in a way concomitant
with UK interests. (Paragraph 189)
22. We recommend that
the Government reports regularly to Parliament during 2008 and
beyond on the progress of the discussions with other Member States
and the EU institutions on the establishment of the European External
Action Service, and on the positions it is adopting. Parliament
should be kept informed of developments in resolving all the practical,
organisational, legal, diplomatic status and financial issues
which we have specified in paragraph 182 above. We further recommend
that, in its response to this Report, the Government informs us
of the arrangements which it proposes to put in place to ensure
that Parliament and its committees receive the information necessary
to scrutinise on an ongoing basis the work of the European External
Action Service. (Paragraph 190)
23. We welcome the
opportunity that the new European External Action Service will
offer for a greater intermingling of national and EU personnel
and careers. We conclude that it would be beneficial to the UK
for national secondees to be well represented among the new Service's
staff. We recommend that the FCO encourages high-quality candidates
among its staff to undertake secondments to the European External
Action Service, by assuring them that they will have a "right
of return" and that the experience will form a valued part
of an FCO career. We recommend that the FCO should also reciprocally
encourage European External Action Service staff to undertake
secondments within the UK diplomatic service, in the interests
of maximising the European External Action Service's collective
understanding of UK national interests and foreign policy. (Paragraph
194)
24. We conclude that
the emergence in third countries of EU delegations which may be
active in Common Foreign and Security Policy areas will at the
least require careful management by UK Embassies on the ground.
This might be of particular importance in those countries where
there is no resident UK diplomatic representation. We recommend
that in its response to this Report, the Government sets out its
position regarding the conversion of Commission delegations into
Union delegations, and informs us of the guidance which it is
giving to British posts on working with the new EU bodies.
(Paragraph 199)
25. We recommend that
in its response to the present Report, the Government sets out
its reaction to the proposals that there should be "common
offices" of EU Member States in third countries and that
the new EU delegations may take on consular tasks. We also recommend
that the Government clarifies the role and responsibilities of
EU delegations in countries where the UK has no Embassy or High
Commission. (Paragraph 203)
26. We conclude that
the Lisbon Treaty retains from the Constitutional Treaty a wording
that on the surface at least is clumsy and ambiguous in its references
to the prospect that the European Security and Defence Policy
both "might" and "will" lead to a common defence.
We therefore recommend that in its response to this Report the
Government states whether or not it agrees that this is the case,
providing such clarification as is necessary. (Paragraph 207)
27. We conclude that
there is no material difference between the provisions on foreign
affairs in the Constitutional Treaty which the Government made
subject to approval in a referendum and those in the Lisbon Treaty
on which a referendum is being denied. (Paragraph 219)
28. We conclude that
the creation of the post of High Representative for Foreign Affairs
and Security Policy, and of the European External Action Service,
represent major innovations in the EU's foreign policy-making
machinery. We further conclude that although their establishment
does not risk undermining the Common Foreign and Security Policy's
intergovernmental nature, the Government is underestimating, and
certainly downplaying in public, the significance of their creation.
This is unlikely to be beneficial to the UK's position in the
EU. We recommend that the Government should publicly acknowledge
the significance of the foreign policy aspects of the Lisbon Treaty.
(Paragraph 220)
29. We conclude that
the new institutional arrangements for EU foreign policy created
by the Lisbon Treaty have the potential to encourage more coherent
and effective foreign policy-making and representation. However,
the way in which the new arrangements will work in practice remains
unclear. Much will depend on the individuals chosen to fill the
new posts and how they choose to interpret their roles. We recommend
that the Government engage actively with its EU partners to minimise
the short-term disruption involved in the introduction of the
new arrangements created by the Lisbon Treaty, and to help them
contribute to the EU's development as a more effective international
entity. It is particularly important that the Government and the
FCO should not neglect the critical opportunities that are likely
to arise over the next 12 months to influence the detailed planning
of the new foreign policy arrangements, so as to ensure that they
operate in ways which are fully compatible with UK interests.
(Paragraph 221)
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